金剛般若疏 3.2.3

3.2.3

若依論經，人空之中有於四句，法空之中亦有四句，故論偈云「依八八義別」。 言八八義者，人四法四，名為一八，破人四，破法四，不此八病復為一八，故云八八。 言法四者：一者、法相； 二者、非法相； 三者、相； 四者、非相。 此四是病也。 問：外道計我可是病，今見法生時是有、滅時是無，何故言病耶？ 答：作此問者，未讀大乘經論也。 破第一句法相言非法相者，陰、界、入等法不可得，故言無法相。 破第二句者言非無法相者，惑者聞陰、入、界虛誑故空，便謂諸法實相亦空。 如《大經》云「既聞生死虛誑，謂涅槃亦虛誑。 」為破此執生死自虛誑空，實相涅槃此非是空，故云「空者二十五有，不空者大般涅槃。 」破第三句者云無相者，惑者云：涅槃實相若不可空，便還同有； 若不可有，還應是空。 是故今云不可謂涅槃還是有無相也。 涅槃實相不可說有無相破第四句者，惑者既聞實相不可有無，便應不可得說，是故今明雖絕有無，為眾生故，無說而說。 云何言不可說？ 但舊經文略，但云無非法相也。 「何以故？ 若心取相」下，此第二對得明失，亦是舉失顯得。 就此為二：初明計人為失，次明計法為失。 今失即是初。 若心取相，即取眾生相，則同外道計有我人，是故為失也。 「若取法相」下，此第二明計法為失。 就中有兩：前明見法為失，次明見非法為失。 問曰：若計法為失，應云著於法相； 何因緣故，計法為失，著我相也？ 答：理實應然。 計人故著人，計法故著法。 今明欲顯其失患之甚，計法之人非但起於法見，計法之人還起我見，以法是我因緣故也。 《成實論》云「灰炭不盡，樹想還生。 」又數論取一切有相非病，取我相為病。 《成實論》云「有二諦則非病，取我人故是病」耳。 今明不然，但使生心動念，則過同我人。 何以故？ 「若取非法相」下，此第二明著於非法，此亦為失。 既聞計法為失，或者便謂無法為得； 是故今云若計非法，是亦為失。 所以者何？ 計有非法必起法見，若有法見則有我見。 又若無有我則無所計，以有所計故知有我。 所以計於非法，亦復著我。 「是故不應取非法」下，此第三章勸捨失從得。 此文有二：一者、正勸捨失； 二者、引證。 此即是初勸捨失。 然法與非法尚自須捨，我人之見云何不捨？ 是故舉法況人，但勸捨法，不勸捨人。 以是義故，「如來常說」下，第二引證。 《阿含經》中，佛為比丘作於筏喻，譬如有人為賊所逐，取草為栰度於彼岸。 既至彼岸，則便捨筏。 初則取筏度河，既至彼岸，則河筏兩捨矣。 譬意初則以善捨惡，後則善惡雙捨。 初則以法捨人，以空捨有； 次則人法兩除，空有雙淨。 如是生死、涅槃、萬善類然。 若依論經，大意略同，其文小異，論經亦有三何以故，與舊經意同。 第三何以故云不應取法非不取法，此明理教之義。 以得理忘教、得月捨指故，故云不應取法。 而藉教悟理，因指得月，故非不取法。 如到岸捨栰，故不應取。 栰為欲度河，故非不取栰也。 問：筏喻是小乘經，云何證大乘耶？ 答：筏在小名小，在大名大也。 又舉小況大，於小乘法中尚明兩捨，況於大乘耶？ 如《中論》引《迦旃延論》是小乘尚捨有無，況大乘耶？ 「法尚應捨，何況非法」，明有是物情所安，尚應須捨； 無非六情所對，豈可執也？ 「須菩提！ 於意云何」下，此文所以來者，凡有二義：一者、證信故來。 上辨無依無得之信，乃至法非法皆捨； 今明一切賢聖同作此悟，故知此法可信受也。 二者、依論釋疑故來。 論主至此章凡釋三疑：初舉法身非有為釋，以果徵因疑； 次信者章雙釋因果之疑，謂說因果法門便無信者，上明有信者即釋此疑。 今此一章經釋以果徵果，疑上法身非有為章云生住滅相非是無為法身，故不可以此三相見如來法身。

If one relies on the treatise and the [translated] sūtra, within the emptiness of persons there are four propositions, and within the emptiness of dharmas there are also four propositions. Therefore the treatise verse says, 'Relying on the distinction of eight and eight meanings.' The eight and eight meanings mean that four regarding persons and four regarding dharmas are called one eight, and refuting the four regarding persons and refuting the four regarding dharmas—not [falling into] these eight illnesses—constitute another eight; hence it says 'eight and eight.' The four regarding dharmas are: first, the lakṣaṇa of dharmas; second, the non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas; third, lakṣaṇa; fourth, non-lakṣaṇa. These four are illnesses. Question: When non-Buddhists impute a self, that may well be an illness, but now when we see dharmas arising as existing and ceasing as non-existing, why is that called an illness? Answer: One who asks this question has not yet read the Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises. Refuting the first proposition, the lakṣaṇa of dharmas, by speaking of the non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas [means that] dharmas such as the aggregates, realms, and sense fields are unobtainable; therefore it says there is no lakṣaṇa of dharmas. Refuting the second proposition by speaking of not having no lakṣaṇa of dharmas [is because] confused people, hearing that the aggregates, sense fields, and realms are deceptive and therefore empty, then claim that the dharmatā of all dharmas is also empty. As the Great Sūtra [Nirvāṇa Sūtra] says, 'Having heard that saṃsāra is deceptive, they claim that nirvāṇa is also deceptive.' To refute this clinging [it teaches that] saṃsāra is inherently deceptive and empty, while dharmatā-nirvāṇa is not empty; hence it says, 'What is empty is the twenty-five states of existence; what is not empty is Mahāparinirvāṇa.' Refuting the third proposition by speaking of marklessness [is because] confused people say: if the dharmatā of nirvāṇa cannot be empty, it must be the same as existence; if it cannot be existent, it must be empty. Therefore it now says that nirvāṇa cannot be said to still be a mark of existence or non-existence. That the dharmatā of nirvāṇa cannot be spoken of as a mark of existence or non-existence refutes the fourth proposition. Confused people, having heard that dharmatā cannot be existent or non-existent, [think that] it should be inexpressible. Therefore it now explains that although it transcends existence and non-existence, for the sake of sentient beings, through non-speaking it is spoken. How could it be said to be inexpressible? It is only that the older translation's text is concise, merely saying 'neither non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas.' Below '[What is the reason? ] If the mind grasps lakṣaṇas', this is the second [section], explaining the fault in contrast to attainment, which is also adducing the fault to reveal the attainment. Within this there are two parts: first, explaining the imputation of persons as a fault; next, explaining the imputation of dharmas as a fault. The present fault is the first. If the mind grasps lakṣaṇas, it grasps the lakṣaṇas of sentient beings, which is the same as non-Buddhists imputing an ātman or person; therefore it is a fault. Below 'If it grasps the lakṣaṇas of dharmas', this second [part] explains that imputing dharmas is a fault. Within this there are two parts: first, explaining that viewing dharmas is a fault; next, explaining that viewing non-dharmas is a fault. Question: If imputing dharmas is a fault, one should say that one is attached to the lakṣaṇas of dharmas; for what reason does imputing dharmas as a fault mean being attached to the lakṣaṇa of an ātman? Answer: In principle, it should indeed be so: imputing persons leads to attachment to persons, and imputing dharmas leads to attachment to dharmas. Now, in order to reveal the gravity of this fault and affliction, one who imputes dharmas not only gives rise to views of dharmas, but also reverts to giving rise to views of an ātman, because dharmas are the causal condition for an ātman. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra says, 'When charcoal and ashes are not extinguished, the conception of a tree arises again.' Furthermore, the Sarvāstivādins [hold that] grasping all existent marks is not an illness, but grasping the mark of an ātman is an illness. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra says, 'Having the two truths is not an illness; grasping an ātman or person is the only illness.' Now it is clarified that this is not so: as long as one gives rise to a thought or stirs the mind, the fault is the same as [grasping] an ātman or person. Why is this? Below 'If it grasps the non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas', this second [part] explains that attachment to non-dharmas is also a fault. Having heard that imputing dharmas is a fault, some people then suppose that non-existence of dharmas is attainment. Therefore it now says that if one imputes non-dharmas, this is also a fault. Why is this? Imputing non-dharmas inevitably gives rise to views of dharmas; if there are views of dharmas, then there are views of an ātman. Moreover, if there were no ātman, there would be nothing imputed; because there is something imputed, one knows there is an ātman. Therefore, imputing non-dharmas also entails attachment to an ātman. Below 'Therefore one should not grasp non-dharmas', this third section exhorts relinquishing faults and following attainment. This text has two parts: first, directly exhorting the relinquishing of faults; second, adducing proof. This is the first, exhorting the relinquishing of faults. Since dharmas and non-dharmas must themselves be relinquished, how could views of ātman and person not be relinquished? Therefore, bringing up dharmas to illustrate persons, it only exhorts the relinquishing of dharmas and does not exhort the relinquishing of persons. By this meaning, below 'The Tathāgata constantly teaches', the second part adduces proof. In the Āgama sūtras, the Buddha spoke the raft parable for the monks: for example, a person pursued by bandits takes grass to make a raft to cross over to the other shore. Having reached the other shore, he then abandons the raft. Initially he takes the raft to cross the river; having reached the other shore, both the river and the raft are abandoned. The meaning of the parable is that initially one abandons evil through good, and later both good and evil are doubly abandoned. Initially one abandons persons through dharmas and abandons existence through emptiness; next, persons and dharmas are both eliminated, and emptiness and existence are both doubly purified. Saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, and the ten thousand goods are all like this. If one relies on the treatise and the [translated] sūtra, the general idea is roughly the same, though the text differs slightly; the treatise sūtra also has three 'What is the reason?', which agrees in meaning with the older sūtra. The third 'What is the reason?' says 'one should neither grasp dharmas nor not grasp dharmas'; this clarifies the meaning of principle and teaching. Because realizing principle means forgetting the teaching, and seeing the moon means relinquishing the finger, it says 'one should not grasp dharmas.' Yet, relying on teaching to awaken to principle, and by means of the finger seeing the moon, it says 'nor not grasp dharmas.' Just as upon reaching the shore one abandons the raft, 'one should not grasp.' Because the raft was for crossing the river, 'one does not not grasp the raft.' Question: The raft parable is from a Hīnayāna sūtra; how can it serve as proof for the Mahāyāna? Answer: The raft in the lesser [vehicle] is called lesser; in the great [vehicle] it is called great. Furthermore, it adduces the lesser to illustrate the greater: if in the Hīnayāna Dharma both are already explained as abandoned, how much more so in the Mahāyāna? Just as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā quotes the Kātyāyanāvavāda, where even Hīnayāna abandons existence and non-existence, how much more so the Mahāyāna? 'Dharmas should still be relinquished, how much more so non-dharmas': it clarifies that existence is what ordinary feelings settle into, yet it still must be relinquished; non-existence is not what the six senses confront, so how could one cling to it? Below 'Subhūti! What do you think?', this text appears for two reasons: first, it appears to verify faith. Above, faith without reliance and without apprehension was explained, up to relinquishing both dharmas and non-dharmas; now it clarifies that all āryas and sages make this same awakening, so one knows that this Dharma can be believed and accepted. Second, it appears in order to resolve doubts according to the treatise. The treatise master, up to this section, resolves three doubts in total: first, adducing that the dharmakāya is not conditioned to resolve the doubt of examining the cause through the fruit; next, the section on those with faith doubly resolves doubts regarding cause and fruit, which assumed that when the Dharma approach of cause and fruit is taught, no one would believe—the above explanation that there are those with faith resolves this doubt. Now, this section of the sūtra resolves examining the fruit through the fruit; the doubt [related to] the previous section that the dharmakāya is not conditioned stated that the lakṣaṇas of arising, abiding, and ceasing are not the unconditioned dharmakāya, and therefore one cannot see the Tathāgata's dharmakāya by means of these three lakṣaṇas.