The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma" c19.s2: Part II.—The case against Everlasting Elements
The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma" c19.s2
- Language
- English
Part II.—The case against Everlasting Elements
c19.s2.1
*Sautrāntika.*—To this we must make the following reply :—What is it that keeps (an element from exhibiting its action) ? And how is (the time of this action to be determined) ? If it, the time of an element's existence, does not differ from the essence of the element itself, there will altogether be no time. If the element in the future and in the past exists just in the same sense as in the present, why is it future and past ? The essence of the elements of existence (*dharmatā*) is deep !
c19.s2.2
If the essence alone of the elements of existence persists throughout all the three times, but not their function, what is it that constitutes an impediment to this function ? What is it that sometimes induces them to perform and sometimes keeps them back from performing their function ?
c19.s2.3
*Vaibhāṣika.*—The function is performed when all the necessary conditions are present.
c19.s2.4
*Sautrāntika.*—This won't do ! because (according to your theory) these conditions are always present. Again, as to the functions themselves, they likewise may be past, future, and present. They then require an explanation in their turn.
c19.s2.5
Will you admit the existence of a second function (which will determine the time of the first)? or will you suppose that it neither is past, nor future, nor present, but that it, nevertheless, does exist? In this case this function will not be subject to the elementary forces of life (*saṃskṛta*) and will represent an immovable eternal entity (*asaṃskṛta*). For this reason you cannot maintain that, as long as an element does not yet perform its function, it is future.
c19.s2.6
*Vaibhāṣika*.—If the function of an element were something different from the element itself, your objections would be right. But since it is not different, they do not hold good.
c19.s2.7
*Sautrāntika*.—Then there is no time at all! If the function is the same as the substance, the elements will always remain identical. For what reason are they sometimes called past, sometimes future, and sometimes present?
c19.s2.8
*Vaibhāṣika*.—An element that has not yet appeared is future, one which has appeared and not yet disappeared is present, one which has disappeared is past. What is it you find unfounded in this explanation?
c19.s2.9
*Sautrāntika*.—The following point needs here to be established:-- if the past and the future exist in the same sense as the present, as realities, why is it, then, that, being existent in the same sense, they are future and past? If the substance of the same element is alone (permanently) existent, what is the reason that it is spoken of as "having not yet appeared" or "gone"? What is it that does not appear later on and whose absence makes us call it "past"?
c19.s2.10
Thus it is that the notion of three times will altogether have no real foundation, as long as you don't accept the view that the elements appear into life out of non-existence and return again into non-existence after having been existing. (Your theory implies eternal existence of the elements.)
c19.s2.11
*Vaibhāṣika*.—It is absurd to maintain that it implies eternal existence! There are the four forces (of origination, decay, maintenance, and destruction) to which every element is subject, and the combination (of the permanent essence of an element with these forces produces its impermanent manifestations in life).
c19.s2.12
*Sautrāntika*.—Mere words! They cannot explain the origination and decay (which are going on in the process of life). An element, according to this view, is permanent and impermanent at the same time. This, indeed, is something quite new! It has been said on this occasion :—
c19.s2.13
Maintained eternal essence;
Denied eternal being!
And yet no difference between
This essence and this being.
'Tis clearly a caprice
Of the Almighty!
'Tis spoken by His order!
c19.s2.14
(*Vaibhāṣika*.—But Buddha has said that there "is" a past and there "is" a future.)
c19.s2.15
*Sautrāntika*.—We, likewise, maintain that there "is" a past and there "is" a future. But this means that what has been formerly "is" past, and what, in the (presence of its causes), will happen "is" future. They exist in this sense only, not in reality.
c19.s2.16
*Vaibhāṣika*.—Who has ever maintained that they exist just in the same sense in which the present exists?
c19.s2.17
*Sautrāntika*.—How can one exist otherwise?
c19.s2.18
*Vaibhāṣika*.—The essence of the past and of the future is (always) existent.
c19.s2.19
*Sautrāntika*.—If they are always existent, how is the (remarkable result) brought about that they are called past or future? Therefore the words of our Sublime Lord, "there is a past, there is a future," must be understood in another sense. He proffered them when discussing with the Ājīvikas (who denied moral responsibility for past deeds). He strongly opposed their doctrine, which denied the connexion between a past cause and a future result. In order to make it known that a former cause and a future result are something which happened formerly and will happen in future, he categorically declared: "There is a past, there is a future." For the word "is" acts as a particle (which may refer to something existent and to non-existence as well). As e.g. people will say: "there is absence of light" (before it has been kindled), "there is absence of light after (it has been put out)," or the "light is put out, but I did not put it out". When Buddha declared that there "is" a past and there "is" a future, he used the word "is" in that sense.
c19.s2.20
Had it been otherwise, it would be absolutely impossible to account for (the notions of) a past and a future.
c19.s2.21
*Vaibhāṣika.*—But, then, how are we to understand the words of our Sublime Lord when addressing the Lāguḍacikhīyaka wandering ascetics (the bearers of a tress on the head and a stick in the hand)? Why did he declare: “a deed (which requires immediate retribution) is past, is accomplished, is finished, is gone, has disappeared, but, nevertheless, it does exist.” What did these ascetics really deny? Not that the accomplished deed was past, (but that it could have some actual existence, i.e. some efficiency. Hence the words of Buddha imply an actual existence of the past).
c19.s2.22
*Sautrāntika.*—(No!) He meant that a force to produce retribution is driven by a past deed into the run (of combined elements which constitute an individual). Were it existent in reality, it would not be past. This is the only way in which this passage needs be understood, because on another occasion, in the sermon about “Non-substantiality as the Ultimate Truth”,¹ the Sublime Lord has spoken thus: “when the organ of vision appears into life, there is absolutely nothing from which it proceeds, and when it vanishes, nought there is to which it retires. Therefore, O Brethren, this organ of vision has no former existence. Then it appears, and after having been existent it vanishes again.” If a future organ of vision were existent, Buddha would never have declared that it appeared out of non-existence (out of nothing).
c19.s2.23
¹ Paramārtha-śūnyatā-sūtra, Saṃyuktāgama, xiii, 22 (McGovern).
c19.s2.24
*Vaibhāṣika.*—(This passage means that), as far as the present time is concerned, it did not exist, and then appeared (in the scope of this time).
c19.s2.25
*Sautrāntika.*—Impossible! Time is not something different from the object (existing in it).
c19.s2.26
*Vaibhāṣika.*—But may not its essence have not been present and then have appeared?
c19.s2.27
*Sautrāntika.*—This would only prove that it had no (real) future existence.
c19.s2.28
(The second argument of the Sarvāstivādins refuted)
c19.s2.29
*Sautrāntika.*—Now your second argument is drawn from the circumstance that cognition, when arising, reposes on two factors:
c19.s2.30
a perceptive faculty and a corresponding object. Here we must at first (consider the instance) of mental cognition reposing on the operation of the intellect and on a mental (not sensuous) object.¹ Is this object a real cause in the same sense as the intellect? or is it a mere (passive) object realized by the intellect? If it were a real active cause, how could events which must happen after the lapse of a thousand æons, or those which never will happen, possibly constitute an active cause of the corresponding cognition? And the Final Deliverance, which is synonymous with the total cessation of every operation of all the elements of existence, how can it constitute a really active cause of its own conception? But if, on the other hand, such objects are mere passive objects of the operating mind, then I maintain that they may be future and may be past.
c19.s2.31
¹ *dharmaḥ*, i.e. 64 dharmas, *āyatana* No. 12.
c19.s2.32
Vaibhāṣika.—If they altogether do not exist, how can they possibly be objects?
c19.s2.33
Sautrāntika.—Their existence I admit, (understanding by existence) that very form in which they are conceived by us at the present moment in the present place.
c19.s2.34
Vaibhāṣika.—And how are they conceived?
c19.s2.35
Sautrāntika.—As past and as future. If somebody remembers a past object or a former feeling, he has never been observed to say "it exists", but only "it did exist".
c19.s2.36
(The third argument of the Sarvāstivādins examined)
c19.s2.37
Sautrāntika.—As (to the cognition of past and future) sense objects, the past ones are remembered in that very form in which they were experienced when they were present, and the future ones are known to Buddhas just in that form in which they will appear at the time when they will be present.
c19.s2.38
Vaibhāṣika.—And if it be just the same existence (as the present one)?
c19.s2.39
Sautrāntika.—Then it is present.
c19.s2.40
Vaibhāṣika.—If not?
c19.s2.41
Sautrāntika.—(It is absent: and thus) it is proved that absence can be cognized just as well (as presence).
c19.s2.42
Vaibhāṣika.—But (will you not admit that the past and the future) are fragments of the present itself?
c19.s2.43
*Sautrāntika.*—No, because we are not conscious of apprehending fragments.
c19.s2.44
*Vaibhāṣika.*—But, then, it may represent the same stuff, with the mere (difference that in the past and the future) its atoms may be disjoined?
c19.s2.45
*Sautrāntika.*—In that case, atoms will be eternally existent, and (all the process of life) will consist in their either combining or disjoining. There will altogether be no new origination, no real extinction, and thus you will become guilty of adhering to the (heretical) doctrine of the Ājīvikas.
c19.s2.46
Moreover, you will be contradicted by the scriptural passage 283, b. 4. (referred to above): “when the organ of vision is produced, it does not come from some other place; when it disappears, it is not going to be stored up in another place, etc.”
c19.s2.47
On the other hand, it is impossible that feelings and other (mental phenomena), which have no atomic structure, should be divided into fragments. If remembered, they likewise are remembered in that very form in which they did appear and were experienced. And, if you suppose that they continue to exist in the same form, they must be eternal. If they do not, it will be proved that (a non-existent feeling) may be apprehended (by memory) just as well (as an existent one is apprehended by self-perception).
c19.s2.48
*Vaibhāṣika.*—If non-existence is capable of being apprehended, 283, b. 6. you must add to (the list of all things cognizable, i.e.) to the twelve bases of cognition (*āyatana*), a new category, the thirteenth, non-existence.
c19.s2.49
*Sautrāntika.*—Supposing I think about the absence of a thirteenth category, what will be then the object corresponding to my thought?
c19.s2.50
*Vaibhāṣika.*—It will be this very (category, i.e. its) name.
c19.s2.51
*Sautrāntika.*—And what is it (generally speaking) that we apprehend, when we are expecting to hear a word which as yet is not pronounced?
c19.s2.52
*Vaibhāṣika.*—It is nothing else than this very word.
c19.s2.53
*Sautrāntika.*—Then a person who desires not to hear this word, will be obliged to pronounce it!
c19.s2.54
*Vaibhāṣika.*—It may be the future condition of this word?
c19.s2.55
*Sautrāntika.*—If it is something existent, why does it produce an idea of absence?
c19.s2.56
*Vaibhāṣika.*—Then it may be its present absence?
c19.s2.57
*Sautrāntika.*—No! it is the same. (If this present absence is something existent, why does it produce an idea of non-existence?)
c19.s2.58
*Vaibhāṣika.*—Then it may be the characteristic sign of a future; (this sign is absent at present, and gives rise to the idea of non-existence).
c19.s2.59
*Sautrāntika.*—This sign consists (in the fact that the future) will appear into existence out of a previous non-existence. Thus it is that both existence and non-existence may be objects of cognition.
c19.s2.60
*Vaibhāṣika.*—And how do you explain the words of the future Buddha, who has spoken thus: "that these persons know or perceive things which do not exist in the world—this is impossible!"?
c19.s2.61
*Sautrāntika.*—These words (do not mean that non-existence cannot be an object of cognition, but they) have the following meaning:—"there are other, manifestly deluded, persons (who have not yet attained the divine power of vision: they) perceive things that never did exist. I perceive only existing (remote) things." If, on the contrary, every possible thought had only existing things for its object, what reason could there have been for doubting (the accuracy of the assertion of such people about what they were perceiving by their power of divine vision)? or what would have been the difference (between the *bodhisattva*'s real power of vision and the incomplete power of these men)?
c19.s2.62
It is inevitable that we should understand the passage in this sense, because it is confirmed by another scriptural passage, which begins with the words: "come unto me, ye monks, my pupils!" and goes on until the following words are spoken: "what I am telling him in the morning becomes clearer at night; what I am conversing about at night becomes clearer to him next morning. He will cognize the existence of what does exist, the non-existence of what does not exist. Where something still higher exists, he will know that there is something still higher; and where nothing higher exists, he will know that (it is the Final Deliverance, that) there is nothing higher than that!" Therefore the argument (in favour of a real existence of the past, that you have drawn from the supposed fact that) our intellect can have only existent things for its object—this argument is wrong.
c19.s2.63
(The fourth argument of the Sarvāstivādins examined)
c19.s2.64
*Sautrāntika*.—As to your next argument (in favour of the real 284, a. 7. existence of the past, viz. because it has a real) result—we must observe that we, the Sautrāntikas, never did maintain that a result can be produced from a past deed (directly).
c19.s2.65
*Vaibhāṣika*.—How is it produced, then?
c19.s2.66
*Sautrāntika*.—(This deed) is the beginning of a peculiar chain of events (in the course of which the result appears sooner or later). A more detailed explanation of this point will be given later on, when we will refute the theory (of the Vātsiputrīyas, who) maintain the existence of an individual.¹ (As to your view, it is manifestly inconsistent) What result can a past deed produce according to this view? If the past and the future are actually existent, the result will necessarily be pre-existent from all eternity.
c19.s2.67
¹ *Ab. K.*, ix; translated in my *Soul Theory*.
c19.s2.68
*Vaibhāṣika*.—(But we assume the existence of the force of generation?)
c19.s2.69
*Sautrāntika*.—Well, then, it will be established that this force 284, b. 1. itself appears after having previously been non-existent! In fact, if everything without any exception is pre-existent, there can be nothing that could have a force to produce anything! In the end it comes to the same as the theory of the followers of Varṣagaṇya. According to them there is neither production of something new nor extinction of something existent: what exists is always existent, what does not exist will never become existent.
c19.s2.70
*Vaibhāṣika*.—But the force (of a past deed) may consist in “making present” (some already existing element)?
c19.s2.71
*Sautrāntika*.—How is this “making present” to be understood? 284, b. 3.
c19.s2.72
*Vaibhāṣika*.—It consists in removing (the result from one) place to another.
c19.s2.73
*Sautrāntika*.—Then the result would be eternally pre-existent. And, as to non-existent elements, how can they (be made to change place)? Moreover, such “removing” means production (of a motion, i.e. of something) which previously did not exist.
c19.s2.74
*Vaibhāṣika*.—It may consist in a “specification” of the (everlasting) essence of an element?
c19.s2.75
*Sautrāntika*.—This, again, would prove that there is production of what previously did not exist. To conclude: the principle of Universal Existence, as far as exegetical literature is concerned, where it implies an actual existence of the past and the future, does not hold good. On the contrary, it is all right if we strictly conform to the words of Scripture, where it is declared that “everything exists”.
c19.s2.76
*Vaibhāṣika*.—And in what sense has it been declared in Scripture that “everything exists”?
c19.s2.77
*Sautrāntika*.—O Brahmins! it has been declared, “everything exists”: that means no more than “the elements included in the twelve categories (*āyatana*) are existent”.
c19.s2.78
*Vaibhāṣika*.—And the three times (are they not included among these elements)?
c19.s2.79
*Sautrāntika*.—(No, they are not!). How their existence is to be understood we have already explained.
c19.s2.80
*(The Sarvāstivādin reverts to his first argument)*
c19.s2.81
*Vaibhāṣika*.—If the past and the future did not exist, how could it be possible that a man should be attracted by (a past and future passion) to a (past or future object of enjoyment)?
c19.s2.82
*Sautrāntika*.—This becomes possible because past passions leave residues (or produce seeds), which are the causes of new passions; these seeds are existent (and the saint has the capacity of keeping them down, of being independent of them). Therefore, a man can be bound by (past accesses of) passion. And it is in this sense that he can be allured by (future or past) objects, because the seeds of these passions, which are directed towards (past and future enjoyments), are always present in him.
Linked texts (3)
- Abhidharmakośa — Vasubandhu, Sanskrit
- Saṃyuktāgama (Sanskrit fragments) — Sanskrit
- *Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra — Sanskrit