Vyaktiviveka 1.13.2

1.13.2

ghaṭatīti ghaṭo jñeyo nāghaṭan ghaṭatāmiyāt. aghaṭatvāviśeṣeṇa paṭo'pi syād ghaṭo'nyathā..8.. ghaṭanañca tadātmatvāpattirūpā kriyā matā. mūlañca tasyāścitrārthabhāsāviṣkṛtirīśituḥ..9.. yaḥ kaścidarthaḥ śabdānāṃ vyutpattau syānnibandhanam. pravṛttau tu kriyaivekā sattā''sādanalakṣaṇā..10.. tasyāmeva kvibādyāśca vidheyāḥ kartṛmātrataḥ. na tūpamānādācāre tayorarthāt pratītitaḥ..11.. yathā hyaśvati bāleya ityato'rthaḥ pratīyate. aśvatvamāsādayati khara ityarthataḥ punaḥ..12.. aśvatulyasamācāraḥ khara ityavasīyate. na tattvasādanaṃ yuktaṃ tadatulyakriyasya hi..13.. sattāyāṃ vyāpṛtiścaiṣā citratvapariniṣṭhiteḥ. saṅgacchate jaḍasyāpi ghaṭāderghaṭanādivat..14.. nāmnaḥ sattvapradhānasya dhātukāro'ta eva hi. śabdavakraikadeśāderdhātvarthatvamavocata..15.. evañca vipacya ghaṭo bhavatīti ktvo'sya pūrvakālatvam. ghaṭanāpekṣaṃ jñeyaṃ bhavanāpekṣantu nāsamanvayataḥ..16.. bahiraṅgatvācca yathā bhavatyadhiśritya pācako'yamiti. atra hi pākāpekṣādhiśrayateḥ pūrvakālatāvagatiḥ..17.. tasmānnāmapadebhyo yaḥ kaścidarthaḥ pratīyate. na sa sattāmanāsādya śabdavācyatvamarhati..18.. itthañcāstibhavatyādi kriyāsāmānyamucyate. nāntaraṅgatayā'vaśyaṃ vaktārastat prayuñjate..19.. kriyāviśeṣo yastvanyaḥ pākādirvyabhicārabhāk. bahiraṅgatayā tasya prayogo'vaśyamiṣyate..20.. iti saṅgrahaślokāḥ.

'It takes form' (ghaṭate), therefore it should be known as a pot (ghaṭa); not taking form, it could not attain pot-ness. Otherwise, by the absence of distinction in not taking form, even a cloth would be a pot. // 8
And 'taking form' (ghaṭana) is regarded as the action whose nature is the attainment of that identity. And its root is the Lord's manifestation of the appearance of manifold objects. // 9
Whatever entity may be the basis for the derivation of words, in their actual application there is only one action, defined as the attainment of being. // 10
And it is with respect to that alone that suffixes like kvip and the like should be prescribed, merely by virtue of [its being] an agent, but not from standard of comparison with respect to conduct, because both are understood through sense. // 11
For just as from 'the donkey acts like a horse' (aśvati bāleyaḥ) the literal meaning is understood: 'the donkey attains horse-ness', but through the sense, again: // 12
'The donkey is of conduct equal to a horse' is determined. For the attainment of the true nature of that is not fitting for one whose action is not equal to it. // 13
And this activity toward being, owing to the completion of manifoldness, is compatible even with an insentient entity like a pot, as in taking form and so forth. // 14
For this very reason, the author of the Dhātupāṭha stated that the meaning of a verbal root belongs to a crooked segment of a word and so forth, in a noun which is predominantly being (sattva). // 15
And thus, in 'having baked, the pot comes to be' (vipacya ghaṭo bhavati), the anteriority of this suffix ktvā must be understood in relation to taking form, but not in relation to coming to be, because of the lack of syntactic connection. // 16
And because it is external, just as in 'having placed [the pot] on the fire, he becomes a cook' (adhiśritya pācako bhavati); for here, placing on the fire is understood as being anterior in relation to cooking. // 17
Therefore, whatever meaning is understood from nominal bases, without attaining being, it does not deserve to be the expressible sense of a word. // 18
And in this way, 'exists' (asti), 'comes to be' (bhavati), and the like are called action in general; speakers do not necessarily employ it, because it is internal. // 19
Whereas that which is a specific action, such as cooking and the like, which is subject to deviation, its employment is necessarily required because it is external. // 20
These are the summary verses.