Shringaraprakasha 4.p1.32

4.p1.32

anye punaḥ kriyānyatiriktamanudāyāstamabhinnamanavāvacchinnadeśaṃ ca dravyaṃ pṛthagvidhānekaśaktiśatasahastrapākāyatanaṃ jagatprattiniyamakāraṇaṃ kriyāparicchedahetumadṛṣṭādyapekṣaṃ kālāmācakṣate ; sa ca kriyāparicchedyaḥ kileti | kecidāhūśca--nityo vyāpi saṃprati bhūtaviṣyatkriyāsamāvośāt | ākāśaklapa eko dravyātmā bhidyate kālaḥ ; tañcāsamīcīnameveti brūmaḥ | kriyā hi sādhyatvāt sādhanamevāpekṣate | na ca kriyāviśṣṭasyāpi dravayātmanaḥ kālakārakeṇa saṃbandho ghaṭate, dvayorapi siddhatvāt | tasmāddravyapūpe kriyarūpe vā kriyāmeva vaśieṣayati | sa ca tadviśiṣṭā kārakaviśeṣamupatiṣṭhate | yadāha-- guṇaḥ kṛtātmasaṃskāraḥ pradhānaṃ pratipadyate | pradhānasyopakāritve tathā bhūyasi vartate || kalābhiḥ pṛthagarthābhiḥ pravibhaktaṃ svabhāvataḥ | kecidbūnusaṃdhānalakṣaṇatatvaṃ pracakṣate || sattālakṣaṇamanye tu kṣaṇarūpaṃ tathā'pare | devatāvastuśaktyātmasvarūpamapare viduḥ || tamasya lokayantrasya sūtradhāraṃ pracakṣate | pratibandhābhyanujñābhyāṃ vṛttiryā tasya śāśvatī || tayā vibhajyamāno'sau labhate kramarūpatām | tṛṇarājasya yā vṛddhistavācisārasya vā dadhat || cirakṣiprādibhede ca kālakatvaṃ vikalpate | vyatikme'pi mātrāṇāṃ na tasyāsti vyatikramaḥ || niyantṛgatibhedena mārgabhedo'sti kaścana | dūrāntikavyavasthāvanamadhvādikaraṇaṃ yathā || cirakṣipravyavasthānaṃ kālādhikaraṇaṃ tathā | kriyopādhissa yā bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānatā || parāvaravibhāgārthaṃ sā śaktiḥ pratipādyate | bhūtānāṃ caiva yadrūpaṃ rūpaṃ yadbhāvināmapi || sudurdarśa ivādarśe kāla evopalabhyate |

Others, however, describe time as a substance distinct from action, without rising or setting, undivided, of uncircumscribed location, the seat of the ripening of hundreds of thousands of diverse manifold powers, the cause governing the cosmic order, the cause of the delimitation of actions, and dependent upon unseen destiny and the like; and it is said to be delimited by action. And some say: "Time is one, eternal, all-pervading, resembling space, a substantial entity differentiated by the intrusion of present, past, and future actions." And we say that this is entirely incorrect. For an action, being an end to be accomplished, requires only an instrument of accomplishment. Nor does an entity of substantial nature, even when qualified by action, properly connect with time as a syntactic role, because both are already accomplished entities. Therefore, whether it has the form of a substance or the form of an action, it qualifies only the action; and qualified by that, it assists the specific syntactic role. As it is said: / "A subordinate factor, having refined itself, approaches the principal; / it functions thus when contributing abundantly to the principal. // By parts having distinct referents, it is divided by nature; / some declare its essence to be characterized by the continuity of moments. // Others, however, consider it characterized by existence; others as of the nature of the moment; / still others know it as having the nature of a deity, real entity, or power. // They call it the puppeteer of this cosmic mechanism; / its perpetual operation consists in obstruction and permission. // Divided by this [operation], it assumes sequential form; / bearing the growth of the bamboo or of the sugarcane, // and in the distinction between slow and swift and the like, the nature of time is conceptually differentiated; / even when elements are displaced, there is no displacement of it. // Through difference in the motion of the driver, there is a certain difference in the road; / just as distance and proximity are established with space as their locus, // so slow and swift are established with time as their locus. / That condition of past, future, and present, which is an adventitious condition of action, // is propounded as that power for the purpose of distinguishing earlier and later; / both the form of past things and the form of future things // are perceived in time alone, like [reflections] in a mirror difficult to perceive."