Pramanavarttikasvavritti 1.320

1.320

etaduktambhavati . yatsāpekṣa midaṅkādācitkaṃ . vijñānantatkimapyasya vijñānasya kāraṇamastītyanumīyate . tadeva cendriyamiti vyavahriyate . na tvevaṃbhūtamiti na rūpaviśeṣeṇa mūrttatvādinā yuktamindriyamanumīyata ityarthaḥ .. evamiti yathā kādācitkavijñānakāryānyathānupapattyendriyānumānaṃ . tathā sukhādikāryaṃ . yasyasukhādikāryantatkimapyastītyanumānena taccātmasvarūpamiti prasādhitaṃ kañci- darthaṃmātmavādino na puṣṇāti . yena kenacidanirdiṣṭaviśeṣeṇa kāraṇena kāraṇavattvābhyupagamāt sukhādīnāṃ . na caivaṃbhūta ātmā . nityakarttṛbhoktṛtvādilakṣaṇatvenābhyupagamāt . yataśca yathābhyupagatasyātmano nāsti kāryaliṅgaṃ . tathā ca satyanupalambha evātmanaḥ syāt . tasmāt tamātmānantenānupalambhena pratyakṣānumānanivṛttilakṣaṇena pratyācakṣāṇaḥ kimiti prativyūḍhaḥ pratikṣipta ā tmavādinā . anupalambhamātrānnāstyasattvamātmana iti . kathamasādhanaṃ sad vipakṣāddhetoḥ prāṇādimatvādervyatirekaṃ sādhayet .. bhūtānāmeva śaktiścaitanyamiṣyate cā rvā kaiḥ . bhūtasvabhāvā ca mṛdityevaṃ mṛdaḥ khalvapi caitanyamanupalabhyamānamapīcchan lo kāya ti kaḥ . yadāha . tebhyo bhūtebhyaścaitanyammadaśaktivadvijñānamiti . punastata evāpramāṇakādanupalambhāt . ada rśanād vacanāderasarvajñatvādisādhanāya liṃgatvenopanītasya vipakṣād vyāvṛttimāha .. dadhyādikaṃ kṣīrādiṣvanupalabhyamānamapīcchan .

This is what is meant: whatever is dependent and occasional—this consciousness—it is inferred that there is some cause of this consciousness, and that very [cause] is designated as 'sense faculty.' But it does not mean that a sense faculty endowed with a specific visible form, with corporeal extension, and so forth is inferred. 'Thus': just as the inference of the sense faculty occurs due to the impossibility of the occasional effect, [namely] consciousness, otherwise, so is the effect [consisting of] pleasure and so on. If one establishes by inference that whatever has pleasure and so on as its effect has some [cause], and that this is the nature of the soul, this does not support any specific object of the proponent of the soul. For pleasure and so forth are accepted as having a cause through some cause whose specific characteristics are unspecified. And the soul is not of this kind, because it is accepted as having the characteristics of being an eternal agent, enjoyer, and so on. And since there is no effect-mark for the soul as accepted [by them], and this being the case, there would only be non-apprehension of the soul; therefore, when someone rejects that soul by that non-apprehension characterized by the cessation of direct perception and inference, why was he repulsed and dismissed by the proponent of the soul [saying]: "The non-existence of the soul does not follow from mere non-apprehension"? Being non-probative, how could it establish the negative concomitance of the logical reason, such as possessing life-breaths and so forth, from the dissimilar case? Consciousness is accepted by the Cārvākas as merely the power of the material elements. And clay has the nature of a material element; thus, even though the consciousness of clay is not apprehended, the Cārvāka accepts it. As he says: "Consciousness, like the intoxicating power [in fermented grain], arises from those material elements." Yet again, based on that very non-apprehension which lacks validity, from the non-observation [of speech in stones], he asserts the exclusion of speech and the like, brought forward as a probative mark to establish non-omniscience and the like, from the dissimilar case. Accepting curd and so forth even though unapprehended in milk and the like,