The History of Buddhist Thought c26.41
The History of Buddhist Thought c26.41
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c26.41
Like the Mādhyamikas the Yogāchāras spoke of the non-selfness of individuals as well as of things. The two beliefs, the belief in the real existence of self and of things were the two obstructions, the obstruction of the depravities, passion, etc. (*kleśāvaraṇa*), and the obstruction to attaining full knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). The store-consciousness, it has been said, covers all that we now refer to as the subconscious and the unconscious. It is probable that the psychological facts of the subconscious gave rise to the concept of the store-consciousness, but it is not, as in modern psychology, a mere extension of the group of facts that are included in the conscious. It is a metaphysical concept of a different order of being, an ultimate reality at the base of all phenomena. The store-consciousness is already differentiated by the vāsanās, which as seeds ripen and produce their fruit. When it evolves it develops touch, mental activity (manaskāra), feeling, perception, and will (cetanā).¹ These five correspond to the five factors of the individual, the skandhas, but the skandha theory has had to be modified according to the mind-alone theory. The first skandha, body (rūpa) implies the heresy of externality and is replaced by its subjective element, touch. Manaskāra includes the saṃskāras, all the ideas or states of mental activity. Feeling (vit, vedanā) and perception (saṃjñā) remain the same, and the place of consciousness (vijñāna) is taken by cetanā. This is a difference of terminology, as the term vijñāna, used in other special senses in this system, is here avoided. Cetanā is mind in action, i.e. will, and includes consciousness. It is “the activity of mind” (manaśceṣṭā) according to the commentary.