金剛般若疏 4.10

4.10

From "[a heap of the seven treasures equal to Mount Sumeru in] a trichiliocosm" onward is the ninth chapter. Question: In the previous cycle, inner and outer generosity were both already adduced to complete the comparative evaluation; why is it spoken again now? Answer: Above it was already explained that these earlier and later teachings were for the assemblies of two gatherings, so one should not ask this. Furthermore, what preceded has already clarified the aspect of the essence of prajñā and the aspect of faithful acceptance; now the sūtra speaks of the aspect of merit. Moreover, according to the commentary's contextual arising, this arises from the preceding passage, "cultivating all good dharmas attains bodhi." If one says that cultivating good dharmas attains bodhi, then upholding the verses and phrases of this sūtra would not attain bodhi. Why is this? Because persons of the Sarvāstivāda and other schools say that names, words, and phrases are indeterminate dharmas. To refute this doubt, it is adduced again, explaining that although names, words, and phrases are indeterminate, they are able to express dharmatā; hence, the merit of upholding four lines is boundless. Furthermore, in your doctrine they are said to be indeterminate, but in my doctrine it is explained that these are the names, words, and phrases of prajñā—how could they be indeterminate? Therefore, upholding four lines surpasses vast dāna throughout the trichiliocosm. Question: Since both serve equally to refute the doubt of non-existence, why not adduce the seven treasures [in quantity equal to] the sands of the Ganges, or adduce life and limb [equal to] the sands of the Ganges? Answer: The treasures of a trichiliocosm were the very first comparative standard, so only the initial chapter is adduced. Furthermore, for the people of the later gathering, there must be a gradual comparison; one cannot leap directly into an instantaneous comparison speaking of the sands of the Ganges. Moreover, the present material wealth of a trichiliocosm differs from the former: the former merely explained that the material wealth of a trichiliocosm does not equal upholding four lines of the sūtra, whereas the present text explains that "it does not equal one hundredth part," and so forth. According to the commentary, the sūtra has four kinds of superiority: First, it says that "it does not equal one hundredth part... up to a hundred-thousandth part"; this is superiority in number, meaning the merit of upholding the sūtra cannot be numbered. Second, "it does not equal one kalā-fraction"; this is superiority in power and function, explaining that the power and function of the sūtra surpass the power and function of the dāna of the seven treasures. Third, "it does not equal an upaniṣad-fraction"; here translated as "superiority in incomparable number"; this is the subtlest of numbers among numbers, such that no number can resemble even a tiny fraction of the merit of upholding the sūtra, hence it is called superiority in number. Fourth, superiority in cause and fruit; the cause and fruit of this sūtra surpass other causes and fruits. From "'Subhūti, what do you think?'" onward is the arrival of the tenth chapter of the sūtra. The commentary states: "It arises from the preceding [statement that] bodhi has neither high nor low: if there is no high, then the Buddhas are not high, and a Buddha is not one who can deliver [others]. If there is no low, then sentient beings are not low, and without being low they would not be sentient beings to be delivered. Yet a Buddha is the one who delivers, so a Buddha is high; sentient beings are those who are delivered, so sentient beings are low; thus, there should not be an absence of high and low." It also arises from the preceding [teaching on] speaking four lines for others: when those in the assembly heard that speaking four lines for others brings boundless merit, they immediately thought there were sentient beings for whom to do so; therefore, this is now refuted. The preceding text puts an end to doubts and notions; next, "Why is this?" explains the reason for putting an end to doubts and notions, clarifying that in truth there are no sentient beings to be delivered, and you should not think that the Buddha delivers sentient beings. "If there were sentient beings whom the Tathāgata delivers": this is an inverted explanation: if one sees that there are sentient beings to be delivered, then the Buddha would incur the fault of apprehending a self. For when a sentient being sees sentient beings, the sentient being is called a sentient being and cannot deliver himself—how could he deliver sentient beings? If the Buddha also saw sentient beings, the Buddha would also be called a sentient being and could not deliver himself—how could he deliver sentient beings? If the Buddha, seeing sentient beings, were able to deliver sentient beings, then when sentient beings also see sentient beings, sentient beings ought to be able to deliver the Buddha. Because there would be such a great fault, the Buddha should not see that there are sentient beings. "When the Tathāgata speaks of having a self, then it is not having a self": this again resolves a doubt. The doubt says: If there are no sentient beings to be delivered, why does the Buddha himself say "I" with his own mouth? As in saying, "When I originally practiced the bodhisattva path," and so forth; hence we know there is a self. The reply states: The Tathāgata merely speaks of having a self in accord with worldly convention; in reality there is no self to speak of. As for "yet ordinary persons consider that there is a self": this resolves a further doubt: If there is no self, why does the world universally say, "I come, I go," "I am born, I die," and so forth? It then explains: This is merely ordinary persons arbitrarily calculating that there is a self where there is no self; hence it says that ordinary persons consider that there is a self. "As for ordinary persons, the Tathāgata says they are not ordinary persons": the sūtra text of the commentary fully states, "Subhūti, as for the arising of ordinary persons, the Tathāgata says it is non-arising; this is called the arising of hair-path ordinary persons." The reason this phrase appears is that, having said above that ordinary persons consider that there is a self, it now explains the meaning of "ordinary person." The reason it says that the arising of ordinary persons is called non-arising by the Tathāgata is that because they do not give rise to noble contemplation, it is called non-arising; because they give rise to the inverted minds of ordinary persons, this is called the arising of ordinary persons. Question: Why does the sūtra text of the commentary say "hair-path ordinary persons"? Answer: Because in their foolishness and ignorance they do not understand even a hair's-tip of the noble Dharma. In the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, there is a separate dharma of ordinary persons, a nature of ordinary persons; the nature of ordinary persons is an indeterminate dharma among formations not associated [with form or mind], neither form nor mind. The dharma of ordinary persons extends through the five aggregates and extends through the three natures [of wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate]. In the doctrine of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, there is no separate dharma of an ordinary person's nature; it is merely that there is no uncontaminated noble Dharma, and thus it is simply named the dharma of ordinary persons.