The History of Buddhist Thought c18.66

c18.66

Psychological theorizings such as these do not tell us anything more about the fundamental question. The list of undetermined questions remained established like a creed throughout the history of Buddhism. The distinction of two kinds of Nirvāṇa is probably such a development. It is one which would raise itself as a problem after Buddha’s death. In *Dhammapada* 89 there is a reference to “ those who have attained Nirvāṇa in the world with the destruction of the āsavas ”.³ The commentator here explains “ attained Nirvāṇa ” as attained by the two attainings of Nirvāṇa (*dvīhi parinibbānehi*), (1) that which is with a remainder of substrate of rebirth after reaching arahatship and getting rid of the course of the depravities, and (2) that which is without a remainder of substrate of rebirth with the cessation of the last thought and getting rid of the course of the khandhas. What is to be understood by this substrate of rebirth has been disputed, for in Pāli the term is upādi and in Sanskrit upadhi.¹ It is now generally agreed to be a collective name for the khandhas, the elements constituting the individual, which at death, unless dispersed by knowledge of the truths, continue their existence in a new birth. The form that they have at the moment of conception is consciousness (viññāṇa, citta), and with enlightenment it is said to cease. It is not said to be annihilated, but it stops or ceases (nirujjhati) to transmigrate. What that implies may be still further argued, but it is known only to the arahat.