A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy c8.s4.7

c8.s4.7

( iii ) But this raises another fundamental question. Granted that the Self is the eternal knower of objects, granted also there is no other knower of him, would it be possible for the knower to know himself ? This very subtle question was asked of Yājñavalkya in another passage of the Bṛhadāraṇyakopanishad, and here again we see the brilliant light which the sage Yājñavalkya throws on the problem. It is possible, he says, for the knower to know himself. In fact, Self-knowledge or Self-consciousness is the ultimate category of existence. The Self can become an object of knowledge to himself. According to the philosophy of Yājñavalkya, nothing is possible, if self-consciousness is not possible. Self-consciousness is the ultimate fact of existence. We see here how boldly Yājñavalkya regards both introspection and self-consciousness as the verities of experience. We also see the nudity of the doctrines of Kant and Comte when they try to deny the fact of introspection. Introspection is a psychological process corresponding to Self-consciousness as a metaphysical reality. Self-consciousness is possible only through the process of introspection. The Self is endowed with the supreme power of dichotomising himself. The empirical conditions of knowledge are inapplicable to the Self. The Self can divide himself into the knower and the known. It is wonderful how Kant should have posited the " I am I " as the supreme metaphysical category, which he called the transcendental, original, and synthetic unity of apperception, and yet should have denied the reality of the corresponding psychological process of introspection. The answer of Yājñavalkya is that Self-consciousness is possible, and is not only possible, but alone real. King Janaka asked Yājñavalkya what was the light of man. Yājñavalkya first said that the light of man was the sun. It is on account of the sun that man is able to sit and to move about, to go forth for work, and to return. " When the sun has set, O Yājñavalkya," asked king Janaka " what is the light of man?" Yājñavalkya said that then the moon was the light of man. For, having the moon for light, man could sit, and move about, and do his work, and return. " When both the sun and the moon have set," asked king Janaka, " what is the light of man?" " Fire indeed," said Yājñavalkya, " is man's light. For having fire for his light, man can sit and move about, do his work, and return." " When the sun has set, when the moon has set, and when the fire is extinguished, what is the light of man?" asked Janaka. " Now, verily," says Yājñavalkya, " you are pressing me to the deepest question. When the sun has set, when the moon has set, and when the fire is extinguished, the Self alone is his light ” (S. 13. c.). Yājñavalkya is here clearly positing what Aristotle called “ theoria, ” the act of pure self-contemplation in which the Self is most mysteriously both the subject and object of knowledge.