A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy c5.s3.3

c5.s3.3

18. This entirely personal setting for the supreme Godhead is to be found in the Śvetāśvataropanishad. It is true that the Śvetāśvataropanishad was written in the interest of a Śaivite theory of theism; but if we just divest our minds of this sectarian aspect and equate the god Śiva of the Śvetāśvataropanishad with the supreme Godhead, which has, in fact, been done in many places by the Śvetāśvataropanishad itself, we may see how the Śvetāśvataropanishad tries philosophically to account for the creation of the world by the Godhead by the method of construction through criticism of the various extant opinions on the subject of the origin of the world. The passage from the Śvetāśvataropanishad I. 2 makes a classical enumeration of the various opinions held at the time of the Upanishad on the subject of the origin of the world. "Some people say", says the Upanishad, "that it is Time, others Nature, others Necessity, others Chance, others the Elements, others yet the Person, still others the Combination of these, and yet a few others the Ātman, which is the cause of all things whatsoever" (S. 20. a). The Śvetāśvataropanishad in the course of its chapters criticises all these theories and puts forth a constructive programme of Śaivite theism in explanation of the origin of the universe. We cannot say, says the Śvetāśvataropanishad, that Time is the origin of all things, for, is not God, it asks, the very Time of Time, or as another Upanishad puts it, Death to the very God of Death? (S. 20. b). We cannot try to explain the origin of the world from Nature, says the Śvetāśvataropanishad; for is not Nature itself brought to maturity by the presence of God inside it? (S. 20. c). Nor can we say that Necessity and Chance are the origin of things: they are either too fatalistic or too unphilosophical ways for the explanation of creation. The Ele-