Shringaraprakasha 3
English (machine translation) 3
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Contents
3.p1.1
Third illumination: on words consisting of bases and the like (3.1). In this context, a word (pada) is that by which meaning is attained. It is threefold: having the nature of an action, having the nature of a syntactic role, and having the nature of an ornament. Among them, that having the nature of an action expresses an effect to be accomplished; that having the nature of a syntactic role expresses an instrumental means; and that having the nature of an ornament constitutes the adornment and so forth of the effect and the means. Because each of these has six varieties, there are eighteen varieties of words. Among them, the varieties of words having the nature of an action are: the impersonal word (bhāvapada), the agentive word (kartṛpada), the objective word (karmapada), the impersonal-objective word (bhāvakarmapada), the impersonal-agentive word (bhāvakartṛpada), and the objective-agentive word (karmakartṛpada). Among these, the impersonal word is as follows: "Cooking is done (pacyate), was done (apāci), will be done (pakṣyate) by Devadatta." "Sitting is done (āsyate), was done (āsi), will be done (āsiṣyate) by you." "Breaking occurs (bhidyate), occurred (abhedi), will occur (bhetsyate) by the granary." "Boiling takes place (śrāyate), took place (aśrāyi), will take place (śrāyiṣyate) with barley gruel." Likewise: "May it be boiled (śrāyiṣīṣṭa), it was boiled (śaśre), it would be boiled (āśrāyiṣyata) with boiled rice." "May it be struck (ghāniṣīṣṭa), it was struck (jaghne), it would be struck (aghāniṣyata) by an elephant." "May it be seized (grāhiṣīṣṭa), it was seized (jagṛhe), it would be seized (agrāhiṣyata) by a crocodile." "May it be seen (darśiṣīṣṭa), it was seen (dadṛśe), it would be seen (adarśiṣyata) by the beloved." The objective word is as follows: "Boiled rice is cooked (pacyate) by the cook." "A month is spent sitting (āsyate) by the hired servant." "The village is gone to (gamyate) by the traveler." "A krośa is slept through (supyate) by the child." "The mat was made (akāri) by the skilled artisan." "The cow was restrained (arodhi) by the cowherd." "The milk-cow was milked (adohi) by the herdsman." "The earth was crossed (atāri) by the king." "The gambler was consumed with grief (anvavātāpi) by his own deed." "The blanket was experienced (anubabhūve) by touch." "Barley gruel will be cooked (pakṣyate) by the physician." "May alms be plucked (alāniṣīṣṭa) by the ascetic." Likewise: "The book will be made (kariṣyate), is made (grāhitā), may it be grasped (grāhiṣīṣṭa); the performance will be shown (darśiṣyate), is shown (darśitā), may it be shown (darśiṣīṣṭa)."
3.p1.2
The agentive word is as follows: "Caitra cooks (pacati)." "Maitra sits (āste)." "The goldsmith refines (tapati) the beautiful gold." "The ascetic performs (tapyate) austerity." "The garland-maker weaves (sṛjati) a garland." "The righteous person generates (sṛjate) righteousness." "The generous person gave away (udasarji) his own property." "The king spoke (udapādi) the truth." "Ear-ornament makers cut (paripārayante) the tree." "The heat dries (śoṣayate) the grains of rice." "The householder unites (saṃyujyate) with his wife." "The fig fruit ripens (pacyate) reddish." Likewise: "Smoke shone (adīpi / adīpiṣṭa)." "The sleeper awoke (abodhi / abuddha)." "Desire was fulfilled (apūriṣṭa)." "Righteousness was extended (atāyi / atāyiṣṭa)." "The world flourished (āpyāyi / āpyāyiṣṭa)." The impersonal-objective word is as follows: "I desire: let him eat (icchāmi bhuñjīta)." "I imagine: may you eat (saṃbhāvayāmi bhuñjīta bhavān)." "I anticipate: you will eat (samarthayāmi bhokṣyate bhavān)." "I believe: you have not eaten (śraddadhe nābhukta bhavān)." "I expect: you will not eat (avakalpayāmi nābhokṣyate bhavān)." "I do not believe: would you really perform sacrifices for an outcaste (na śraddadhe nanu bhavān vṛṣalaṃ yājayet)?" "I do not expect: your honor will perform sacrifices for an outcaste (nāvakalpayāmi tatrabhavān vṛṣalaṃ yājayiṣyati)." "I cannot bear: your honor would perform sacrifices for an outcaste (na marṣayāmi tatrabhavān vṛṣalamayājiṣyat)." "I condemn: does your honor even perform sacrifices for an outcaste (vigarhe api tatrabhavān vṛṣalaṃ yājayeti)?" "Do you remember, Devadatta, we will live in Kaśmīra (smarasi devadatta kāśmīreṣu vatsyāmaḥ)?" "Do you recall that we lived in Kaliṅga (abhijānāsi kaliṅgeṣu yadavasāma)?" "Do you recall that we always lived in Kaliṅga (abhijānāsi kaliṅgeṣu śaśvadavasāma)?" "Do you remember we will live in Kaśmīra and there eat rice (smarasi kāśmīreṣu vatsyāmas tatraudanaṃ bhokṣyāmahe)?" "Do you recall we lived in Kaliṅga and there ate rice (abhijānāsi kaliṅgeṣvavasāma tatraudanaṃ bhuñjmahi)?" "Come, I think you will travel by chariot (ehi manye rathena yāsyasi)." "I know: having abandoned [him] asleep, I depart (jāne supto vihāya gacchāmi)." "Look: the deer runs (paśya mṛgo dhāvati)." "Here we see... (iha paśyāmaḥ)." In the object, dual and plural forms are cited. The impersonal-agentive word is as follows: "It aches of the thief (corasya rujati)." "It sickens of the thief (corasyāmayati)." "It afflicts of the thief (corasya bādhate)." "It torments of the thief (corasya pīḍayati)." "It burns of the thief (corasya dahati)." "It terrifies of the thief (corasyāttabhāyayati)." "It touches of the thief (corasya spṛśati)." "It withers of the thief (corasya śoṣayati)." "It crushes of the thief (corasya mardayati)." "It snaps of the thief (corasya moṭayati)." "It produces fever in the thief (coraṃ jvarayati)." "It causes distress to the thief (coraṃ saṃtāpayati)."
3.p1.3
Likewise: 'he becomes, he cooks, he will cook', 'he becomes, he cooked', 'he may become, he might become', 'it would be, it could be', 'I do not exist, I take pleasure', 'you have joined, you are', 'having sat, you command', 'there is [this:] we go', 'there is [this:] he sees some cow here', 'you are, it is gone', 'let it be, we are going'. The agent-as-object word (karmakartṛpada) is as in: 'the cloth dyes itself', 'the foot hurts by itself', 'the elephant scatters / or scattered by itself', 'the garland weaves / or wove itself', 'the mat is eager to be made / or was eager to be made by itself', 'the staff rises up / or was raised up by itself', 'the cow enclosed itself', 'the mat was made by itself'. 3.2. Others, however, consider these also to have the nature of an agent-as-object: 'the granary breaks by itself', 'the rope breaks by itself', 'the field is reaped by itself', 'the fruit ripens by itself', 'the wood breaks by itself', 'the foot aches by itself', 'the cow was milked by itself', 'the cow was restrained by itself', 'the oblation was offered by itself'; likewise: 'the girl adorns herself', 'the girl decorates herself', 'the cow lets herself be milked', 'the elephant lets itself be mounted', 'the king allows himself to be served', 'the girl decorates herself', 'the cow lets herself be milked', 'the elephant lets itself be mounted', 'the king allows himself to be served', 'the teacher allows himself to be greeted', 'the field allows itself to be harvested', 'the rice allows itself to be cooked', 'the granary allows itself to be broken', 'the troop counts itself', 'the forest flower smiles by itself'. 3.3.
3.p1.4
And they say: "Like the object is [the agent] whose action is equivalent to that of the object" (Pāṇini 3.1.87); the purpose of treating it like an object is the middle endings and the affix ciṇ; and in the case of vowels in the agent-as-object, it behaves like ciṇ. And they say: "Not in the case of the root rudh" (Pāṇini 3.1.64), "In the case of duh, snu, and nam, yak and ciṇ do not occur" (Pāṇini 3.1.89), "In the prohibition of yak and ciṇ, the addition of the causative (ṇi), śri, and brū must be stated" (Vārttika 2881), "In the case of roots signifying decoration, the kir-group, the causative, śranth, granth, brū, and intransitives taking the middle ending, an addition must be stated" (Vārttika 1882). But that is correct. For: in 'the granary breaks by itself', 'the mat was made by itself', and so forth, yak and ciṇ occur only with reference to the object, whereas the awareness of the agent-as-object arises from the word 'svayam' ('by itself'), as in 'the cow was confined by itself'. Even for the root rudh, when one intends to express the object, ciṇ certainly occurs, as in 'the cow was restrained by itself'. Whatever meaning is expressed by 'by itself' (ātmanaiva) is indeed the meaning expressed by 'spontaneously' (svayameva). And when 'arodhi' ('was restrained') is uttered, even without hearing another word expressing an agent, the state of being an agent-as-object is understood. Therefore, here too ṇic occurs only with reference to the object. But in expressions such as 'the girl adorns herself', the middle ending occurs when the agent is one who obtains the result, according to "The affix ṇi takes the middle ending when its object in the non-causative becomes the agent in the causative, provided it does not refer to reciting" (Pāṇini 1.3.67). From where, then, comes the recognized usage of the agent-as-object in these? Listen, first regarding object-words: "When an object undergoing an action succeeds completely on its own, made easy by its own qualities for the agent—they know that to be the agent-as-object." 3.4. In agent-words, the figurative application is made on account of what was previously the case. To explain: young women and the like employ ornaments and cosmetics for self-adornment because of their supreme charm. Great poets like Māgha say: "With a procedure marked by unreserved affection, the female elephant lets her driver mount; free from pride, she constantly displays a bond of righteous friendship, as if having established his mastery." And the result of these two is comfort and pleasing the world;
3.p1.5
otherwise, one would be pained by elephant-drivers, and the other, being unapproachable, would not be approached. Even in inanimate things, when one wishes to express the result of an action, it is seen: 'the thorns surround the tree', 'the heat dries the rice'. By this, it also need not be stated that 'an agent whose action is equal to that of an instrument behaves like an object': 'men surround the tree with thorns' [becomes] 'the thorns surround [it] by themselves'. Likewise, it need not be stated that 'the agent of duh ('to milk') and pac ('to cook') when transitive frequently behaves like an object'. 'The cow milks her milk by itself' is understood as 'she releases the milk'. Therefore, in 'the fig tree cooks into a reddish fruit', it is intended as an object qualifying the action: the word 'udumbara' here denotes the fruit; that fig tree in time ripens so as to have a reddish quality, meaning it is joined with a red cooking; and when one wishes to express agency, [it means] 'it cooks itself'. Likewise, in the case of yuj, one must state [the affix] jyat and agenthood: 'the student of the Veda applies himself for a month'. If one intends to express agenthood, membership in the div-class will not succeed; whereas if agency is not intended, it has objecthood, just as agenthood is understood by the word 'svayam'. Enough of this digression. 3.5. Verbal nature also belongs to primary derivatives (kṛdanta); among them, the abstract state (bhāva) is as follows: 'here walking was done by them', 'sitting was done', 'here eating was done by them', 'here purification was done by them', 'it was done by you', 'sleeping was done by you', 'it was well done by you', 'it was well watered by you', 'becoming was done by you', 'being about to become by you', 'being invoked by you', 'ought to be by you', 'ought to be by you', 'fit to be by you', 'necessarily to be by you', 'respectful becoming by you', 'becoming slightly rich, difficultly rich, easily rich by you', 'slight rising by you', 'easy oozing by you'.
3.p1.6
[Words having the nature of a syntactic role:] Object is as follows: "The mat was begun (prakṛtaḥ) by you." "The mat is made (kṛtaḥ), being made (kriyamāṇaḥ), about to be made (kariṣyamāṇaḥ) by you." "Indeed, the mat is to be made (kartavyaḥ / kṛtyaḥ / karaṇīyaḥ / kāryaḥ), easily to be made (īṣatcāryaḥ / īṣatkaraḥ), intended for an action (kriyārthaḥ) by you." "Easily made wealthy (īṣadāḍhyaṃkaraḥ), self-enriching (svāḍhyaṃkaraḥ); Soma is easily drunk (īṣatpānaḥ / supānaḥ), difficult to drink (duṣpānaḥ) by you." "You are difficult to subdue (duśśāsanaḥ) by enemies; easy to fight (suyodhanaḥ), difficult to fight (duryodhanaḥ), unbearable (durmarṣaṇaḥ), invincible (durdharṣaṇaḥ), easily won (īṣallabhyaḥ / sulabhaḥ) by people, difficult to behold (durdarśaḥ)." Agent is as follows: "One who has made (kṛtavān) the mat." "One who has approached (upeyivān) the village." "One who desires (ākāmukaḥ)." "One who longs for (abhilāṣukaḥ) a woman." "One who desires to eat (bubhukṣuḥ) rice." "One who wishes for (āśaṃsuḥ) prosperity." "One who gives (dadiḥ) cows." "This is Pavissu." "One who does not give (adāyī)." "One who gives a hundred (śataṃdāyī)." "Going to the village (grāmaṃgāmī)." "Attaining the status of a village (grāmatāṃ gāmī)." "Making (kārakaḥ) the mat, he goes." "Cooking (pācakaḥ) the rice, he goes." Impersonal-object is as follows: "Actions (kriyāḥ) are performed (kriyante)." "Rules (vidhayaḥ) are ordained (vidhīyante)." "Mannerisms of a camel's sitting (uṣṭrāsikāḥ) are sat (āsyante); the postures of falling down (hataśāyikāḥ) are slept (śayyante)." "You are worthy of sugarcane eating (ikṣubhakṣikā)." "You owe me a sugarcane feast (ikṣubhakṣikām)." "They indulge in mutual laughter (vyāvahāsīṃ vidadhate)." "They make a contracted gathering (sāṃkoṭinam)." "I invite to the festival (utsavamāmantraye)." "I make an invitation (āmantraṇamāmantraye / mantraye)." "What making did you perform (kāṃ tvaṃ kāramakārṣīḥ)?" "What rule, what action, what deed, what task, what deed? I made every making, every rule, every deed, every action, every task, everything done." Impersonal-agent is as follows: "Becoming Brahman (brahmabhūyam) exists." "Killing a brahmin does not take place." "Cooking occurs (pāko vartate)." "Abandonment takes place (tyāgo bhavati)." "Uproar (sāṃrāviṇam) exists." "Coming forth from a rat-hole (ākhūtthaḥ) happens." "Investigation (anveṣaṇā) goes on." "Mutual talk (vyāvabhāṣī) takes place." "A gathering (samajaḥ) of animals; a pen (uṭajaḥ) of animals." "The mating (upasaraḥ) of cows." "The succession (paryāyaḥ) of seasons." "Sitting (āsikā) by you." "Lying down (śāyikā) by you." "Eating parched grain (ābhyūṣakhādikā) takes place." "Eating sugarcane (ikṣubhakṣikā) arose." "Head-pain (śirortiḥ) exists." "Dysentery does not take place." "Headache torments (bādhate) the head." "Lack of appetite does not occur." "May restraint (nigrahaḥ) be yours; may hindrance (avagrahaḥ) be yours; may non-birth (ajananiḥ) be yours; may non-existence (abhavantiḥ) be yours, O outcaste!"
3.p1.7
The reflexive agent [karmakartṛ] is as follows: 'the two feet washed themselves', 'the clarified butter melted by itself', 'rice-grains ripening without plowing', 'beans cooking easily', 'pieces of wood splitting easily', 'the earth fragile', 'fragile lands of the king', 'brittle wood', 'an elephant mounting [the driver] itself', 'the field being mown [as if by itself]', 'a story telling itself', 'a maiden adorning herself', 'a garland stringing itself', 'a garland braiding itself', 'a mat desiring to make itself', 'an elephant scattering [fodder] by itself', 'a staff measuring itself', 'a staff erecting itself', 'a milch cow giving milk by itself', 'a cow restraining itself', 'a cow being struck [by itself]', 'a cloth reddening itself', 'a foot suffering pain'. 3.6. Others, however, consider even the following to be instances of the reflexive agent: 'you commenced the mat', 'the mat was commenced by you'; 'you went along the road', 'the road was traversed by you'; 'you sat for a month', 'a month was sat through by you'; 'you eat porridge', 'porridge is eaten by you'; 'you would lie on the bed', 'the bed would be slept on by you'; 'you climbed the tree', 'the tree was climbed by you'; 'you embraced the beloved', 'the beloved was embraced by you'; 'you worshipped the sun', 'the sun was worshipped by you'; 'you attended upon the fire', 'the fire was attended upon by you'; 'you resided near the teacher', 'the teacher was resided near by you'; 'the young boy was born after the young girl', 'the young girl was followed in birth by the young boy'; 'Devadatta outlived the Śūdra', 'the Śūdra woman was outlived by Devadatta'. That is not correct, because it would entail a division of the sentence. Objection: Surely you [hold that] the agent is obtained through implication [ākṣepa] and is not denoted by the verbal suffix [tiṅ]; then how can one speak of an agent-word, an action-agent-word, and a reflexive-agent-word? For the denotative power of a word is determined by the method of agreement and difference [anvaya and vyatireka]. And the agent is understood through the implication of the efficient force [bhāvanā]; agreement and difference with respect to the affix are not established with regard to the agent, just as when an individual is understood through the implication of the universal, it is not reasonable to assume a denotative power of the word toward that [individual].
3.p1.8
[Opponent continues:] How, then, if the agent is not denoted, is the distinction of grammatical number and person of the affix justified? Just as in the case of ātmanepada affixes—in the view that the universal is denoted, even though the universal is devoid of gender and number, gender and number based on the individual that serves as its substrate apply—in the very same way, even though efficient force [bhāvanā] has no internal difference, the distinction of number and person based on the agent will be obtained. 3.7. Nor should it be said that the l-affix is taught by grammatical rule [smṛti] to denote the agent; for the rules 'A kṛt affix occurs in the sense of an agent' (Pāṇini 3.4.67), 'An l-affix occurs in the sense of an object and action, and after intransitives [in the sense of action and agent]' (Pāṇini 3.4.69), 'laṭ occurs in the present' (Pāṇini 3.2.123)—the substitutions ti-etc. are for l; 'The tiṅ affixes in triads are the third, second, and first persons', 'They, individually, are the singular, dual, and plural', 'When yuṣmad is syntactically connected... the second person', 'When asmad is syntactically connected... the first person', 'In the remainder, the third person' (Pāṇini 1.4.101–102, 105, 107, 108), 'ātmanepada is used in the sense of action and object', 'parasmaipada is used in the sense of an agent from the remainder' (Pāṇini 1.3.13, 78)—these sentences have been explained as forming a single unified rule together with the prescription of number, namely 'The dual and singular are used when two and one are meant' and 'The plural is used when many are meant' (Pāṇini 1.4.22, 21), because of the intention to convey a single meaning. For a single word such as 'cooks' [pacati] is analyzed by them. In that alone lies the sentence-meaning. When the singular belonging to the agent is present, the singular affix tip etc. is used; tip etc. is the expression of the agent; when the plural of the agent is present, the plural affix jhi etc. is used; and thus the l-affix is taught only to express the number of the agent as implied by efficient force, not the agent itself. [Reply:] To this it is said: If by the l-affix only the number of the agent implied by the efficient force were expressed, then even in an expression denoting mere action, such as 'It is sat by Devadatta', denotation of the number of the agent alone would follow, because an agent exists in both cases. For by the very same condition that one arrives at the denotable content as the number of the object in 'cooks' and the like, one would also arrive at it in another usage. And how, when the agent is being denoted, is the denotation of the number qualified by it proper? 3.8. Now, if it is said that mere number is denoted, and not any particular [substratum];
3.p1.9
then the apprehension of distinctions such as person would be inexplicable; and the denotation of what is qualified by that is properly preceded by the denotation of that itself, according to the maxim: 'Cognition of a qualificand does not occur when the qualifier is unapprehended.' Nor can the agent, though untouched by the word, distinguish number merely by proximity; since number is of the nature of a property [dharma], its contact with the agent as an owner of the property [dharmin] serving as a delimiting factor is appropriate; because instruments and the like also have proximity and are property-possessors, the same condition would apply to them as well. Furthermore, of the efficient force and number denoted by the l-affix, the agent is obtained at a later time, as implied by the efficient force. Therefore, because of its existing prior to this [implication], the number denoted simultaneously with the efficient force would, due to lack of distinction, delimit all syntactic roles [kārakas]. And how could an agent implied subsequently restrict to itself a number denoted simultaneously with the efficient force? Now, if it is held that the agent is apprehended at the very same time as the apprehension of the efficient force, just like number, then it is not obtained through implication; rather, like number, it is denoted directly by the l-affix. Furthermore, because one observes coreferentiality [sāmānādhikaraṇya] of 'Devadatta' and the like with 'cooks' and the like, it is the agent possessing number that is denoted by the l-affix. If, on the other hand, the l-affix were to express the number of the agent, such as oneness, then the usage would be 'of Devadatta, [he] cooks' [devadattasya pacati], just as one says 'the oneness of Devadatta'. If it is argued that numbering is not expressed by the l-affix, but rather the numbered entity itself, such as Devadatta, is denoted, then the meaning of 'Devadatta cooks' is 'delimited by the number of oneness, he performs cooking.' And thus, when the numbered entity is denoted, the agent alone is denoted. 3.9. Nor should it be said that even when the agent is denoted, coreferentiality is unfeasible because syntactic role is a capacity [śakti]. For capacity, even when denoted by an l-affix, is denoted only as dependent on a quality or substance, just as in: 'white cloth' [śuklaḥ paṭaḥ], 'white garment' [śuklā śāṭī]. Moreover, you too accept that the object is denoted by the affix; that [distinction of yours] is untenable.
3.p1.10
Just as the agent ought not to be expressed [directly] because it is obtained through the implication of the two operations, so too ought it to be for the object. If [it is argued] that the object is expressed because it is not implied, then in that case it would follow that the agent is also so. For we perceive no distinction between the agent and the object in respect to the implication of an action: just as an action is not understood without an agent, so too [is it not understood] without an object. If it is objected that a relation to an object does not exist everywhere, [we reply that] there it does exist; in that case, how [could it be otherwise]? If [one says that] because the object is also obtained through the implication of the action, only the number residing in it is expressed by the personal ending, how now would the personal ending, which does not express the agent or the object, express in some cases the number residing in the agent and in other cases the number residing in the object—how could such a distinction occur? And one cannot say that there is no distinction, because the cognition arises in the form of an agent manifest in 'he cooks' (pacati), and as residing in an object grasped in that form in 'it is cooked' (pacyate). Furthermore, if the agent and object are not expressed by the personal ending, when the agent is [otherwise] expressed in 'Devadatta cooks' (devadattaḥ pacati), the third case-affix [instrumental] would follow, and the second case-affix [accusative] would follow for the object in 'the rice is cooked' (odanaḥ pacyate). If it is stated that they will not occur because the number of the agent or object is expressed, then in the case of primary nominal derivatives (kṛdanta) there would be an undesirable consequence regarding the case-affix, since number is not expressed by the kṛt affix: thus in pakva odanaḥ ('cooked rice') the second case-affix would result, [or] the third case-affix would result. If it is argued: 'Both number and the object, etc., are the meaning of a case-affix; there, just as the second and third case-affixes do not occur for the agent and the object in finite verbs because number is expressed, so in primary nominal derivatives the second and other case-affixes will not occur because the syntactic role is expressed'—this might be so if there were a prohibition when [meaning] is expressed; but this rule applies when it is unexpressed, because exclusion is resorted to through semantic compatibility and sentence-unity. Thus, in the case of finite verbs, even though number is expressed, case-affixes expressing the syntactic role would follow because it is not expressed.
3.p1.11
Moreover, in 'Devadatta cooking' (devadattaḥ pacan, devadattaḥ pacamānaḥ), the third case-affix would not follow because neither the agent nor number is expressed by the affixes śatṛ and śānac. If non-expression of the agent is admitted in the case of śatṛ and śānac, what wrong has the finite verb-affix (tiṅ) committed? If it is said that because of its being a substitute for a l-affix, and because śatṛ and śānac are kṛt affixes, the agent is expressed by virtue of the rule 'kṛt occurs in the sense of the agent' (Pāṇini 3.4.67), then how is the object [expressed] in 'the rice being cooked' (odanaṃ pacyamānaḥ)? If [it is answered that] the expression of the object will occur because the original l-affix is prescribed in the sense of the object and śānac is its substitute—for indeed, the l-affix is prescribed in the sense of an object by 'la occurs in the sense of an object and in the sense of the verbal state, and from intransitives' (Pāṇini 3.4.69) or 'ātmanepada occurs in the sense of the verbal state and the object' (Pāṇini 1.3.13)—if that be so, then wherever tiṅ is also prescribed, it would apply to the object there too. And from that, who could prevent [it applying] to the agent as well? There too [by] 'kṛt occurs in the sense of the agent', [and] by 'parasmaipada occurs in the sense of the agent after the remainder' (Pāṇini 1.3.78), the l-affix is also prescribed in the sense of the agent. Thus it is said: 'For indeed, through the form of ātmanepada, the l-affix would exist in the sense of the object everywhere; would not this same [l-affix] likewise exist in the sense of the agent as well?' Nor is it proper to assume that finite verb-affixes occur with reference to whatever number belongs to the agent or object. For the rule 'la occurs in the sense of an object and in the sense of the verbal state, and from intransitives' (Pāṇini 3.4.69) has no sentence-unity with 'the dual and singular occur in the sense of two and one' and 'the plural occurs in the sense of many' (Pāṇini 1.4.22, 21), because the l-affix is also prescribed in the verbal state. And the verbal state, being something to be accomplished, has no connection with number. Nor does the prescription of nominal case-affixes, beginning with sū-au-jas, have sentence-unity with the prescription of number, since the nominal affix su arises even after indeclinables, which are devoid of number. And the great author of the Vārttikas says: 'Because affixes sup and tiṅ are prescribed without distinction, and because separation is observed, the statement is for the sake of restriction.' The author of the Mahābhāṣya also says: 'Sup and tiṅ arise without distinction; the restriction applies to those that have arisen.'
3.p1.12
Therefore, the prescription of the l-affix does not apply to the number of the agent or object, but rather it must be accepted that it applies to the agent and the object themselves. How then, in the presence of all syntactic roles, is there expression of only the agent and the object by the l-affix? It is replied: because only those two are principal. There, the prominence of the agent is due to the fact that the instrument and other [roles] operate subordinately to it, while that of the object is due to the fact that its very operation is for its sake. Alternatively, the l-affix, arising after a verbal root that expresses the activity of the agent or object, expresses only the agent and object. Now, why does it not express tense, etc., just like the agent and object? Because their domains are different. For thus, six meanings are understood from a finite verb: action, tense, voice-marker, syntactic role, grammatical person, and number. Among these, the morphological base expresses action, tense, and the causes of ātmanepada; the affix expresses the means of accomplishment (sādhana), number, and grammatical person. Among the items to be expressed by the base, action is principal, and tense and voice-marker are qualifications. Among the items to be expressed by the affix, the means of accomplishment is principal, and number and grammatical person are qualifications. How, then, is number a qualification only of the syntactic role, and not of action, tense, voice-marker, and grammatical person? It is replied: because action, being something to be accomplished, is not definitively established; and because tense is distinct from action, or even if distinct, it is subordinate as a delimiter of the action. Since the voice-marker too, [signifying] manifestation and so forth, is not definitively established because of being the object of the action, number has no connection with it because it cannot be pointed to as 'this'. Grammatical person, on the other hand, is nothing other than the means of accomplishment itself, beginning with the first person. Therefore, number is connected only with the syntactic role, and not with action and the others. Thus, what was stated—that because of being unexpressed by the finite verb-affix, there are the agent-word, the verbal-state-agent-word, and the object-agent-word—is simply untenable. The varieties of syntactic roles are: the agent-word, the object-word, the instrument-word, the recipient-word, the ablative-word, and the locus-word.
3.p1.13
In this regard, the agent and others will be elaborated upon later in the exposition of syntactic roles; here, however, they are exemplified in brief so that the connection is not broken. Among them, the agent is threefold: independent, dependent, and agent-object. Among these, that which employs the syntactic roles such as instrument by its own will in an action, and is not employed by them, is independent. It is twofold: expressed by its own case-ending, and expressed by another case-ending. Among these, expressed by its own case-ending is as follows: / "By intoxication—adept at breaking pride, spreading desire for lovemaking, expanding passion in the eyes, and instilling emotion within—the women were immediately captivated as if by a lover." / Expressed by another case-ending is as follows: / "Charm adorned the body of these women; that charm was adorned by union with full, fresh youth; that in turn was adorned by the splendor of the God of Love; and that splendor was adorned by intoxication, the ornament of union with the beloved." (3.14) / That which engages in actions having been prompted by another is dependent. It too is twofold: whose operation is manifest, and whose operation is unmanifest. Among these, whose operation is manifest is as follows: / "Who else other than you, an earthly lord devoted to virtues, having devoted resources, and possessing pride of lineage, would cause his delightful prosperity—like his own highborn wife—to be carried off by enemies?" / Whose operation is unmanifest is as follows: / "Solitude that brings peace to the mind, the God of Love, spring intoxication, the rays of the moon, and union together with their beloveds lead the love of lovely women to an extraordinary state." (3.15) / The agent-object is also simply twofold: having a prominent objective portion, and having an unprominent objective portion. Among these, having a prominent objective portion is as follows: / "Drinking in the moonlight that has burst forth in full and seeming unable to endure the flow of brilliance, the white water-lily splits quickly from its stalk, releasing the humming of bees." / Having an unprominent objective portion is as follows: / "Of him of noble fame, compassionate, who dispels affliction through protection, yielding wealth like an equivalent of Kubera, the earth itself pours forth riches, overflowing with affection on account of his virtues." / That which is attained by the action of the agent aimed at nothing else is the object. That too is threefold: to be produced, to be transformed, and to be reached.
3.p1.14
Among these, the object to be produced is twofold: "that which, being non-existent, is produced, or that which, being existent, is manifested through birth." / Among the two, the first is as follows: / "This Malaya breeze, which sways the young shoots of mature sandalwood trees, produces pleasure for the people." / The second is as follows: / "Spring intoxication revealed grace in the limbs of lovely women—grace that indeed existed already but had long been unmanifest due to inapplicability—just as a prefix reveals the meaning inherent in a verbal root." / The object to be transformed is also twofold: through destruction of the original material, and through the impartation of a different quality. Among these, the first is as follows: / "Even as the words of the gods 'Restrain, Lord, restrain your wrath!' were traversing the sky, that fire born of Śiva's eye reduced the God of Love to mere ashes." / The second is as follows: / "Adorning her with the flowers of the Pārijāta tree worthy of the locks of Indrāṇī, the three-eyed god in the Nandana grove was gazed upon longingly by the celestial maidens." (3.17) / The object to be reached is likewise simply twofold: explicitly mentioned and unmentioned. Among these, that which is expressed by krtya-affixes, the past participle kta, khal, etc., is explicitly mentioned; that which is not expressed by them is unmentioned. Among the two, the first is as follows: / "With its clusters [of blossoms] being drunk by bees, its young, fluttering shoots imitating the vigorous shaking of hands by bitten-lipped women, the slender Aśoka branch was seen by the wives." / The second is as follows: / "The Himalayas must be solicited by you on our behalf; alliances properly concluded do not lead to change for the worse." (3.18) / That which functions immediately as the most effective means in accomplishing an action is the instrument. That too is threefold: external, internal, and external-internal. Among these, the external is twofold: intervening and non-intervening. Among the two, the first is as follows: / "Deprived of its moistness by the heat of incense, with safflower blossoms within, her hair of noble arrangement was bound by a woman with a garland of pale Madhūka entwined with Dūrvā grass." / The second is as follows: / "Indicated by the prince of Vidarbha, this young prince mounted the platform by means of the prepared staircase, as a lion cub ascends a lofty mountain slope through a series of rocks."
3.p1.15
The internal is also twofold: distinct from the agent, and indistinct from the agent. Among the two, distinct is as follows: / "By the chest-regions of the gods, solid as stone, and by the voluminous breasts of the women brought near to the banks, the water, its waves broken, assumed turbidness as if in anger." / The second is as follows: / "Having performed special respect oneself, it is not fitting for you to consider me another; for friendship among the virtuous, O lady of slender limbs, is said to be based on taking seven steps together." / The external-internal is also twofold: turned outward and turned inward. Among the two, turned outward is as follows: / "Going to every single lattice-window, bearing extreme longing on account of love, the woman repeatedly measured with her gaze the intervening space between the setting mountain and the sun." / The second is as follows: / "Possessing extraordinary sweetness, the wine from the mouths was drunk simultaneously by passionate lovers through blossoming lips, and the fragrance of black water-lilies [was drunk] through nostrils." (3.19) / That which is intended by the effect of the action, experiencing connection with the object or the action, is the recipient. That is threefold: reached by the object of 'to give', reached by an object alone, and reached by an action. Among these, reached by the object of 'to give' is twofold: when proprietary ownership does not cease, and when it ceases. Among the two, the first is as follows: / "Śiva too yielded his forehead-born eye, smeared with cosmetic powder from kissing, to the bearer of the fragrance of Pārvatī's face, possessing the perfume of a blowing lotus." / The second is as follows: / "You have the power to give me to someone else or to abandon your servant; but I, O fair-browed one, am not of such a nature as you suspect me to be." / Reached by the action and the object is twofold: having the sense of 'to give' as its domain, and [otherwise]. Among these, the first is as follows: / "The radiant creepers are mansions, herbs are lamps, fresh shoots of the Haricandana are beds; in this place, breezes from the lotuses dispelling extreme weariness do not allow the heavenly beauties to remember heaven." / The second is as follows: / "Having bowed down, Nandī announced to him the daughter of the mountain, who had approached with the desire to serve."
3.p1.16
and caused her to enter to her husband, her entry permitted merely by a knitting of the brows. // That which is reached by an action (kriyāvyāpya) is also twofold: technical (pāribhāṣika) and non-technical (apāribhāṣika). Between those two, the first is as follows: / “Garlands brought no delight to the lovely ladies, nor did sandalwood pastes or wine in separation; / only union with the beloved imparts charm to the instruments of pleasure.” / The second is as follows: / “Having thus performed the rites of marriage through the family priest who knew the ritual rules, / those two, parents of the world’s creatures, bowed down to the Grandfather seated on the lotus.” (3.20) // There, that which—mediated through the agent or the object—undergoes immersion born solely from action by virtue of stability is the point of departure (apādāna). It is threefold: having an explicitly mentioned domain (nirdiṣṭaviṣaya), having an implied domain (upāttaviṣaya), and having an action to be supplied (apekṣitakriya). Among these, that having an explicitly mentioned domain is twofold: abandoned (ujjhita) and unabandoned (anujjhita). Between those two, the first is as follows: / “Upon the cheek marked with fresh fingernail scratches mingled with perspiration, its crest almost entirely bitten, / the śirīṣa blossom, though fallen from the ears of passionate women, suddenly dropped.” / The second is as follows: / “Having retreated in fear of the morning sun, growing dense at the decline of the day’s splendor, / darkness, as if descending slowly from the lowlands, reached the plains.” / That having an implied domain is also twofold: that to be abandoned (heya) and that to be embraced (upādeya). Between those two, the first is as follows: / “Waving your hands shaped like tender sprouts, do not labor in vain, proud girl; / having approached under the illusion that you are a wish-fulfilling creeper, how indeed will the swarm of bees depart?” / The second is as follows: / “Kumudvatī obtained a son named Atithi from the descendant of Kakutstha, / as consciousness attains clarity from the final watch of the night.” / That with an action to be supplied is also twofold: requiring a general [action] and requiring a specific [action]. Between those two, the first is as follows: / “Do not let that offender approach again, your mind bewildered by intoxication; / so thinking, the woman did not desire the wine; indeed, pride is hard to abandon even for pleasure.” / The second is as follows: / “From where [do you come], sir?” “On the path from Citrakūṭa.” “Was the majesty of graceful fortune seen by you?” / “What of it, foolish girl? In this festival of love, I shall have Kāma painted in your house.” (3.21)
3.p1.17
The locus of an action mediated by the agent or object is the locus (adhikaraṇa). It is threefold: pertaining to a domain (vaiṣayika), pertaining to physical contact (aupaśleṣika), and pertaining to a cause (naimittika). Among these, the domain-related is twofold. Between the two, the first is as follows: / “On the vast expanse of the hip, an expansive tree with thighs lovely as banana stems, / the bride restrained the elephant of the crocodile-bannered [god of love] with the cord of her girdle.” / The second is as follows: / “Courage in adversity, forbearance in prosperity, eloquence of speech in the assembly, valor in battle, / delight in renown, devotion to sacred tradition—this is indeed natural to the great-souled.” / The contact-related is also twofold: partial (ekadeśika) and pervasive (abhivyāpaka). Between those two, the first is as follows: / “Sharing soft touch, beautiful with faded luster, arranged for lovemaking, / the glances of the fawn-eyed women continuously fell upon the beloved and upon the bed in deep inclination.” / The second is as follows: / “In eyes charming with passion, and across the expanse of cheeks red as coral, / the splendor of intoxication was seen universally in every way upon the faces of women as in mirrors.” / The cause-related is also twofold: unmixed (śuddha) and mixed (saṅkīrṇa). Between those two, the first is as follows: / [corrupt Prakrit verse] / The second is as follows: / “Here, previously, the king of tortoises bearing the weight of the earth studied; from him, the oceanic lord of waters, a refuge for mountains, read [these]; / then the clouds, having dispelled the heat of the body, obtained them—the secret teachings of perpetual benevolence, discovered through the suffering of the wicked.” (3.22) // But the prompter of an active [agent], being a specific cause, is the instigator (hetu) and an agent (kartṛ). That too is threefold: the impeller (preraka), the consenting [agent] (anukūla), and the cognitive cause (pratyayaka). There, the impeller is twofold: mediated (vyavahita) and immediate (avyavahita). Between the two, the mediated is as follows: / “She with thighs like a young elephant’s trunk, through the hands of the foster mother, / caused the necklace white with powder to be placed in its proper place on Raghunandana's neck, like embodied passion.” / The immediate is as follows: / “Disregarding what had been left incomplete, while garlands, garments, and ornaments slipped away...”
3.p1.18
[The eyes] revealed that [her] intoxication and amorous confusion had ceased, having risen without any cause to depart. / The [animator / promptor] is also of two kinds: accomplished and to be accomplished. Among them, the accomplished is as follows: / 'In the courtyards of the houses of the farmers, charming with the effect of the fragrance of the falling grains of newly harvested rice, / young brides bring joy, the rows of their bracelets slipping down their hands tossed by the rise of the pestles.' / The one to be accomplished is as follows: / 'In the empty village on the mountain, the sun being entirely eclipsed by clouds, / the daughter of the householder, delightful to behold, shows the bower […].' / 3.23. The conveyor [of information / prompter] is of two kinds: one whose caused action is not visibly perceived, and one whose caused action is visibly perceived. Between them, that whose caused action is visibly perceived is such as in 'He has Kaṃsa killed,' 'He unites the moon with the flower,' and so forth. It is as follows: / 'Vālmīki connected the ocean with rocks brought by monkeys; / Vyāsa did likewise with the arrows of the son of Pṛthā; yet no exaggeration is imputed to the two. / And words and meanings are, as it were, held in a balance [by them]; nevertheless, this world / has its mouth wide open to disparage our literary composition: homage to you, O [immovable] Fame!' / 3.24. That whose caused action is not visibly perceived is such as in 'He passes the night in Vārāṇasī,' 'He makes the sun rise in Māhiṣmatī,' and so forth. It is as follows: / 'Obstructed by the vast expanse of the hips of his beloved, not obtaining room to lie down, / the lord of her life, with slumber and languor disappearing due to amorous intimacy, somehow spends the night on the couch; what is he to do?' / 3.25. How, then, is the production of the affix ṇic spoken of through the operation of the causal agent in such expressions as 'The storyteller has Kaṃsa killed' and 'The singer has Bali bound'? / 'Those [forms] which have entered the domain of the intellect, having forms presented by linguistic sound, / he considers to be agents, as if directly perceived, like Kaṃsa and the rest. / 3.26. And narrating their flourishing from their birth onwards up to their destruction, he causes others to comprehend them in the very same way. / For instance, speakers say: "Go, Kaṃsa is being killed!" [or] "What is the point of going? Kaṃsa has been killed." In the same way, comprehension should also be understood in such expressions as 'He causes the night to pass.'
3.p1.19
And this principle holds on the view that the sūtras need to be initiated; whereas on the view that the sūtra is initiated [with the vārttika]: 'From a narrative [affixes occur], expressing that; elision of kṛt, reversion to base form, and the kāraka acts like the base,'—this was cited earlier. / 3.27. Now, when this meaning of ṇic is delimited as the meaning of the verbal root, is it delimited directly? That could be so; but since nothing else is obtained here, that is untenable. The mutual connection is through their expecting their own means of realization, owing to action being something to be accomplished. Let it then be through the mediation of the agent; this too is incorrect. For the meaning of the verbal root is of the nature of the agent's operation; that [verbal root-meaning], even though the agent is not directly apprehended, implies the agent and will qualify the affix-meaning through that medium. / 3.28. Nor, if this be so, is prompting purposeless, because, fearing an interruption, [the prompter] impels even one who has already engaged in the action. Even where someone who is entirely unengaged is impelled, there too, comprehending the connection with the action residing in the intellect due to suitability, he employs him. Even a connection between the action and the agent that is based on the intellect is logically tenable. In that case, too, whether by the supplementary rule 'From a narrative, kṛt affixes… expressing that,' the commonality, because it is caused, is not distinct from the causal agent; thus it was refuted precisely as being based on the intellect. And then, having recourse to the operation of the causal agent, which is an object of the intellect such that 'He is being killed in the intellect by Vāsudeva,' the operation of the causal agent was admitted to be purely mental. Or rather, the action denoted by the verbal root, being connected with the agent implied by the sense, is connected with urging and the like as the meaning of the affix. For this very reason, even when one who is already engaged is commanded, affixes like loṭ and others are introduced, because agency would [otherwise] be lost. Well, how could one who has no connection with external engagement attain agency? And how indeed could agency, which is to be accomplished by command, exist prior to it? It is replied: this agency is not spoken of as dependent upon engagement in external performance. But when there is the speaker's intention for it as being connected in the action, its being accomplished thereby [is established].
3.p1.20
The agent, who is an inseparable concomitant and whose presence is conveyed through semantic compatibility, is already established and is made an object by the operation of the causal agent solely for the sake of accomplishing external performance. Otherwise, if agency depended upon the operation of the causal agent, his agency would only occur subsequent to the causal agent; thus, there being no agency at present, loṭ and others based upon it would not be tenable. Therefore, by 'he cooks' and the like, it is said: 'let him who cooks proceed towards cooking.' The verbal affix is applied in the sense of denotation to this agent, who is recognized through the semantic compatibility of the action, as one who is to be commanded. For instance: they state that this agent, comprehended through the semantic compatibility of the verbal root-meaning such as cooking, being made the object of the operation of commanding and the like for the sake of accomplishing the external performance of the purpose of instrumentality, is denoted by the affix. / 3.19. Granted that the agent has his presence established by the action; but how is that specific person known, by which it is said: 'You who cook, proceed to cooking'? For this very reason, in the Mahābhāṣya, having stated ṇic when using an agent who is engaged in action, the production of loṭ was stated when using a mere substance: 'May you ask me,' 'May you question me.' It is replied: even a mere substance, when being commanded, is commanded only as being suitable as an instrument of action, not a log, a wall, and the like. Well, in this way there would result an overlapping of the domains of ṇic and loṭ! There is no overlap: he alone whose agency in action has been repeatedly known through another means of knowledge is one whose action is potential, and is the domain of ṇic. But that which is merely suitable, whose capacity for action has not been seen, being a mere substance, is the domain of loṭ. By this [it is meant]: 'You who cook'—that is, you who are incapable, but worthy of cooking and capable of cooking—'proceed to cooking.' And thus, because one known through suitability as an agent of action is impelled in application, it is stated that competence belongs exclusively to the agent. / 3.30. This very meaning is corroborated by various turns of phrase such as: 'You are appointed to the kingship whose agents are wise, heroic, and noble-born.'
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- Śṛṅgāraprakāśa — Bhoja, Sanskrit