The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus c10.48

c10.48

(2) In the second place, even supposing that the fire in this particular case (which satisfies the Method of Difference rigidly) is ascertained to be the cause of the smoke, how can I know that fire is the cause in other cases, or that there is no other cause? You will perhaps argue that if there were an *indefinite* number of causes of the same specific phenomenal effect, it would violate the principle that phenomena are all conditioned, *i.e.* exist only under certain conditions (कादाचित्कत्व), which is more comprehensive than the principle of causality, and the contradiction of which equally overthrows all rational practical activity. Yes, I accept the conditionality of phenomena, but this is not violated by supposing that one specific assemblage of phenomena has more than one cause. It is true that if you suppose such plurality of causes you cannot establish the invariableness of the particular conjunction (green-wood fire and smoke) which your Method of Difference fixes upon as a case of cause and effect; in other words, with your special principle of Causality so restricted, and without any general principle of Uniformity of Nature to fall back upon, you cannot ascertain from the present case, or from any number of similar cases that you may have observed, that *all* green-wood fires are followed by smoke, or that in a given case smoke has been preceded by fire—*i.e.*, you are helpless in demonstrating (or ascertaining indubitably) the relation of cause and effect. But this is an objection against your own position, not mine. Why not admit at once that certain phenomena are naturally connected (as invariable concomitants or antecedents) with other phenomena, and take your stand on observed concomitance (uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement in presence as well as absence) without assuming causality as an *a priori* principle and making deductions therefrom, and without the trouble of ascertaining the relation of cause and effect in every individual case? I am free to admit that theoretical objections of irresistible force (like those of the Chárváka sceptics) can be urged against this ascertainment of universal invariable and unconditional concomitance (व्याप्तिग्रहोपाय) on the basis of mere observation. Doubts of this kind can no more be laid by my view of the matter than by your canons of causality and essential identity (तदुत्पत्ति and तादात्म्य). Ultimately we all have to fall back on the rational practice of thinking persons (प्रेक्षावन्तः), and such persons are always content to act on practical certitude instead of hankering after an unattainable apodictic certainty in the affairs of life (प्रामाणिकलोकयात्रामनुपालयता यथादर्शनं शङ्कनीयम्). This same practical certitude is also the ultimate warrant of the Deductive-Inductive Inference by which we ascertain the characters of things without direct perception and through the medium or instrumentality of a mark.