The History of Buddhist Thought c18.36

c18.36

Here the charge of annihilationism is simply denied. In a discourse attributed to Sāriputta it is discussed and refuted. The elder Yamaka had formed the view, “thus do I understand the doctrine taught by the Lord, that a monk in whom the āsavas are destroyed is annihilated and destroyed with the dissolution of the body, and does not exist after death.” Yamaka is made to admit that the body and all the other constituents of the individual are impermanent, and that, therefore, he cannot say of any one of them, “ this is mine, I am this, this is my self.” “ What do you think, friend Yamaka, is a Tathāgata the body ? ” “ No, friend.” (And so of feeling, perception, the aggregates, and consciousness.) “ Do you look on a Tathāgata as existing in body, etc. ? ” “ No, friend.” “ Do you look on a Tathāgata as existing apart from body, etc.—or as consisting of them—or as existing without any of them ? ” To all these questions Yamaka answers no. No loophole is left for asserting the existence of a self either within or beyond the five constituents. The conclusion is that “ a Tathāgata cannot be held to be perceived as existing even in this life in truth and reality.” ¹