釋摩訶衍論 5.20

5.20

已說白品相熏有力門，次說發起問答決疑門。此決疑門義理難解、文教更閉，作釋非散說，無定通人不能明了，是故今更作種種釋，具足開示曉行者心。如其次第問答之相，應審觀察。一切眾生皆有本覺，有眾生數而無本覺？皆有理故。所以者何？大覺尊者如是說故。此義云何？一切眾生從無始來具足本覺，從無始來無本覺故。若依初門，一切眾生悉有本覺，如是本覺唯是一體遍諸眾生，一一眾生各有別覺，一切眾生唯有一覺無別覺故。若爾，眾生唯應是一，所有本覺一故。本覺應非一，能有眾生多故。此事不爾。所以者何？意趣別故。謂本覺心平等性故不能異種，一切眾生差別性故不能同種。不能異種故一，不能同種故多。若爾，此文云何通耶？謂馬鳴尊者大宗地玄文本論中作如是說：

Having explained the gate of the pure factors mutually perfuming with efficacy, I shall next explain the gate of initiating questions and answers to resolve doubts. The principles of this gate of resolving doubts are difficult to understand, and its scriptural teachings are yet more closed; if an explanation is made without dispersal [of obscurities], one who lacks definitive penetration cannot comprehend it. Therefore, I now make various explanations further, fully revealing and illuminating the mind of the practitioner. The characteristics of the questions and answers in their proper sequence should be carefully observed: Do all sentient beings possess original awakening, or does original awakening not exist relative to the count of sentient beings? Both have principle. Why is that? Because the Great Awakened Honoured One spoke thus. What is the meaning of this? All sentient beings from the beginningless past are fully endowed with original awakening, because from the beginningless past there is no original awakening. If one relies on the first gate, all sentient beings possess original awakening; is this original awakening solely one single entity pervading all sentient beings, or does each sentient being have a distinct awakening? Because all sentient beings have only one awakening and not distinct awakenings. If so, sentient beings ought to be only one, because their original awakening is one. Original awakening ought not to be one, because sentient beings that possess it are many. This matter is not so. Why is that? Because their purport is distinct. Namely, because the mind of original awakening is of an equal nature, it cannot be of different kinds; because all sentient beings are of differentiated natures, they cannot be of the same kind. Because it cannot be of different kinds, it is one; because they cannot be of the same kind, they are many. If so, how does this text resolve it? The venerable Aśvaghoṣa spoke thus in the *Dazongdi xuanwen benlun*: