Shringaraprakasha 7
English (machine translation) 7
- Language
- English
Contents
- 7.p1 — 67 parts
7.p1.1
Seventh Illumination: The Power of the Relation of Linguistic Sound Alone (7.1). There, the twelve capacities belonging to linguistic sound and meaning—consisting of denotative capacity, speaker's intention, purport, division, mutual expectancy, semantic compatibility, syntactic connection, integration of meaning, avoidance of poetic faults, adoption of poetic qualities, poetic ornaments, and non-separation from aesthetic relish—are called literary conjunction. Among them, the power of linguistic sound that denotes meaning is denotative capacity. Operating through it upon the expressible meaning as if upon its own form, linguistic sound functions through three semantic operations; and they are three: primary, secondary, and figurative. Among them, the primary is that which denotes an immediate, unmediated meaning. The secondary is that whose meaning is mediated by a connection with qualities such as heroism that are being inferred. But the figurative is that which indirectly indicates another meaning invariably connected with its own meaning. To explain: this linguistic sound 'cow' conveys by its primary operation an entity possessing a dewlap and so forth; but that very same [sound], when it operates upon a Bahīka person while expecting an abundance of qualities such as indolence and dullness, then repeats the secondary operation. Hence he says: / 'Where a word is applied by convention in worldly usage even to an existing thing, / it is primary in that sense; elsewhere, through resemblance to that, it is secondary, moving smoothly.' / But when words, on account of their own primary meaning, are incapable of becoming an instrument in the accomplishment of an action, then they figuratively indicate another meaning invariably connected with the expressible meaning. Then that is the figurative operation. For example, 'a settlement on the Gaṅgā,' being incapable of becoming the locus of the action of living, figuratively indicates the bank invariably connected with its own primary meaning. Thus it is said: / 'That which is the comprehension of another meaning invariably connected with the expressible, / this very operation is accepted as the life of witty and crooked speech.' / And each of these three, being twofold, is divided separately into six kinds. Among them, the primary is twofold: referring to the real thing as it is, and the assumption of its nature. Between these two, that which refers to the real thing as it is is of six kinds: having as its object a universal, an individual, a bodily configuration, a quality, an action, and a relation. Among them, words such as 'cow', 'horse', 'man', 'brahmin' have a universal as their object, as in: / 'Clear, captivating, clever in diverse puns...'
7.p1.2
"Through whose merit do words appear in the mouth, and women in the home?" / Or as in: / "[Look at her,] with broad breasts, ample [...] / [...] walking slowly [...], / whose form is beheld with sidelong glances, rich in graces, a singular maiden!" / And as in: / "Deceived many times in the water by the reflections of her own eyes, / a certain flower-gatherer hesitates to place her hand upon the blue lotuses." / Having an object defined by bodily form, through meanings such as picture, reflection, illusion, or 'what is this?', as in: / "This is that ingudī tree of old in Śṛṅgaverapura, / where the meeting took place with the friendly king of the Niṣādas." / Having quality as its domain, such as 'white', 'rough', 'slender', 'stout', as in: / "The directions are blackened by rows of rainy clouds, / and the grounds are soft with rows of fresh verdure." / Or as in: / "Deeply reddened by betel, enjoyed by her lover, dusky along its edge, / the maiden's lower lip attains the beauty of the kāñcanāra blossom." / Having action as its domain, such as 'cooker', 'cooking', 'cooked', 'being cooked', as in: / "He was a giver, an upholder over the heads of adversaries, a sacrificer, an appeaser of the ancestors; / why do you grieve for the ten-headed [Rāvaṇa], who died undefeated in battle?" / Or as in: / "Whether angered, reconciled, their faces stained with tears, or laughing, / haughty women steal the heart just as they catch it." / Having relation as its domain, such as 'father', 'mother', 'enemy', 'son', 'descendant of Upagu', as in: / "He whose maternal and paternal grandfathers were the Sun and the Moon, / and who was chosen as husband by two: by Urvaśī and by the Earth." / Or as in: / "Immediately, in secret, the female companions break off / the very first tips of the sprouts of the mango clusters, to protect the women parted from their lovers." / 'Assumption of another's nature' (tadbhavāpatti) is the superimposition of that nature on an entity through non-entities by means of superimposition. It is sixfold: consisting of superimposition (adhyāsa), imagination (kalpanā), illusory transformation (vivarta), modification (vipariṇāma), error (viparyaya), and popular consensus (pravāda). Among these, superimposition is the attribution 'this is that' onto what it is not, even while knowing better. As in: / "O brother-in-law, why don't you look at the sky? Why do you gaze in vain? / Look at the line of marks of the deer-bearer [the moon] at the armpit of my sister-in-law!"
7.p1.3
Or as in: / "A lotus out of water, and upon the lotus two blue water-lilies, and they upon a golden creeper, / and she is delicate and lovely—what kind of series of portents is this?" / Imagination (kalpanā) is poetic fancy (utprekṣā) even of the non-existent, as in: / "By your fame, blended with the love for your virtues, spreading everywhere, / an unexpected half-circle of saffron was born upon the faces of the quarters of space [conceived as brides]." / Or as in: / "How could a wise man take to villainy, which brings no abatement of torment, / is devoid of fruit, and is abandoned by the virtuous—villainy which dwells in wickedness?" / Illusory transformation (vivarta) is the [apparent] change of states of an entity by a particular spatial arrangement. As in: / "Raised up from that blooming bed of land-lotuses, the pollen born of water-lilies, / whirled all around in the sky by whirlwinds, assumes the splendour of a golden parasol." / Or as in: / "Slightly curled, uneven, broken here and there and bent, / somewhat sunken, bending down to the forest, gathered and surging up, / the plume of smoke from the forest fire, blue like the shoulder of a young buffalo, / spreading at will, creates fleeting decorative leaf-paintings in the sky." / Modification (vipariṇāma) is an entity's passing into another state. As in: / "These sacrificers of renowned majesty, these kings, / these fawn-eyed maidens—enough of other worldly tales!— / and these trees bending under fruit and blossoms: / ah, it is the divine lady [Māyā] herself that sports in this world in such form!" / Or as in: / "Having curved into a ring the fallen crescent of the moon and her bracelet broken in the love-quarrel, / the Daughter of the Mountain, her face smiling, said, 'Look at him!' / May he [Śiva], may the Mountain-born goddess, and may that play-moon whose body was filled by the rays of her teeth, protect you tomorrow!" / Error (viparyaya) is false apprehension. As in: / "Marked by falling tears that washed away the lip-redness, / dropped in anger from her deep navel with agitated gait— / without a doubt, this is the breast-cloth, dusky like the belly of a parrot." / Or as in: / "Do not fear, O moon! In my wine there is no Rāhu; / Rohiṇī resides in the sky; O timid one, timid one, why are you afraid?"
7.p1.4
"In first unions with experienced women, men's minds usually waver; what is wonderful about that?" / Popular consensus (pravāda) is a false renown in non-things as if they were real things. As in: / "The forms of cities of Gandharvas, rainbows, mirages, and darkness— / such are the deeds of the wicked, unreal, hard to grasp, unattainable, and foul." / Or as in: / "To be beheld like an intermingling of the luster of gems, / a piece of Indra's bow rises up ahead from the top of an anthill, / through which your dark body will attain extraordinary splendor, / like that of Viṣṇu in a cowherd's dress with a shimmering peacock feather." / The secondary capacity (gauṇī) is twofold: based on a quality (guṇanimittā), and based on metaphorical transfer (upacāranimittā). Among them, that secondary capacity in which there is the use of two expressions in syntactic agreement or syntactic disagreement, and the relation of the one is mediated by an inferred or expressed quality due to the impossibility otherwise of the relation of qualifier and qualified—that secondary capacity, having an object mediated by a quality, is based on a quality. And on this point: / "Whatever distinguishing mark of a connected entity is perceived as dependent upon another, / that is exemplified in the treatise as possessing quality, because of its dependency." / 'Quality' (guṇa), 'inherent nature' (svārtha), 'qualifier' (viśeṣaṇa), and 'occasion of application' (pravṛttinimitta) are equivalent terms. That is infinite, through the distinctions of characteristic attribute (dharma), quality (guṇa), action (kriyā), shape (ākṛti), genus (jāti), universal form, and so on. Even though the function caused by that relation is conceived as infinite in mode, nevertheless it has only six varieties: / having a primary object, having a non-primary object, having difference as its object, having non-difference as its object, having a non-qualifier as its object, and having a qualifier as its object. Among these, when an attribute or the like of two primary entities that are both substantives becomes the qualifier of the other, that has a primary object. When based on an attribute in a compound, as in: / "He who is subject to that lovely face with elongated white eyes and playfully arched brows— / reverence to that beast of a man!" / The same not in a compound, as in: / "A word (gauḥ), properly used, is recalled by the wise as a wish-yielding cow (gauḥ); / but when badly used, that very cow indicates beastliness."
7.p1.5
A compound conditioned by action is as follows: / “Where does that light of the moon, / the fierce outcast moon, which longs to seize the rays with its hands, / not torment me, my dear friend, even at the rising of the sun in the sky?” / The uncompounded equivalent is as follows: / “Why was this wicked poison-tree nurtured by the wretched fate at the door? / When it is even slightly given to blooming and swelling, the fearful paroxysms of the fever of love arise.” / Where, between the qualifier and the qualified, one is primary from the start, that belongs to the sphere of the non-primary. When the qualified is non-primary in grammatical co-reference, conditioned by an attribute, it is as follows: / “Wiping away the drops of perspiration resembling snow-drops from that newly-wed bride, / the youth, through agitation of mind, somehow touched her two young jug-breasts.” / The same conditioned by action is as follows: / “On this stage of your lotus-face, your dancer-like creeper of a brow / gracefully sprinkles the glances of youth in the two pathways of your limbs, dear friend.” / When the qualifier is primary in grammatical non-co-reference, conditioned by shape, it is as follows: / “On the assembly of sighs of the rival woman, on the pitcher of beauty, on the frontal globe of the elephant of Kāma, / held by the heart of your husband, why, sighing one, do you carry breasts?” / The same conditioned by action is as follows: / “The evening of the effort of action, the binding chain of the mighty elephant of wrath, / how did the rainy season, the cage of the lion of the son of Daśaratha, pass away?” / Where one single word, through the conception of difference in the referent, undergoes the relation of qualifier and qualified conditioned by a poetic quality, that belongs to the sphere of difference. Conditioned by a poetic quality between a metaphorical and a primary [sense], and conditioned by universal between two primary ones, it is as follows: / “Your moon-face, O moon-faced one, is indeed a lotus and a moon; / but a lotus is just a lotus, and the wretched moon is just the moon.” / Conditioned by a poetic quality between two primary ones, it is as follows: / “Qualities become qualities only when they are seized by a connoisseur; / lotus blossoms, favored by the rays of the sun, become true lotus blossoms.” / Conditioned by action between two primary ones, it is as follows: / “Whose name, uttered with respect in the assembly as if swallowing up their splendors, / even enemies acclaim—he alone is a real man.”
7.p1.6
Conditioned by its essential nature, it is as follows: / “Nectar is nectar, the moon is the moon, likewise a lotus is a lotus; / amorous pleasure is amorous pleasure, Kāma is Kāma, and wines are wines; / thus, things generally do not take on each other's mixture; / then how does this slender woman possess feelings that have the nature of all of them?” / Where, due to the fame of common properties and the like, the standard of comparison itself conveys the subject of comparison, that belongs to the sphere of non-difference. It occurs in an indirect statement as follows: / “Drinking honey as it pleases in the open lotus, / look, the bee kisses the bud whose fragrance is not yet developed.” / [Or as follows:] / “The twilight is full of love, the day is in front of it; / alas, the movement of destiny is strange: nevertheless, there is no meeting.” / In the statement of both, it is as follows: / “O travelers, again seek that lake which is the ornament of the road, / having reached which, freed from the burden of exhaustion, you disport at will; / from here, however, there is an entrance into the belly of the salty ocean with harsh sharks; / withdrawal is fortunate, but never any re-entry.” / In the absence of a statement of both, it is as follows: / “Then this, by the contrivance of the disguise of the golden deer, with tormenting hands, / was so committed by the wicked ones that it grieves even when washed; / in the empty Janasthāna, through the despondent, pathetic deeds of the noble one, / even a stone weeps, even the heart of the vajra splits.” / Where a noun or a pronoun serving as a qualifier adopts a distinctive poetic quality, attribute, or the like as its ground of application, that belongs to the sphere of the qualifier. When it is conditioned by a distinctive poetic quality of a noun, it is as follows: / “Let her be harsh in anger, yet the deer-eyed one is charming; / delicious are these changes of those sweet without disguise: / the water which assumes a hard state in the shells of oysters / becomes pearls in them out of great respect for high birth.” / A proper name that arises from purificatory rites and the like is also just a noun. An example of it is: / “The clouds, with swallows darting across the sky smeared with a lustrous dark splendor, / the winds with sprays of mist, the joyful, sweet calls of the friends of the clouds, the peacocks— / let these come together; I, the hard-hearted Rāma, can bear all; / but how will Vaidehī fare? Alas, alas, O queen, be steadfast!”
7.p1.7
When a pronoun is conditioned by the possession of a distinctive poetic quality, it is as follows: / “That king, that happiness, that retinue, and those days— / everything has manifested in memory today upon seeing you, a friend; / in this terrible ripening of fate, your friend was not at all bewildered; / for the heart of noble women is as delicate as a flower.” / Just like the primary sense, the qualifier of a metaphorical sense is also its qualifier; in that regard, when a pronoun is conditioned by the possession of a poetic quality, it is as follows: / “[…] / […]” / When an invariable qualifier, being non-distinctive, operates through the connection of that attribute and other poetic qualities, that is the reversal of the non-qualifier: / “[…] / […]” / In the case of an animate entity, it is as follows: / “Truly the lord of the gods is made of wood, since by the hands / of the plowman's daughter, tender as lotus petals, he was touched but did not sprout!” / In the case of an inanimate entity, it is as follows: / “Be it so, this is known: you are indeed wood; truly, what else shall I say? You were grown in a forest; / since in this festival of contact with the hand of the lotus-eyed woman, / a pestle, you did not instantly put forth shoots.” / In the case of an inanimate entity through majestic power, it is as follows: / “If this [wish-fulfilling jewel] might somehow be obtained after a long time by seekers searching for it, / you, O Lord, on the other hand, search for seekers daily with effort; / this one grants only what is thought of upon being found, while you grant beyond thought; / if upon seeing you the wish-fulfilling jewel does not shatter, it is truly just a stone.” / The superimposition onto another of an existing qualifier of another, whether primary or metaphorical, is figurative transfer. The metaphorical transfer conditioned by it is figurative metaphor; and that, because its meaning is mediated by a metaphorical sense, is metaphorical. It too has grounds of application and divisions based on attributes, poetic qualities, actions, shapes, universals, and the like.
7.p1.8
And that is of six kinds: based on attribute, based on quality, based on shape, based on action, based on essential nature, and based on universal. Among these, the one based on attribute is as follows: / "Let the fawn-eyed one be hard in anger, yet she is delightful..." / "...was danced by my beloved with [her hands] charming with jingling bracelets." / Here, the words "hard" and "charming" are conventionally established as qualifiers of a physical substance and of a particular living being, respectively; being superimposed upon anger and the jingling of bracelets, through their connection they also experience the status of qualifiers of the heroine and of time. The one based on quality is as follows: / "For what is not an ornament for sweet forms?" / "This bracelet-sound, unpleasant at the close, was heard by the father-in-law." / Here, the words "sweet" and "unpleasant" are conventionally established as qualifiers of taste. Through the mediation of that [taste], superimposed through description onto the words "forms" and "bracelets", they experience the status of qualifiers. The one based on shape is as follows: / "When the mango tree had sprouted, leafed, budded, and blossomed, / love in the heart sprouted, leafed, budded, and blossomed." / Or as in: / "As if leafed out by the leaf-hands of the beloved, as if opened by her eyes, / the loveliness of the noble lady has, as it were, borne fruit in her swelling breasts." / Here, "sprouted", "leafed", and so on are conventionally established as qualifiers due to specific shapes in physical trees and the like; through the mediation of that [shape], being superimposed on the formless love and loveliness, they experience the status of a secondary qualifier. The one based on action is as follows: / "The east has given birth to the moon; Love dances; the quarters also smile; / the wind scatters powder of blue lotus pollen across the courtyard of the sky." / Or as in: / "..." / Here, the status of qualifiers arises from superimposing other actions such as serving and embracing onto another through the mediation of that.
7.p1.9
How, then, is this division distinct from the secondary function? Where a well-known standard of comparison and an object of comparison are understood, scholars describe that as having its meaning mediated by a quality, being non-secondary, [and termed] anyokti or samāsokti. Where, however, the standard of comparison is understood from the object of comparison due to similarity of quality, they declare that to be the secondary trope samādhi, having its meaning unmediated by the secondary function. Thus it is said: "If what is expressed belongs to the context, it is samādhi; if it is outside the context, it is samāsokti." The one based on essential nature is as follows: / "Whom would poverty, the mother of dejection, not bring low? / Or whom does this fortune, the wife of intoxication, not drive mad?" / Or as in: / "Her body, my friend, is an ornament to ornament, a special decoration to the procedure of decoration, / and even a counter-standard of comparison to the standard of comparison." / Here, because poverty causes dejection, through the superimposition of the status of mother upon its own nature, the relationship of [dejection's] being offspring is mediated; the sentence-meaning is: "Poverty causes dejection." And its metaphoric transfer is explained just as in "The east has given birth to the moon" and so forth. The same should be applied subsequently. The one based on universal is as follows: / "Resolution, forbearance, restraint, purity, ability, speech that is not harsh, / and non-violence toward living beings—these seven are the firewood of prosperity." / Or as in: / "Those for whom slaughtering living beings is sport, jokes are words that cut to the quick, / and afflicting others is duty—they are deaths above Death." / Here, when the attributes of fire and firewood, and the attributes of mortal and death, are superimposed respectively on prosperity and resolution, and on death and wicked people, there is subordination only of the universals firewood and death, but not of fire and mortal. Since these lack a direct connection, a metaphoric transfer operating through attributes such as illumination and destruction brings about the connection. Thereby this meaning results: resolution and the rest cause prosperity to grow; wicked people kill even Death. And this—namely, that an action established in one thing is superimposed onto another—is indeed the secondary function of metaphoric transfer. As it is said: / "Water lilies close and lotuses open."
7.p1.10
'Thus, through the superimposition of the action of leading, the word denoting that [leader] is obtained.' Likewise: 'Which Pārtha experiences distress... / Joy comes to a living man even after a hundred years,' and so forth should be observed. If so, why is this not caused by action? Because the action itself transforms into the form of a substance or universal, as in the form of a compound in 'mother of misery' and the like. But then, just as 'an ox is like an ox,' why is 'they are firewood' not also a qualitative secondary usage? It would be so if by 'firewood' fortune were not intended, or if the word 'fire' were used for 'the fire of fortune.' As in: '...when crushing the temple-globes of the rutting elephant of passion...' and so forth. By this it is said that 'poverty, the mother of misery,' 'they are deaths even of death,' and the like also do not possess qualitative secondary usage. By the inclusion of 'and so forth,' when figurative transference occurs through difference or non-difference even of names, pronouns, and the like, it becomes a qualitative secondary usage whose meaning is mediated by a quality. That [usage], when there is figurative transference of difference by superimposing a name, is as follows: 'O right hand, release the sword upon the Śūdra ascetic to restore life to the dead Brahmin child! You are the limb of Rāma, who was skillful in banishing Sītā weighed down with an advanced pregnancy: whence could you have compassion?' Or as in: 'Fittingly do you despair, descendant of Raghu! Creator, what inauspicious mark did you see on her limbs? Do you still live, Ten-headed one? O Hanūmān, what is this waiting for an enemy who stands before you?' Figurative transference of non-difference by superimposing a pronoun is as follows: 'On a sandbank white as moonlight, by the edge of the river, an endless debate once arose between two young Siddhas: one says that Kaiṭabha was slain first, the other Kaṃsa; tell the truth, the reality: who was slain first there by you?' Or as in: 'Why would he, who has obtained fortune, again inflict upon me that torment of churning? Nor do I even imagine that previous sleep of his, whose mind is ever alert. Why does he build a bridge again?' (Variant reading: 'and how is it that he...') 'Followed by the lords of all continents, when you arrived, the ocean's trembling seemed as if it were holding such doubts.'
7.p1.11
Here, in the first two examples, Rāma and Hanūmān, through the name-words, are conventionally established as specific designative attributes of their own forms that are extremely pitiless and intolerant of insult; mediated by that, being superimposed upon another differentiated form of theirs figuratively transferred as opposite to that, they assume the status of a figurative attribute: thus this is a qualitative secondary usage caused by figurative transference whose meaning is mediated by a quality. Where, however, there is no figurative transference of difference, there, because of the absence of mediation, the qualitative secondary usage is caused purely by a quality, as in: 'I am Rāma, I endure everything,' and 'Even that Garuda knows me to be Rāvaṇa along with his own master.' But how can there be a designation of difference when word and meaning are non-different? For such a difference of word and meaning is seen only in 'the head of Rāhu,' 'an ox is an ox,' 'she gives desires,' and so forth. It is replied: Indeed, when the primary meaning is absent, figurative transference operates when there is a purpose and a motivating condition. And it becomes the cause of the designation of difference among non-different things, and the cause of the designation of non-difference among different things. There, the difference among non-different things is as follows: 'You know yourself through yourself, you create yourself through yourself, and through yourself, as an agent, you dissolve into your very self.' Here, because there is no other entity apart from the Supreme Self, and because actions such as knowing are not possible without syntactic roles such as the object, the one alone is differentiated through the figurative transference of agent, object, instrument, and so on. And once difference is established, on the basis of similarity, the convention of standard of comparison and object of comparison operates even for figuratively transferred things just as for primary ones. As follows: 'Your face is like your face, your eyes are like your eyes, your form is like your form, you are like yourself, O slender-waisted woman!' But difference on the basis of dissimilarity is contrast. As in: 'He whose name even his enemies praise, that man is indeed a man! Only those lotuses favored by the sun's rays are true lotuses!'
7.p1.12
And then, as in the case of distinct meanings, there arises a relation, case-endings, and the like, as in 'you are the limb of Rāma,' 'O Hanūmān.' By this, simile, metaphor, and so forth are explained even in the case of primary and secondary [meanings]. As in: 'This face-moon, reddish in tint through intoxication, roars back at the moon that has assumed the redness of rising.' 'The moon is drunk by the gods; your face-moon is drunk by me. For that one is constantly incomplete; this one has a full disk.' 'When this face-moon of yours—nectar-natured, hating lotuses, having a soft pupil—is present, what is the use of the other moon?' 'It does not close lotuses, nor does it traverse the sky; your face-moon will rise only to take my life!' Figurative transference of non-difference with a different name is as in the subsequent examples: there, indeed, the pronoun, which is the standard of comparison with manifold qualities identical to those being comprehended and expressed, applied to the object of comparison through the mediation of the standard of comparison, superimposes preeminence through the figurative transference of non-difference. But why is this not allegorical expression, condensed metaphor, or composite expression? For indeed: even in the superimposition of a pronoun, allegorical expression, condensed metaphor, and composite expression are seen to possess the qualities and powers of the object of comparison that are comprehended and expressed. There, allegorical expression is as follows: 'Alas, where is that fragrance of yours? Alas, where is your coolness that dispels affliction? Sandalwood, you have fallen into the hands of a charcoal-maker; fie upon fate!' Condensed metaphor is as follows: 'Why do you torment the tender, budding, immature, juice-less blossom of the fresh jasmine out of season? Meanwhile, O bee, amuse your restless mind among other flowering creepers capable of enduring crushing!' Composite expression is as follows: 'Sitting at ease, by what pitiless one were you extracted from the mine? Or by whom were you brought to be sold in this foreign land? Let alone a buyer capable of bearing the burden of immense expense, brother emerald, there is no one here even capable of examining you!' It is replied: Only where the standard of comparison alone, being employed, makes known the object of comparison whose qualities are comprehended and expressed, do allegorical expression and the like occur.
7.p1.13
Here, however, the standard of comparison is not directly employed. What then? A pronoun qualifying it [is used]; therefore, in the first example there is no allegory (anyokti), while in the second example there is no condensed metaphor (samāsokti). If that is so, why does a transformation into that state (tadbhāvāpatti) characterized by superimposition (adhyāsa) not occur? Just as in: "at the young girl's underarm is the young moon", or as in: "Alas, O kings, why do you not strike down this condemned one, this servant, together with these five sons of paramours and along with this aged princess?" It is answered: here, pronouns alone are not employed. What then? Substantives are also [employed]; thus, transformation into that state is justified. In phrases such as "the moon's radiance," however, when there is superimposition via a pronoun, it is purely metaphorical transfer (upacāragauṇī) due to the connection with the poetic figure samādhi; and as to how samādhi is established even upon the superimposition of a subject possessing attributes (dharmin), we shall explain that later. 7.3. Metaphorical indication (lakṣaṇā) is twofold: direct indication (lakṣaṇā) and mediated indication (lakṣitalakṣaṇā). Of the two, where the meaning of the expressed word, being incapable of serving as the means in accomplishing the action, indicates through mediation another meaning inseparable from its own meaning, that is direct indication (lakṣaṇā); but that which differs from it and has manifold forms (to be described below) is mediated indication (lakṣitalakṣaṇā). There, direct indication is sixfold: indication through proximity (sāmīpyalakṣaṇā), indication through concomitance (sāhacaryalakṣaṇā), indication through associated attribute (sahacaritalakṣaṇā), indication through cause (hetulakṣaṇā), indication through purpose (tādarthyalakṣaṇā), and indication through measure (parimāṇalakṣaṇā). Among these, in cases like "the settlement on the Ganges" or "the platforms are crying out," indication through proximity is the cause of cognizing another nearby meaning inseparable from its own primary meaning. As in: "Her face pale like a ripened palm-leaf, / her cheek lovely as a slice of freshly cut elephant-tusk." Here, because "ripening" and "cutting" are actions and thus incorporeal, paleness and loveliness are impossible [in them]; hence they indicate the nearby ripe palm-leaf and the freshly severed elephant-tusk. In cases like "the umbrella-bearers are walking" or "enter the spears," indication through concomitance is the cause of cognizing another meaning apprehended through concomitance that is inseparable from its own meaning.
7.p1.14
As in: "Taking whom as the calf, all the mountains—while Meru, skilled in milking, stood as the milkman—milked from the earth bright jewels and great medicinal herbs directed by Pṛthu." Here, due to the concomitance with the milkman, "milked" is used even in the case of the mountains. Or as in: "At every footstep Śatakratu stationed a hundred pole-riders, at every chariot a hundred rutting elephants, at every elephant a hundred horses, at every horse a hundred spears." Where another attribute concomitant with the stated attribute is indicated, that is indication through associated attribute (sahacaritalakṣaṇā). As in: "Yellow drops of water like honey drops; / having broad buttocks like a golden slab." Here, the form, brightness, and so forth of the substratum accompanied by yellowness and broadness are indicated. In cases like "food indeed is life-breaths" or "clarified butter is longevity," indication through cause is the cause of cognizing another meaning that is an instrumental or efficient cause inseparable from its own meaning. As in: "You are my life, you are my second heart." Here, by the word "life" and the word "heart," the beloved woman, who is the cause of life and consciousness, is spoken of. In cases like "Indra-pillar" and "jasmine-lamp," indication through purpose is the cause of cognizing that intended meaning. As in: "When the king, a lion among monarchs, ascended the Malaya mountain, staging the absolute other shore of the ocean, his army-stick [was raised] to uproot the spotless glory of the lord of Siṃhala." Here, by the word "stick" (daṇḍa), people dispatched for punishment (daṇḍanā) are spoken of. In "a prastha," "a pala," "a krośa," and so forth, indication through measure is the cause of cognizing another meaning that serves as the instrument of measurement. As in: "From whom boundless jewels were constantly received by the people as if from a wealthy guest, / extracted repeatedly in great abundance by unreduced prasthas." Here, by the word "prastha," the measuring vessel made of wood or the like, which is the instrument of the prastha-measure, is spoken of. 7.4. Mediated indication (lakṣitalakṣaṇā) is likewise sixfold: conventional indication (rūḍhalakṣaṇā), indication through an abbreviation (pratīkalakṣaṇā), indication of the intended meaning (vivakṣitalakṣaṇā), indication of the contradictory (viruddhalakṣaṇā), indication of something other than that (tadanyalakṣaṇā), and miscellaneous indication (prakīrṇalakṣaṇā).
7.p1.15
Among these, that wherein, by an expression indicated through etymology in any manner whatsoever, a meaning indicated solely by convention is indicated, is conventional indication (rūḍhalakṣaṇā). For instance, durodara [a gambler/die], cakravāka [a ruddy sheldrake], dvirepha [a bee, having two r's], bhramara [a bee]. As in: "The bee (dvirepha) drank honey from a single flower-cup, following after his beloved." Here, possessing two 'r's (dvirephatva) and having a difficult entrance (durodaratva) are possible even in an osprey (kurara); yet convention does not hold here, so this [bird] is not indicated. Where the whole is indicated through an abbreviation—a single part of the expression—which is itself already established by indication, and not just any arbitrary [word], that is indication through an abbreviation (pratīkalakṣaṇā). As in: "Bhīma of terrible valor"; [or in Prakrit:] "even a friend becomes eager to see him." Here, because of hearing the abbreviations "Bhīma" and "Satya", the previously indicated indications of the names "Bhīmasena" and "Satyabhāmā" are indicated. One does not similarly say "jyeṣṭha" for Jyeṣṭhā, or "ārdrā" for Ārdrā. Where, upon the usage of words in any manner, only the intended sense is indicated in accordance with the indicated object, that is indication of the intended meaning (vivakṣitalakṣaṇā). As in: "half a glance, a victorious chariot for the Mind-born; / one third of an eye, captivating like a startled doe." Here, the literal meaning of the word "half" or the word "one third" is not meant; rather, an incomplete gaze is indicated by both. For one never says "a fourth part of an eye" or "a sixth part of an eye." Where a single word, either alone or in proximity to another, indicates a meaning that is already indicated as opposed to what was directly expressed, that is indication of the contradictory (viruddhalakṣaṇā). As in: viṣṭi [the unfavorable astrological period] called bhadrā [auspicious], Mars called maṅgala [auspicious], or: "How virtuous (puṇyavatī) am I, to whom you are such a husband!" Here, the words bhadrā and maṅgala, and the word expressing "virtuous," indicate purely what is indicated as inauspiciousness and lack of merit. Or as in the Ratnāvalī, where the king says to the jester: "You are a great Brahmin; who else is so conversant with the Ṛgvedic verses?" Here, by "great Brahmin" and by "conversant with the Ṛgvedic verses," a state lower even than an outcaste and utter foolishness are indicated.
7.p1.16
And as in Mālatīmādhava, Lavaṅgikā says to Madayantikā: / "How indeed, having obtained your husband's brother, who knows the means of winning over a new bride, who speaks charmingly, boldly, and sweetly, and who is free from anger, will my dear friend be displeased?" / Here, knowing the means of winning over a new bride and so forth indicate a meaning opposite to that. Likewise others, as in: / "This fresh nail-mark on the slope of your breast belongs to one whose pride is unfaded; / cover it with your upper garment, my friend." / "Angry or pleased, with tearful faces or smiling, / whatever manner they are seized, the wicked women steal the heart." / "We may indeed be as you say; what shall I say? Suddenly agitated in another story, / how has this completely pure and innocent family girl assumed the form of a kadamba flower?" / In these, by the word "unfaded pride" the breaking of pride is indicated; by the word "wicked" a blessing of non-destruction is indicated; and by the words "completely pure and innocent" impurity and lack of innocence are indicated. Where another meaning is indicated through the rejection of the expressed word-meaning, that is indication of something other than that (tadanyalakṣaṇā). As in: / "Three men gather the earth that flowers with gold: / the brave, the learned, and he who knows how to serve." / Here, neither the word-meaning of "gold" nor the word-meaning of "flower" [is meant]; rather, by the word "gold" gold as the root of all human goals is indicated, and by the word "flower" the meaning of fruitfulness is indicated. And through those two being indicated, [it means that] the earth brings forth all desires for specific energetic men. Indication other than those mentioned is miscellaneous indication (prakīrṇalakṣaṇā). As in: / "...having a splendor equal to a thousand rays, renowned in all ten directions with fame, / having the word 'ten' preceding 'chariot' as his name, whom the wise know as the father of the enemy of the Ten-Necked One..." / "They call him whose name has 'gold' preceding 'seat' [Hiraṇyakaśipu]..." / "...rose up out of the water just as fire having the mouth of the mare-consort..." / Others, however, explain secondary indication (lakṣitalakṣaṇā) differently.
7.p1.17
When, through secondary indication operating by metaphorical transfer, another meaning is indicated by the expressed meaning through a quality, that is 'indicated indication' (lakṣitalakṣaṇā). As in: 'He whose weapon is a chariot-part' (rathāvayavāyudhaḥ), 'He of ten chariots' (paṅktirathaḥ), 'She named after a chariot-part' (rathāṅganāmā). Here, by the expression 'part of a chariot', the word 'wheel' (cakra) is indicated, and by 'paṅkti', the word 'ten' (daśa); and through their juxtaposition with 'weapon' and 'chariot', the Wielder of the Discus (Viṣṇu) and Daśaratha—a specific deity and a specific king—are indicated. By 'rathāṅga' a part of a chariot is indicated; thereby the word 'cakra' [is indicated]. By 'nāman', naming is the indicated sense; through their mutual juxtaposition, 'cakravāka', a specific bird, is indicated. And its application is exceedingly frequent in compositions. As follows: / 'By this upper world, entering a pestle where a needle pierces, / he was seen in the same village, though he was not seen by these eyes.' / Here, the entry of a pestle into a needle's eye is impossible; but by the indicated meaning that 'people do even that', his character of uttering impossibilities is indicated. / As in: / 'Kissed a hundred times, embraced a thousand hundred times, / made love to, then ceased—with a beloved person there is no tautology.' / Here, the word 'tautology' (punarukta) has a meaning, its capacity being fixed in a particular repeated use; indicating the generality of repeated action […] it indicates the particular act of kissing a rival woman. / Likewise: / 'As two people who are drunk […]; / moons bereft of pride carry off, as it were, dark nights.' / Here, the words 'drunk' and 'bereft of pride', indicating instability, are conventionally established with respect to sentient beings; being applied to insentient things, they indicate an association with such a meaning in them as well. / Furthermore: / 'Quite different is her loveliness, quite different the glow of her maturing limbs; / she possesses an uncommon youthfulness; beauty is her very outline.' / Here, by the word 'outline' (rekhā), a painted portrait is indicated, and not an ordinary formation of bodily form. / Another: / 'Disregarding the fatigue of the eyes […], what relation are you to Love?' / Here, by 'what are you to Love?', kin relation to him is indicated.
7.p1.18
And thereby similarity to him [is indicated]. / Likewise: / 'Her lower lip welcomes the fading of the aśoka sprout; / her cheek, through pallor, descends to the ripeness of the tālī-palm leaf; / her gaze mimics an almost completely withered lotus-bed: / ever triumphant is the slender-limbed woman's fresh transformation wrought by Love.' / Here, by 'welcomes', 'descends', and 'mimics'—qualities of sentient beings applied to insentient things—in what are secondarily indicated by receiving, attaining, and mimicking […], through 'fading of the sprout', the grayishness of sighing is indicated. Through that also, because of proximity, similarity to the aśoka sprout [is indicated]; through 'ripeness of the tālī' and 'withered state of the lotus-bed', emaciation caused by separation is indicated, and through that, an excess of love. / Thus: / 'Withered on both sides from contact with plump breasts and hips, / green at the center of the body having found no contact inside, / thus tossed about by the flinging and turning of slack creeper-like arms, / the bed of lotus leaves speaks the torment of the slender-limbed girl.' / Here, by 'speaks', through metaphorical transfer, 'makes known' [is indicated]; through those qualities such as 'withered', the excellence of beauty in the arrangement of her body is indicated. / Moreover: / 'A blue lotus is the discarded garland of her eyes' beauty; the moon is the slave of her face; / why else is the creeper-bow of the Mind-born kept at the gate of her brows?' / Here, by the words 'discarded garland' and 'slave', which are indicated as inferior through metaphorical transfer, the superiority of the eyes and the face is indicated. And through the secondary indication of dismissing the creeper-bow of the Mind-born from entering the door, it expressly states its still greater inferiority to both. / Furthermore: / 'That face pale like the ripeness of a tālī leaf, that foul weather of the eyes, / and that lotus petal made to dance in sport, while sighs spread forth.' / Here, in 'foul weather (durdina) of the eyes', the denotative capacity of the word 'durdina' is conventionally established for a day whose splendor is struck by rain and clouds; because that is impossible in the case of eyes, by indicating a stream of water inextricably connected with its own meaning, it indicates a stream of tears. / And another: / 'Times of happiness have passed away; terrible times have presented themselves;
7.p1.19
the days are ever more sinful, and the earth has lost its youth.' / Here, by qualities of sentient beings, such as 'having its happiness passed away', attributed to insentient entities like time, because of their impossibility in them, living beings and the like that are inextricably connected with them and situated in them are indicated. Through that, self-disgust (nirveda) [is indicated]. / And another: / 'All these three worlds would turn into blinding darkness; / like a mirror blinded by breath, the moon does not shine.' / Here, just as in a blind man the manifestation of particular visual forms cannot occur, so too in darkness, where the manifestation of particular forms is impossible because it is dense, that is called 'blinding darkness' (andhatamas); similarly, just as a blind man is incapable of perceiving visual form, so too is a mirror. One who is incapable of perceiving visual form is called 'blind'. There, in metaphorical transfer, only one who does not see like a blind man is called 'blind'. Here, where nothing at all is seen, the word 'blind' also functions by indicated indication. / Other examples are likewise, as in: / 'This one is not burnt even by a small amount of wood; / friend, you too are […] by a little sandalwood paste.' / Here, in the first case, the literal sense is possible in the subject described: it indicates that 'just as Vikramāditya was, so too is this particular great man'. And through that, it indicates in both of them a greatness of virtues such as majesty that cannot be expressed in few words. But in the second case, that very meaning is expressed inversely through indication. In this manner, this endless operation of indicated indication is to be observed in literary compositions. / As in: / […] / 'Making the rows of eyelashes of the young women dirty with a web of frost and exceedingly dense through repetition, / the dust trodden for a moment by the Yadu forces desiring to ascend to the sky, rising from the mountains, held up the face of the directions.'
7.p1.20
The speaker's intention is the desire to convey an expression with reference to meanings through linguistic sounds. As has been said: "The deployment of linguistic sound is preceded by what the speaker intends to convey." For speech is threefold: non-human, originating from seers, and human. Among these, the non-human consists predominantly of linguistic sound, namely the mantras and the Brāhmaṇas. In that case, because there is no speaker, no speaker's intention applies. That which originates from seers consists predominantly of meaning, namely the Smṛtis and the epics. In that case, mere speaker's intention operates: / "For the speech of ordinary virtuous persons follows along after the meaning, / but the meaning itself runs after the speech of the primeval seers." / And the human kind, in which both are prominent, arises from specific speaker's intentions of persons of focused intellect. For example: syntactic roles arise from the speaker's intention. "He plays with the dice" (*akṣān dīvyati*), "he plays with the dice" (*akṣair dīvyati*), "he plays among the dice" (*akṣeṣu dīvyate*). "The cloud flashes" (*valāhako vidyotate*), "it flashes over the cloud" (*valāhakasya vidyotate*). / "Because the universe, a conglomeration of capacities having manifold properties, / is at all times and in every way existent, only some particular [aspect] is intended to be conveyed anywhere." / The intention to convey non-syntactic roles even within syntactic roles is as in: "He remembers his mother" (*mātuḥ smarati*), "he is conscious of the ghee" (*sarpiṣo jānīte*), "he should not eat beans" (*na māṣāṇām aśnīyāt*). / "These do not know of happiness, whereby they might dwell in the Nandana [grove]." / Here, when the object and so forth are intended to be conveyed merely as remaining relations, the genitive case appears merely for relation, not the case-ending denoting the syntactic role, even though they are object, instrument, or agent. The intention to convey a syntactic role in non-syntactic roles is as in: "It is happening, he cooks" (*bhavati pacati*), "it is happening, he will cook" (*bhavati pakṣyati*), "it is happening, he cooked" (*bhavaty apākṣīt*); "It is that we go" (*asti gacchāmo vayam*). Likewise: "You remember, we will dwell in Kashmir" (*smarasi kāśmīreṣu vatsyāmaḥ*); "Come, I think you will not go" (*ehi manye na yāsyasi*); "Look, the deer is running" (*paśya mṛgo dhāvati*); "Look here at us" (*iha paśya mām*); [and] dual and plural numbers are cited in the object [as in grammatical rules]. The intention to convey a syntactic role even in an action is as in: "It pains the thief" (*corasya rujati*), "it sickens the thief" (*corasyāmayati*), "it causes fever to the thief" (*coraṃ jvarayati*), "it torments the thief" (*coraṃ saṃtāpayati*). Here, with verbs having the sense of pain, as in: "It pains the thief" (*corasya rujati*), "it sickens the thief" (*corasyāmayati*), "it causes fever to the thief" (*coraṃ jvarayati*), "it torments the thief" (*coraṃ saṃtāpayati*).
7.p1.21
Here, in the case of roots meaning 'to pain' expressive of bhāva, and of the causatives of jvar and santāp, the agency belongs to bhāva alone. The intention to express a non-action as an action is as follows: "the forest turns blue", "the palace turns white"; "even a poisonous tree, having grown it oneself, is improper to cut down." The intention to express one action as another action is as follows: "he desires to wish", "he desires to love", "it might even be", "it could possibly be". 7.5. The intention to express an action even within a syntactic role is as follows: "an eye to see", "a bow to fight", "intending to go", "desiring to go". Here, the suffix tumun is prescribed in the presence of an action whose purpose is another action; that cannot be accomplished without the intention to express the action of the eyes and so forth. The intention to express a relation where there is non-relation is as follows: "Roaring continuously, with which these clouds will arrogantly inundate the earth all around, / those waters he saw the clouds drinking secretly from one region of the ocean." The intention to express sentience in insentient things is as follows: "the river-bank desires to fall", "the stone desires to divide". […] speaker's intention, as in: "the horseman desires to fall." The intention to express a quality in the principal entity is as follows: "the whiteness of the crane", "the blackness of the crow". The intention to express the principal entity in a quality is as follows: "the sweet flavor gladdens", "the sour stimulates". The intention to express the whole in a part is as follows: "the village is burnt", "the cloth is burnt", "he is blind in one eye", "he is lame in one foot". The intention to express a part in the whole is as follows: "When there is a bow to be strung merely with the fierce power of the staff-like arm, Lord Ārya, through the humble foot-soldier Lakṣmaṇa, should you, my lady, consider me too, Vikukṣi by name, an ultimate servant of that very same god of auspicious name?" The intention to express difference where there is non-difference is as follows: "you, the clever speaker, were clever"; "this one is cleverer"; "it became someone else altogether", "the head of Rāhu", "the body of the stone statue". The intention to express non-difference even where there is difference is as follows: "we eat the very same rice as in Mathurā", "we wear the very same garments as in Pāṭaliputra."
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- Śṛṅgāraprakāśa — Bhoja, Sanskrit