Shringaraprakasha 8.p1.23

8.p1.23

tathā ca devadatta gāmānayeti karaṇānupādānādaparipūrṇatā syāt || 8.21. athaikakārakajñānenāpi tāvadanuṣṭhānopapatterna kārakāntarajijñāsā devadatta gāmabhyaja daṇḍeneti prayukte'pi daṇḍaśabde tadākāṅkṣā na syāt | tataścānākāṅkṣitatvāttasya tadanvayo vākyārtho na syāt || 8.22. atha daṇḍapadoñcāraṇāttatrākāṅkṣā parikalpyate ; anyathā daṇḍapadasyānanvaye tatpadoñcāraṇamanarthakaṃ syāditi | evamaruṇayaikahāyanyā piṅgākṣyā somaṃ krīṇātītyanvayaprasaṅgaḥ | na hi vedapadoñcāramenānarthakena bhavitavyamiti kiñcana pramāṇamasti | na ca tatrākāṅkṣodaye kiñcitkāraṇāntaramastīti somaṃ krīṇātītyato'dhikasyānanvayitā syāt | ato nākāṅkṣāyāmavinābhāvo nimittatvenāśrīyata iti | ākāṅkṣāvañca sannidhāvapi sannidhāpakakrameṇaiva kramo veditavyaḥ | tadanusāreṇa cānvitābhidhānamapi tathaiveti || sannidhiśśabdajanmaiva vyutpattau nopalakṣaṇam | adhyāhṛtenāpyarthena loke sambandhadarśanāt || sahasaiva na sarveṣāṃ sannidhiḥ pratiyoginām | sannidhāpakasāmagrīkrameṇa kramavānasau || yathāyathā sannidhānaṃ jāyate pratiyoginām | tathātathā krameṇaiva śabdairanvitabodhanam || || yo gya tā || 8.23. atha kā yogyatā ? yadetatsambandhārhatvaṃ nāma | taddhidhā---mukhyārthadvārakaṃ jaghanyārthadvārakaṃ ca | kaḥ pumarmukhyārthaḥ jaghanyārtha iti ? śravamasamanantaraṃ sākṣādeva śabdādyatrārthaḥ pratīyate sa mukhamiva prathamaṃ bhavatīti mukhyaḥ | yastu guṇasambandhādivyavadhānena śabdādavagamyate sa jaghanamiva paścājjāyata iti jaghanyaḥ |

And in that case, [in a sentence like] "Devadatta, bring the cow!", there would be incompleteness because no instrument is mentioned. [8.21] Now, if [it is held that] because execution [of an action] is possible even through the cognition of a single syntactic role, there would be no desire to know another syntactic role, then even when the word "stick" is uttered in "Devadatta, drive the cow with a stick!", there would be no expectancy for it; and consequently, because it is unexpectant, its syntactic connection would not be the sentence-meaning. [8.22] Now, if an expectancy is assumed in that case merely from the utterance of the word "stick"—on the grounds that otherwise, if the word "stick" had no syntactic connection, the utterance of that word would be meaningless—then there would absurdly result a [direct] syntactic connection [among the qualifications] in "He buys the soma with a red, one-year-old, brown-eyed [cow]". For there is no authority whatever asserting that the utterance of a Vedic word must be useless [if unconnected]. Nor is there any other cause for the arising of expectancy there, so that everything beyond "He buys the soma" would lack syntactic connection. Therefore, invariable concomitance is not resorted to as the cause in expectancy. And just as with expectancy, in proximity also the order is to be understood strictly in accordance with the sequence of the causes that produce proximity; and following that, connected designation is also just so. / Proximity is generated only from linguistic sound, and is not a mere secondary indicator in linguistic comprehension, / for in the world a relation is seen even with a meaning that is supplied by ellipsis. / Not all counter-correlates have proximity simultaneously; / proximity possesses a sequence according to the sequence of the totality of causes producing proximity. / In whatever manner the proximity of the counter-correlates arises, / in that very manner, in sequence, is the awareness of the connected [meaning] brought about by the words. / Fitness. [8.23] Now, what is fitness? It is this property of being suitable for relation. It is of two kinds: operating through primary meaning, and operating through secondary meaning. What, then, are primary meaning and secondary meaning? That meaning which is understood directly from a word immediately upon hearing it is "primary" because, like a face, it comes first; but that which is understood from a word through the intervention of a relation of quality or the like is "secondary" because, like the rear, it arises later.