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Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s9: Debates on the Absolute and God as Creator

Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s9

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English

Debates on the Absolute and God as Creator

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Īśvaravāda (theory of the existence of God) is one of the most contentious issues that has always provoked vigorous fights not only between the non-believers and the believers, but amongst the theistic schools as well. The proponents of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools claimed that unknown can be known with the apparatus of facts that are known. They developed such apparatus through the process of logic based on *anumāna* (inference). The followers of Advaita Vedānta vehemently opposed any move to make the Supreme Being a subject of inference.

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The whole discourse on *Īśvarasiddhi* in the tradition of Nyāya is based on the edifice of the following three aphorisms in Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra*:

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*īśvaraḥ kāraṇaṁ, puruṣakarmaphalyadarśanāt |*
*na puruṣakarmābhāve phalāniṣpatteḥ |*
*tatkaritatvād ahetuḥ |* — IV.1.19-21
God is the cause (of the world), because actions of men (by themselves) do not yield fruits. (The opponent says): This is not so, because there is no fruit without the action by men. It is improper to say so, because, God makes men to take actions.

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Following Vātsyāyana's *bhāṣya* on these aphorisms, Ganganath Jha in his commentary entitled *Khadyota* suggests that these three aphorisms refute certain other systems and approve some systems. The first aphorism (IV.1.19) refutes the prima-facie view of Vedānta which accepts God as the *upādāna kāraṇa* (inherent cause) of world. The third aphorism (IV.1.21) again disapproves the Vedāntic view that God is the *nimitta kāraṇa* (efficient cause) of the world. Accordingly Vātsyāyana's view of *Iśvara* establishes Him as the observer and regulator of this world, and not as the creator. He does not transform himself in the form of this world. If we accept the theory of *pariṇāma* (transformation), the question would arise as to whether God transforms Himself partly or fully to create this world. There will objections both ways. If he transforms Himself partly then he would not remain *akhaṇḍa* (whole). If he transforms Himself fully then He will not remain eternal.

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Even though the Naiyāyika combated with Sāṁkhya, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta on the issue of Īśvaravāda, it is the Buddhist with whom he had to fight tooth and nail in this field. The Naiyāyikas and the Buddhist philosophers displayed remarkable ingenuity of reasoning here. John Vattanky says:

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From the discussions of these arguments and counter- arguments, we can easily see, if we are objective and unprejudiced, that these philosophers manifest an admirable spirit of rigorous thinking and often scale the very heights of human thought. The Buddhist attacks shorn of their ancient form and technical vocabulary have not since been surpassed by any system of human thought that denies the existence of God. And it could be said without exaggeration that the Nyāya arguments in their spirit and intent have gone as far as human spirit has ever gone in search of an answer to these objections and problems. They have established the existence of God with arguments as exact and as sure as it has been so far possible for human thinking. And this should evoke the appreciation and admiration of any objective historian of ideas.⁵⁴

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Vasubandhu was first to attack the idea of God as propounded by Gautama and his *bhāṣyakāra* Vātsyāyana. He gave the following arguments:
1. If there is a single cause for all the things, then all the things should originate at one time.
2. If God be accepted as the creator, he must have a purpose for creating this world. If the purpose is His satisfaction, then his very status as God becomes doubtful, as He is not satisfied with Himself. If the purpose is to keep others satisfied, then this world should not have been full of mysery.
3. Acceptance of God as the cause of all results in negation of other causes producing different effects.

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Even though these assertions by Vasubandhu were directed against Vātsyāyana's exposition of *Nyāyasūtra*, they were taken up for refutation by Sāṁkhya and Mīmāṁsā systems.⁵⁵

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Udyotakara attempted to resolve the dilemma of commentators on the three aphorism of *Nyāyasūtra* (IV.1.19-21) as cited above by establishing God as the *nimitta kāraṇa* of the world. The crux of his reasoning lies in the necessity of accepting God as activator of atoms, without being activated, the atoms cannot combine to produce things.

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Dharmakīrti devotes a sizeable portion in the first chapter of his *Pramāṇavārtika* on refuting the concept of the Absolute. The logic that there is always a creator for a cause would lead to fallacies. If there is a pot, then its creator is a *kumbhakāra*. This would make the *kumbhakāra* a creator of *valmīka* (anthill) also. In this way all the *hetus* cited for proving the existence of God are fallacious. The logic proving one substance as the causality of an effect can be employed to prove the non-causality of the same substance for the same effect.⁵⁶ Further acceptance of an eternal God as the cause of the world leads to fallacy, because it is not possible to formulate an invariable concomitance, rendering the inference invalid. When it is said that God is the cause of the world, one will have to accept that God was not the cause of this world when it was not created, and He becomes the cause of the world at the time of creation. This implies a change in the nature of God again rendering Naiyāyika's position untenable.

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Vācaspati Miśra approaches the issue of Īśvaravāda with his brilliant analytical mind. He divides all phenomena into three categories comprised of: things made by human beings like pot, things known as not created by human beings, viz. atoms; and things supposed to be created by God, viz. elements like the earth. With this premise, he develops the syllogism to prove that the world is not only caused by an intelligent agent, this intelligent agent also knows the material causes of this world directly.⁵⁷ On their objection that this intelligent agent has not actually been seen by anybody, he defeats the Buddhists on their own ground, i.e. they will be denying their own idea of point-instant. Developing the order of syllogisms further, Vācaspati proves that this intelligent agent is omniscient and eternal.

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Udayana in his magnum opus *Nyāyakusumāñjali* created a strong argumentative defence structure for cause of God. He countered the five major theses based on different views of causality:

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1. Materialist view that there is no supernatural cause of this world.
2. The Mīmāṁsā view that the other means of attaining *svarga* (heaven) rule out the necessity of a belief in God.
3. The Sāṁkhya view that there are valid means of proving that God does not exist.
4. Even if God exists, He cannot be relied upon as an object of right knowledge.
5. There are no positive arguments to prove His existence.⁵⁸

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Mīmāṁsā holds *anupalabdhi* or *abhāva* (non-existence) as a valid means of knowledge and uses it for the denial of God. Arguing against them, Udayana says — the mere non-apprehension of any entity does not prove its non-existence. It is the non-apprehension of a perceptible object that proves its non-existence. As a rebuttal to the Mīmāṁsaka, he specially gives eight proofs to prove the existence of God in chap. V of his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. They are:

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1. *Kārya*: Every effect has a cause. God is the being who conveys His intension through Veda.

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2. *Āyojana*: In the beginning of the creation, the conjunction of two atoms was caused by a conscious effort.

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3. *Dhṛti*: God is the preserver of this Universe.

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4. *Pada*: The existence of God is proved by the use of words like Īśa or Īśvara.

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5. *Pratyaya*: Use of verbal suffixes to indicate a particular tense in the Vedas, bringing out the intentions of God.

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6. *Śruti*: All the Vedas refer to God.

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7. *Vākya*: The Vedas have sentences describing God or praising Him.

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8. *Saṁkhyā*: Vedas refer to God in a singular number.⁵⁹

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The Cārvāka’s contention that perception is the only means of knowledge is refuted by Udayana with reasons for accepting inference. Perception does not work even in the well-known example of inference, i.e. “there is fire on the mountain, because smoke is arising from its top”.

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Haribhadra in his *Śāstrārthavārtāsamuccaya* raises a potent objection to theism on the basis of man’s choice and freedom. If a man has freedom of choice and has to decide his own course of action, God becomes unnecessary. Then trying to reconcile with theistic presumptions, he adds that the noble souls who have attained liberation may be called as gods.

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Following Udayana and Śaśadhara, the author of *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*, Gaṅgeśa gave as many as seven formulations of *pakṣa* in the invariable concomitance to prove the existence of God and also several formulations of the prima-facie view regarding the “syllogism of” in “being-an-effect” is “having-a-cause”. The universe itself being infinite cannot be taken as an individual *pakṣa*. In this way he goes on excluding everything that can be produced by human beings from the category of *pakṣa* to reach the conclusion that “what is not produced by an effort that is not produced can only by implication that which is produced by God”.⁶⁰ Gaṅgeśa also takes into account the theory of conjunction of the mind and the soul (*ātmamanaḥ saṁyoga*) for production of knowledge, and argues that no such conjunction was possible in the beginning of creation, there being no human body to make this conjunction possible. Therefore God has to be accepted here who could make the movement of mind possible. Another argument he employs in his discourse on *Īśvaravāda* is the ignorance of human beings with regard to the material cause of the universe.

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