Shringaraprakasha 6.p1.11

6.p1.11

rupameva hi dṛśyate na rasādi, darśanāyatanaṃ paśyati na rasanādi, rasa eva ratasyate na rūpādi, rasanameva rasayati na cakṣurādi, āpa eva pipāsāmapanayanti na tvagniḥ, agnireva śītaṃ śamayati na tvāpa iti | apratighāte hi vastusvarūpāviśeṣāt sarvasmātsarvakāryodayaprasaṅgaḥ | tatascakṣuriva rasanamapi paśyet | rūpamiva saro'pi dṛśyeta | rasanamiva cakṣurapu rasayet | rasa iva rūpamapi rasyeta | āpa ivāgnirapi pipāsāmapanayet | agnirivāpo.pi śītaṃ śamayeyuḥ | yathā ca tailārthinā tilā upādīyante tathā sikatā apyupādīyeran | yathā vā pādapaṃ chettumanasā paraśurudyamyate tathā pādukādyapyudyamyeta | api ca viśadahanayormāraṇe dāhe ca śaktāvaniṣyamāṇāyāṃ mantrapratibaddhāyāṃ yattayossvakāryodāsūnyaṃ tatra kā yuktiḥ ? cakṣuḥśrotrayorvā darśane śravaṇe ca rogādinā yat svakāryākaraṇaṃ tatra kopapattiḥ ? na hi mantrādinā rogādinā vā tatsvarūpāṇi sahakārimo vā pratibadhyante, tadrūpeṇaiva teṣāmuralambhāt | śaktayastu pratibadhyanta iti satsvapi svarūpasahakāriṣu kāryānutpādo yuktāḥ | tasmādyathā sukhādikāryānumutamadṛṣṭaṃ sātiśayabuddhinibandhanasmṛtipratyayahetissaṃskāraḥ kriyāviśeṣajanitaḥ kriyāntaraprasavopayogī vega ityādyaparamatīndriyameva kalpyate | bhavadbhistathā śaktirapi kāryātiśayakāramamatīndriyā kalpyatāmiti | tadanupapannam ; śaktimantareṇāpi kriyāpratighātādīnāmupapatteḥ | svakāraṇaparaṃparāyātaniyatasvabhāvatayaiva bhinnasvabhāvā rasādayo rūpādibhyaste rūpādibhyaste kathaṃ rūpādisādhyāmarthakriyāmatathābhūtāssādhayeyuḥ ? niyogataścaitadaṅgīkartavyam ;

For color-form alone is seen, not taste and the like; the organ of vision sees, not that of taste and the like; taste alone is tasted, not color-form and the like; the tongue alone tastes, not the eye and the like; water alone removes thirst, not fire; fire alone dispels cold, not water. For if there were no restriction, since the intrinsic nature of things is without distinction, every effect would arise from everything. Consequently, the tongue too would see like the eye; taste too would be seen like color-form; the eye too would taste like the tongue; color-form too would be tasted like taste; fire too would quench thirst like water; water too would dispel cold like fire; and just as sesame seeds are taken by one desiring oil, so sand too would be taken; or just as an axe is raised by one intending to cut down a tree, so a shoe or the like would also be raised. Furthermore, when poison and fire are prevented from their effects of killing and burning by mantras, if capacity is denied, what is the explanation for their failure to produce their respective effects? Or what is the justification when the eye and the ear fail to produce their own effects of seeing and hearing due to illness and the like? For neither their intrinsic natures nor their auxiliaries are obstructed by mantras or illnesses, since they are still perceived in their proper form; but their capacities are obstructed, so that the non-production of effects is explicable even when their intrinsic nature and auxiliaries are present. Therefore, just as other imperceptible things are posited by you—such as the unseen factor (adṛṣṭa) inferred from effects like pleasure, the mental impression (saṃskāra) that is the cause of recollection based on enhanced cognition, or momentum (vega) produced by a particular motion and serving to generate further motion—in the same way let an imperceptible capacity that causes the distinction of the effect be posited! This is untenable; because the obstruction of action and the like are established even without capacity. Tasting and the like have distinct natures from color-form and the like solely by virtue of their fixed natures inherited from their own causal lineage; how could these [factors], not being of such a nature, accomplish an effective action that is to be accomplished by color-form and the like? And this must necessarily be accepted;