Indian Philosophy v2.c27.s9.26

v2.c27.s9.26

While both Rāmānuja and Nimbārka regard difference and non-difference as necessary, and treat animate and inanimate existences as attributes of Brahman, Rāmānuja emphasises more the principle of identity. For Nimbārka the two are equally real and have the same importance. Again, Rāmānuja regards the individual souls (cit) and the world (acit) as the attributes (viśeṣaṇas or prakāras) of Brahman; and his view emphasizes the non-duality of the supreme Lord, qualified by the individual souls and the world.¹ Nimbārka disputes this view on the ground that the presence of a body does not necessarily imply the possession of attributes; for an attribute has for its object the distinction of the thing which possesses it from others which do not possess it. If cit and acit are the attributes of Brahman, then, what is that reality from which Brahman is distinguished by the possession of these marks?