Pramanavarttika 1.1.4.3.1: (1) janmāntarasiddhiḥ—

Now, is cognition of all things impossible and completely useless, so that his cognition of only the primary human aim is sought?

This is not so.

Let him know everything; one who knows everything is not denied. / It is because he cannot be known by us that contentment [with knowing the essentials] is accepted. // 375

Indeed, an omniscient one is not known [to be omniscient] by one who is not omniscient, because there is no means [to know this]. For:

The thought that 'he knows everything' arises from knowledge of his knowable objects. / Even a partial cognition of that arises only for one who knows that [object]. // 376

Whether even trees and the like, which are common to the knowledge of women and Śūdras, are known by another or not, the thought [about it] arises only from knowledge of that. But when it is not known by oneself, there is no means to say 'this has been known by him.' However, for those great beings whose range involves distant vision, the conjecture of omniscience is preceded by a partial knowledge of them; and even for them, the conjecture of truth is by another.

[Objection:] Well, what is the proof, or what is the logical reason, for a means of valid cognition possessing both characteristics? In reply, he says:

"The proof is from the cultivation of compassion; that [compassion] of the intellect, because of its dependence on the body—"

From what does the proof of that validity arise? From the cultivation of compassion. And that compassion belongs to the intellect, because of its dependence on the body. Because of its dependence on the intellect's body, that compassion, accompanied by cultivation, reaches the highest degree of excellence.

[Objection:] Even if there is compassion, still, whence is the possibility that validity [as a means of valid cognition] comes from it? [Answer:] There is a possibility, because:

The desire to free another from suffering and from the cause of suffering / is compassion; therefore, one possessing that has the intention to acquire the means to it. // 377

For it is inevitable that one who desires another's separation from suffering searches for the means to that, as will be demonstrated later.

Alternatively, compassion is the proof. For one possessing compassion is not devoid of helping others. Therefore, through teaching what is for the benefit of others, he is a means of valid cognition. One possessing compassion engages in the means; and that means is the proof of his own validity.

Whence does that very compassion, characterized by the desire to protect all, arise? He says: 'From the cultivation of compassion.' For through the practice of [contemplating] suffering, compassion operates even toward neutral persons and enemies. Consequently, since protecting all is impossible without being omniscient, the practice of the means to that is undertaken.

[Objection:] Well, for intelligent beings, their own intellect depends on the body, and compassion is also just an intellect [or mental state]. Therefore, that too depends strictly on the body. Hence, because the body turns to ashes, cultivation cannot be established. For only if there were another life could the desired attainment be reached through the accumulation of cultivation over multiple lives. For:

The intellect is identical with the body, an effect of the body, and a quality of the body: / based on these three views here, the possibility of cultivation does not exist. // 378

Therefore, he says: 'because of the intellect's dependence on the body—'

—if it is said that cultivation is unestablished, this is not so, because its dependence [on the body alone] is refuted. (35)

Because its dependence on the mere body, devoid of an antecedent homogeneous intellect, is refuted. Indeed, whether [intellect] is an effect, a quality, or otherwise, the state of being a substratum cannot belong to the mere body.

(The intellect does not depend on the body and so forth.)

[Cārvāka:] But the intellect is observed to depend on the body, being an effect of the body, because it is seen to depend on the parents' bodies. To explain: their form, conduct, mental acuity, and so on, following upon the parents, depend on the great elements of the produced body, just like paintings and so forth. Paintings, following upon the painter's form, consciousness, and so on, and depending on a wall, are of the nature of the painter's effects. Therefore, a painting does not exist without a wall, nor does it transmigrate to another wall or arrive from another wall. Or, it is like the color produced by cooking in a mango fruit and the like. Or, an effect such as smoke does not come from another fire, nor does it go to another fire. The intoxicating power, however, depending on liquor, arises anew through the combination of astringent and other juices. While dissolving, it does not rely on another liquor. Likewise are the specific conscious states of the senses. And thus it is said: 'Earth, water, fire, and wind are the principles.' The principles are earth and the others alone; earth and the others alone are the principles. There is no space and the like, nor momentariness and the like. Likewise, there are principles alone; there is not mere consciousness, nor is everything void, because there is no means of valid cognition for any of that. 'Object', 'sense faculty', and 'body' are designations for their aggregation. The range of the designation 'body' and so forth is an aggregation resulting from an immeasurable particular transformation of the great elements themselves. Consciousness arises from these bodies, senses, and objects, just as the intoxicating power arises from fermenting yeast and the like. Therefore, like the intoxicating power, consciousness does not come from another world possessing rebirth. And the phrase 'like the intoxicating power' is illustrative, as are 'like a painting' and 'like smoke'. For these are not observed to be migratory.

That is false.

Apart from visible form and so forth, whence is there the apprehension of the elements? / These are five; therefore, restricting their number [to four] is unjustified. // 379

Form, sound, smell, taste, and touch are the five great elements. 'Earth' and so forth are designations for their aggregation, because earth and the others are not apprehended otherwise.

Now, if [you claim] that taste is merely touched, so that there is a quantity of four, even so, 'earth and the others' is not appropriate; 'form and the others' should be the designation. Momentariness and so on will be proven later, so their rejection is not [valid].

Furthermore:

For if [classified as] 'visible, visible', it would follow that everything is one. / But if there is a difference in modes, it would follow that there is infinity. // 380

Therefore, let what is apprehended by five bases be designated fivefold. / Its internal difference, however, does not contradict the fivefold nature. // 381

And as for what was said: 'If there is a means of valid cognition for the emptiness of all, there is no emptiness; / if there is emptiness, there is no valid cognition'—this pair is contradictory. // 382

What kind of emptiness of all it is, will be explained later, / as well as what kind of means of valid cognition exists there; what is the use of haste here? // 383

[Objection:] Surely the senses and the like, which conform to the positive and negative concomitance with the parents' bodies and so on, depend on them alone because their nature is the great elements of the body; they are not apprehended otherwise, as having arrived from another world. Then how is the doctrine of the existence of another world sound?

That too is untrue, because:

The birth of the life-breaths, faculties, and intellects, / independent of their own homogeneous class at the acquisition of a birth, / is not from the mere body, // (36)

because an absurd consequence would follow;

For inhalation and the like, due to their specific nature caused by restlessness and so forth, are not plausible [if arising] independent of their own class. And restlessness and the like are connected with one's own habituation, not with the habituation of the parents; otherwise, the parents' nature would not exist due to association with the wicked and the like. Therefore, there is no occurrence from the parents' bodies alone, independent of their own class. If, however, desires and the like were already present in the parents' nature, then it is plausible that the body of the parents and the like is also a cause.

[Tibetan variant]: 'connected with the body'.

Now, if it is accepted that taking rebirth is entirely independent of another world, then, in accepting [such] taking rebirth, an absurd consequence follows: the entire relation of cause and effect would collapse. And that [relation] must be determined by the specification of inference.

If all inhalations, exhalations, and so forth are preceded by habituation, / and yet are devoid of their own habituation, how indeed could they be without support? (384)

For this is the property of an effect: that it does not come into being otherwise, abandoning its cause. Otherwise, it is not produced by that [cause]. The relation of produced and producer is established through positive and negative concomitance. Therefore, the eye and other faculties are exclusively preceded by an eye and other faculties that have arisen from habituation of a homogeneous class.

[Objection:] Surely,

Smoke produced from other smoke does not arise from smoke alone in every case. / How does an edible lotus root arise from cow dung as well as from an edible lotus root? (385)

Likewise,

A painting arises from a painter; is it like that among birds as well?

For the specific distinction that comes from habituation may also occur through another [cause]. (386)

This too is incorrect:

Smoke, as it is, arises from smoke; it is not recognized as arising from anything else.

Whereas the specific distinction from habituation—such is the situation at birth and so forth. (387)

Precisely that specific distinction which is born of habituation to learning and so on is seen to be of that very nature here, even in the absence of habituation in this birth. Nor is its connection to habituation sublated, because past habituation cannot be apprehended elsewhere at that time, just like habituation brought from another village. For that very reason, it also establishes that it is preceded by habituation in another world, because of the necessary connection of the effect with the cause, and because even an unseen cause has that effect—just as it establishes that it is preceded by habituation in another region, because of the necessary connection of the effect with the cause, and because even an unseen cause has that effect, like knowledge preceded by habituation in another region. In this regard, the story of Tauta has arrived:

A certain Tauta, they say, was asked by another: 'Explain the birth

from a mother: how can a bull with long horns be so?' (388)

He replied: 'These buffaloes are not born from a mother's womb; / they have arrived at the market, and there is only buying [them] for a price.' (389)

The Lokāyata view is just like that.

Or, with regard to the statement 'due to an absurd consequence': if consciousness, as an effect, arises from those very great elements without an arrival from another birth, [why does not everything consist of living beings? If it is said: 'Because of the existence of a particular transformation,' then] why does that very particular transformation not occur [everywhere]? The cross-examination is the same.

Now, [suppose you claim that] there is some beginningless transformation or an unobservable specific continuum from which some are living beings and not others. That too is unreasonable:

If a particular transformation is seen, [good; if] not, what kind of conceptual fabrication is this?

What is capable of being seen, but unperceived, is not an object of conventional practice as real. (390)

If that particular transformation existed, it would be apprehended. If, now, it is conceptually assumed merely from observing the effect, in that case, what is observed alone—namely, habituation—ought to be conceptually assumed, because assuming the unobserved incurs conceptual proliferation. Therefore, it is well said: inhalation and the like are preceded by a state of a homogeneous class.

Granted that causes belonging to a prior life are established from the effect, but how is there an inference for those belonging to a subsequent life? In response to that, he says:

That which was seen to possess the capacity for connection— / what did it have that is not present later, by the absence of which it has no connection? (37)

For the connection of each preceding one is ascertained by inferences, by inferences from what is inferred, and so forth.

[Objection:] Surely, restlessness and the like occur from non-restlessness, through its habituation, characterized by lack of movement, sluggishness, and so forth. But that [sluggishness] arises from the mere great elements. Consequently, even when it exists, just as smoke exists when other smoke exists, there is not always an unbroken continuity. Hence, annihilation too is just like smoke; therefore, the infinitude of living beings and the appearance of unprecedented beings are not defects. [Response: That too is not so.]

Through the habituation of slow activity, there is sluggishness as well in living beings. / That too is preceded by habituation; thus the wheel of existence is beginningless. (391)

Living beings certainly do not have modalities such as sluggishness and the like by their inherent nature alone, but rather from habituation to their homogeneous class. Just as restless [senses] and the like arise from habituation to that, so sluggishness and the like also arise from habituation to indolence; thus the beginninglessness of saṃsāra is established. For the sluggishness of the eye and other faculties arises from habituation to sleep and the like; therefore, one who possesses a restless eye and so forth, when sleeping and waking, is mutually connected with a restless eye and so forth. Hence, at birth and the like as well, just like waking from sleep, there is the connection of the eye and other faculties for one whose latent imprints have awakened and become manifest. [Question:] How can the eye situated in another body connect to a different body? How does a capacity situated in one substance transfer to another?

Through the power of mantras, tantras, and the like, capacities of poison [occur] in molasses and the like; / likewise, through the power of karma, the seeing-capacities occur in another body. (392)

Just as the body within a dream, through trembling, leaping, and running, / causes alterations in the waking body, so too across other births. (393)

If that [dream body] is devoid of reality, so much the better! / Where even the unreal causes alteration, what need be said of the real? (394)

This is mere conventional practice: 'reality' and 'unreality.' / When reflexive awareness of nature occurs, such notions as reality are difficult to maintain. (395)

Therefore, regarding that which was previously perceived as possessing the capacity for connection: what additional factor did it have that is not present later, by the absence of which it is unconnected later? For an effect is absent when there is a deficiency in the cause, but when the cause is complete in all its factors, for the effect to not arise is a contradiction.

Well, what contradiction could there be here? Surely it is just this: the absence of the relation of cause and effect.

If there were no effect even though the cause is identical in all states, / the effect would thus be independent; that being so, it would not be an effect. (396)

For an effect is dependent on a cause; the capable cause produces it quite perforce. Even so, in the absence [of the cause], the effect would not come to be.

Now, whence [the claim] that an effect does not come to be in the absence of that [cause], that it does not come to be in its absence? Well, whence even this: that it necessarily comes to be in the presence of that [cause]? Because it is determined to be so, it is likewise determined that it does not come to be in the absence of that [cause]. Whence [the objection], 'Why always?', is equal in both cases. Therefore, it must be accepted just as it is observed, and both are observed.

It necessarily comes to be in the presence of that [cause], and it comes to be precisely upon the completeness [of the cause]; thus both must be accepted. If it is objected: 'An effect-and-cause relation not observed in this manner does not exist'—

There is no observation of negative concomitance nor of positive concomitance through pervasion; / how is there an observation of this causal relation? // 397

If, because there is no observation through pervasion, there is no establishment of the relation of cause and effect, in that case, it has been stated: 'There is no observation of anything distinct from positive and negative concomitance; the intrinsic nature is understood by itself.'

There is no other world, no this world, no sublation of the other world, no doubt, no transformation of the primary elements, and so forth—[all this] is consciousness-only. Even if this is due to conventional practice, so too is the other world.

If you are satisfied with non-duality, you are liberated in every way; / if conventional practice continues, let the other world too be considered. // 398

When disturbance exists, such disturbance is preferable, because tranquility is conducive to heaven and the like. For the disturbance of passion and the like brings about only the destruction of being a good person and having all desired things. To explain: all the distinctions of the eye and so on, and of passion and so on, depend on the force of beginningless latent imprints and do not differ from consciousness-only. Then, even for one deficient in the eye and so on, in another rebirth there is again possession of an intact eye and so on. Then the succession of rebirths is itself of this manner, and saṃsāra is beginningless. And as long as there is no pacification of disturbance, it is also endless. Even if the eye and so on are real, external objects, this intrinsic nature is beginningless; thus saṃsāra is beginningless and endless.

[Mind does not arise from the primary elements.]

[Opponent:] Well, specific varieties of the primary elements, such as solidity and the like, are indeed apprehended. Therefore, even if there is origination from the primary elements due to those specific varieties, there is no overextension. Hence, only the specific variety of solidity and the like has the nature of a seed; from that alone does a living being originate. [Answer:] It has been stated in this regard that the relation of cause and effect itself would not exist.

Moreover:

There is no portion of earth and the like where living beings / such as those born of moisture are not born; therefore everything has the nature of a seed. // (38)

Indeed, the distinct origination of distinct living beings does not occur through the distinction of specific varieties such as solidity and the like, because living beings are observed everywhere. For even living beings born of moisture and the like are certainly not observed without distinction. Therefore, the distinction is not made by solidity and the like. At most, karma, characterized as volition, remains. If it is said that a genus of living beings is apprehended as conforming to wood and the like, then everything of the same kind would consist of living beings of that form. Whatever water is determined by a certain measure, all of that would consist of living beings of that form. Whence [then] the difference of color and shape among living beings?

To explain:

Aquatic and other creatures are seen with red heads, yellow bodies, and so forth; / whence could that form arise? // 399

Is the distinction of lotus and the like, which is seen or unseen from a seed of that nature, ever invariable?

The distinction of living beings is not fixed from a seed; here karma operates as the determinant. // 400

In the origination of the senses and the like without regard for their own class, / just as there would be the transformation of one, there would be that of all without distinction. // 39

Moreover, the sense faculties, depending on the mental consciousness, produce their own effects, but the mental consciousness does not depend on them. Therefore, he shows that the senses arise from the mental consciousness alone, and not from earth, water, and the like, beginning with 'individually' and so forth.

Alternatively, the mental consciousness certainly does not originate from the body, which is an aggregate of those [elements]. Inhalation, exhalation, and the like, however, have the intrinsic nature of transformations of the primary elements, [arising] merely from the seed of mother and father. And the mental consciousness is that which transmigrates, not the senses and the like. Because:

Severance, reconnection, loss of dispassion, death, and birth / are accepted in the mental consciousness alone; death and birth occur in equanimity. // 401

[Thus it has been said.] Therefore the mind has transmigrating nature and does not depend on the primary elements. Because:

Even upon the impairment of each of the senses, there is no impairment / of the intellect of the mind; when it is damaged, their damage is observed. // (40)

For when the mental intellect is damaged, changes in the eye and so forth are observed through fear, grief, joy, anger, and the like; therefore, the eye and so on depend on the mental consciousness. Hence, at birth and so on as well, they depend on it alone; thus another rebirth is established. Nor is the mental consciousness dependent on the body in this way, because it depends on the effects of the aggregate of the five senses which are modifiable by the mental consciousness.

[Opponent:] Well, granted that the eye and so on are modifiable by the mental consciousness, whence does origination from it alone follow? For an entity such as a pot, acquiring a modification from fire, does not originate from fire alone.

To this it is said:

A pot or the like is observed otherwise; therefore it is not from that alone. / But a sense faculty is never observed otherwise than from its modification. // 402

For every sense faculty is apprehended as characterized by the characteristics of clarity and so forth, but a pot and the like are not exclusively modified by fire. Therefore, a pot or the like is not an [applicable] example.

[Opponent:] Now, even granted that the mental consciousness is observed to be the basis now, whence [is it known that it is] likewise at another time? This is incorrect.

Even though smoke is observed from fire, direct perception / is not a means of valid cognition for anyone that it is from that alone at another time as well. // 403

Therefore:

Just as the knowledge that smoke is preceded by fire occurs through its recognition, / so the knowledge that there is modifiability by mind occurring at birth and so on [is obtained]. // 404

At birth and so on, the eye and the other [senses] are recognized as modifiable in accordance with a mind possessing fickleness and the like; it is reasonable to understand that they are just so. Just as, when its production preceded by fire has been seen once somewhere, it is recognized in another place as precisely preceded by that.

Even when there is impairment of the sense faculties of a son or the like, an alteration of the mind occurs. It would follow that the mind is supported by that; nor is there a invariable rule for either of the two. // 405

If, because there is no invariable rule that whenever there is an alteration of the eye or other [faculties] of a son or the like an alteration occurs, the eye and other [faculties] of a son or the like are not its support—that very lack of an invariable rule is observed in both cases. An alteration of the mind does not occur even when there is an alteration of one's own eye and other [faculties]

for someone; therefore, it is not the case that they are not non-supports [either]; hence the sense faculties are not its support. In that case, mental consciousness is the support of the sense faculties, but the sense faculties are not [the support] of the mind; hence it entails that the mind is without a support. Even all six consciousnesses, such as visual consciousness, must have some support.

The sense faculty [arises] from a cognition of the mind, and from that there is mental cognition;

and from that, there would also be [another] there—thus the condition of existence is beginningless and endless. // 406

If it is said that mental cognition also is not altered by an alteration of the sense faculties, thus:

Upon the destruction of the eyes or the like, depression of the mind or the like is seen in many cases. If it is supported by that, why is the unwholesome not inferred here [as well]? // 407

This is not so. There is no rule that everything necessarily has some support.

Now, if there is insistence [on this], that also is stated:

Therefore, that which is the support of the endurance of the intellect is supported only by the intellect; / it is a certain cause of the sense faculties, and therefore the sense faculties [arise] from the intellect. // (41)

Therefore, that which is the support of the endurance of the intellect is the cause of the sense faculties, termed 'action whose defining characteristic is intention'. [The opponent might ask:] 'Is that itself, then, supported by the eye and other sense faculties?' Hence he says: and it is supported only by the intellect, not by the sense faculties. For the sense faculties are not its support, because of the statement: 'Intention is action; having intended, one performs bodily action and verbal action.' And intention is of the nature 'this and this'. And that, having the nature of an integration of the prior, occurs having supported itself only on the intellect, not supported by the body. And that which is a certain [intention] is the support of its own sense faculties, not all [intentions], because there are no sense faculties in the formless realm. For the generation of the body and sense faculties is by action accompanied by craving for a body, through connection with delight therein; for delight arises when the object of craving is obtained. Therefore, the conclusion is that the sense faculties are from the intellect, not the intellect from the sense faculties. Therefore, causality belongs to the mind alone; hence by the mind a prior and prior birth is implied.

If, then, the present birth is from mental cognition whose nature is the conceptual construction of 'I', then in a future birth what is the cause of confident cognition, or how was the mind said to be supported by the body? Hence he says:

Of whatever kind was that which projected [birth], let it be of such a kind later as well. / Because it is assisted by their cognitions, the mind is said to be supported by the body. // (42)

Of whatever kind was the mental cognition—the grasp of a self—that projected the continuum of beginningless births for beings in saṃsāra, let it be projective in the same way later as well. It cannot be otherwise; that very thing is the assumption of birth later as well. For whatever has an essential nature that is not distinct from the essential nature of producing that, necessarily produces that. Just as another fire, not distinct in its nature from producing smoke, [produces smoke] when joined with dense fuel and the like. Otherwise, there would be no cause-and-effect relationship and no conventional practice; the world would be devoid of effort.

Now, the mind's state of being supported by the body was taught by the Blessed One when stating that body and mind also conform to one another. The resolution here is: Because it is assisted by bodily cognitions, the mind's being supported by the body was taught by the Blessed One; but the body is not its direct support, as the eye and other [faculties] are for visual and other consciousnesses. Therefore, the mind whose defining characteristic is the 'I'-maker is not supported by the eye and other sense faculties, nor is it supported by the body. Its being supported only by mind of the same class is reasonable, because of its existence even in the formless realm and because its occurrence there has been taught.

Even if the intellect cannot exist without the sense faculties, still there is no absence of another world, because mutual dependence exists. Hence he says:

Even if the intellect cannot exist without the sense faculties, nor can they exist without it, / nevertheless, there is mutual causality; from that, both are mutually caused. // (43)

For just as it is your acceptance that the intellect does not exist without the body because it is seen to be of the nature of the sense faculties, likewise let it be accepted that those sense faculties also do not exist without mental intellect, because the basis of acceptance—namely, being observed as such—is the same. That being the case, mutual causality is entailed for both mind-streams because of their mutual assistance. And of two things that are mutually caused, their causal complex arises from another causal complex. From that causal complex as well, the prior and posterior body and mind are mutually caused, like the intermediate state; thus it should be understood.

And if the body alone were the support and the mental intellect were not [the support] of the body, then the intellect, arising from the body, would arise either from that which possesses sequence or from that which is devoid of sequence, because there is no other way.

Among these, it is not, first of all, from that which is devoid of sequence, because:

There is no existence of a sequential thing from that which is devoid of sequence, nor can there be dependence for that which has no difference. / Arising sequentially from the body, the intellect indicates sequence in it as well. // (44)

For this mental intellect has sequence. Otherwise, upon the grasping of its own form as 'I', there would be grasping of its entire past, present, and future essential nature, which entails the grasping of all births.

Now, [if the opponent says that] without grasping the states, there is no cognition of pervading the earlier and later [times]:

If the states are not grasped, how could there be cognition of that which possesses the states? / When the pervaded is not cognized, another cannot be cognized as the pervader. // 408

[The verse continues]: When the pervaded is not cognized, another cannot be cognized as the pervader. // 408

For if the pervasive state is not cognized, how, when the pervaded is not cognized, can that [subject] be cognized as the pervader in that way? For even if it is not cognized under that form, it does not become so. For cognition alone establishes real identity or difference. And if its nature as a pervader is not cognized, then it follows that it is cognized under a form different from that. Consequently, it has no endurance into another time, so there is no temporal difference for another cognition. Therefore, cognition has sequence. Therefore, there is no existence of a sequential thing from that which is devoid of sequence.

[Objection:] Well, even granted that the cause is devoid of sequence, why must the effect also be of that very nature? For the effect is not entirely non-different from the cause, because that which possesses different characteristics is also observed.

To this it is said:

If an effect were from that which is devoid of sequence, it would all exist right then.

At another time, however, it does not exist at all, because it is exhausted at that [very] time. // 409

For in this way, it would produce that effect if it were perceived at the time of the effect. For what is not being cognized is not its cause at that time. If it were cognized then, because of its singularity, perception would have destruction as its limit, and thus it would be destroyed at that very time. For in this manner it would have a non-gradual nature. From that which has been destroyed, another effect would simply not arise; or if it did arise, it would not be an effect of that. Now, [if you say that] what is cognized gradually is the cause of that which possesses a sequence—in that case, it is not non-gradual; for what is cognized as blue is not non-blue. Or rather: