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Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s27: XXXVI Sākṣin and Jīva

Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s27

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XXXVI Sākṣin and Jīva

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In each individual self we have, besides the cognitive, emotional and conative experience, the witness self or sākṣin. The external consciousness is called the sākṣin when the internal organ serves as the limiting adjunct to it and when it illumines objects. The presence of this adjunct is enough to transform the ultimate consciousness into the witness self. Though this witnessing consciousness arises with the experience of objects, it is not due to the experience, but is presupposed by it. When the internal organ enters into the individual and becomes an organic constituent thereof, we have the jīva.

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What is the relation between the witness self and the jīva? In the later Advaita treatises it has been variously defined. Vidyāraṇya defines the witness self as the unchanging consciousness, which is the substratum of the phenomena of gross and subtle bodies, observing their effects without being affected by them in any way.⁶ When the action of the enjoying ego ceases, the illumination of the two bodies is due to this witness self. This witness self is immediately conscious of the two kinds of bodies which are present to it as its associates, even when the enjoying ego ceases to function. The constant presence of the witness self helps to maintain the identity of the seer in a series of mental ideas with respect to something other than the ego. Vidyāraṇya is clear that the witness self cannot be identified with the jīva which participates in life and affairs. The Upaniṣad declares it to be one without qualities, a mere looker on and not an enjoyer of fruits.¹ Vidyāraṇya compares it, in another place, to the lamp on the stage which illumines equally the stage manager, the actress and the audience, and shines of itself even in their absence.² This simile is to point out that the witness self illumines equally the empirical ego (jīva), the inner organ and the objects, and shines of its own accord in sound sleep where all these are absent.³ Passivity distinguishes the sākṣin from Īśvara. In the *Tattvapradīpikā*, the witness self is defined as the pure Brahman, which is the universal self of all creatures, and which, being the substratum of each individual soul, seems to be as many as the jīvas. The witness self cannot be identified with the qualified Brahman or Īśvara, since it is defined as absolute, devoid of qualities; nor is the witness to be identified with the jīva, who is a doer and enjoyer of actions and their fruits.⁴ The view advocated in *Pañcadaśī* and *Tattvapradīpikā* has the support of Śaṃkara.

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⁶ Pañcadaśī, viii. Siddhāntaleśa (ch. i) describes Vidyāraṇya's view thus: "Dehadvayādhiṣṭhānabhūtaṁ kūṭasthacaitanyaṁ svāvacchedakasya dehadvayasya sākṣād ikṣaṇān nirvikāratvāt sākṣity ucyate."

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¹ Cp. “Sākṣī, cetā, kevalo, nirguṇaś ca” (Śvet. Up.).

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² “Nṛtyaśālāsthito dīpaḥ prabhuṃ sabhyāṃś ca nartakīm Dīpayed aviśeṣeṇa tadabhāve ’pi dīpyate.” (*Pañcadaśī*, x. 11.)

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³ Ibid., x. 12.

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⁴ Tattvapradīpikāyām api, māyāśabalite, saguṇe parameśvare, ‘kevalo nirguṇa’ iti viśeṣaṇānupapatteḥ sarvapratyagbhūtam, viśuddham brahma, jīvād bhedena, sākṣīti pratipādyata ity uditam (*Siddhāntaleśa*, i).

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Kaumudī teaches that the witness self is a special form of Īśvara. The author of this treatise takes his stand on the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad passage which makes Īśvara the witness. While he is conscious of the jīva’s activity and cessation from activity, he is in no way moved by them.⁵ He operates in the jīva, illumining his avidyā and all else pertaining to him. He is known as prājña, when all activities are withdrawn as in the state of dreamless sleep.⁶ The author of *Tattvaśuddhi* agrees with this view. That Īśvara is the sākṣī, is the religious or empirical way of describing the first view. We find support for it in Śaṃkara’s writings. Commenting on the famous passage⁷ of the Upaniṣad which describes the two birds perched on the same tree, Śaṃkara writes: “Of these two so perched, one, the ksetrajña, occupying the subtle body, eats (i.e. tastes) from ignorance the fruits of karma marked as happiness and misery, palatable in many and diversified modes; the other, the Lord eternal, pure, intelligent and free in his nature, omniscient and conditioned by sattva, does not eat;

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⁵ Parameśvarasyaiva rūpabhedaḥ kaścit jīvapravṛttinivṛttyor anumantā svayam udāsīnaḥ sākṣī nāma (*Siddhāntaleśa*, i).

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⁶ See V.S., i. 3. 42.

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⁷ Muṇḍ. Up., iii. 1. 1.

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for he is the director of both the eater and the eaten." "His mere witnessing is as good as direction, as in the case of a king."¹

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¹ Paśyaty eva kevalaṁ darśanamātreṇa hi tasya prerayitṛtvaṁ rājavat (S.B., Muṇḍ., iii. i. 1).

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Some others maintain that the jīva conditioned by avidyā is the witness self, since he is essentially a looker on and not a doer. It is only when he falsely identifies himself with the inner organ that he becomes the doer and the enjoyer.² Jīva has thus two aspects, one real and the other unreal, that of sākṣin or passive spectator, and abhimānin or active doer and enjoyer. It is objected to this view that if the all-pervading avidyā is to be regarded as the condition of the witnessing jīva, then the latter must be able to illumine not only one's own mind but the minds of other creatures also. But this is not confirmed by experience. So the jīva, with the antaḥkaraṇa or the inner organ, as its condition, is the witness self, and this is different in individuals. In suṣupti (dreamless sleep) it is supposed to exist in a subtle form, and so is present in all the three states. The difference between the empirical ego and the witness self is that, while the inner organ is an attribute or property of the former, it is only a condition or limitation of the latter.³ This is the view of the Vedāntaparibhāṣā, and is not in conflict with the other views set forth, since it points out that the ultimate consciousness, when it operates in an individual subject, is called sākṣin. The eternal consciousness or Ātman, is given the name of jīvasākṣi when it operates in the individual organism, as it is called Īśvarasākṣi when it operates in the universe as a whole. The limitations or upādhis in the two cases justify the different names. In the former, the upādhi is the internal organ, body, etc., in the latter the whole world of being. Īśvara is the world-soul, while the jīva is the individual soul.

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² Kecid avidyopādhiko jīva eva sākṣād draṣṭṛtvāt sākṣī; jīvasyāntaḥkaraṇatādātmyāpatyā kartṛtvādyāropabhāk tv epi svayam udāsīnatvāt (Siddhāntaleśa, i).

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³ Antaḥkaraṇopadhānena jīvaḥ sākṣī . . . antaḥkaraṇaviśiṣṭaḥ pramātā (Siddhāntaleśa, i).

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