The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma" c19.s1: Part I.—The case for Everlasting Elements
The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma" c19.s1
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Part I.—The case for Everlasting Elements
c19.s1.1
The Vaibhāṣika answers: The times are always existent Kārikā, v, 2 (1) because this has been declared in Scripture, (2) because of the double (cause of perception), (3) because of the existence of the perception’s object, (4) because of the production of a result (by previous deeds). Since we maintain that all this exists, we profess the theory that everything exists (Sarvāstivāda).
c19.s1.2
(1) Because this has been declared in Scripture.—Our Sublime Lord has declared: (“the elements of matter, O Brethren, the past and the future ones, are impermanent, not to speak of the present ones. This is perceived by the perfect saint, endowed, as he is, with wisdom. Therefore, he is regardless of past sense-objects, he does not rejoice at future enjoyments, he entertains disgust and aversion in regard to the present ones, he is engaged in keeping them off). O Brethren! if some kind of past matter did not exist, the perfect saint endowed with wisdom could not be regardless of past sense-objects, but, since they are existent, he (enjoys the privilege of) disregarding them. If some kind of future matter were not existent, the wise and perfect saint could not be free from rejoicing at future enjoyments (since his independence would have no object). But future sense-objects do exist, etc.”
c19.s1.3
(2) Because of the double (cause of perception).—It is declared in Scripture: “consciousness, when operating, is conditioned by (elements) of a double kind.” What are they? The sense of vision and colour (for a visual consciousness), and so on (an organ of perception and its respective object for each of the six kinds of consciousness, the last being) the intellect itself and its non-sensuous objects ¹ (for consciousness purely mental).
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¹ *Manaḥ* and *dharmaḥ*.
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Thus these first two reasons for admitting the existence of the past and the future are taken from Scripture, but there are others, too, which are founded on argument.
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(3) *Because of the existence of an object.*—If there is an object, its cognition can arise; if there is none, neither can its cognition be produced. If the past and the future were not existent, the objects (of the corresponding cognition) would be non-existent, and, as non-existent, they could not be cognized.
c19.s1.7
(4) *Because of the production of a result (by former deeds).*—If the past did not exist, how could a deed, good or bad, attain, after some lapse of time, its fruition, since, at the time when the latter appears, the cause which has produced retribution is gone. (A former deed, good or bad, does exist in reality, because, when it becomes ripe, it produces fruition, just as a present one does.)
c19.s1.8
For these reasons we *Vaibhāṣikas* maintain that the past and the future necessarily exist. This leads to the theory that everything is existent, and our school is known by emphatically adhering to the principle of such universal existence (*Sarvāstivāda*). Accordingly (it is said above in the mnemonic verse): "since we maintain that all this exists, we profess the theory that everything exists." Those who maintain that everything, past, and present, exists are advocates of universal existence (*Sarvāstivādins*). On the other hand, those who make a distinction, partly admitting and partly denying this theory, are termed the Distinguishing School (*Vibhajyavādins*). They maintain that the present elements, and those among the past that have not yet produced their fruitions, are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and of those among the past that have already produced fruition.²
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² Cf. above, p. 43, n. 3.
c19.s1.10
*Sautrāntika*.—And how many branches are there among these advocates of universal existence?
c19.s1.11
*Vaibhāṣika*.—There are four branches, inasmuch as they maintain (1) a change of existence (*bhāva-pariṇāma*), (2) a change of aspect (*lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma*), (3) a change of condition (*avasthā-pariṇāma*), or (4) contingency (*apekṣā-pariṇāma*). The third is all right. The difference in time reposes on a difference of condition (i.e. function of the elements).
c19.s1.12
(1) It was the venerable Dharmatrāta who maintained the view that existence (*bhāva*) changes in the course of time, not substance (*dravya*). He is known to have been arguing thus: when an element enters different times, its existence changes, but not its essence, just as when a golden vessel is broken, its form changes, but not its colour. And when milk is turned into curds, its taste, consistency, and digestive value are gone, but not its colour.¹ In the same manner, when an element, after having been future, enters into a present time, it gets rid of its future existence, but not of the existence of its essence, and when from present it becomes past, it casts away its present existence, but not the existence of its substance.
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¹ Or, if *rūpa* stands for *svarūpa*, "its essence."
c19.s1.14
(2) It was the venerable Ghoṣa who assumed a change in the aspect of the elements (*lakṣaṇa*). He is known to have professed the theory that, when an element appears at different times, the past one retains its past aspect, without being severed from its future and present aspects, the future has its future aspect, without being altogether deprived of its past and present aspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect, without completely losing its past and future aspects. Just as, when a man falls into passionate love with a female, he is not altogether deprived of his capacity of love towards other females (but this capacity is not prominent).
c19.s1.15
(3) A change of condition (*avasthā*) is advocated by the venerable Vasumitra. He is known to have maintained that, when one element manifests itself at different times, it changes in condition, and receives different designations according to the condition which it has reached, without changing in substance. (When an element is in a condition in which it does not yet produce its function, it is called future; when it produces it, it is called present; when, having produced it, it ceases to work, it is past, its substance remaining the same.) Just as in an abacus the same ball receives different significations according to the place it is thrown in. If it is thrown in the place for units it means one, if in the place for hundreds it means a hundred, if in the place for thousands it means one thousand.
c19.s1.16
(1) An advocate of contingency (*apekṣā*) is the venerable Buddhadeva. He is known to have maintained the principle that an element in the course of time receives this or that denomination on account of its relation to the former and the next moment. (An element is future with respect to the former one, be it past or present, it is present with respect to a former, i.e. past one or with respect to the next one, i.e. future one, it is past with respect to the next one, be it present or future.) Just as the same female may be called a mother (with respect to her children) and a daughter (with respect to her own mother).
c19.s1.17
Thus it is that all these four (lines of thought) are so many varieties of the theory which maintains Universal Existence. As regards the first of them, it is nothing else than the doctrine of the changing manifestations (of one eternal matter). Therefore it must be included in the Sānkhya system (which has already been rejected). As to the second, it is a confusion of all times, since it implies co-existence of all the aspects (of an element) at the same time. The passion of a man may be prominent towards one female, and merely existent (imperceptibly) towards another one; but what has this fact to do with the theory it is supposed to illustrate? According to the fourth explanation, it would follow that all the three times are found together, included in one of them. Thus in the scope of the past time we can distinguish a former and a following moment. They will represent a past and a future time. Between them the intermediate moment will correspond to a present time. Thus it is that among all proposed explanations the (remaining one alone), the third in number, is right, that which maintains a change of condition (or function). According thereto the difference in time reposes on the difference in function: at the time when an element does not yet actually perform its function it is future; when performing it, it becomes present; when, after having performed it, it stops, it becomes past.
c19.s1.18
*Sautrāntika*.—Although I perfectly understand all this, I do not see my way to admit that it implies a real existence of the past and the future. For, if the past is really existent and the future likewise, what induces us (to make a distinction between them and) to call them past and future?
c19.s1.19
*Vaibhāṣika.*—But have we not already explained it: the time of an element is settled in accordance with the time of its function.
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*Sautrāntika.*—If this be the case, an eye which does not look at the present moment will not be present, because it does not perform its function?
c19.s1.21
*Vaibhāṣika.*—It is present (because it performs its other functions) : it is the immediate cause (of the next moment of its existence and the remote cause) determining (its future character).
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(Although an eye that does not look is not performing its function, it, nevertheless, is efficient in immediately producing and forecasting the homogeneousness of its future with its past and in producing its, so-called, co-operative result.¹ In that sense it is present.)
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¹ The Sarvāstivādins establish several kinds of causal relations between the elements. If e.g. a moment of the sense of vision produces in the next moment a visual sensation, it is termed *kāraṇa-hetu* and its result *adhipati-phala*. This relation will be absent in the case of an inefficient condition of the organ of vision. But there are other relations between the moments of this organ. When the next moment is just the same as the foregoing one, thus evoking in the observer the idea of duration, this relation is termed *sabhāga-hetu* as to *niṣyanda-phala*. If this moment appears in a stream (*santāna*) which is defiled by the presence of passions (*kleça*), this defiling character is inherited by the next moments, if no stopping of it is produced. Such a relation is called *sarvatraga-hetu* as to *niṣyanda-phala*. Finally every moment in a stream is under the influence of former deeds (*karma*) and may, in its turn, have an influence on future events. This relation is termed *vipāka-hetu* as to *vipāka-phala*. The simultaneity of the inseparable elements of matter will produce a co-operative result (*puruṣakāra-phala*). These last three relations must be existent even in the case of a non-operative moment of the sense of vision. Cf. *Ab. K.*, ii, 50 ff.; O. Rosenberg, *Problems*, chap. xv.
c19.s1.24
*Sautrāntika.*—In that case the past will be the same as the present, since the past likewise produces such results—the past viewed as a cause of homogeneousness in consecutive moments,² as a general moral cause,³ and as a cause requiring retribution⁴—all these causes would be present since they may perform their actual functions at the present moment.
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² *Sabhāga-hetu*. ³ *Sarvatraga-hetu*. ⁴ *Vipāka-hetu*.
c19.s1.26
*Vaibhāṣika.*—I call present a cause which exhibits at the present moment a double function—that of giving an immediate result and that of determining the character of its remote future. A past cause, although it may produce a result at the present moment, does not, at present, determine its general character (which has been previously determined). Therefore the past is not the same as the present.
c19.s1.27
*Sautrāntika.*—If the time is settled according to efficiency, an element may be past inasmuch as its power of determining the general character of a remote result belongs to the past, and it may be present nevertheless, since it produces the result of the present moment. Thus a confusion of the characteristic signs of all the three times will arise, and I maintain that you are guilty of such confusion. Your standpoint leads to the absurdity of assuming actual or semi-actual past causes (i.e. semi-present elements), since the cause of homogeneousness and other past causes may produce a (present) result. A confusion of the essential natures of the three times is the consequence.
Linked texts (1)
- Abhidharmakośa — Vasubandhu, Sanskrit