Shringaraprakasha 6.p1.10

6.p1.10

tasmiṃśca prātipadikainaivokte kiṃ vibhaktyocyate | śaktiriti brumaḥ ? dvidhā hi dravyaṃ sattvabhūtamasattvabhūtañca | tayośśaktisaṅkhyāśrayassattvabhūtaṃ vṛkṣādyarthaḥ | tadanāśrayo'sattvabhūtamavyāyārthaḥ | tadubhayamapi nirupādhyeva prātipadikenocyate | tadāśritāstu saśaktisaṅkhyāsaṃbandhopādhayo vibhaktyeti | nanu ca --- svarūpādudbhavatkāryaṃ sahākāryubṛṃhitam| naiva kalpayituṃ śaktaṃ śaktimanyāmatīndriyām || 6.5. śaktirhi kalpyamānā padārthasvarūpavannityā vā syāt | kāryaṃ vā tatra nityatve nityameva kāryotpādaprasaṅgaḥ |sahakāryapekṣā tu svarūpasyaivāstu kiṃ śaktyā | kāryatve tu padārthasvarūpamātrakāryatāyāṃ sadā śakterutapādāt sadaiva kāryotpādaḥ | sāmagrīkāryaṃ tu kāryamevāstu | kimantarāle śaktyā ? aśaktātkārakātkāryāniṣpattiriti cecchaktirapi kāryaṃ, tadutpattatau śaktyantarakalpanādanavasthā ; anyathā'byupagamanyāghātaḥ | āha, dṛṣṭasiddhaye hyadṛṣṭaṃ kalpyate | śaktyantarakalpanāyāḥ śaktiśreṇinirmāṇa eva, kṣāṇatvāt | kārakāṇāṃ mābhūtkāryavyāghāta ityekaiva śaktiḥ kalpyate | tatkutonavasthā ? naivam ; anyathāpi tadupapatteḥ | yadi hyarthatattvaṃ kriyāsu pratihanyeta tadā tadatiriktāśaktikalpanā yuktamiti | apratihatāśca sahakārilābhādapi kāryopajanaścārthavyaktayaḥ | tatkiṃ vṛthā śaktikalpanayeti | 6.6. nanu śaktimantareṇa kārakaṃ, kārakameva na bhanet, bhāvatattvasya kriyāsu pratidhātāt |

And when that [substance] is already expressed by the nominal stem itself, what is expressed by the case suffix? We reply: capacity (śakti). For substance is of two kinds: concrete entity (sattvabhūta) and non-concrete entity (asattvabhūta). Of these two, that which is concrete is the substrate of capacity and number, such as the referent of 'tree' and the like; that which is non-concrete is not their substrate, such as the referent of an indeclinable. Both of these are expressed by the nominal stem purely without limitation; but the limiting conditions dependent upon them, consisting in capacities, numbers, and relations, are expressed by the case suffix. But against this it is objected:

'An effect, arising from the thing's own nature assisted by auxiliaries, is by no means capable of establishing another capacity that is beyond the senses.' (6.5)

For if a capacity is posited, it must either be eternal, like the intrinsic nature of the word-meaning, or it must be an effect. In that regard, if it were eternal, there would follow the constant production of the effect. If dependence on auxiliaries is admitted, let it belong to the intrinsic nature itself; what is the use of capacity? If, on the other hand, it is an effect, then if it is an effect merely of the intrinsic nature of the word-meaning, the effect would be produced at all times because the capacity would always be produced; but if it is the effect of the whole causal complex, let that effect simply be the effect itself! What is the use of an intermediate capacity? If it be said that no effect is produced from an incapable factor (kāraka), then capacity itself is an effect, and positing another capacity for its production leads to infinite regress; otherwise, one's own premise is contradicted. He replies: the unseen is posited for the sake of establishing what is seen; the positing of another capacity would only be exhausted in constructing a series of capacities; a single capacity is posited so that there may be no frustration of the effects of causal factors. Whence then an infinite regress? It is not so, because it is established otherwise: if the true nature of things were obstructed in actions, then the assumption of a capacity over and above that would be proper; but individual things, being unobstructed, produce effects simply upon obtaining auxiliaries; why then this useless positing of capacity? (6.6) But surely, without capacity, a causal factor would not even be a causal factor, because the reality of an entity would be obstructed in its actions.