Shringaraprakasha 8.p1

The eighth chapter: 'Illumination of the Relational Capacities of Words in Mutual Expectancy'. There, mutual expectancy is the mutual requirement between word-meanings whose difference of relation has become apparent. And this occurs in what is contiguous and compatible. As in: 'The god rains.' Since the action of raining cannot occur without an agent, it expects the 'god', which is contiguous and compatible. Where, however, that which is contiguous lacks compatibility, that which is compatible is expected even if separated by intervening words. As in: 'Enter, the rice-ball.' Here, since the action of entering cannot occur in an incompatible rice-ball, it expects that which is compatible, such as 'the house', even though separated. This object-word 'rice-ball' too, being impossible in connection with 'enter', expects a compatible action-word such as 'eat'. This mutual expectancy among word-meanings, in brief, is threefold: denotational, logical, and prohibitive. Among them, that which is expressed through direct Vedic audition, superimposition, sentence, alternation, conjunction, extended application, and the like, is denotational. That which is apprehended through conjecture, inversion, transformation, supplied ellipsis, positing a separated head noun in a sentence, and the like, is logical. That which is excluded through impossibility of expression, contradiction, accomplishment of purpose, exclusive specification, ascertainment, and the like, is prohibitive. Among them, the denotational is first: where there is specification of an attribute and a subject for the sake of resemblance between two things, by repetition and through a difference of case-inflection heard directly, that is denotational through direct audition. As in: 'With his slender body touching her slender body, his burning hot limb touching hers intensely heated, his tear-filled face touching hers moist with tears, with intense yearning touching her longing, his hot breath touching hers breathing deeply—blocked in his way by a hostile fate, he enters her far distant through those mental resolves.' And where also, for the sake of resemblance between two things, there is a connection of attribute and subject through a single shared expression and non-difference of case-inflection, that too is denotational through direct audition. As in: 'Seeing Rāma with his younger brother, like a leafy tree devoid of shade, having lost its foliage through fate, and unsought by those seeking fruit, she wept.'

Where the meaning of a designation is established through a word or through a sentence, that is nominal [expectancy] (*samākhyābhidhānikī*). Through a word, for instance:
"He is a refuge for those who have come for refuge, of unfathomable courage, established in Magadha; / a king who has won fame by pleasing his subjects, Parantapa ('oppressor of foes') by name, truly named."
Through a sentence, for instance: […]
Where, having expressed a sentence that raises mutual expectancy, that which establishes it is expressed, or having expressed that which establishes it, that which raises mutual expectancy is expressed, that is sentential [expectancy] (*vākyābhidhānikī*). Of these two, the first is as follows: […]
The second is as follows: […]
That which originates from expressing an alternative is alternative [expectancy] (*vikalpābhidhānikī*), for instance: […]
That which originates from expressing a conjunction is conjunctive [expectancy] (*samuccayābhidhānikī*), for instance: […]
Where attributes obtained through general or specific transfer of rules are expressed either before or after, that is transference [expectancy] (*atideśābhidhānikī*). There, the statement beforehand of an attribute obtained through general transfer is as follows: […]
Likewise it should be observed when placed after as well.
The statement afterwards of an attribute obtained through specific transfer is as follows: […]
Because of the word "etc.", where a single expression mentions something else incidentally, that is incidental [expectancy] (*prasaṅgābhidhānikī*). That too is of two kinds: by word and by sentence. Of these two, the first is as follows: […]

[…] / […].
Here, while describing beauty, he incidentally indicates the six tastes, and whether they are desired or not desired. The second is as follows:
"Sluggish with recent opening, unable to face the radiance of the jewel lamps, / heavy with its own movement, with drops of water produced by yawns and stretchings of the limbs, / wishing to leave the couch that has the mark of the serpent [Śeṣa] and the pillow of the round horizon, / red from the interruption of sleep, slightly closed—may Hari's gaze protect you for a long time!"
Here, in the *Mudrārākṣasa*, when the Kaumudī festival has been forbidden by Cāṇakya and Rākṣasa is scheming, the bard, reciting auspicious morning verses, secretly informs Candragupta that the autumn has arrived.

8.2. Now, logical [expectancy] (*naiyāyikī*). Where a previously spoken sentence is adjusted and applied to another meaning by clever speakers and the like through conjecture (*ūha*), they consider that conjectural logical [expectancy] (*ūhanaiyāyikī*). As follows: Kālidāsa, being asked by Vikramāditya, "What is the lord of Kuntala doing?", said:
"Because of slight smiling, as if washed by luster; because of budded eyes, with blue lotus ear-ornaments clearly visible— / having laid his burdens upon you, the lord of the Kuntalas drinks the nectar-fragrant faces of his beloveds."
Vikramāditya, having conjectured from this very [verse], replied:
"Let the lord of the Kuntalas, having laid his burdens upon me, drink the nectar-fragrant faces of his beloveds!"
Where words are rearranged according to the order of sense when connection is impossible through the order of reading, that is inverted logical [expectancy] (*viparyayanaiyāyikī*). As follows:
"Feeding on fallen leaves of trees by oneself is said to be the highest stage of asceticism; / she, however, cast aside even that; therefore those who know the past call that sweet-speaking lady 'Aparṇā' ('leafless')."
Here, the words are construed inverted as: "therefore those who know the past call that sweet-speaking lady Aparṇā." Where, in the use of words of equivalent sense, modifier and modified are construed by changing the grammatical case, that is case-variation logical [expectancy] (*vipariṇāmanaiyāyikī*).

As follows:
"Radiant with teeth [as peaks with tusks], having pristine stone girdles [as pristine rock ledges], with large buttocks [as broad slopes] adorned with excellent gem-bracelets, / having firm and smooth rounded breasts [as firm, smooth projecting rocks], women enjoy a fitting dwelling upon this mountain's plateaus."
Here, the modifiers ending in the locative and those ending in the nominative modify women and plateaus through variation of grammatical case. By this, variation of number and case, and variation of gender, are also explained. Of these two, the first is as follows:
"Victorious kings with their virtues followed the wielder of the Śārṅga bow [Kṛṣṇa], / who possesses an unbroken discus held in his hand [or: an unbroken circle of kings held in his power], dear to the foremost among the twice-born [or: the Moon], whose chest is embraced by Śrī, who is devoted to Satyā [or: devotion to truth], the conqueror of Naraka."
The second is as follows:
"Yellowing the quarters with the rays of their shining masses of gold, grazing the mass of clouds with their bamboo flagstaffs, / the rows of chariots shone like feet of the king planted continuously."
Where another meaning is supplied to satisfy expectancy, that is supply-based logical [expectancy] (*adhyāhāranaiyāyikī*). As follows:
"Not by gift, not by honor, not by trickery, not by service, / not by weapon, not by scripture—in any way whatever, women [are never] ..."
Here, "brought under control" and so on is to be supplied. Where, when an imperative ending or the like is not explicitly heard, an injunction or prohibition is posited because all sentences aim at injunction or prohibition, that is sentence-remainder logical [expectancy] (*vākyaśeṣanaiyāyikī*). As follows:
"That indeed is unexpected luck, or that is an accidental stroke, / namely, that the lives of undisciplined men, and the fortunes of immoral men, [endure]. / Therefore, when an undisciplined king hears that he is established on the throne, / like a fire previously smoldering, [rage] arose in the heart of kings."
Here, since the action of hearing is impossible for a fire, and the antecedent-time relation is incompatible, even in "having heard that he was established on the throne", the meaning at the time of origin—namely "the status of being kings"—though separated, is brought in. Thereby this meaning is achieved: "Hearing that he was established on the throne, in the heart of those bearing the pride of kings, fire as it were arose." By this, attribute-conjecture logical [expectancy] (*guṇakalpanā-naiyāyikī*) is also explained. As follows: […]

[… having placed her hand on the lotus grove, the splendour descends upon the world.] By the mention of “and the like” [in the definition], the extraction of embedded words, sentence-split, and so forth are included. Among them, where a word concealed within a compound is extracted and linked by means of a pronoun and the like, that is logical connection by extraction (apoddhāranaiyāyikī). As in: / “Auspicious rites are observed by one intent on averting misfortune, or by one eager for prosperity. / For a virtuous being who is the refuge of the world and devoid of desires, what need is there for these pursuits of hope?” / Here, when the words “misfortune” (vipad) and “prosperity” (vibhūti), which are concealed within compounds, are retrieved by the pronoun “these” (ābhiḥ), the sense is properly formed: “What need has the refuge of the world of misfortunes? What need has one devoid of desires of prosperities?” / Where, despite forming a single sentence, the required sense is not obtained and another sentence is posited, that is logical connection by sentence-split (vākyabhedanaiyāyikī). As in: / “Your unequalled good fortune, and my daring unsuited to a woman, / the flood of the Godāvarī knows, and the midnight of the monsoon night.” / Here, “The flood of the Godāvarī knows your unequalled good fortune and my daring unsuited to a woman” constitutes one complete sentence; upon the expectancy that “a single witness is not authoritative,” the second sentence follows: “and the midnight of the monsoon night [knows].” For otherwise, if there were only a single sentence, according to the rule of relative order of application (yathāsaṅkhya), the meaning would result: “The flood of the Godāvarī knows your good fortune, but the midnight of the monsoon night knows my daring.” And if even this is not the scope of relative order, what else could be? If it be asked what fault there would be in that, [we reply:] the failure to accomplish the intended meaning. For on the view of relative order, the sense would be: “If only the flood is able to enter into those cave-dwellings on the bank of the Godāvarī screened by expanding tendrils of sprouts where, driven by passion, you take your pleasure being approached by noble women; and if only the midnight of the rainy season is able to see great acts of daring as I wander in the dead of a monsoon night when all the people of the countryside are fast asleep, when rain pours from clouds in utter darkness with no movement of people, and no one else has this capacity” — this sense would follow.

And this is not her intended meaning; rather, it is: “You are indeed so fortunate, and I am indeed so daring that, crossing the Godāvarī filled with flood-waters at midnight during the rains, disregarding danger to my life, I have come to you; therefore, deferring to gratitude, you, though beloved by many because of your supreme attractiveness, ought not to abandon tenderness toward me who am devoted to you.” / 8.3. Now, where a property of a word-meaning that extends to another meaning by virtue of similarity and so forth is negated by an explicit statement, that is negation by statement (vacananaiṣedhikī). And it is twofold: caused by an implied [absence] and caused by [explicit statement]. The first of these is as follows: / “At the base is a succession of thorns, and above are blossoming red flowers; / by this much alone does the silk-cotton tree resemble the lotus-cluster, not [further].” / Here, the silk-cotton tree’s resemblance extending to the lotus-cluster due to the commonality of thorns and flowers is negated by the statement indicating the absence of implied qualities such as fragrance. / The second is as follows: / “One who knows practical duty should be consulted, not one who is merely venerable or dear to me; / a guru is to be revered with a seat, [and] when is a beloved’s hip a counselor?” / Here, whoever is venerable or dear to someone is generally thought to be his counselor through the qualities of venerability and dearness; that condition of being consulted, which had extended [to both] through venerability and dearness, is negated by the statement indicating the absence of knowledge of practical duty, made vivid by reliance on the example of the beloved's hip. / Where what is to be enjoined is negated because of impossibility, that is negation by impossibility (asambhavanaiṣedhikī). That is of two kinds: caused by lack of occasion, and caused by non-production. The first of these is as follows: / “On the path of the pen that slipped as my trembling, sweating fingers clasped it, / even the word ‘svasti’ is not finished; dear friend, what shall we write in the letter?” / Here, since the word ‘svasti’ is unfinished, there is no occasion for giving a message and so forth that would occur subsequent to it; thus, through impossibility caused by that, the enjoining of writing is negated. / The second is as follows: / […]

Here, because even curds have not been produced, through the impossibility of the subsequent production of buttermilk, the enjoining of drinking buttermilk is negated. / Where an effect is averted by a contradictory word or meaning, that is negation by contradiction (virodhanaiṣedhikī). The first of these is as follows: / “Let their leaves be torn away, which do not come from that direction; / seeing whose face are those people kept alive?” / Here, [the sentence] “Those news are to be inquired of; those who do not come from that direction” [presents a contradiction]. Through a sentence conflicting in its former and latter parts, the nominative does not attach to anything; just as the word “blue” (nīla), expressing the universal of its own meaning, is connected directly with the nominative case by distinguishing the meaning of the nominal stem, and similarly the word “lotus” (utpala). That very word which merely denotes an undistinguished meaning, even in the proximity of another word, remains that very word; therefore, the form determined as capable of denoting that meaning conveys that very meaning even in the proximity of another word. For difference of form does not allow the sense of taste, in the absence of the sense of sight, to manifest sweetness and the like, nor does it gain the capacity to manifest blueness and the like in the presence of sight. Rather, a person who has ascertained the meaning of two words, upon their juxtaposition, by the power of usage, by the mutual compatibility of the two meanings to coalesce, and by the apprehension of a single sentential form, conceives them mutually in the relation of qualifier and qualified (viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya) through the relation of primary and subordinate. To explain: where a qualifier and a qualified attain unity in a single meaning, the word there conveys this basis residing in the prior and posterior words. The word “lotus,” setting forth, proceeds as an apprehension of all lotuses; the word “blue,” setting forth in that very same locus, delimits it as a specific apprehension. Or rather, “blue,” which while proceeding requires a relation of less or more, and which by this very property is capable of applying to everything, is restricted to a qualified suitability by another word, namely “lotus.”

Or, just as in the case of ‘this black and white deer is dappled (sāraṅga)’ or ‘variegated (śābala)’, so in ‘blue lotus’ (nīlotpala) the entity itself is indeed dual in form, for both [aspects] are situated in it. ‘The blue and the lotus are one, [namely] a blue lotus’—that single substratum of the two in which the two qualities are experienced distinctively and yet the two entities become as though fused together. Or rather, the word ‘blue’ (nīla), when it operates, operates by taking up the quality of blueness alone; nor are the lotus and the rest, though taken up, abandoned by it. In the same way, the word ‘lotus’ (utpala) operates by taking up only the association with its distinct class; it neither abandons nor takes up blueness and the like. There, just when the two distinct forms of meaning are embraced as they are referred to by the pronoun ‘this’—as ‘this substance is both blue and a lotus’—then, because of the difference between the words, the substance is different as qualifier and qualified […] Because the relationship of qualifier and qualified depends on the juxtaposition of two words, it is the sentence-meaning, not the word-meaning. That is what is stated: ‘Whatever is additional here, that is the sentence-meaning’ in ‘blue lotus’. And because both qualifier and qualified are qualified, their subordination is not established. For just as the word ‘lotus’, connected with the word ‘blue’, expresses a specification, so too the word ‘blue’, connected with the word ‘lotus’, is connected as expressing a specification. Not so: here the prominence of one is intended, and the non-prominence of the other—of the lotus—is intended, [namely] the subordination of the word ‘blue’. When, then, the prominence of the blue and the subordination of the lotus are intended, then grammatical apposition must be formed; for this is not a dvandva compound, ‘a lotus and a blue’, nor is it a genitive compound, ‘the blue of a lotus’; rather, these two principal words are simultaneously applied to a single referent. And there is no purpose in simultaneously applying two principal words to a single referent; therefore, from the capacity of usage, it is understood: one here is principal, and the other qualifies it.

There is only this doubt: what is the qualified, and what is the qualifier? In that regard, the substance is the qualified and the quality is the qualifier, because the substance, having no need of another, has prominence through its direct utility in actions. / Objection: But the direct utility of a quality in actions is also seen, as in ‘one should sacrifice a white goat’. / [Reply:] Not so. Here, in the absence of a white [goat], one sacrifices even a black goat, but one does not fulfill one's duty by sacrificing a white mass of dough. So too, even when metaphorical transfer operates in such expressions as ‘a man-tiger’ (puruṣavyāghra), if the object of comparison, such as a man, whose difference is understood from the connection to the standard of comparison internal to it, is denoted by the word ‘tiger’ and the like, then, when grammatical apposition is established, the compound takes place according to [the rule] ‘an object of comparison [is compounded] with tiger and the like, when the common property is not expressed’. In the same way, expressions like ‘he cooks well’ (prapacati) and ‘he cooks properly’ (sādhu pacati) are to be regarded. / But how, when functioning as action-qualifiers through apposition, do words like ‘properly’ (sādhu) denote non-substances? / It is replied: Just like prefixes, action-qualifiers too, being indeed non-substantial, enter into subordination to the action. Just as the word pra-, establishing cooking and the like in a specific state and having a non-substantial meaning, attains qualifier status, so too the word sādhu, denoting an excellence or the like situated in the action, which constitutes an action-property, is non-substantial, and has entered into the action, assumes the status of a non-substance precisely in conformity with the action and attains the status of an action-qualifier. / But how, in ‘he cooks well’ (prapacati) and the like, when pra- and the rest qualify both, is there a connection with the action-portion alone? Or, if that is the case, how do they qualify both?

It is replied: / Just as in ‘a month after birth’ (māso jātasya), how does the complex of actions called ‘a month’ delimit as a terminus the birth called the initial separation from the womb, or measure out by repetition the existence obtained at birth? And just as in ‘one who has resorted to hardship’ (kaṣṭaśritaḥ), the agent, delimited by the specific action taken up, having internalized the relation of means, when connected to the action, through connection with the action of resorting, has the status of an object in relation to hardship, and so experiences connection with hardship mediated by the action of resorting; and just as in ‘frightened of a wolf’ (vṛkādbhītaḥ), the agent, delimited by the action taken up, because of the connection to the action of fear, the wolf having the status of an ablative point of departure, is connected with the wolf mediated by the action of fear; so here too, the agent, delimited by the specific action taken up, such as cooking, having internalized the relation of end and means, when connected with the action, pra- and the rest having the status of prefixes, is connected to pra- and the rest mediated by the action. And all things related to a whole are connected with that whole possessing parts only through contact with a part. That has been said: / ‘Those whose connection is with a whole, such as a teacher's family, / are joined with that [whole] having parts by touching its parts.’ / Syntactic connection is the mutual interweaving of word-meanings taken up toward a single meaning through mutual expectancy and the like. That is threefold: based on semantic power (śākta), based on case inflection (vaibhakta), and consisting of both power and inflection (śaktivibhaktimaya). Among these, that which is accomplished by powers such as that of the object is based on semantic power; that which is accomplished by inflections such as that of the genitive relation is based on case inflection; and that which is accomplished by both consists of power and inflection. There, when the agent and the object are denoted by finite verbal and nominal endings, the one based on semantic power is as follows: / ‘The high golden seats that these [kings] sat upon, / by them was imagined a resemblance to the three peaks of Trikūṭa overcome by lions.’ / When the two powers of the agent existing at different times are denoted by a primary nominal suffix (kṛt) and a finite verb ending (ākhyāta), and when the object, instrument, and recipient are denoted by nominal case inflections, the one based on semantic power is as follows: / ‘Without conquering the earth bounded by the oceans, without sacrificing with diverse sacrifices, / and without giving wealth to petitioners, how could I be a king?’

When the verbal ending expresses causal capacity, and the case endings express the capacities of object, agent, source, and locus, for example: / 'He caused the bridge to be built by the monkeys in the salt ocean, / like Śeṣa emerging from Rasātala for the sleep of the wielder of the Śārṅga bow.' / In 'for sleep' (svapnāya), there is a genitive sense of agency, not of relation; and the dative case expresses merely the action itself, not purpose. / When the agent is expressed by a finite verb, the object by a kṛt-affix through a secondary nominal derivative, and the expressed and unexpressed objects by nominal case endings, the semantic capacity is illustrated thus: / 'Indeed, without completely rendering the adversary powerless, stability is hard to attain; / without turning the dust into mud, water does not stay.' / An example involving a case ending expressing relation is: / 'He who has wealth, has friends; he who has wealth, has kinsmen; / he who has wealth is a real man in the world; and he who has wealth is wise.' / An example involving a case ending of residual relation is: / 'Among beings, living creatures are the best; among living creatures, those living by intellect; / among the intelligent, humans are the best; among humans, those who proclaim the Veda.' / An example involving a case ending conditioned by an adjoining word is: / 'Salutation to Śambhu, who is charming with the chowrie of the moon kissing his lofty head, / the foundational pillar for the beginning of the city of the three worlds.' / And an example involving the vocative case ending is: / 'O Inner Self of earth, wind, fire, ether, and water! O Sun! O Moon! O Universe! O Sole Womb of the Universe! / O Hara, Bhava, Śiva, Śarva, Tryambaka, Īśāna, Rudra, Trinayana, Vṛṣaketu, Infinite Form! Salutation to You!' / An example consisting of both semantic and inflectional capacities through syntactic role endings, relational endings, adjoining word endings, residual endings, and vocative endings is: / 'At sacred sites, who except you has the power to give ceaselessly / to the best of the twice-born wealth not grasped by hostile people, which has the name of absorption?' / Where capacities shine forth even when case endings are elided, and case endings are also directly perceived, that too consists of semantic and inflectional capacities. / For example: / 'Whose enemies are terrified, whom people desire, to whom feudatories have surrendered, who has borne fortitude, / who is established in the sacrificial session of steadfast duty, who has conquered the earth—who here is like you?'

Where the semantic capacity is on one side and the inflectional ending on the other, that too consists of semantic and inflectional capacities, as in: / 'Seeing Rādhā's son [Karṇa], whose courage was destroyed by agitated fury, who had propitiated Paraśurāma, / partiality would arise forcibly even in Death toward fears not previously known.' / Here, if the action of seeing precedes the action of arising, then because the agents are different, the suffix -ktvā is not permissible. / And the denotative operation is obstructed: the agent expressed by the genitive is connected only with the action of partiality, not with the action of seeing; / for the genitive under the rule 'of the agent and the object in the presence of a kṛt affix' is barred by the prohibition 'not with l-substitutes, indeclinables, past participles, or the suffixes in the sense of khal or tṛn'. / And this is made consistent through modification of the case ending, contextual ellipsis, inversion, sentence-division, intervening construction, and metaphorical attribution. / In that regard, 'having seen Rādhā's son, even Death becomes partial regarding fears' is modification of the case ending; / 'having seen Rādhā's son, partiality would arise even in Death who considers his own power' is sentence-division; / 'having seen Rādhā's son he kills: thus even in Death partiality would arise' is an intervening construction, because an intervening action required at the time of understanding is resorted to even at the time of usage; / taking 'nirīkṣya' in the sense of 'as if having seen' is metaphorical attribution, by superimposing the quality of a sentient being onto the non-sentient 'partiality'. / As it is said: when the primary meaning is absent, and there is a purpose and a basis, secondary application operates; / and the secondary attribution of the action of a conscious being onto an unconscious thing like love is seen, as in: / 'Love sees fears even where there is no occasion; / circumstance expands things and contracts them.' / Now, is there syntactic connection of expressed word-meanings, or is there denotation of connected [meanings]? / It is answered: here there is a difference of opinion. Some explain that there is denotation of connected meanings and syntactic connection of expressed meanings.

Some say that there is neither the denotation of connected [meanings] nor the connection of denoted [meanings]. 8.7. On this point, the proponents of denotation of connected meanings (anvitābhidhānavādin) say this: Linguistic sound causes meaning to be understood indeed through the power of linguistic convention, and linguistic convention [comes] from the usage of elders, and elders communicate only by means of sentences, not by means of isolated words. And when they use an isolated word assisted by other word-meanings accessible through context and the like, that too is just a sentence: / "Even when a single word is observed somewhere fulfilling the required action, / they regard that too as a sentence, like a vocative word and the like. / And when, in response to the question 'What is this?', it is said 'a cow' or 'a horse', / the action mentioned in the question itself, such as 'is obtained', is intended there." / And a sentence is a collection of words aimed at a single meaning that denotes an integrated meaning. They are spoken of as words, and the collection thus has a single meaning; and thus the words together denote the meaning. If each single word operates upon an undivided meaning alone—just as three stones hold up a pot, or four carriers lift a palanquin, or all the syntactic roles bring about cooking—so too all the words bring about the understanding of the sentence-meaning. And the sentence-meaning is of the nature of a conjunction of actions and syntactic roles. There, because syntactic roles are eager for a connection with an action, and because actions cannot endure the absence of syntactic roles, the denotation of connected [meanings] alone takes place by their own words. And this being so, the sentence-meaning's nature as directly conveyed by linguistic sound is established, not indirectly as in the view of the connection of denoted meanings (abhihitānvayapakṣa). The proponents of the connection of denoted meanings (abhihitānvayavādin) do not accept that. For they say this: Because the comprehension of the sentence-meaning is observed to be preceded by the understanding of word-meanings, the comprehension of the sentence-meaning is necessarily preceded by the understanding of word-meanings. And the understanding of word-meanings is possible in this way: if only that much meaning is denoted by a word; but if it were denoted as connected with another word-meaning, the distinction of word-meanings could not be established because of the cognition of meaning in the form of a composite mass.

If it is claimed: “The determination of this word’s meaning is [ascertained] through insertion and extraction—[namely, that] the meaning of this word is a universal, of that word a substance, of that word a quality, and of that word an action,” that is not so; for even in that case, the apprehension of the meaning in a composite form does not disappear. // 8.8. Furthermore, because correlates are infinite and syntactic connection is infinite, and because connection is thus infinite, grasping the relation in the case of denotation of the connected is impossible; hence, grasping the relation between two word-meanings is difficult to comprehend. If that [relation] were disregarded, the apprehension of that meaning would result even from [a word] heard for the very first time. From the sentence, “Bring the cow,” a command to tie up a horse might be apprehended. Moreover, in the linguistic usage of elders, communicative competence arising even from a sentence terminates only at the word. Otherwise, communicative competence would be required for every sentence, and because sentences are infinite, that would be difficult to establish, which would lead to the destruction of all verbal usage. And sentence-meaning is indeed seen to be apprehended from the verse of a new poet; and that is possible only when there is communicative competence regarding words and word-meanings, not regarding sentence-meanings. Therefore, there is no denotation of the connected. // 8.9. Moreover, since syntactic connection is a qualification of what is connected, what is connected cannot be denoted without the denotation of that [connection]; hence the denotation of syntactic connection must be accepted. And that cannot be denoted by a single capacity; thus there is the unwanted consequence of postulating an additional capacity. // 8.10. Moreover, in “Bring the cow,” when its own meaning qualified by the meaning of bringing is denoted by the word “cow,” then the meaning of “cow” lacks prominence; and when its own meaning qualified by the meaning of the cow is [denoted] by “bring,” then [there is no prominence] of that meaning; thus, because two primaries would be admitted in this single sentence, the calamity of sentence-split would occur. // 8.11. Furthermore, since base and affix attain the state of a single word through denotation of their own mutually connected meanings, they would [then have to] denote a meaning connected with another word-meaning, so there would be a double denotation. // 8.12. Furthermore, when its own meaning connected [with another] is denoted by a word, is it denoted as connected with another word-meaning that has been denoted, or with one that has not been denoted? If with one that has been denoted, then since the second word-meaning that qualifies that meaning is apprehended from the single word alone, the utterance of the second word is pointless.