Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s40: X Self and Consciousness

Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s40

Language
English

X Self and Consciousness

v2.c26.s40.2

Śaṃkara believes that the distinction between subject and object is a relative one, since the real is the one undifferenced Brahman. Rāmānuja disputes this view, and holds that the nature of consciousness testifies to the existence of a permanent thinking subject, as well as objects distinct from the self.⁴ Knowledge involves the perception of difference. There is no source of knowledge enabling us to apprehend mere undifferenced being. Even if there were, it would place Brahman in the position of an object, and thus involve it in the sphere of the perishable. There cannot be such a thing as pure consciousness. This is either proved or not. If pure consciousness is proved to be real, it follows that it has attributes; if it is not, then it is non-existent, like a sky flower.¹ Even Śaṃkara attributes to consciousness qualities like eternity, self-luminousness. Knowledge, to be sure, is self-luminous (svayaṃprakāśa), but it is also an object of knowledge (vedya). It is not necessary that everything known must be a non-conscious (jaḍa) object.

v2.c26.s40.3

⁴ Na ca nirviṣayā kācit saṃvid asti.

v2.c26.s40.4

¹ Saṃvit siddhyati vā na vā, siddhyati cet sadharmatā syāt, na cet tuccatā gaganakusumādivat (i. 1. 1).

v2.c26.s40.5

If knowledge were unlimited, its objects also should be so, which is, however, not the case. It is a mistake to think that knowledge exists in deep sleep and similar states, as pure knowledge devoid of any objects. "For a person risen from deep sleep never represents to himself his state of consciousness during sleep in the form 'I was pure consciousness, free from all egoity and opposed in nature to everything else, witnessing nescience (ajñāna).' What he thinks is only 'I slept well.' From this form of reflection it appears that even during sleep the self, *i.e.* the 'I,' was a knowing subject and perceptive of pleasure. Even when the self says that it was 'conscious of nothing,' it means that the knowing 'I' persisted, and what is negated is the objects of knowledge."² Jñāna is not known except in relation to an object, and, in deep sleep, it does not function, since there is no object. The soul, in deep sleep, remains in its intrinsic state of self-consciousness along with the jñāna, which is not functioning at the moment. The self is always an ego and never pure knowledge. Śaṃkara admits as much when he says that the self exists in deep sleep as the witness (sākṣin) of the general nescience, though the organ of egoity (ahaṃkāra) is dissolved. But that which does not know cannot be a witness (sākṣin). Pure knowledge is not a witness. Sākṣin is a knower, *i.e.* a subject. This subject persists even in deep sleep, only we are not conscious of it, since it is overpowered by tamas. If it did not persist in deep sleep, we could not remember that we slept well on waking from sleep. But for this permanent self memory would be impossible, and we could not recognise anything to-day as something we had seen yesterday. Even if consciousness were identified with the conscious subject and acknowledged as permanent, the phenomenon of recognition would not be easily explained. For it implies a conscious subject persisting from the earlier to the later moment, and not merely consciousness.¹ The self is not self-luminous knowledge, but only the subject of it. We do not say "I am consciousness,"² but only "I am conscious."³ The self-luminous character of knowledge is derived from the self or the knower. The existence of knowledge and its self-luminous character depend on its connection with a self.⁴ To argue that the subject, thus established, belongs to the side of the object is "no better than to maintain that one's own mother is a barren woman." We cannot attribute to self-sense (ahaṃkāra), which is a non-intelligent effect of prakṛti, knowership any more than knowledge. The self is of the essence of knowledge, and has knowledge also for its quality.⁵ It is a knower and not mere light.⁶ We need not think that to be a knower is to be essentially changing. For to be a knower is to be the substrate of the quality of knowledge; and, since the knowing self is eternal, knowledge, which is its quality, is also eternal. Only this eternal knowledge does not manifest itself always. Knowledge, which is in itself unlimited (svayam aparicchinnam), is capable of contraction and expansion. Owing to the influence of karma, it becomes contracted when it adapts itself to work of different kinds and is variously determined by the different senses. With reference to these adaptations due to the senses, it is said to rise and vanish. It never ceases to be, though it functions, throughout life, in a more or less restricted manner. But since the quality of adaptation is not essential and is brought about by action, the self is regarded as essentially unchanging.⁷

v2.c26.s40.6

² i. 1. 1. See also ii. 3. 31.

v2.c26.s40.7

¹ Pratisandhānaṃ hi pūrvaparakālasthāyinam anubhavitāram upasthāpayati, nānubhūtimātram (i. 1. 1).

v2.c26.s40.8

² Anubhūtir aham.

v2.c26.s40.9

³ Anubhavāmy aham.

v2.c26.s40.10

⁴ i. 1. 1. See also ii. 3. 18.

v2.c26.s40.11

⁵ Cidrūpa . . . caitanyaguṇaka.

v2.c26.s40.12

⁶ Jñātaiva na prakāśamātram. See also Bṛh. Up., iv. 3. 7 and 14; iv. 5. 15; Chān., viii. 12. 3 and 4; viii. 26. 2; Praśna, iv. 9; vi. 5; Tait., ii. 4.

v2.c26.s40.13

⁷ i. 1. 1.

v2.c26.s40.14

Rāmānuja disputes the view that consciousness is never an object. Though it is not an object when it illumines other things, it can and does frequently become an object. For common observation shows that the consciousness of one person becomes the object of the cognition of another, as when we infer something from the friendly or unfriendly appearance of another, or when one's past states of consciousness become the objects of his present cognition. Consciousness does not lose its nature simply because it becomes an object of consciousness. We cannot say that consciousness is self-proved. For Rāmānuja the essential nature of consciousness consists in its manifesting itself at the present moment through its own being to its substrate, or in being instrumental in proving its own object by its own being.¹ When unconscious things are revealed, they are not revealed to themselves. The other attributes of the self, such as atomic extension, eternity and so on, and the past states of consciousness, are revealed not through themselves, but through an act of knowledge different from them.²

v2.c26.s40.15

¹ Anubhūtitvaṃ nāma vartamānaśāyāṃ svasattayaiva svāśrayam pratiprakāśamānatvaṃ, svasattayaiva svaviṣayasādhanatvaṃ vā (i. 1. 1).

v2.c26.s40.16

² See Śrutaprakāśikā.

Cites (4)