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The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana c4: Introduction

The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa c4

Language
English

Contents

Introduction

Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna

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There are two aspects of Mahāyāna Philosophy, viz. the Madhyamaka Philosophy or Śūnyavāda and Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda. Here we are concerned only with Madhyamaka Philosophy or Śūnyavāda.

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Generally there are three names current for Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. The three names for the former are Southern Buddhism, Original Buddhism, and Hīnayāna, and those for the latter Northern Buddhism, Developed Buddhism and Mahāyāna. The first two names are given by European scholars. Southern and Northern Buddhism are names used on Geographical basis. European scholars called Buddhism prevalent in countries to the north of India, viz., Nepal, Tibet, China, Japan etc., Northern Buddhism and that prevalent in countries to the South of India, viz., Ceylon, Burma, Siam etc. Southern Buddhism. This division is not quite correct, for, according to Dr. J. Takakusu, the Buddhism prevalent in Java and Sumatra which lie in a southern direction from India is similar to that prevalent in the North.

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The division ‘original and developed Buddhism’ is based on the belief that Mahāyāna was only a gradual development of the original doctrine which was Hīnayāna, but this is not acceptable to Mahāyānists. Japanese scholars maintain that the great Buddha imparted his teachings to his pupils according to their receptive capacities. To some he imparted his exoteric teachings (*vyakta-upadeśa*) containing his ‘phenomenological perception’, to more advanced pupils he imparted his subtle esoteric teachings (*guhya-upadeśa*) containing his ‘ontological perception’. The Buddha generally gave an outline of both the teachings, and both were developed by the great ācāryas. It is, therefore, a misnomer to call one ‘original Buddhism’, and another ‘developed Buddhism.’ Both the teachings were delivered simultaneously The exoteric teachings may be called well-known Buddhism and the esoteric less known, the latter being subtler than the former.

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We have, however, to find out how the terms Hinayāna and Mahāyāna came into vogue. According to R. Kimura, the Mahāsanghikas had retained the esoteric teachings of the Buddha and were more liberal and advanced than the Sthaviras. In the Vaisālī Council, the Mahāsanghikas or the Vajjian monks were excommunicated by the Sthaviras for expressing opinions different from those of the orthodox school, and were denounced as ‘Pāpa Bhukkhus’ and ‘Adhammavādins’ The Mahāsanghikas, in order to show the superiority of their doctrines over those of the Sthaviras, coined the term Mahāyāna (the higher vehicle) for their own school, and Hinayāna (the lower vehicle) for the school of their opponents. Thus the terms Mahāyāna and Hinayāna came into vogue. It goes without saying that these terms were used only by the Mahāyānists

Three phases in Buddhism

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Three phases can be easily marked in Buddhist philosophy and religion.

1. The Abhidharmic phase from the Buddha's death to Ist Century A. D.

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This was the realistic and pluralistic phase of Buddhism. The method of this school was one of analysis The philosophy of this period consisted mostly of analysis of psycho-physical phenomena into *dharmas* (elements) *samskrta* (compounded or conditioned) and *asamskrta* (uncompounded or unconditioned). The main interest in this period was psychological-soteriological The dominant tone of this school was one of rationalism combined with meditation practices. The language used in this period was Pāli, and the school is known as Hinayāna.

2. Development of Esoteric Teachings

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The second phase consisted of the development of the esoteric teachings of the Buddha which were current among the Mahāsaṅghikas, simultaneously with the Abhidharmic phase. The main interest in this period was ontological-soteriological. The dominant tone of this school was one of supra-rationalism combined with *yoga*. The main attempt was to find out the *Svabhāva* or true nature of Reality and to realize it in oneself by developing Prajñā. The language used was Saṃskṛta or mixed Saṃskṛta. This school was known as Mahāyāna. The earlier phase was known as Madhyamaka philosophy or Śūnyavāda, the later as Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda. This phase lasted from 2nd century A. D. to 500 A. D.

3. Development of Tantra

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The third phase was that of Tantra. This lasted from 500 A. D. to 1000 A. D. The main interest of the period was cosmical-soteriological. The dominant feature of this school was occultism. The main emphasis was on adjustment and harmony with the cosmos and on achieving enlightenment by *mantric* and occult methods. The language was mostly Saṃskṛta and Apabhraṃśa. The main Tāntric schools were Mantrayāna, Vajrayāna, Sahajayāna, Kālacakrayāna.

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Here we are not concerned with the first and third phase. We are concerned only with the earlier phase of the second period. Stcherbatsky has provided a translation only of the first and twentyfifth chapters i. e. the chapter dealing with causality and that dealing with Nirvāna of the Madhyamaka Śāstra or the Madhyamaka-Kārikas of Nāgārjuna together with the commentary of Candrakīrti. In the Introduction, an attempt is made to give a brief resumé of the Madhyamaka system as a whole

Madhyamaka Śāstra - Life of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva

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The Madhyamaka philosophy is contained mainly in the Madhyamaka Śāstra of Nāgārjuna and the Catuh-Śataka of Āryadeva.

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Books on Mahāyāna Buddhism were completely lost in India. Their translation existed in Chinese, Japanese and Tibetan. Mahāyāna literature was written mostly in Saṃskṛta and mixed Saṃskṛta. Scholars who had made a study of Buddhism hardly suspected that there were books on Buddhism in Saṃskṛta also.

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Mr. Brian Houghton Hodgson was appointed Resident at Kāthamāndu in Nepal in 1833, and served in this capacity up to the end of 1843.

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During this period, he discovered there 381 bundles of manuscripts on Buddhism in Saṃskṛta. These were distributed to various learned societies for editing and publication. It was then found out that the Buddhism in the Saṃskṛta manuscripts was greatly different from that of the Pāli Canon, and that the Buddhism in China, Japan, Tibet etc. was very much similar to that of the Saṃskṛta works. Among the Saṃskṛta manuscripts was also found the Madhyamakaśāstra of Nāgārjuna together with the commentary known as Prasannapadā by Candrakīrti. This was edited by Louis de la Vallée Poussin and published in the Bibliotheca Buddhica, Vol. IV. St Petersburg, Russia in 1912. An earlier edition of this book was published by the Buddhist Text Society, Calcutta, in 1897 and edited by Śaraccandra Śāstrī. This was full of misprints. Poussin consulted this book, but he also used two other manuscripts, one from Cambridge and another from Paris. He also checked up the text of the Kārikās and the commentary with the help of Tibetan translation. Dr P. L. Vaidya utilised Poussin's edition and brought out in 1960 Madhyamaka Śāstra of Nāgārjuna with Candrakīrti's commentary in Devanāgarī character. This has been published by Mithilā Vidyāpītha, Darbhangā. Stcherbatsky had utilised Poussin's edition in writing out his Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa.

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The Buddha used to characterize his teaching as madhyamā pratipad (the middle path). When Nāgārjuna evolved his philosophy, he seized upon this important word, and called his philosophy Madhyamaka (madhyamāva madhyamakam) or Madhyamaka-śāstra. The followers of this system came to be known as Mādhyamika (madhyamakam adhīyate vidanti vā *Mādhyamikāḥ*). The correct name for the system is Madhyamaka, not Mādhyamika. Mādhyamika means the believer in or follower of the Madhyamaka system.

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Under the title of *Madhyamaka śāstra*, Nāgārjuna wrote out his philosophical teaching in over 400 *kārikās* in *anuṣṭubha* metre, divided into 27 chapters.

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*Nāgārjuna.*

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He was the teacher who developed and perfected the Madhyamaka system. He flourished in the second century A. D. He was born in a Brahmin family in Āndhradeśa probably in Vidarbha (Berāra). Śrīparvata and Dhānyakataka were the centres of his activities in the south. In the north, he carried on his activities in many places of which Nālandā is said to be the most prominent He was also connected with Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunakonda. Rājataranginī (11 th Century A. D.) says that he was a contemporary of Huska, Juska and Kaniska.

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According to the biography of Nāgārjuna, translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva ( about 405 A. D. ), Nāgārjuna was born in a Brahmin family in Southern India, and studied the Vedas and other important branches of Brāhmanical learning. He was later converted to Buddhism.

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One of his minor works, *Suhrllekha* ( Friendly Epistle ) is said to have been addressed to the Āndhra king, Śātavāhana. Śātavāhana is, however, regarded not as the name of a particular king, but as the name of a family of Āndhra kings, founded by Simuka (vide, Ancient India, by R. C Majumdar, P 133). Some scholars maintain that Suhrllekha was addressed to Kaniska.

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There is a legend associated with his name. Nāga means a serpent or dragon. Arjuna is the name of a tree It is said that he was born under an Arjuna tree, and he visited the submarine kingdom of the Nāgas, where the Nāga king transmitted to him the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra* which had been entrusted to the Nāgas by the Buddha.

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The word ‘Nāga’ however, is symbolic of wisdom. The Buddha is said to have remarked, “The serpent is a name for one who has destroyed the *āsavas* (passions)” (Majjhima-Nikāya, I 23). The Nāgas may, there fore, have been certain Arhants to whom the *prajñāpāramitā* teachings may have been handed down. Nāgārjuna may have received the teachings from them.

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The Buddhist Nāgārjuna should not be confused with the Chemist and Tāntrika Nāgārjuna who lived probably in the 7 th century A D

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The Tibetans ascribe 122 books to Nāgārjuna, but only the following seem to have been his authentic works.

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(1) *Madhyamaka-Śāstra*, also known as Prajñā or Kārikās with the commentary, *Akutobhayā* by the author himself.

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(2) *Vigrahavyāvartanī* with a commentary by the author.

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(3) *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*,

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(4) *Śūnyatā-saptati* with a commentary by the author.

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(5) *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdaya* with a commentary

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(6) *Catuḥstava*

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(7) *Bhāvanākrama*.

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(8) *Suḥllekha*

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(9) *Bhāvasamkrānti*.

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(10) *Ratnāvalī*

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(11) *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra-Śāstra*

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(12) *Daśabhūmivibhāṣā-śāstra*.

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(13) *Eka-śloka-śāstra*

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(14) *Vaidalaya sūtra and Prakarana*

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(15) *Vyavahāra-siddhi*

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Only a few of these are available in the original There is, however, a Tibetan translation of all these books.

Āryadeva or Ārya Deva

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He was born in Simhala (Ceylon) and became a pupil of Nāgārjuna. He travelled with him to various places and helped him greatly in propagating his doctrine.

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His biography was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva in about 405 A. D.

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His most famous work is Catuh-Śataka which consists of 400 Kārikās. He defended the teachings of Nāgārjuna, and criticized the philosophy of Hinayāna, Sāmkhya and Vaiśesika. He was probably the author of Aksara-Śatakam. He is also said to have been the author of Hastavala-prakarana and Cittaviśuddhi-prakarana. Prof. Winternitz expresses his doubt whether Cittaviśuddhi-prakarana was his work.

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It is said that he was murdered by the pupil of a heretical teacher whom he had defeated in disputation.

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*The Original Sources of Mahāyāna*

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The origin of Mahāyāna may be traced to an earlier school known as Mahāsaṅghika and earlier literary sources known as Mahāyāna sūtras.

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*1. Mahāsaṅghikas.*

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At the council held at Vaisālī (according to Kimura), sertain monks differed widely from the opinions of other monks on certain important points of the dharma. Though the monks that differed formed the majority, they were excommunicated by the others who called them ‘Pāpa Bhikkhus and Adhammavādins. In Buddhist history, these Bhikkhus were known as Mahāsaṅghikas, because they formed the majority at the council or probably because they reflected the opinions of the larger section of the laity. The Bhikkhus who excommunicated them styled themselves Sthaviras or the Elders, because they believed that they represented the original, orthodox doctrine of the Buddha. We have seen that the Mahāsaṅghikas coined the term Mahāyāna to represent their system of belief and practice, and called the Sthaviras Hinayāna.

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Let us see what the main tenets of the Mahāsaṅghikas were. Their contributions can be summed up under four heads.

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1. The Status of the Buddha

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According to the Mahāsanghikas, the Buddha was not simply an historical person The real Buddha was transcendental, supramundane eternal, infinite The historical Buddha was only a fictitious person sent by Him to appear in the world, to assume a human body, to live like an ordinary human being and teach the *dharma* to the inhabitants of the world The real Buddha is the Reality *par excellence* and will continue to send messengers to the world to teach the true *dharma* to mankind

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2. The Status of the Arhat

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The *Sthaviras* had attributed perfection to the Arhats The Mahāsanghikas maintained that the Arhats were not perfect, they were troubled by doubts and were ignorant of many things They should not be held up as ideals. Rather those should be emulated as ideals who during aeons of self-sacrifice and struggle attained to Buddhahood.

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3. The Status of Empirical knowledge

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According to the Mahāsanghikas, empirical knowledge could not give us an insight into Reality Only *Śūnyatā* which transcends all worldly things can give us a vision of the Real All verbal statements give us a false view of the Real, they are mere thought-constructions

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4. The Unsubstantial Nature of the Dharmas

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The *Sthaviras* believed that the *pudgala* or a personal self was unsubstantial, but the *dharmas* or elements of existence were real entities The Mahāsanghikas maintained that not only were the *pudgalas* unsubstantial (*pudgala-nairātmya*), but the *dharmas* (elements of existence) were also unsubstantial (*dharma-nairātmya*). Every thing was unsubstantial (*śūnya*)

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It will be seen from the above account that the germs of practically all the important tenets of Madhyamaka philosophy were present in the system of the Mahāsanghikas.

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It is the *Mahāsaṅghikas* who first of all gave expression to Buddha's ontological perceptions which were first embodied in the Mahāyāna sūtras and were later developed into Mahāyāna philosophy and religion.

11. Literary Sources

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In Buddhism, *sūtra* literature is said to contain the direct, oral teachings of the Buddha, and *śāstra* is said to contain the scholarly and philosophical elaboration of the direct teachings of the Buddha.

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We have a large bulk of literary works known as *Mahāyāna* sūtras. Being sūtras, they claim to be the 'direct teachings of the Buddha'. Such bulky volumes, obviously, cannot be the spoken word of the Buddha. They are the elaboration of some 'seminal sūtras' which are so deeply embedded in the voluminous *Mahāyāna* sūtra literature that it is now almost impossible to disentangle them.

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The most important of these works are the *prajñāpāramitā* sūtras. *Prajñā-pāramitā* is generally translated as 'perfect wisdom'. The word 'pāram-itā' i. e. 'gone beyond' suggests that it would be better to translate *prajñā-pāramitā* as 'transcendent insight' or 'transcendent wisdom'. The Tibetans translate it in this way. In all countries where Mahāyāna is a living religion, the following *prajñā-pāramitā* mantra is generally recited. "Gate, gate, pāramgate, pārasamgate Bodhi, svāhā" i. e. "O wisdom which has gone beyond the beyond, to thee Homage".

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According to Dr. Edward Conze, the composition of the *Prajñā pāramitā* texts extended over about a thousand years which may be divided into four phases.

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The first phase (C. 100 B. C. to A. D. 100) consists in the elaboration of the teaching in a basic text.

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The second phase (C. A. D. 100-300) consists in the expansion of the teaching into three or four lengthy treatises.

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The third phase (C. A. D. 300-500) consists in the abridgement of the teachings into a few shorter treatises.

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The fourth phase (C A. D 500-1200) consists in its condensation into Tāntric dhāraṇīs and mantras

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(1) According to most scholars, the Aṣṭa sāhasrikā, consisting of 8,000 lines is the oldest of the Prajñāpāramitā literature It had its origin probably among the Mahāsaṅghikas. The principal theme of this treatise is the doctrine of śūnyatā (void or emptiness)

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(2) Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā seems to have been expanded in the three hundred years that followed into Śatasāhasrikā (of 100,000 lines), Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā (of 25,000 lines) and Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā (of 18,000 lines). The last one was translated by Lokarakṣa in A. D 172.

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(3) Now began the abridgement of the Prajñā-pāramitā literature The earliest abridgements are the Hṛdaya-sūtra and the Vajracchedikā sūtra The Vajracchedikā was translated into Chinese probably in the 5th century A. D. This translation was printed in China on 11th May, 868 This is said to be the oldest printed book in the world.

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Abhisamayālaṃkāra is said to be a summary of pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā made by Maitreyanātha, the teacher of Asanga

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(4) Lastly Prajñāpāramitā was condensed into dhāraṇīs and mantras One of these, viz., Ekākṣarī says that the perfection of wisdom is contained only in one letter, viz, ‘a’. Ultimately Prajñāpāramitā was personified as a goddess to be worshipped.

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Prajñāpāramitās are both philosophy and religion They are not mere ‘philosophy’ in the Western sense of the word. ‘In the West, philosophy cut itself adrift from religion and became a purely intellectual pursuit In India, every philosophy was a religion, and every religion had a philosophy. Western religion became only a credal religion Indian religion was a philosophical religion.

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The principal theme of the Prajñāpāramitā literature is the doctrine of śūnyatā The Hīnayānists believed only in pudgala-nairātmya or the unsubstantiality of the individual They classified Reality into certain dharmas or elements of existence and thought that the *dharmas* were substantially real. *Prajñā-pāramitā* gives a knock-out to this belief It teaches *sarva-dharma śūnyatā*, the unsubstantiality of all *dharmas*.

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Phenomena are dependent on conditions. Being so dependent, they are devoid of substantial reality. Hence they are *śūnya* (empty).

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*Nirvāṇa* being transcendent to all categories of thought is *Śūnyatā* (emptiness) itself.

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Both *samsāra* and *Nirvāṇa*, the conditioned and unconditioned are mere thought-constructions and are so devoid of reality (*Śūnya*).

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Ultimate Reality may be called *Śūnyatā* in the sense that it transcends all empirical determinations and thought-constructions.

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*Prajñā* or transcendent insight consists in ceasing to indulge in thought-constructions. So *prajñā* becomes synonymous with *Śūnyatā*.

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One, however, acquires insight into *Śūnyatā* not merely by avowing it enthusiastically, nor by logomachy, but by meditation on *Śūnyatā*.

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One has to meditate on *Śūnyatā* as the absence of self-hood, on the absence of substantiality in all the *dharmas*, on *Śūnyatā* as even the emptiness of the unconditioned. Finally one has to abandon *Śūnyatā* itself as a mere raft to cross the ocean of ignorance. This meditation will, however, be ineffective unless one has cultivated certain moral virtues.

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Though this is a very brief summary of the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts, it is enough to show that this kind of literature contained all the important elements of the Mahāyāna system

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Thus we see that the Madhyamaka system was developed on the basis of the doctrines of the Mahāsanghikas and the Mahāyāna *sūtras* known as *Prajñāpāramitā sūtras*

The Madhyamaka Works and Schools

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The Madhyamaka system of philosophy was developed mainly by Nāgārjuna. He was one of the greatest geniuses the world has ever known. The system of which he laid the foundation was developed by his brilliant followers. It had a continuous history of development from the second century A.D. upto eleventh century A D.

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Three stages of its developmont can be easily marked. In the first stage, there was a systematic formulation of the Madhyamaka philosophy by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva. The second stage is one of division of the system into two schools the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika. The third stage is one of re-affirmation of the Prāsaṅgika school.

First stage-Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva (2nd century A. D.)

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Nāgārjuna was the author of a voluminous commentary on Prajñāpāramitā known as Prajñāpāramitā-śāstra This was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva (A D. 402-405). The original is not available now. He, however, formulated his main philosophy in prajñā-mūla or Mūla-Madhyamaka-Kārikās known also as Madhyamaka-Śāstra His devoted pupil Āryadeva elaborated his philosophy in Catuḥ-śataka We have already seen what other books were written by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva.

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Second stage Nāgārjuna had used the technique of prasanga in formulating his Madhyamaka philosophy. Prasanga is a technical word which means reductio ad absurdum argument. Nāgārjuna did not advance any theory of his own, and therefore, had no need to advance any argument to prove his theory. He used only prasanga-vākya or reductio ad absurdum argument to prove that the theories advanced by his opponents only led to absurdity on the very principles accepted by them. This implied that Reality was beyond thought-construction.

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Buddhapālita who flourished in the middle of the sixth century was an ardent follower of Nāgārjuna. He felt that *prasanga* was the correct method of the Madhyamaka philosophy and employed it in his teachings and writings. He wrote a commentary called *Madhyamakavṛtti* on the *Madhyamaka Śāstra* of Nāgārjuna. This is available only in Tibetan translation. The original is lost.

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A junior contemporary of Buddhapālita, named Bhavya or Bhāvaviveka maintained that the opponent should not only be reduced to absurdity, but *svatantra* or independent logical arguments should also be advanced to silence him. He believed that the system of dialectics alone could not serve the purpose of pin-pointing the Absolute Truth.

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He wrote *Mahāyāna-Karatala-ratna Śāstra*, *Mādhyamikahṛdaya* with an auto-commentary, called *Tarkajvālā*, *Madhyamārtha-Samgraha* and *Prajñā-pradīpa*, a commentary on the *Madhyamaka Śāstra* of Nāgārjuna. Only a Tibetan translation of these works is available. Dr. L. M. Joshi transcribed the *Madhyamārtha-Samgraha* into Nagari letters and translated it into Hindi which appeared in the Dharmadūta, Vol. 29, July-August, 1964.

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N. Aiyaswāmi Śāstri has restored *Karatalaratna* from the Chinese translation of Yuan Chwang into Samskṛta (Viśvabhārati Śantinekatan, 1949).

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So we see that in the sixth century, nearly 400 years after the death of Nāgārjuna, the Madhyamaka school was split into two, viz. (a) Prāsaṅgika school, led by Buddhapālita and (2) Svātantrika School, led by Bhāvaviveka.

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Y. Kajiyama says that the problem which divided the Mādhyamikas was whether the system of relative knowledge could be recognised as valid or not, though it was delusive from the absolute point of view.

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According to Yuan Chwang, Bhāvaviveka externally wore the Sāmkhya cloak, though internally he was supporting the doctrine of Nāgārjuna.

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*Third Stage*—In the third stage. we have two very brilliant scholars of the Madhyamaka system, viz. Candrakīrti and Śāntideva

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A large number of comentaries (about twenty) was written on Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Śāstra They are available only in Tibetan translatiou’. Candrakīrti’s *prasannapadā* commen--tary is the only one that has survived in the original Samsakrta It seems to have elbowed every other commentary out of existence.

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He flourished early in the seventh century A D. and wrote several works He was born in Samanta in the South He stud--ied Madhyamaka philosophy under Kamalabuddhi, a disciple of Buddhapālita and probably under Bhavya also His *prasannapadā* commentary on Nāgārjuna’s *Madhyamaka Śāstra*, has already been mentioned He wrote an independent work, named *Madhyamakāvatāra* with an auto-commentary He frequently refers to *Madhyamakāvatāra* in his *Prasannapadā* which goes to show that the former was written earlier than the lattier

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He also wrote commentaries on Nagarjuna’s *Śunyatā-Saptati* and *Yukti Sastikā* and on Aryadeva’s *Catuḥśataka*. Two other *prakaranas* or manuals, viz , *Madhyamakaprajñā-vatāra* and *Pancaskandha* were also written by him Of all his works, only *Prasannapadā* is available in the original, other works are available only in Tibetan translation

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Candrakīrti vigorously defends the *Prāsangika* school, and exposes the hollowness of Bhāvaviveka’s logic at many places

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He also supports the common sense view of sense-perception and criticizes the doctrine of the ‘unique particular’ (*svalaksana*) and perception devoid of determination (*kalpanā-podha*).

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He has also criticized Vijñānavāda and maintains that consciousness (vijñāna) without an object is unthinkable.

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Śāntideva was another great pillar of the *Prāsangika* school He flourished in the seventh century A D According to- Tārānātha, Śāntideva was the son of King Kalyāṇavarman of Saurastra and was the rightful successor to the throne. As a prince he was known as Śāntivarman. He was so deeply inspired by Mahāyānic ideal that he fled away from his kingdom and took orders with Jaideva in Nālandā after which he was known as Śāntideva.

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He was the author of Śikṣa-samuccaya and Bodhicaryāvatāra. In the former, he has referred to many important Mahāyāna works, nearly 97 in number which are now completely lost. In the Bodhicaryāvatāra he has emphasized the cultivation of Bodhicitta. He was the greatest poet of the Madhyamaka school and his works evince a beautiful fusion of poetry and philosophy. He was the follower of the Prāsaṅgika method and has criticized Vijñānavāda vehemently.

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It may be said in passing that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla represent a syncretism of the Madhyamaka system and Vijñānavāda and cannot be strictly called Mādhyamikas. Śāntarakṣita flourished in the eighth century A. D. His great work was Tattvasaṃgraha (Compendium of Reality). His celebrated pupil, Kamalaśīla wrote the Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā, a learned commentary on Tattvasaṃgraha.

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The Madhyamaka Dialectic : Its Origin, Structure And Development.

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We have seen that nearly all the important tenets of the Madhyamaka philosophy were already adumbrated in the Mahāsaṅghika system and Prajñāpāramitā literature. Nāgārjuna only developed them. What was then the original contribution of Nāgārjuna? His original contribution was the dialectic that he evolved. He certainly threw new light on the various doctrines of Mahāyāna foreshadowed in the Mahāsaṅghika thought and Prajñāpāramitā works, and provided a deeper and more critical exposition of those doctrines, but his most original contribution was the dialectic.

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The mysterious silence of the Buddha on the most fundamental question of Metaphysics led him to probe into the reason of that silence Was the Buddha agnostic as some of the European writers on Buddhism believe him to be ? If not, what was the reason of his silence ? Through a searching inquiry into this silence was the dialectic born.

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There are well-known questions which the Buddha declared to be *avyākṛta* 1. e. the answers to which were inexpressible. Candrakīrti enumerates them in his commentary on the MK. 22, 12.

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He begins by saying "*Iha caturdaśa avyākṛta-vastūni bhagavatā nirdiṣṭāni*"—The Lord announced fourteen things to be inexpressible'', and then mentions them in the following order :

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(1) Whether the world is (a) eternal (b) or not, (c) or both. (d) or neither-4

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(2) Whether the world is (a) finite (b) infinite (c) or both (d) or neither-4

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(3) Whether the Tathāgata (a) exists after death, (b) or does not (c) or both (d) or neither-4

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(4) Whether the soul is identical with the body or different from it-2=14 in all

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It will be seen that there are four alternatives in the first three sets of questions. There could be four alternatives in the last question also. These four alternatives formed the basis of *Catuṣkoṭi* or tetra-lemma of Nāgārjuna's dialectic. In each, there is (1) a positive thesis, opposed by (11) a negative counter-thesis. These two are the basic alternatives. (111) They are conjunctively affirmed to from the third alternative, and (iv) disjunctively denied to form the fourth.

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The 'yes' or 'no' answer to these fundamental questions could not do justice to truth. Buddha called such speculations mere '*diṭṭhivāda* (dogmatism), and refused to be drawn into them.

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Nāgārjuna had before him the structure of these questions and Buddha's silence, refusing to give any categorical answer to such questions. Buddha used to say that he neither believed in *Śāśvata-vāda*, an absolute affirmation, nor in *Ucchedavāda* an absolute negation His position was one of '*madhyamā pratipada*' (literally, the middle position).

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Nāgārjuna pondered deeply over this attitude of the Buddha, and came to the conclusion that the reason of Buddha's studied silence in regard to such questions was that Reality was transcendent to thought. He systematized the four alternatives (*antas* or *koṭis*), mercilessly exposed the disconcerting implications of each alternative, brought the antinomies of Reason luminously to the fore by hunting them out from every cover, and demonstrated the impossibility of erecting a sound Metaphysic on the basis of dogmatism or rationalism., This was his dialectic The four alternatives were already formulated by the Buddha His originality consisted in drawing out by the application of rigorous logic the implications of each alternative, driving Reason in a *cul de sac* and thus preparing the mind for taking a right-about-turn (*parāvṛtti*) towards *prajñā*

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To the unwary reader, Nāgārjuna appears to be either a cantankerous philosopher out to controvert all systems, or as a sophist trickster wringing from an unsuspecting. opponent certain concessions in argument by artful equivocation and then chuckling over his discomfiture or as a destructive nihilist negativing every view brusquely, affirming none.

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On a more careful study of his dialectic, it will appear that none of these fears is true, that he is, in all soberness, only trying to show up the inevitable conflict in which Reason gets involved when it goes beyond its legitimate province of comprehending phenomena, and enters the forbidden land of noumena.

The Meaning of Dialetic

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What then does dialectic mean? In plain words, dialectic is that movement of thought which, by examining the *pros* and *cons* of a question, brings about a clear consciousness of the antinomies into which Reason gets bogged up, and hints at a way out of the impasse by rising to a plane higher than Reason.

Structure of The Dialetic

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We have seen that the origin of the dialectic of the Mādhyamika lay in the four alternatives in each *avyākṛta* problem followed by a mysterious silence on the part of the Buddha. Nāgārjuna clearly systematized these and formulated them into the *catuṣkoṭi*, tetralemma or quadrilemma, also called the four-cornered negation. The structure of the clearly articulated dialectic finally stood thus :

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The first alternative of the tetralemma consisted of (i) a positive thesis, the second of (ii) a negative counter-thesis, the third of (iii) a conjunctive affirmation of the first two, the fourth of (iv) a disjunctive denial of the first two.

The Technique of the Dialectic

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The technique of the dialectic consisted in drawing out the implications of the view of the opponent on the basis of the principles accepted by himself and thus showing the self-contradictory character of that view. The opponent was hoisted with his own petard. He was reduced to the position of absurdity when the self-contradictory consequences of his own assumptions were revealed. The dialectic was thus a rejection of views by *reductio ad absurdum* argument. Technically this was known as *prasaṅga*.

The Purpose of The Dialectic

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The purpose of the dialectic was to *disprove* the views advanced by others, not to prove any view of one's own. He who advances a view must necessarily prove it to others whom he wants to convince; he who has no view to advance is under no such necessity. Nāgārjuna states clearly in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (St. 29) that no one can find fault with the Mādhyamika, for he has no view of his own to advance.

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“*Yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eva me bhaved doṣaḥ. Nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ*”

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“If I had a thesis of my own to advance, you could find fault with it. Since I have no thesis to advance, the question of disproving it does not arise”.

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The dialectic was directed against the dogmatists and rationalists who maintained a definite view about Reality. By exposing the hollowness of their logic and the self-contradictory consequences of their assumptions, Nāgārjuna wanted to disprove the claims of Reason to apprehend Reality. Candrakīrti puts the whole position very clearly in the following words:

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“*Nirupapattika-pakṣābhyupagamāt svātmānam eva ayam visamvādayan na śaknoti paresām niścayam ādhātum iti. Idameva spaṣṭataram dūṣaṇam yaduta svapratijñātārthasādhanāsāmarthyam iti*” (P.P. p.6) “By his illogical assumption, the opponent only contradicts himself, and is unable to convince others. What could be more self-convicting than the fact that he is unable even to prove the premises on the basis of which he advances his arguments”

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Nāgārjuna mercilessly demolished every philosophical opinion of his time, not because he derived a sadistic pleasure in doing so, but because he had a definite purpose. Negatively the dialectic was meant to prove that Reality could not be measured by the three-foot rule of discursive thought. But this was not all. It had some positive suggestions. Firstly, phenomenon or empirical reality is a realm of relativity, in which an entity is *śunya* or *niḥ-svabhāva* i.e., devoid of independent reality.

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Secondly, one can comprehend Reality by rising to a plane higher than logical thought i.e., the plane of *prajñā*.

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Thirdly, Reality cannot be expressed in terms of the ‘is’-‘is not’—dichotomising mind.

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*The Application of the Dialectic*

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Nāgārjuna rigorously examines all philosophical theories that were held by the thinkers in his time He turns the battery of his dialectic against concepts like causality, motion and rest, the āyatanas, the skandhas, the ātman etc.

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Stcherbatsky has included only his criticism of causality and nirvāna, for they are the most important We shall, therefore, confine our observations only to these two We shall consider Nāgārjuna's examination of the concept of causality here, and his examination of Nirvāna under a separate heading

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Nāgārjuna fires the first shot against causality, for that was the central problem of philosophy in his days.

Examination of Causality

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Applying his tetralemma to causality, Nāgārjuna says that there can be only four views about causality, viz. (1) view of svata utpattih, the theory of self-becoming (2) parata utpattih, i.e. production from another (3) dvābhyām utpattih i.e production from both-from itself and from another (4) ahetuta utpattih i e production without any cause, production by chance

c4.s10.2

(1) Svata utpattih—This means that the cause and effect are identical, that things are produced out of themselves Nāgārjuna, had evidently in view the Satkāryavāda of Sāmkhya, while criticizing the autogenous theory of causality.

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The Mādhyamika's criticism of this theory may be summarized thus .

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(1) If the effect is already present in the cause, no purpose would be served by its re-production. The Sāmkhya may say that though the effect may be present in the cause, its manifestation (abhivyakti) is something new This, however, does not mean that the effect is a new substance. It only means that it is a new form or state of the substance But this difference of form or state goes against the identity of the underlying substratum.

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(ii) If it is said that the cause is partly actual, and partly potential, it would amount to accepting the oppsoed natures in one and the same thing.

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If the cause is wholly potential, it cannot by itself become actual without an extraneous aid. The oil cannot be got out of the seed, unless it is pressed by a crusher. If it has to depend on an external aid, then there is no *svata utpattih* or self-production. This amounts to giving up *satkāryavāda*.

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(iii) If the cause and effect are identical, it would be impossible to distinguish one as the producer of the other.

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The identity view of cause and effect (*Satkāryavāda*) is, therefore, riddled with self-contradiction.

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(2) *Parata Utpattih* This means that the cause and effect are different This view is known as *asatkāryavāda*. This was held by the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas or the Hinayānists in general. Nāgārjuna had obviously these in view while criticizing this heterogeneous view of causality.

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His criticism of this view makes out the following important points

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(i) If the cause is different from the effect, no relation can subsist between the two. In that case anything can be produced from anything.

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(ii) The Hinayānist believed that with the production of the effect the cause ceased to exist But *ex hypothesi* causality is a relation between two. Unless the cause and effect coexist, they cannot be related. If teey cannot be related, causality becomes meaningless.

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(iii) The Hinayānist believed that the effect is produced by a combination of factors. Now for the co-ordination of these factors, another factor would be required, and again for the co-ordination of the additional factor with the previous one, another factor would be required. This would lead to a *regressus ad infinitum*.

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(3) *Dvābhyām utpattiḥ*—This theory believes that the eflect is both identical with and different from the cause. This is a combination of both Satkāryavāda and Asatkāryavāda, and so contains the inconsistencies of both. Besides this would invest the real with two opposed characters (identity and difference) at one and the same time.

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(4) *Ahetutaḥ Utpattiḥ*—This theory maintains that things are produced without a cause, by chance. The Svabhāvavādins-Naturalists and Sceptics believed in such a theory. If no reason is assigned for the theory, it amounts to sheer, perverse dogmatism. If a reason is assigned, it amounts to accepting a cause.

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Having exposed the inherent inconsistency in all the above views, Nāgārjuna comes to the conclusion that causality is a mere thought-construction superimposed upon the objective order of existence. In the words of Kant, causality is only a category of mind.

Distinction Between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna

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There are several aspects of Buddhist philosophy and religion in which Mahāyāna differs from Hinayāna. In what follows, we shall deal mostly with the Madhyamaka system of Mahāyāna.

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(1) *Difference in the Interpretation of Pratītyasamutpāda*—The doctrine of Pratītyasamutpāda is exceedingly important in Buddhism. It is the causal law both of the universe and the lives of individuals. It is important from two points of view. Firstly, it gives a very clear idea of the impermanent and conditioned nature of all phenomena. Secondly, it shows how birth, old age, death and all the miseries of phenomenal existence arise in dependence upon conditions, and how all the miseries cease in the absence of these conditions.

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We have seen what view the Mādhyamikas held of causality. Since Pratītyasamutpāda was the universal causal law, the Mādhyamikas undertook a critical examination of this law.

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Their interpretation of this law differs considerably from that of Hīnayāna-Pratītyasamutpāda is generally translated as ‘conditioned co-production’ or ‘interdependent origination’.

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According to Hīnayāna, *pratītyasamutpāda* means “*prati prati ityānām vināśinām samutpādaḥ*” i.e. “the evanescent momentary things appear”. According to it, *pratītya-samutpāda* is the causal law regulating the coming into being and disappearance of the various elements (*dharmas*).

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According to the Mādhyamika rise and subsidence of the elements of existence (*dharmas*) is not the correct interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

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As Candrakīrti puts it “*hetupratyayāpekṣo bhāvanām utpādaḥ pratītyasamutpādārthaḥ*” (P.P., p. 2) i.e. *pratītyasamutpāda* ‘means the manifestation of entities as relative to causes and conditions.

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The Hīnayānists had interpreted *pratītyasamutpāda* as temporal sequence of real entities between which there was a causal relation.

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According to the Mādhyamika, *pratītyasamutpāda* does not mean the principle of temporal sequence, but the principle of essential dependence of things on each other. In one word, it is the principle of relativity Relativity is the most important discovery of modern science. What science has discovered to-day, the great Buddha had discovered two thousand five hundred years before. In interpreting *pratītyasamutpāda* as essential dependence of things on each other or relativity of things, the Mādhyamika means to controvert another doctrine of the Hīnayānist. The Hīnayānists had analysed all phenomena into elements (*dharmas*), and believed that these *dharmas* had a separate reality of their own. The Mādhyamika says that the very doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* declares that all the *dharmas* are relative, they have no separate reality (*svabhāva*) of their own. *Niḥ-svabhāvatva* is synonymous with *śūnyatā* i.e. devoid of real, independent existence. Phenomena are devoid (*śūnya*) of independent reality. *Pratītyasa-* mutpāda or Interdependence means Relativity, and Relativity connotes the unreality (śunyatā) of the separate elements

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Candrakīrti says, "Tadatra-nirodhādyasta-niṣesana-viśiṣṭah pratītyasamutpādah śāstrābhidheyārthah" ( P P. P 2 ) i. e, "The subject matter or the central idea of this treatise is pratītyasamutpāda characterized by eight negative characteristics"

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The importance of pratītyasamutpāda lies in its teaching that all phenomenal existence, all entities in the world are conditioned are devoid of (śūnya) real, independent existence (svabhāva).

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As Nāgārjuna puts it "Na hi svabhāvo bhāvānām. pratyayādiṣu Vidyate" (M. K 1, 5)—"There is no real, independent existence of entities in the pratyayas i e conditions" As Dr E Conze puts it "All the concrete content belongs to the interplay of countless conditions" ( Buddhist Thought in India, P. 240 ).

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Nāgārjuna sums up his teaching about pratītya-samutpāda in the following words

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"Apratītya samutpanno dharmah kaścinna vidyate Yasmāt tasmāt aśūnyoḥ dharmah kaścinna vidyate" (M K, 24, 19) "Since there is no element of existence (dharma) which comes into manifestation without conditions, therefore there is no dharma which is not śūnya (devoid of real, independent existence)"

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The pratītyasamutpāda becomes equivalent to śunyatā or relativity Nagarjuna says "Yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatā tām pracaksamahe" (M K 24, 18) "What is pratītyasamutpāda that we call śunyatā"

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Śūnya or śunyata is the most important concept of Madhya. maka philosophy. We shall, therefore, consider it under a separate heading in the sequel.

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1. Difference in the concept of Nirvāṇa

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The following points regarding Nirvāṇa are common between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna.

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(1) Nirvāṇa is inexpressible. It has no origin, no change, no decay. It is deathless (*amṛta*)

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(2) It has to be realized within oneself. This is possible only when there is complete extinction of craving for sense-pleasure.

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(3) Personal self as such ceases in Nirvāṇa. Access to Nirvāṇa is possible only on the extinction of the personal self.

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(4) It is a peace (*śama* or *upaśama*) that passeth understanding.

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(5) It provides lasting security.

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The word ‘nirvāṇa’ literally means ‘extinguished’ and therefore ‘tranquil’.

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The Buddha is said to have made the following remark about Nirvāṇa :

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“There is an Unborn, Unbecome, Unmade, Uncompounded; for if there were not this Unborn, Unbecome, Unmade, Uncompounded, there would be apparently no escape from this here that is born, become, made, and compounded” (Udāna VIII.3)

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This goes to show that Nirvāṇa is not annihilation. In Saṃyutta Nikāya (1069-76), there is a long dialogue between Upaśiva and Buddha about Nirvāṇa. In that dialogue, the following two statements made by the Buddha are very important :

c4.s11.28

“Acci yathā vātavegena khitto
attam paleti, na upeti saṅkham
evam muni nāmakāyā vimutto
attam paleti, na upeti sankham”

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“As flame blown out by wind goes to rest, and is lost to cognizance, just so the sage who is released from name and body, goes to rest and is lost to cognizance".

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"Atthan-gatassa na pamāṇam atthi,
yena nam vajju, tam tassa n'atthi,
sabbesu dhammesu samūhatesu
samūhatā vādapathā pi sabbeti"

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"There is no measure to him who has gone to rest, he keeps nothing that could be named When all dharmas are abolished, all paths of speech are also abolished".

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Both Hinayānists and Mahāyānists would concur in these beautiful descriptions of Nirvāna It is only on the stepping-stone of our dead selves that we can rise to Nirvāna As Suzuki puts it "Nirvāna according to Buddhists, does not signify an annihilation of consciousness nor a temporal or permanent suppression of mentation, as imagined by some, but it is the annihilation of the notion of ego-substance and of all the desires that arise from this erroneous conception" (Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism pp 50-51,

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We shall now turn to the difference in the interpretation of Nirvāna between the two.

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(1) The Hinayānists believe that Nirvāna is eternal (nitya), blissful (sukha)

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The Mādhyamika says that there can be no predication of Nirvāna.

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(2) Hinayānists believe that it is something to be acquired. Mādhyamikas believe that it is not something to be acquired

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Nāgārjuna describes Nirvāna in the following words

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"Aprahīnam asamprāptam anucchinnam aśāśvatam
Aniruddham anutpannam etan nirvānam ucyate"
(MK. 25, 3)

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"Nirvana is that which is neither abandoned nor acquired, it is neither a thing annihilated, nor a thing eternal, it is neither destroyed nor produced"

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To quote Candrakīrti "*Sarvaprapañcopaśamaśivalaksanam nirvānam*" (P.P. p.2). Nirvāna connotes the cessation of all talk about it, the quiescence of phenomenal existence, and the attainment of the highest good"

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3. The Vaibhāsika thinks that Nirvāna is a positive entity (*bhāva*). Nāgārjuna says that the Hīnayānist believes Nirvāna to be unconditioned. To say it is unconditioned (*asamskrta*), and yet a positive entity (*bhāva*) amounts to self-contradiction, for a positive entity which is not dependent on conditions cannot be discovered If it is not *bhāva*, it cannot be *abhāva* (total cessation) either, for *abhāva* is a relative word. There can be *abhāva* only when previously there is *bhāva*. Moreover cessation (*abhāva*) is an event, occurring in time. It would make Nirvāna transitory.

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Candrakīrti in his commentary on Madhyamaka kārikā gives a relevant quotation from Ārya Ratnāvali.

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"Na cābhāvo' pi nirvānam kuta evāsya bhāvanā
Bhāvābhāvaparāmarśa-ksayo nirvānam ucyate"

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"Nor is Nirvāna abhava (non-ens). How do you entertain such an idea? Nirvāna is really complete cessation of such consideration as *bhāva* (ens) or *abhāva* (non-ens) of the real".

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It is above the relativity of existence and non-existence.

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Candrakīrti clinches the whole issue by saying "*Tataśca sarvakalpanā ksayu rūpam eva nirvānam*" (P. P. p. 229) Nirvāna or Reality is that which is absolved of all thought-constructin.

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4. The Hīnayānist thinks that *Nirvana* is the apposite of *samsāra* (phenomena). Nāgārjuna says that there is no difference between *Nirvāna* and *samsāra*.

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*Na samsārasya nirvanāt kimcid asti viśesanam*
*Na nirvānasya samsārāt kimcid asti viśesanam*

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(Mk 25, 19)

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"Nothing of phenomenal existence (*samsāra*) is different 'rom *nirvāna*, nothing of *nirvāna* is different from phenomenal existence".

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Cites (38)