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Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c6.s5.t13: Vādas after Dharmakīrti

Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c6.s5.t13

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Vādas after Dharmakīrti

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Arcaṭa wrote a commentary on *Hetubindu* of Dharmakīrti, presenting an exhaustive analysis of the text along with references to the proponents and opponents. Pt. Sukhalal Singhavi has compared him with Vācaspati Miśra. He gave a rejoinder to Kumārila’s objections on Dharmakīrti’s treatment of the *pramāṇas*. Kumārila had said that there would be *regressus ad infinitum* (*ānantyadoṣa*) the way Dharmakīrti has enumerated the theory of inference (*anumāna*). According to the Buddhists, when fire is inferred due to the presence of smoke, the smoke is the inferential mark (*liṅga*) for fire which is *sādhya*. The orthodox Naiyāyika would find the smoke cognized through direct perception — it is an object visible through eyes therefore there is contact between this object and the sense-organ (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*). But in Buddhist epistemology, the object smoke is not cognized through perception, it is only the *sāmānya lakṣaṇa* of the smoke that is inferred. But for having the inference of this smoke, some other mark of inference (*liṅga*) will be required and for that other mark of inference again one more inference mark will be needed — this chain will continue in an unending way.

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Arcaṭa gave a rebuttal to this objection by Kumārila, because Buddhists do not hold that all generalized reality (*sāmānya lakṣaṇa*) is cognized through inference only. But then this argument of Arcaṭa has gone against the dictum of Dharmakīrti himself, and thus misunderstood the theory of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. D.N. Shastri rightly points out that followers of Buddhist philosophy like Arcaṭa as well as the adherents of orthodox Nyāya philosophy misunderstood Dharmakīrti. The idea of inference in Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti is different from its counterpart in orthodox Nyāya.

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Besides, the commentary on *Hetubindu*, Arcaṭa had written at least two more works — *Kṣṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ* and *Pramāṇadvitvasiddhiḥ*.

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Durveka Miśra, who flourished between the last quarter of the tenth and the first half of the eleventh century CE, wrote a sub-commentary on Arcaṭa’s commentary on *Hetubindu*. The appellation *miśra* added after his name indicates that he must have been a brāhmaṇa and belonged to Mithilā. (Perhaps from a poor family as the very name Durveka is suggestive of.) He became a disciple of Jitāri, the head of Vikramaśilā University.¹²⁵ He had written five more works as referred in the sub-commentary — *Dharmottarapradīpa*, *Svayūthyavicāra*, *Viśeṣākhyāna*, *Kṣṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ* and *Catuḥśatī*.

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Ratnakīrti was one of the brilliant disciples of Dharmakīrti. In continuation to Dharmakīrti’s *Santānāntarasiddhi*, he wrote *Santānāntaradūṣaṇa* (Refutation of Other Mind-streams) in which he further developed and refined the themes of substantiation of other mind-streams. He did not refute the tenets of *Santānāntarasiddhi*, but further developed the topic from an empirical one, that is, where there are manifold minds cognized by one’s experience of others’ mental processes attributed through the perceived actions of other sentient beings to an absolutist view, there is only “one mind-stream” (*ekacitta*). Ratnakīrti’s argument is that the valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) of another’s mind-stream is an inference (*anumāna*) and not a direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). Moreover, Ratnakīrti introduced the two truths doctrine as key to the nature of the discussion as inference is trafficking with illusory universals (*sāmānya*), the proof of the mind-streams of others, whilst empirically valid in relative truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*), does not hold ultimate metaphysical certainty in absolute truth (*paramārtha-satya*).

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Both the proponents and the opponents of Buddhist philosophy extensively used Arcaṭa’s commentary for support and refutation of Dharmakīrti’s postulations. Amongst the orthodox Naiyāyikas, Śālikanātha, the author of *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Vyomaśiva refer to Arcaṭa. Udayana, one of the most outstanding philosophers in the tradition of the orthodox Nyāya and Vācaspati Miśra — known as a towering figure for his overall mastery of systems of philosophy known by that time — seem to have consulted Arcaṭa for sharpening their weapons against Buddhist philosophers like Dharmakīrti.

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Amongst Dharmakīrti's opponents, Vyomaśiva, Akalaṅka, Haribhadra and Jayanta came a little later after him, and all of them criticized him.

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Vācaspati Miśra, one of the most celebrated philosophers of India, entered into a debate with Dharmakīrti in his *Tātparyapariśuddhi*. He was followed by several other authors like Vyomaśiva in his text on Vaiśeṣika philosophy, Śālikanātha in his text on Mīmāṁsā and Akalaṅka, a Jaina philosopher. Dharmakīrti, who had lamented for having been left alone in his pursuits of philosophy, was actually supported by a host of his followers. Jñānaśrīmitra, Śāntarakṣita, Ratnakīrti and others sharply criticized Vācaspati Miśra for his attack on Dharmakīrti and presented a threadbare analysis of his arguments to demolish the prima facie views of Vācaspati Miśra. Finally it was Udayana, one of the greatest philosophers who entered into this scholastic debate and provided a sound defence for the Gautamīya Nyāya. Even though Udayana was countered by his critics from the Buddhist schools, the vigorous exercise which Dharmakīrti had initiated in one of the most enduring philosophical debates almost came to an end with Udayana.

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The opponents of Dharmakīrti on the other hand attacked the logistics of inference as envisaged by him. Amidst the works by the orthodox Naiyāyikas, *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi*, *Nyāyamañjarī* and *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* vehemently criticize him. The first two accept Dharmakīrti as an original thinker, the other two however find his theses as the derivative of *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama. A staunch critic of Dharmakīrti, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, specifically said that Dharmakīrti was indebted to Akṣapāda Gautama.

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The adherents of the orthodox schools had extra-logical considerations in their attempts to demolish the logical structures proposed by Dharmakīrti, as his theory of *anumāna* stood against the authenticity of the Veda. Bhāsarvajña, Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara are some other most brilliant stars on the terra firma of philosophy that dominated the debate between Buddhists and followers of Gautamīya Nyāya.

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