A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy c7.s5.1.5

c7.s5.1.5

If real, it cannot be an “ upādhi ” of Brahman—Is not the description of Brahman that it is incapable of definition a definition itself ?—What is the criterion of the proof of Māyā ?—Is it not a contradiction in terms to say that Māyā ceases by the knowledge of the attributeless Brahman ?—Is not the removal of ignorance, once established, for ever impossible?—all these objections would seem to be merely an *ignoratio elenchi*, if we only consider for a while Śaṅkarācārya’s criticism of the Vijñānavādins and the Śūnyavādins in his exposition of the Brahmasūtra “ Nābhāva upalabdheḥ ” (II. 2. 28), where by a severe criticism of theories which hold that the world is merely an idea, or that the world is merely a naught, Śaṅkarācārya proves himself to be neither an epistemological idealist, nor an epistemological nihilist. To Śaṅkara, the world is real, but only phenomenally real. Noumenally, *sub specie aeternitatis*, it is unreal. We shall entirely mistake Śaṅkara’s point of view if we do not consider the great distinction that he draws between the “ pāramārthika ” and the “ vyāvahārika ” views of reality. Like his later successor in Germany, he was the first in India to bring into vogue the distinction between empirical reality and transcendental ideality. Kant was himself charged with having been an Idealist in spite of his celebrated Refutation of Idealism.