金剛般若疏 1
English (machine translation) 1
- Language
- English
Contents
- 1.24 — 4 parts
1.1
Preface to the Vajracchedikā Prajñā Sūtra
1.2
Composed by Dharma Master Hu Jizang
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The Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra: this is indeed the vacant clarity of the threefold contemplation, the profound purport of the single reality. Formerly in the Rṣi's Park (Mṛgadāva), this maṇi-jewel did not yet shine; now in the Elder's Grove (Jetavana), this sweet dew is first sprinkled. Truly, because lesser aspirations opened first, they earlier galloped in [carts drawn by] goats and deer; only when the great resolve arose did they first mount this white bullock [cart]. This is indeed a model of the orthodox teaching, a luminous instruction for the bodhisattvas (mahāsattvas). Neither cloud nor rain, its virtue nourishes the four modes of birth; neither sun nor moon, its illumination shines upon the three realms. It unites the myriad practices, as the vast ocean receives the host of streams; it sweeps away confusion and divergence, as the winter frost withers the hundred grasses. If fully preserved according to the Sanskrit original, it should be called Vajra-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra. Translated into this land, it is: 'Vajra wisdom arrival at the other shore'. The sūtra makes clear that there is no burden it does not crush, hence it is called 'vajra'; there is no objective sphere it does not illuminate, hence it is designated 'prajñā'; eternally transcending this shore and that shore, it is named 'pāramitā'. 'Sūtra' (經) glosses 'standard' and 'constant'.
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Composed by Dharma Master Hu Jizang
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The profound purport comprises ten layers: first, prefacing the intent of preaching the sūtra; second, clarifying the extent of the corpus; third, discerning division and integration; fourth, clarifying earlier and later; fifth, discerning the central theme of the sūtra; sixth, discerning the sūtra's title; seventh, clarifying transmission and translation; eighth, clarifying confirmed efficacy; ninth, sections and divisions; tenth, properly discerning the text.
1.6
Question: The Buddha expounded the Mahāprajñā through various causes and conditions; for what purpose does he now preach this sūtra? Answer: The Mahāprajñā extensively explains the bodhisattva practices for bodhisattvas, whereas this sūtra briefly explains the great Dharma for great beings. As the sūtra states: "The Buddha told Subhūti, 'This sūtra is spoken for those who have set forth on the Mahāyāna, spoken for those who have set forth on the supreme vehicle.'" Question: How does it briefly explain the great Dharma for great beings? Answer: The Buddha's Dharma is limitless, but briefly speaking of cause and effect encompasses all. By cause, it refers to the bodhisattva's true great vows and true great practices. Regarding the great vows, as the sūtra says, the bodhisattva, abiding in the mind of prajñā, wishes to deliver all sentient beings everywhere and lead them to enter anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa, yet in reality there is none delivered. Regarding the great practices, as the sūtra says, the bodhisattva does not abide in dharmas while practicing dāna and all other practices, yet there is nothing practiced. If one does not generate vows with the mind of prajñā, then the vows do not become [true] vows; if one does not cultivate practices with the mind of prajñā, then the practices do not become [true] practices. Therefore, if a bodhisattva wishes to cultivate vows and practices, prajñā is essential; this is called the meaning of cause. Regarding what is called effect: because a bodhisattva practices the cause of non-apprehension, they attain the effect of non-apprehension; the effect of non-apprehension is precisely the Tathāgata's dharmatā dharmakāya. As the sūtra says, one cannot see the Tathāgata by means of marks; if one sees that all lakṣaṇas are non-lakṣaṇas, then one sees the Tathāgata's unconditioned dharmakāya. Now, wishing to expound this cause and effect for great beings, he therefore spoke this sūtra. Furthermore, to truly distinguish the merits and benefits for all sentient beings of the present and future, he therefore spoke this sūtra. As the sūtra states, in the last five hundred years after the Buddha's nirvāṇa, if one can give rise to a single thought of pure faith in prajñā, externally one will be protected and remembered by the buddhas, and internally one will attain boundless merit, surpassing the renunciation of the precious jewels of a great trichiliocosm, and also surpassing the sacrifice of bodily life as numerous as the sands of the Ganges. Furthermore, wishing to expound the paramārtha-siddhānta, he therefore spoke this sūtra. The paramārtha-siddhānta is what is called the dharmatā of all dharmas, which extinguishes all prapañca and transcends all speech, yet there is nothing transcended and nothing extinguished. It is like a flame of fire, which cannot be touched on four sides and has no fixed point of reliance. As the sūtra says, "cannot be grasped and cannot be spoken": "cannot be grasped" means that the mental activities are cut off; "cannot be spoken" means that words are extinguished—this is precisely the paramārtha-siddhānta. Furthermore, accepting the entreaty to preach the Dharma with a mind of great compassion, he therefore spoke this sūtra. As the Lotus Sūtra says: "For three weeks, I reflected on such matters: Sentient beings have dull faculties, are attached to pleasure and blinded by folly; rather than preach the Dharma, I should swiftly enter nirvāṇa. At that time, the King Brahmā bowed his head and entreatingly requested: 'The faculties of sentient beings are superior, middling, and inferior; we pray that you open the gate of nectar and expound the Dharma for their sake.'" Thereupon, the Tathāgata went to Mṛgadāva to teach the four truths, and subsequently to Jetavana to expound prajñā. Question: In the past, preaching the four truths at Mṛgadāva was for Brahmā; now expounding prajñā at Jetavana, what entreaty did he accept? Answer: What King Brahmā requested was not limited to the minor Dharma; the Tathāgata's acceptance of the request was fundamentally for the Great Matter. The Great Matter is what is called prajñāpāramitā. Furthermore, the Buddha wished to gather all Dharma medicines to heal illnesses that are difficult to heal, and therefore spoke this sūtra. Why is that? All sentient beings have two kinds of illness: first, physical illness, namely old age, sickness, and death; second, mental illness, namely greed, anger, and ignorance. Since the beginning of saṃsāra, because of not obtaining the medicine of prajñā, no one has been able to cure these illnesses. The Buddha destroys these two illnesses with the vajra of prajñā, and therefore spoke this sūtra. Furthermore, wishing to increase the bodhisattvas' buddhānusmṛti-samādhi, he therefore spoke this sūtra. Although all sentient beings wish to be mindful of the Buddha, they do not recognize the Tathāgata and mostly fall into erroneous contemplation. As the sūtra says, if one sees me through form or seeks me through sound, one falls into an erroneous path and cannot see the dharmakāya. The dharmakāya takes the true Dharma as its body, and is thus called the dharmakāya. Therefore, the Avataṃsaka Sūtra states: "The nature of the true Dharma is far removed / From all paths of speech; / All destinies and non-destinies / Are entirely the mark of tranquility." The nature of the true Dharma is precisely the dharmatā. This sūtra brightly illuminates dharmatā, which is brightly illuminating the dharmakāya; therefore, contemplating the dharmatā of the body is also true of contemplating the Buddha. One who engages in this contemplation is called having correct contemplation; one who differs from this contemplation is called having erroneous contemplation. Furthermore, wishing to reveal the middle way and uproot the views of the two extremes, he therefore spoke this sūtra. As the sūtra states, one who generates the bodhicitta does not assert the mark of annihilation regarding dharmas. The bodhicitta is precisely the mind of the Way. "The Way" means the correct path; if one generates the mind of the correct path, how could one fall into annihilation or eternity? If one falls into annihilation or eternity, one generates the mind of annihilation and eternity, which is not called generating the mind of the correct path. Now, wishing to lead all bodhisattvas to generate the mind of the correct path and bring an end to the contemplation of annihilation and eternity, he therefore spoke this sūtra. Furthermore, wishing to explain different Dharma approaches and different applications of mindfulness, he therefore spoke this sūtra. In the past, he taught wholesome and unwholesome approaches, determined and indeterminate approaches, and applications of mindfulness such as permanent and impermanent, suffering and bliss; now, he wishes to speak of the non-wholesome and non-unwholesome approach, the non-determined and non-indeterminate approach, and the application of mindfulness that is neither permanent nor impermanent. As the sūtra says: "Even dharmas should be abandoned, how much more so non-dharmas." Furthermore, wishing to transform sentient beings' deep and heavy hindrances, he therefore spoke this sūtra. Below it states: one who should fall into the evil destinies, by upholding this sūtra, has the three evil destinies extinguished, and shall attain sambodhi. Such various causes and conditions are all stated based on the text of the sūtra and following Nāgārjuna's Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa regarding the causes and conditions of prajñā. Question: For people of what stages was this sūtra spoken? Answer: Some say: "Prajñā is practiced by those of high stages; how could ordinary persons like us participate in such matters?" Thus they look at the shore and cut themselves off. Now I say this is not so: this person creates obstacles for themselves within the unhindered Dharma; is this not lamentable? If one says that prajñā must belong to the high stages, those of high stages inherently do not fall into the evil destinies—why would they await practice before being able to escape them? Now the sūtra says: if one wishes not to fall into evil destinies, not to be born into lowly families, and wishes to experience bliss life after life among humans, gods, and pure lands, up to the ultimate Mahāparinirvāṇa, one must study prajñā. This intention clearly shows that those who should fall into evil destinies do not fall because they practice prajñā. Therefore, from ordinary persons on the ground of thin [defilements] on up, to the ten bhūmis and below, all must study prajñā. Furthermore, there is the account transmitted by Bodhiruci from the treatise-master Vajrarsi, a disciple of Vasubandhu, which also explains the origin of prajñā. The reason prajñā was spoken is to cut off the ten kinds of hindrances of sentient beings. The ten kinds of hindrances are: first, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of non-existence of things; second, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of existence of things; third, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of being seemingly existent while non-existent; fourth, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of disparagement; fifth, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of unitary existence; sixth, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of different existence; seventh, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of real existence; eighth, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of distinct differences; ninth, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of conforming to names as referents; tenth, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of conforming to referents as names. These ten hindrances hinder prajñā. In each of the eight divisions of Prajñā, every single division addresses these ten hindrances. What is called the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of non-existence of things: sentient beings, for long kalpas, have clung to self and what belongs to self, mostly stagnating in the illness of existence; therefore, the Tathāgata explained that all dharmas are ultimately empty. But when disciples who receive the teaching hear of ultimate emptiness, they immediately give rise to erroneous views, claiming there is no cause and effect, and thus lose the two truths. This annihilationism hinders prajñā. For the sake of this hindrance, the Buddha spoke this sūtra. As the sūtra says, "The bodhisattva does not abide in all dharmas while practicing dāna and all other practices"; therefore, using the myriad practices as the cause and the dharmakāya as the effect, even though it is ultimately empty, cause and effect are not lost. What is called the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of existence of things: the former was annihilationism; this is eternalism. Disciples who receive the teaching, having heard that the bodhisattva practices the cause and attains the effect, then claim that the cause is capable of evoking, the effect is capable of responding with existence, and that there is a person capable of practicing and practices that are practiced. Thus, although the view of non-existence is eliminated, the thought of existence arises again; hence it is called a hindrance. For the sake of this hindrance, prajñā is spoken to cure it. As the sūtra says: if a bodhisattva has the lakṣaṇa of a self or the lakṣaṇa of a person, they are not a bodhisattva; if they see the lakṣaṇa of dharmas or the lakṣaṇa of non-dharmas, they are also not a bodhisattva. Even while practicing dāna, the three elements are constantly empty; cause and effect are distinct, yet there has never been evocation and response. It is comparable to planting a tree in empty space, or weaving silk in empty space; how could one, upon hearing of existence, immediately give rise to eternalism? What is called the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of being seemingly existent while non-existent: disciples who receive the teaching, hearing that the bodhisattva above does not cling to existence or non-existence, then give rise to divergent views: "If both existence and non-existence are unobtainable, how could there be the myriad diverse functions? Thus, as the six sense objects correspond differently and the four great elements are mutually contrary, because there are myriad functions, we know it is not non-existent." Question: What is meant by "seemingly existent while non-existent"? Answer: For example, a mirage is seemingly existent while non-existent. The existence of myriad functions seen by sentient beings—this perceived existence is seemingly existent while non-existent; therefore, it is termed a hindrance. How is it cured? It is again refuted through metaphor. In metaphor, it is like a mirage: although it seems existent, in reality it is non-existent; the perceived existence is also fundamentally non-existent. As the sūtra says: "A composite entity cannot be spoken of, yet ordinary people greedily grasp its affairs"; below, dreams, phantoms, bubbles, and shadows also refute this. Regarding the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of disparagement: some people, hearing the second hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of existence of things above that the essence of dharmas is empty, and then hearing the third that the functions of the myriad dharmas are empty, claim that saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, sentient beings, and Buddha-nature are all empty; adopting this view of emptiness, they then disparage the Buddha-nature. Why is that? What we now distinguish as empty: saṃsāra is false and unreal, so it can be empty; Buddha-nature is not unreal, therefore it is not empty. Thus the sūtra states: what is empty is the twenty-five realms of existence; what is not empty is the Mahāparinirvāṇa. Below, this sūtra states: "nor is it without lakṣaṇas." "Nor without lakṣaṇas" precisely clarifies that the Buddha-nature does not lack the lakṣaṇa of nature. Question: The Nirvāṇa Sūtra may clarify Buddha-nature, but how does the Prajñā have this statement? Answer: "The Nirvāṇa Sūtra clarifies Buddha-nature, whereas the Prajñā Sūtra does not yet clarify Buddha-nature"—this is what the disciples of Harivarman say. Now, the disciples of Vasubandhu clarify that prajñā and Buddha-nature are just different names for the same thing; therefore, prajñā also clarifies Buddha-nature. Next, the fifth and sixth: the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of unitary existence and the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of different existence; these form the pair of unity and difference. This unity and difference encompass both Buddhist and non-Buddhist assertions, covering all dharmas. For example, the Sāṃkhya asserts unity, the Vaiśeṣika asserts difference, the Nirgrantha asserts both unity and difference, and the Jñātīputra asserts neither unity nor difference; these four attachments all hinder prajñā. Furthermore, among disciples who study the Buddhist teachings, some say the two truths are of one essence or of different essences, or they say there is unity because of conventional continuity, and difference because real dharmas perish. Such rigid attachments also hinder prajñā. How are they cured? As stated below: the Tathāgata speaks of a composite entity as not a composite entity. It should also be said that the Tathāgata speaks of the mark of distinct dispersion as not the mark of distinct dispersion. It is only that ordinary people greedily cling to seeing a composite entity, and ordinary people also greedily cling to seeing the mark of distinct dispersion; therefore, the buddhas and bodhisattvas examine this unity and difference as ultimately without foundation, which is called refuting unity and difference. The seventh and eighth: the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of real existence and the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of distinct differences; these two hindrances take attachment to teachings and attachment to marks as a pair. Regarding attachment to teachings: as the six topics above were all refuted and cleared away as empty, the confused person then says: "If they do not exist, why did the Buddha speak of them? Because the Buddha spoke of them, we know they are not non-existent. Just as with form: if it were non-existent, he should not speak of form; because he spoke of form, we know it is not non-existent." Because of clinging to the Buddha's speech and claiming dharmas really exist, it is called a hindrance. How is it cured? As stated below: a bodhisattva should not give rise to a mind abiding in form, nor give rise to a mind abiding in sound, smell, taste, touch, or dharmas. If the six sense objects existed, how could one not abide? Because one does not abide, we know the six do not exist. Although the Tathāgata spoke of the six, they are merely conventional designations; how could one cling to conventional designations and then say they really exist? Regarding the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of distinct differences: the confused person says: "If all dharmas only have conventional designations and no real substance, why does each dharma have its own mark? Just as seeing a crane lets one know there is a pond, and seeing smoke lets one know there is fire, these are called indicative marks. A narrow neck, thick lip, flat bottom, and large belly are the substantial marks of a jar; horns, a dewlap, and a hanging tail are the substantial marks of an ox. Since these marks exist, they should not merely be conventional designations." Making this attachment is called a hindrance. How is it cured? As the sūtra states: "Being free from all lakṣaṇas is called the buddhas." If marks really existed, how could they be freed from? Because they are freed from, we know there are no lakṣaṇas. The ninth is the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of conforming to names as referents, and the tenth is the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of conforming to referents as names. Regarding the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of conforming to names as referents: the confused person says: "If all dharmas have no marks, why are there names? Because there are names, we know there are marks. Just as using the name 'fire' to summon fire results in fire coming, not water arriving; using the name 'water' to summon water results in water coming, not fire arriving. Therefore we know names express dharmas, so the substance of dharmas is not non-existent." Making this assertion is termed a hindrance. However, this ninth hindrance differs from the seventh: the seventh clings to the Buddha's teachings to give rise to delusion and attachment, whereas this one directly traces marks and names to claim there is a substance of things; this is why they differ. How is it cured? As the sūtra below says: "Speaking of minute dust particles, they are not minute dust particles." For example, accumulating minute dust particles forms fine form; accumulating fine form up to forming a world system. Although there is the name "world system", in reality it has no substance, up to: although there is the name "minute dust particle", in reality it has no substance. Since there is no substance, how could there be a name? As Master Sengzhao said: "A name does not have the power to grasp a thing, and a thing does not have the reality to correspond to a name." If a name lacks the power to grasp a thing, it is not a name; if a thing lacks the reality to correspond to a name, it is not a thing. Being neither name nor thing, where do name and thing reside? The tenth, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of conforming to referents as names: the confused person says: "If all dharmas have no substance, how do sentient beings make use of the myriad dharmas? Since they make use of them, there is the substance of the myriad dharmas; because there is the substance of the myriad dharmas, there are the names of the myriad dharmas." Using the substance to substantiate the name is termed a hindrance. How is it cured? As the sūtra below says: "All conditioned dharmas are like dreams, phantoms, bubbles, shadows." The internal mind and external objects are entirely non-existent; how could one say there is a substance of dharmas and use substance to substantiate names? Question: These ten hindrances are cured by prajñā; should we now use this explanation, or should we not use it? Answer: If one insists that there is delusion as the hindrance and understanding as that which can extinguish it, this is still the perspective of arising and perishing, which is itself a hindrance and must be refuted. If one says prajñā is the refuter and the hindrance is the refuted, is it refuted because of seeing it? Refuted because of not seeing it? Refuted because it is alone? Refuted because it has a companion? When examined in this way, one does not see delusion as something that can be extinguished, nor understanding as something that can arise; this is neither understanding nor delusion, without arising and without perishing. Only when one awakens to such an affair is it first called prajñā.
1.7
Second, an explanation of the extent of [the texts of] prajñā. Question: How many kinds of prajñāpāramitā are there in all? Answer: Searching thoroughly across north and south and examining the sūtras and treatises exhaustively, the number of recensions varies. First, there are two kinds, which derive from the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa. Fascicles forty-one and ninety-nine state: Prajñā is of two kinds: (1) that spoken in common with the śrāvakas, and (2) that spoken solely for the great bodhisattvas of the ten bhūmis, unheard by those of lower ranks. The various recensions of prajñā at present are mostly spoken in common with the śrāvakas. Second, there are three kinds. As for these three kinds, fascicle sixty-seven of the Commentary states: The recensions of prajñā vary in length, having superior, middling, and lesser [versions]—namely the Guangzan, the Fangguang, and the Daoxing. Formerly it was said that the Guangzan had five hundred fascicles, but in this land it has fallen into disrepair and has only ten fascicles, or is divided into twelve fascicles with thirty-seven chapters; this is the superior text. Next, the Fangguang is the middling text, and the Daoxing is the lesser text. The Fangguang has twenty fascicles and is the ancient Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, which Master Dao'an lectured upon; the newly settled recension now has twenty-seven fascicles, or twenty-four fascicles, which, contrasted with the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, is the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, but among the previous three recensions it should truly be the middling text. The Daoxing is the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, having ten fascicles; there is also a newly settled recension in seven fascicles. Fascicle seventy-nine of the Commentary states: The meaning of prajñā is boundless, yet the number of fascicles is limited—namely the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, the Fangguang, and the Guangzan. Since the other two listed beforehand are identical to the earlier mention, and the name Aṣṭasāhasrikā is substituted for Daoxing, one therefore knows that the Daoxing is indeed the Aṣṭasāhasrikā. Third, regarding the explanation of four kinds of prajñā: Master Rui of Chang'an states in his Preface to the Aṣṭasāhasrikā: 'The authoritative text of this sūtra is of four kinds in all, the largest having one hundred thousand gāthās and the shortest having six hundred gāthās. This Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā is still only the middling text of foreign lands. Since these are words adapted to circumstances, why bother calculating their extent?' Although he was familiar with the four names, he did not list their numbers. Someone remarked: 'One should use the Vajracchedikā to supplement the previous three recensions to make four.' Yet the Vajracchedikā has only some three hundred gāthās, whereas Venerable Rui said 'the shortest having six hundred gāthās'; thus we know that he did not necessarily use the Vajracchedikā to supplement them. Next, regarding the explanation of the prajñā of five periods: this derives from the Renwang jing. At the beginning it states: Śākyamuni entered the great calm concentration, and the assembly said to one another: 'The Greatly Awakened World-Honoured One previously expounded for our great assembly, over twenty-nine years, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā, the Vajra-prajñā, the Prajñā Spoken at the Heavenly King's Request, and the Guangzan Prajñā; now he emits light again, what will this do?' Having listed the four kinds earlier, the fifth and last spoken is the Prajñā of the Benevolent King Protecting the State. Moreover, the postscript to the Dabai biqiuni benyuan jing, or the postscript to the Renwang jing, says that the prajñā of five periods was the Buddha's pervasive conversion of the people of the three vehicles across thirty years: First, the Buddha was at Rājagṛha and expounded the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñā, from which the Aṣṭasāhasrikā emerged. Second, the Buddha was at the Jetavana vihāra in Śrāvastī and expounded the Vajra-prajñā, which originally had eight fascicles; having fallen into disrepair in Huainan, only the chapter 'Assessing Merit' remains separately as one fascicle, retaining its original title, also called Vajra. Third, the Buddha was at Jetavana and expounded the Prajñā Spoken at the Heavenly King's Request; the large recension did not come to the Han lands, and in this land there are only the Prajñā Spoken at the Request of Devaputra Sucinti in seven fascicles, the Prajñā Spoken at the Request of Prince Dharmavardhana in three fascicles, and the Prajñā Spoken at the Request of the Four Heavenly Kings in one fascicle, which all derive from it. Fourth, the Buddha was at Rājagṛha and expounded the Guangzan Prajñā; the three recensions Chengju, Daoxing, and Guangjing emerged from the Guangzan. Fifth, the Buddha was at Rājagṛha and expounded the Prajñā Protecting the State. Next, Tripiṭaka Master Bodhiruci said: Prajñā should have eight recensions: the first recension has one hundred thousand gāthās; the second recension has twenty-five thousand gāthās—these two recensions are still in foreign lands; the third recension has twenty-two thousand gāthās, which is the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā; the fourth recension has eight thousand gāthās, which is the Aṣṭasāhasrikā; the fifth recension has four thousand gāthās; the sixth recension has two thousand five hundred gāthās—these two recensions have also not yet reached the Han lands; the seventh recension has six hundred gāthās, which is the Mañjuśrī-prajñā; the eighth recension has three hundred gāthās, which is this Vajra-prajñā. It is also said that there are the Guangzan, the Dakuang, the Daoxing, and others. Tripiṭaka Master Bodhiruci stated: 'These are all chapters within the Prajñā of one hundred thousand gāthās, not separate recensions.' Now testing this by the Commentary, it does not match what Bodhiruci said. The Commentary states: 'The recensions of prajñā vary in length, having superior, middling, and lesser [versions]'; how then can he say that the Guangzan and the Daoxing are not separate recensions? Furthermore, the hundredth fascicle of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: 'Prajñā in this [world] may have twenty-two thousand gāthās; the Great Prajñā has one hundred thousand gāthās; in the palaces of the nāgas and devas there are hundreds of billions of gāthās, because with their long lifespans and strong powers of mindfulness, they can bear hearing extensive expositions. The lifespan among humans is brief and their power of retention is weak, so it contains only a few texts.' If so, how could it be confined to five periods or restricted to eight recensions?
1.8
Third, distinguishing division and combination. Question: Other sūtras were never spoken repeatedly; why are the recensions of prajñā limitless? Answer: Limitless Buddhist sūtras have reached the Han lands, far more than can be told, but now one only sees multiple recensions of prajñā and does not see many of other sūtras. But now, discussing why prajñā has multiple recensions: sentient beings' entry into the Way must proceed from prajñā. Why is this? All ordinary persons who have not attained the Way are so because they have that upon which they depend and cling. Prajñā specifically dismantles the attachments and dependencies of sentient beings, and therefore expounds the Dharma of non-dependence and non-clinging. Prajñā is true repentance; therefore, when the various Mahāyāna sūtras distinguish true repentance, they all depend on prajñā. As the Samantabhadra Sūtra states: 'The ocean of all karmic obstructions arises entirely from false thoughts. If one wishes to repent, sit upright and contemplate dharmatā.' The Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra also states: 'If one hears of non-action and non-reception, the king's heavy sins will surely be eradicated.' Question: The various sūtras each expound the Dharma of non-apprehension and each eradicate heavy sins; why say solely that the eradication of sin in the various sūtras depends entirely on prajñā? Answer: Although the various Mahāyāna sūtras all alike teach non-dependence and non-apprehension, prajñā mostly presents expositions of non-dependence and non-apprehension, directly demolishing the disease of dependency and apprehension in sentient beings, which other sūtras do not. For example, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra specifically clarifies permanence and impermanence; the Lotus Sūtra clarifies the Dharma of converging the three into the one; the Avataṃsaka Sūtra extensively clarifies the causes, fruits, and virtuous practices of bodhisattvas, but does not specifically elucidate non-dependence and non-apprehension. For this reason, when the various sūtras speak of attaining the Way and eradicating sins, they must require prajñā; hence prajñā has multiple distinct recensions. Taking the essentials: sentient beings constantly have the affliction of dependency and apprehension, and for this reason the Tathāgata constantly expounded the Dharma of non-dependence and non-apprehension. As the Sūtra of the Two Nights states: 'From the night the Buddha attained the Way until the night of nirvāṇa, he constantly expounded prajñā.' How could five periods or eight recensions ever be considered many? Question: If prajñā in five periods makes five recensions, why are the eight assemblies of the Avataṃsaka not eight recensions? Since the eight assemblies are combined into one recension, why are the five periods not combined into one recension? Answer: Speaking generally, they may all be analogized to one another. That it is not so here is because in the eight assemblies of the Avataṃsaka, the meaning completes itself sequentially from first to last: as when expounding previously the ten faiths, ten abodes, ten practices, ten dedications, ten bhūmis, and the ocean of major and minor marks, this constitutes a progression from shallow to deep, with cause and effect completing each other; hence they are combined into one recension. The prajñā of the five periods is not a progression from shallow to deep or a mutual completion from first to last; therefore they are separately divided into five recensions.
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Fourth, clearly determining the temporal sequence of the two sūtras once more. Question: Which was spoken first, the Mahāprajñā[pāramitā Sūtra] or the Vajracchedikā Prajñā[pāramitā Sūtra]? Answer: Dharma Master Kaishan, Master Ji of Kuaiji, Master Yan of Mount Hua in Gusu, Master Daling, and others all say: as listed in the Renwang [jing], the Mahā[prajñāpāramitā] was spoken first, and next was spoken the Vajra[cchedikā]. They further verify this with two arguments. First, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Previously the bodhisattva practice had not been explained; now [the Buddha] wishes for the first time to explain the bodhisattva practice for Maitreya and others, and therefore speaks the prajñā." If the Vajracchedikā Prajñā had already been spoken before, that would mean the bodhisattva practice had already been explained, and it should not say it had not been explained. Second, at the beginning of the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra it says: "[The Tathāgata] is skillfully mindful of all bodhisattvas and skillfully entrusts all bodhisattvas." If the Mahāprajñā[pāramitā] had not yet been spoken, there would not yet have been bodhisattvas; how could there be entrusting and mindfulness? Only after the Mahā[prajñāpāramitā] had been spoken were there bodhisattvas, and thus only when the Vajracchedikā Prajñā was spoken later could mindfulness and entrustment of bodhisattvas be elucidated.
Next, someone says: the Vajra[cchedikā] was spoken first, and the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra later. How is this known? There are three arguments and three textual citations to corroborate it. The three arguments: First, "vajra" is a name signifying the shattering of marks. During the twelve years, it was termed the teaching of having marks; those who received the designations generated conceptual marks of discrimination, and their clinging attachments were difficult to dispel. When the Buddha first inaugurated this sūtra, he clarified the profound principle of signlessness to break through their mind of attachment to marks; therefore, borrowing "vajra", he forcefully used it as an analogy for the understanding of emptiness. Second, the preaching of this sūtra assembled only twelve hundred and fifty bhikṣus and so on, without broadly assembling devas, humans, and bodhisattvas; it was precisely because he was about to elucidate the extremely profound principle of emptiness to transform sentient beings attached to marks, wishing to cause his close disciples to attain awakening beforehand, thereby enabling the transmission of the teaching to be accomplished and causing the śrāvakas to assist the Buddha in propagating the transformation. Bodhisattvas are in principle close to the Buddha, but in phenomenal traces further removed; furthermore, [if the Buddha] had wished bodhisattvas to teach the śrāvakas, the latter would have looked at the other shore and drawn back; thus he first spoke this sūtra for those who constantly followed the Buddha. Third, because of contrasting with the small, there is the great. Previously he spoke this sūtra very briefly, not yet broadly elucidating the myriad practices of bodhisattvas, and so it is called small; later he expounded the Fangguang bore, and here for the first time again broadly elucidated signlessness and explained the differentiations of the myriad practices, and so it is called Mahāprajñā. Deducing from these arguments, we know that the Vajracchedikā Prajñā was spoken in the first period, and the Mahāprajñā[pāramitā] was next in the second.
Next, the textual proofs are also three: First, in the text below in this sūtra: "Subhūti asked the Buddha: 'Will there be any sentient beings who, hearing such words and phrases, will give rise to real faith?'" If [Kaishan's view were correct], the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā had already been spoken before, and immeasurable sentient beings had attained faith, awakening, and understanding, and had transmitted the teaching and expounded the Dharma. Subhūti had never had this doubt regarding the doctrinal gate of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā; only now coming to this sūtra does he again raise this question, which would be difficult to explain logically. Second, Subhūti comprehended and said: "From the past until now, with the wisdom-eye I have attained, I have never yet heard such a sūtra." If [Kaishan were correct], when the Buddha spoke the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā previously, how could [Subhūti] expound the sūtra and transmit the teaching, and how could he say he had not heard a profound sūtra? If he had heard it and not awakened, how could he have transmitted the teaching? Third, Subhūti answered the Buddha: "One should not view the Tathāgata by means of the thirty-two marks." If [Kaishan were correct], having already heard the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā previously, how could he cling to the bodily marks as being the Buddha? If he gave rise to this clinging, he could not be said to understand emptiness. Thus we know that he was directly clinging to the former teaching of marks, and therefore called the physical body the Buddha. And as for Kaishan adducing two arguments as proof, they must now be resolved: First, as for the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa saying "prior to speaking the Mahā[prajñā], the bodhisattva practices had not been clarified," this means merely that the bodhisattva practices had not been broadly clarified; it does not mean they had not already been briefly spoken in the Vajra[cchedikā]. Second, as for saying that because the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā had not yet been spoken there were not yet bodhisattvas to be skillfully entrusted, this is not so. We now clarify that when the Buddha first attained the Way and delivered people through the three vehicles, how could there have been no bodhisattvas? Entrusting Maitreya means he was precisely such a person. Deducing from text and reason, we therefore know that the Vajracchedikā Prajñā was spoken first.
We now clarify that these two explanations cannot be definitively determined: how could words delivered according to circumstance ever be fixed? Regarding their sequence, it may be that many texts were spoken together at one time, or it may be that one text spanned many periods; when we come to the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, this will be explained in further detail.
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Fifth, discerning the central theme (zong) of the sūtra. Question: What does this sūtra take as its central theme? Answer: Commentators differ. Someone says: It takes the signless objective realm as its theme. Why? Because this sūtra precisely dispels the myriad marks and clarifies the signless principle; therefore, it takes the signless principle as the theme of this sūtra. Someone says: This sūtra takes wisdom as its theme. This in turn has two views. One view says wisdom is of two kinds: first, wisdom in the cause; second, wisdom in the fruit. Now it takes precisely wisdom in the cause as the theme of this sūtra. There are altogether four textual citations as proof: First, the beginning of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: "One who wishes to attain the knowledge of all aspects should train in prajñā." The meaning of this is: one who wishes to attain the wisdom of the Buddha-ground should practice wisdom in the cause. Second, the "Chapter on Encouraging Training" broadly encourages the three vehicles to train in prajñā. This sūtra does not yet speak of the two vehicles attaining Buddhahood, yet encourages them to train in prajñā, proving that prajñā is only in the cause and not the fruit. Third, the beginning of the Upadeśa says: "In order to speak of the bodhisattva practice for Maitreya and others, [the Buddha] speaks prajñā"; therefore, we know that prajñā is practice in the cause, and upon reaching the fruit it changes its name to the myriad virtues. Fourth, fascicle forty-nine of the Upadeśa says: "In the cause it is called prajñā; when the bodhisattva becomes a Buddha, it changes its name to knowledge of all aspects"; therefore, prajñā does not belong to the Buddha, but belongs only to bodhisattvas. Furthermore, it says: "When prajñā becomes a Buddha, it changes its name to sarvajñā"; the Buddha's wisdom is supremely hard and extremely sharp, which is precisely the vajra-sarvajñā. Now, since it speaks of prajñā, we know it only clarifies the undefiled state of the ten bhūmis; therefore, prajñā in the cause is the theme. Someone says: From the initial bhūmi upward to the ultimate Buddha-fruit, all are equal and entirely constitute the substance of the sūtra; thus both cause and fruit together constitute the theme of the sūtra, which is precisely what Kaishan formerly used.
Within wisdom in the cause, there are again two views. Someone says: It takes only the signless real wisdom as the theme of the sūtra. Therefore the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra says: "That which is likened to a vajra is wisdom of the ultimate truth." Someone says: Both real wisdom and expedient wisdom constitute the theme of the sūtra. Therefore the twofold teachings of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā fully clarify both wisdoms. Someone says: The objective realm and wisdom combined constitute the theme of the sūtra. Therefore Dharma Master Yao says: "To speak of the ultimate theme of the sūtra, it takes the dharmatā as its theme; to clarify the sage's mind, it takes wondrous wisdom as primary." For this reason, realm and wisdom combined constitute the theme of the sūtra.
Question: Among such explanations, which is the real one? Answer: Someone says: They all have reason, because they are all the Buddha's words. Someone says: All such explanations entirely miss the intention of prajñā. Yet another says: Only my single explanation is correct, and all other explanations are wrong. For instance, Zhuangyan says: The cause is called vajra, while the fruit is not vajra, because in the cause defilements are severed, while on the fruit-ground they are not severed. Kaishan says: Both cause and fruit are vajra; both cause and fruit sever defilements, and therefore it is said that the Buddha's wisdom severs, and the Buddha's bodhi-wisdom severs.
We now clarify that prajñā has no fixed mark, like a great blaze of fire that cannot be touched on any of its four sides; how could each adhere to a fixed grasping? Now we shall question them one by one. If you say the objective realm is prajñā, yet now for you prajñā is precisely wisdom, why is it that when discerning prajñā you do not take prajñā as the theme, but instead take non-prajñā as the theme? Next we interrogate: If wisdom is taken as the theme, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Prajñā is deep and weighty; wisdom is light and shallow." Now since [the sūtra] speaks of deep and weighty prajñā, why do you not take deep and weighty prajñā as the theme, but take light and shallow wisdom as the theme? Next we ask: If you take wisdom in the cause to be prajñā, this too is not so. Why? In the sūtras there are various explanations: sometimes it says the cause is named prajñā and the fruit is termed sarvajñā; sometimes both cause and fruit are termed prajñā, as among the three virtues in the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra there is the virtue of prajñā; thus we know prajñā is also a name for the fruit, and one should not cling one-sidedly. Next we ask: If you say that beginning from the first bhūmi and ending at the Buddha-fruit, one inclusively takes both cause and fruit as the theme, this too is not so. The Upadeśa says: "Someone says: Both defiled and undefiled wisdom are prajñā. Someone says: Only undefiled wisdom is prajñā." Nāgārjuna did not make a definitive choice; for what reason do you cling one-sidedly? Further we ask: If you say prajñā encompasses both cause and fruit, why does the Upadeśa say it is only the cause? In that case, while attaining what is comprehensive, you lose what is specific. Next we interrogate: If you say realm and wisdom combined are the theme, then realm and wisdom combined should also be prajñā. In your doctrine, wisdom is primary prajñā and the realm is secondary prajñā; then wisdom should also be the primary theme and the realm the secondary theme; how does this differ from the previous explanation? Next we ask: If you say all seven houses are correct, this fails to recognize gain and loss. Like an ignorant blind person who does not know whether a road is passable or impassable and claims that all are the road, this again is an error. Next we ask: If you say Zhuangyan is correct and Kaishan is wrong, Kaishan also takes Kaishan to be correct and Zhuangyan to be wrong; this side has its right and wrong, and that side has its right and wrong—in the end, who is right? As the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: "This view is real, and the rest is false speech."
Question: Is the explanation of our mountain tradition the same as or different from others? Answer: If previous explanations could be apprehended upon seeking, one might ask whether they are the same as or different from our present view; but when sought to the end, they cannot be apprehended—with what could there be sameness or difference? To be able to be neither same nor different, neither self nor other, without dependence or apprehension, abiding nowhere whatsoever—this precisely is the profound theme of prajñā. Making the above interpretations, having that upon which one relies and abides, none of these is the theme of prajñā. We now clarify that prajñā has no fixed mark; skillful in accordance with conditions, its principle penetrates everywhere. Yet true prajñā has never been realm or non-realm, wisdom or non-wisdom, down to cause or non-cause, fruit or non-fruit. As an expedient according with conditions, in the cause it is named cause, in the fruit it is named fruit, in the realm it is named realm, and in wisdom it is named wisdom; therefore fruit, cause, realm, and wisdom must all obtain their names. As Master Zhao said: "Now, that which can make realm, wisdom, cause, and fruit—how could it be the function of realm, wisdom, cause, and fruit? It is simply because being neither realm nor wisdom it can be realm and wisdom; being neither cause nor fruit it can be cause and fruit." But now, discussing it in terms of the text, provisionally speaking, prajñā is neither cause nor fruit, yet precisely takes cause and fruit as its theme.
Question: By what reason is it known that cause and fruit are the theme? Answer: Both the sūtra and the treatise text make this statement. The sūtra says: Generating bodhicitta and abiding in prajñā, down to dāna that does not abide in marks. Such great vows and great practices are precisely the meaning of the cause. Next, attaining the Tathāgata's unconditioned dharmakāya is precisely the meaning of the fruit. In the treatise text, in the chapter on the faithful, it says: "Explaining the profound meaning of cause and fruit, in that evil age, it will not be empty and must have reality." Therefore we know that once the matter of clarifying the cause and discerning the fruit is complete, only then does it clarify faith and acceptance. Hence we know that cause and fruit are the correct theme of this sūtra.
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Sixth, explaining the title of the sūtra, which is further divided into five headings: (1) explaining "Spoken by the Buddha"; (2) interpreting "vajra"; (3) explaining "prajñā"; (4) interpreting "pāramitā"; (5) elucidating "sūtra". The sūtra states, "Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā". In explanation: the title of a sūtra is of two kinds: first, complete; second, incomplete. The complete [form] should say, "Spoken by the Buddha: Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā"; the incomplete [form] simply says, "Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā". Question: For what reason do other sūtras not have "Spoken by the Buddha" in their titles? Answer: All sūtras personally spoken from the Buddha's mouth should indeed have "Spoken by the Buddha" in their titles. Those that do not include it do so for the sake of brevity. Question: Why then does this sūtra have "Spoken by the Buddha" in its title? Answer: The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: "There are five kinds of persons who speak [sūtras]: first, spoken personally from the Buddha's mouth; second, spoken by disciples; third, spoken by devas; fourth, spoken by ṛṣis; fifth, spoken by apparitional beings." Now, this sūtra was personally spoken from the Buddha's mouth and was not spoken by anyone else; therefore, it is titled "Spoken by the Buddha". Question: Other sūtras were also personally spoken from the Buddha's mouth and not spoken by anyone else; why do they not say "Personally Spoken by the Buddha"? Answer: As previously stated, in principle they really should be so titled, but it is omitted for the sake of brevity. Furthermore, sūtras such as the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā commissioned Subhūti to speak them and were not spoken by the Buddha himself; therefore, they could not be titled "Spoken by the Buddha", but are simply called Mahāprajñāpāramitā, as prajñā encompasses the expositions of both teacher and disciple. This sūtra is not like that: although addressed to Subhūti, the Buddha spoke it himself and did not commission him to speak it. Furthermore, speaking from principle, it ought to be titled "Spoken by the Buddha". Why is that? Various non-Buddhists such as the six teachers also all propounded sūtras. Now, fearing that people might fall into erroneous views and wishing to distinguish this from the six teachers, it is titled "Spoken by the Buddha" so as to cause people to have faith in and receive the Dharma. Furthermore, the Way does not operate in isolation; it must be propagated by human beings. Although the Dharma is the teacher of the Buddha, it must depend on the Buddha's exposition for the Dharma to be propagated. For this reason, entitling both the person capable of speaking and the Dharma that is spoken makes the meaning complete.
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- 金剛般若疏 — Classical Chinese