Indian Philosophy v2.c26.s40.2

v2.c26.s40.2

Śaṃkara believes that the distinction between subject and object is a relative one, since the real is the one undifferenced Brahman. Rāmānuja disputes this view, and holds that the nature of consciousness testifies to the existence of a permanent thinking subject, as well as objects distinct from the self.⁴ Knowledge involves the perception of difference. There is no source of knowledge enabling us to apprehend mere undifferenced being. Even if there were, it would place Brahman in the position of an object, and thus involve it in the sphere of the perishable. There cannot be such a thing as pure consciousness. This is either proved or not. If pure consciousness is proved to be real, it follows that it has attributes; if it is not, then it is non-existent, like a sky flower.¹ Even Śaṃkara attributes to consciousness qualities like eternity, self-luminousness. Knowledge, to be sure, is self-luminous (svayaṃprakāśa), but it is also an object of knowledge (vedya). It is not necessary that everything known must be a non-conscious (jaḍa) object.