金剛般若疏 4.10

4.10

「三千世界須彌七寶」下，此第九章。問：前周已舉內外兩施明格量竟，今何故更說？答：上已明前後說為兩會之眾，不應問也。又上來明般若體門及信受門竟，今說經是功德門也。又依論生起，從上修一切善法得菩提文生。若言修善法得菩提者，受持此經章句不得菩提。何以故？薩婆多等諸部人云名字句是無記法故也。為破此疑，故重舉也，明名字句雖是無記，能表實相，故受持四句功德無邊。又汝法中言是無記，我法中明此是般若名字句，豈是無記？故受持四句勝大千廣施也。問：等是破無疑，何故不舉恒沙七寶及舉恒沙身命耶？答：三千寶是最初格，故舉初章耳。又為後會人須漸次格，不得頓格超說恒沙。又今三千財與上為異，上但明三千財不及持經四句，今明百分不及一等也。依論，經有四種勝：一者云百分不及一乃至百千分不及一，此是數勝，持經福不可數也。二者、歌羅分不及一，此是力用勝，明經力用勝七寶施力用；三者、優婆尼沙陀分不及一，此云不相似數勝，此是數中微細之數，乃至持經少許福德數，無有與此數相似，故云數勝。四者、因果勝，此經因果勝餘因果也。「須菩提！於意云何」下，第十章經來者，論云「從上菩提無高下生，無高則諸佛不高，佛非能度。若無有下，則眾生非下，不下度眾生。而佛是能度故佛為高，眾生是所度故眾生為下，不應無高下也。」又從上為他說四句生者，時會既聞為他說四句功德無邊，便謂有眾生可為，故今破之也。前文止於疑念，次「何以故」，釋止疑念所以，明實無眾生可度，汝不應念佛度眾生也。「若有眾生如來度者」，此是反釋，若見有眾生可度，佛則有取我之過也。以眾生見眾生、眾生名眾生，不能自度，何能度眾生？佛亦見眾生，佛亦名眾生，不能自度，何能度眾生？佛若見眾生，佛能度眾生，眾生亦見眾生，眾生應能度佛。有如是大過故，佛不應見有眾生也。「如來說有我者，則非有我」，又釋疑，疑云：若無眾生可度，佛口中何故自稱我耶？如云我本行菩薩道等，故知有我。答云：如來隨俗說有我耳，實無有我可說。而凡夫之人以為有我者，更疑：若無我者，何故世間皆云我來我去、我生我死等耶？即釋云：此是凡夫人於無我中橫計有我耳，故云凡夫以為有我也。「凡夫者，如來說非凡夫」，論經具足云「須菩提！凡夫生者，如來說非生，是名毛道凡夫生。」所以有此語來者，上既云凡夫之人以為有我，故今釋凡夫義也。所以言凡夫生如來說非生者，以不生聖觀故名非生，生凡夫顛倒心故是名凡夫生也。問：論經何故云毛道凡夫耶？答：愚癡不解一毛端聖法故也。數人別有凡夫法、凡夫性，凡夫性是非色非心不相應行無記法也。凡夫法通五陰、通三性也。成論義無別凡夫性法，但無無漏聖法，故名凡夫法耳。

From "[a heap of the seven treasures equal to Mount Sumeru in] a trichiliocosm" onward is the ninth chapter. Question: In the previous cycle, inner and outer generosity were both already adduced to complete the comparative evaluation; why is it spoken again now? Answer: Above it was already explained that these earlier and later teachings were for the assemblies of two gatherings, so one should not ask this. Furthermore, what preceded has already clarified the aspect of the essence of prajñā and the aspect of faithful acceptance; now the sūtra speaks of the aspect of merit. Moreover, according to the commentary's contextual arising, this arises from the preceding passage, "cultivating all good dharmas attains bodhi." If one says that cultivating good dharmas attains bodhi, then upholding the verses and phrases of this sūtra would not attain bodhi. Why is this? Because persons of the Sarvāstivāda and other schools say that names, words, and phrases are indeterminate dharmas. To refute this doubt, it is adduced again, explaining that although names, words, and phrases are indeterminate, they are able to express dharmatā; hence, the merit of upholding four lines is boundless. Furthermore, in your doctrine they are said to be indeterminate, but in my doctrine it is explained that these are the names, words, and phrases of prajñā—how could they be indeterminate? Therefore, upholding four lines surpasses vast dāna throughout the trichiliocosm. Question: Since both serve equally to refute the doubt of non-existence, why not adduce the seven treasures [in quantity equal to] the sands of the Ganges, or adduce life and limb [equal to] the sands of the Ganges? Answer: The treasures of a trichiliocosm were the very first comparative standard, so only the initial chapter is adduced. Furthermore, for the people of the later gathering, there must be a gradual comparison; one cannot leap directly into an instantaneous comparison speaking of the sands of the Ganges. Moreover, the present material wealth of a trichiliocosm differs from the former: the former merely explained that the material wealth of a trichiliocosm does not equal upholding four lines of the sūtra, whereas the present text explains that "it does not equal one hundredth part," and so forth. According to the commentary, the sūtra has four kinds of superiority: First, it says that "it does not equal one hundredth part... up to a hundred-thousandth part"; this is superiority in number, meaning the merit of upholding the sūtra cannot be numbered. Second, "it does not equal one kalā-fraction"; this is superiority in power and function, explaining that the power and function of the sūtra surpass the power and function of the dāna of the seven treasures. Third, "it does not equal an upaniṣad-fraction"; here translated as "superiority in incomparable number"; this is the subtlest of numbers among numbers, such that no number can resemble even a tiny fraction of the merit of upholding the sūtra, hence it is called superiority in number. Fourth, superiority in cause and fruit; the cause and fruit of this sūtra surpass other causes and fruits. From "'Subhūti, what do you think?'" onward is the arrival of the tenth chapter of the sūtra. The commentary states: "It arises from the preceding [statement that] bodhi has neither high nor low: if there is no high, then the Buddhas are not high, and a Buddha is not one who can deliver [others]. If there is no low, then sentient beings are not low, and without being low they would not be sentient beings to be delivered. Yet a Buddha is the one who delivers, so a Buddha is high; sentient beings are those who are delivered, so sentient beings are low; thus, there should not be an absence of high and low." It also arises from the preceding [teaching on] speaking four lines for others: when those in the assembly heard that speaking four lines for others brings boundless merit, they immediately thought there were sentient beings for whom to do so; therefore, this is now refuted. The preceding text puts an end to doubts and notions; next, "Why is this?" explains the reason for putting an end to doubts and notions, clarifying that in truth there are no sentient beings to be delivered, and you should not think that the Buddha delivers sentient beings. "If there were sentient beings whom the Tathāgata delivers": this is an inverted explanation: if one sees that there are sentient beings to be delivered, then the Buddha would incur the fault of apprehending a self. For when a sentient being sees sentient beings, the sentient being is called a sentient being and cannot deliver himself—how could he deliver sentient beings? If the Buddha also saw sentient beings, the Buddha would also be called a sentient being and could not deliver himself—how could he deliver sentient beings? If the Buddha, seeing sentient beings, were able to deliver sentient beings, then when sentient beings also see sentient beings, sentient beings ought to be able to deliver the Buddha. Because there would be such a great fault, the Buddha should not see that there are sentient beings. "When the Tathāgata speaks of having a self, then it is not having a self": this again resolves a doubt. The doubt says: If there are no sentient beings to be delivered, why does the Buddha himself say "I" with his own mouth? As in saying, "When I originally practiced the bodhisattva path," and so forth; hence we know there is a self. The reply states: The Tathāgata merely speaks of having a self in accord with worldly convention; in reality there is no self to speak of. As for "yet ordinary persons consider that there is a self": this resolves a further doubt: If there is no self, why does the world universally say, "I come, I go," "I am born, I die," and so forth? It then explains: This is merely ordinary persons arbitrarily calculating that there is a self where there is no self; hence it says that ordinary persons consider that there is a self. "As for ordinary persons, the Tathāgata says they are not ordinary persons": the sūtra text of the commentary fully states, "Subhūti, as for the arising of ordinary persons, the Tathāgata says it is non-arising; this is called the arising of hair-path ordinary persons." The reason this phrase appears is that, having said above that ordinary persons consider that there is a self, it now explains the meaning of "ordinary person." The reason it says that the arising of ordinary persons is called non-arising by the Tathāgata is that because they do not give rise to noble contemplation, it is called non-arising; because they give rise to the inverted minds of ordinary persons, this is called the arising of ordinary persons. Question: Why does the sūtra text of the commentary say "hair-path ordinary persons"? Answer: Because in their foolishness and ignorance they do not understand even a hair's-tip of the noble Dharma. In the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, there is a separate dharma of ordinary persons, a nature of ordinary persons; the nature of ordinary persons is an indeterminate dharma among formations not associated [with form or mind], neither form nor mind. The dharma of ordinary persons extends through the five aggregates and extends through the three natures [of wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate]. In the doctrine of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, there is no separate dharma of an ordinary person's nature; it is merely that there is no uncontaminated noble Dharma, and thus it is simply named the dharma of ordinary persons.