Shringaraprakasha 4.p1.33

4.p1.33

kriyābhedyathaikasmiṃstakṣādyākhyā pravartate || kriyābhedāttathaikasmin nṛtvākhyācopajāyacate | viseṣṭamapi dhattaṃ tamupādāyāvakalpate || kālaḥ kālavidāmekaḥ kālādipravibhaktaye | tṛṇaparṇalatādīni yathā stroto'vakarṣati || pravartayati kālo'pi mātrā mātrāvatāṃ yathā | prārambhāveśaniṣṭhāsu sthitivipratipattiṣu || sāmyotkarṣeṣu nimittaṃ kāla iṣyate | saṃsargiṇāṃ tu ye bhedā viśeṣāstasya te matā ḥ || saṃbhinnastaivyavasthānāṃ kālo bhedāya kalpate | prativyavasthaṃ kālasya vyāpāro na vyavasthitaḥ || kālo vā viśvarūpātmā vyāpārā iti kathyate | kriyāvacchedahetuṃ vā kriyāvacchedyameva vā || kālātmānamanāśritya vyavahartuṃ na śakyate | tasya vyaktasvarūpasya vyavahāre kriyākṛtāḥ || bhūtādayo mahābhedā yān loko nātivartate || 4.50. ke punaste yān bhūta upādhau luṅādiviṣayānudahariṣyāmaḥ | tadetat dravyātmanaḥ kriyātmano vā kriyāparicchedinaḥ kālasya svarūpamabhihitam | athāparamaparimeyātmano devatādirūpasya svaśaktinimittaviśaavapravṛttiparicchedyasya tasya paricchedino vā kriyāhetiśaktayāyatanabhūtadravyarūpapariṇataṃ nivṛttaṃ vā, na samastanivṛttasaṃgrahānugrahādinityavanaimittikādirūpaṃ, svarūpamasti | tatpurastāt pratipāditaṃ ; agrataśca viśeṣataḥ pratipādayiṣyata iti neha pratanyate, saṃbandhāvacchedārthaṃ tu leśato abhidhīyata iti | tatprabhedāddravyarūpo'pi kālaścatirdhā--nityo, naimittikaḥ, svābhāviko, vaiparāmarśika iti | teṣu nityaśśaśvatiko vaikalpikaḥ naiyogikaśca tridhā | naimittiko'pi audyogikaḥ aupayogikaḥ prāyogikaśceti trividhaḥ |

"Just as the designation 'carpenter' and the like applies to one person through difference in actions, / so the designation of seasons and the like arises in one [time] through difference in actions. / Even what is specified is conceived only by taking recourse to that; / time is one for those who know time, for the purpose of the manifold divisions into divisions of time and the like. / Just as a current carries away grass, leaves, vines, and the like, / so time also sets in motion the elements of those endowed with elements. / In commencement, progression, and conclusion, in stability and failure, / and in equality and excellence, time is acknowledged as the cause. / But the differences of its adjuncts are considered to be its own particularities; / blended with these conditions, time serves to introduce differentiation. / The operation of time is not fixed to each separate condition; / or time, universal in nature, is spoken of as operations themselves. / Without relying on the nature of time, whether as the cause of the delimitation of action or as delimited by action, / ordinary communicative activity is impossible. / Of that time whose nature is manifest, there are great divisions made by action in linguistic convention, / such as the past, which the world does not transgress." (4.50) / Which are these [divisions]? Those which we will illustrate as the domain of the aorist and the like under the condition of the past. / Thus has the nature of time—whether substantial or active, as the delimitation of action—been expounded. / Now, another nature of it exists: of unmeasurable essence, of the form of a deity and the like, to be delimited by the activity of the universe whose cause is its own power, or delimiting it, transformed into or detached from the form of a substance that is the locus of powers serving as causes of action; not consisting merely in universal withdrawal, preservation, grace, and the like, having an eternal or occasional form. That has been demonstrated previously, and will be specifically demonstrated ahead, hence it is not elaborated here; but it is stated briefly for the purpose of specifying connection. / Through its subdivisions, time as substance is also fourfold: eternal, occasional, natural, and reflective. Among these, the eternal is threefold: perpetual, alternative, and obligative. The occasional is also threefold: occupational, utilitarian, and applied.