金剛般若疏 1.6

1.6

Question: The Buddha expounded the Mahāprajñā through various causes and conditions; for what purpose does he now preach this sūtra? Answer: The Mahāprajñā extensively explains the bodhisattva practices for bodhisattvas, whereas this sūtra briefly explains the great Dharma for great beings. As the sūtra states: "The Buddha told Subhūti, 'This sūtra is spoken for those who have set forth on the Mahāyāna, spoken for those who have set forth on the supreme vehicle.'" Question: How does it briefly explain the great Dharma for great beings? Answer: The Buddha's Dharma is limitless, but briefly speaking of cause and effect encompasses all. By cause, it refers to the bodhisattva's true great vows and true great practices. Regarding the great vows, as the sūtra says, the bodhisattva, abiding in the mind of prajñā, wishes to deliver all sentient beings everywhere and lead them to enter anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa, yet in reality there is none delivered. Regarding the great practices, as the sūtra says, the bodhisattva does not abide in dharmas while practicing dāna and all other practices, yet there is nothing practiced. If one does not generate vows with the mind of prajñā, then the vows do not become [true] vows; if one does not cultivate practices with the mind of prajñā, then the practices do not become [true] practices. Therefore, if a bodhisattva wishes to cultivate vows and practices, prajñā is essential; this is called the meaning of cause. Regarding what is called effect: because a bodhisattva practices the cause of non-apprehension, they attain the effect of non-apprehension; the effect of non-apprehension is precisely the Tathāgata's dharmatā dharmakāya. As the sūtra says, one cannot see the Tathāgata by means of marks; if one sees that all lakṣaṇas are non-lakṣaṇas, then one sees the Tathāgata's unconditioned dharmakāya. Now, wishing to expound this cause and effect for great beings, he therefore spoke this sūtra. Furthermore, to truly distinguish the merits and benefits for all sentient beings of the present and future, he therefore spoke this sūtra. As the sūtra states, in the last five hundred years after the Buddha's nirvāṇa, if one can give rise to a single thought of pure faith in prajñā, externally one will be protected and remembered by the buddhas, and internally one will attain boundless merit, surpassing the renunciation of the precious jewels of a great trichiliocosm, and also surpassing the sacrifice of bodily life as numerous as the sands of the Ganges. Furthermore, wishing to expound the paramārtha-siddhānta, he therefore spoke this sūtra. The paramārtha-siddhānta is what is called the dharmatā of all dharmas, which extinguishes all prapañca and transcends all speech, yet there is nothing transcended and nothing extinguished. It is like a flame of fire, which cannot be touched on four sides and has no fixed point of reliance. As the sūtra says, "cannot be grasped and cannot be spoken": "cannot be grasped" means that the mental activities are cut off; "cannot be spoken" means that words are extinguished—this is precisely the paramārtha-siddhānta. Furthermore, accepting the entreaty to preach the Dharma with a mind of great compassion, he therefore spoke this sūtra. As the Lotus Sūtra says: "For three weeks, I reflected on such matters: Sentient beings have dull faculties, are attached to pleasure and blinded by folly; rather than preach the Dharma, I should swiftly enter nirvāṇa. At that time, the King Brahmā bowed his head and entreatingly requested: 'The faculties of sentient beings are superior, middling, and inferior; we pray that you open the gate of nectar and expound the Dharma for their sake.'" Thereupon, the Tathāgata went to Mṛgadāva to teach the four truths, and subsequently to Jetavana to expound prajñā. Question: In the past, preaching the four truths at Mṛgadāva was for Brahmā; now expounding prajñā at Jetavana, what entreaty did he accept? Answer: What King Brahmā requested was not limited to the minor Dharma; the Tathāgata's acceptance of the request was fundamentally for the Great Matter. The Great Matter is what is called prajñāpāramitā. Furthermore, the Buddha wished to gather all Dharma medicines to heal illnesses that are difficult to heal, and therefore spoke this sūtra. Why is that? All sentient beings have two kinds of illness: first, physical illness, namely old age, sickness, and death; second, mental illness, namely greed, anger, and ignorance. Since the beginning of saṃsāra, because of not obtaining the medicine of prajñā, no one has been able to cure these illnesses. The Buddha destroys these two illnesses with the vajra of prajñā, and therefore spoke this sūtra. Furthermore, wishing to increase the bodhisattvas' buddhānusmṛti-samādhi, he therefore spoke this sūtra. Although all sentient beings wish to be mindful of the Buddha, they do not recognize the Tathāgata and mostly fall into erroneous contemplation. As the sūtra says, if one sees me through form or seeks me through sound, one falls into an erroneous path and cannot see the dharmakāya. The dharmakāya takes the true Dharma as its body, and is thus called the dharmakāya. Therefore, the Avataṃsaka Sūtra states: "The nature of the true Dharma is far removed / From all paths of speech; / All destinies and non-destinies / Are entirely the mark of tranquility." The nature of the true Dharma is precisely the dharmatā. This sūtra brightly illuminates dharmatā, which is brightly illuminating the dharmakāya; therefore, contemplating the dharmatā of the body is also true of contemplating the Buddha. One who engages in this contemplation is called having correct contemplation; one who differs from this contemplation is called having erroneous contemplation. Furthermore, wishing to reveal the middle way and uproot the views of the two extremes, he therefore spoke this sūtra. As the sūtra states, one who generates the bodhicitta does not assert the mark of annihilation regarding dharmas. The bodhicitta is precisely the mind of the Way. "The Way" means the correct path; if one generates the mind of the correct path, how could one fall into annihilation or eternity? If one falls into annihilation or eternity, one generates the mind of annihilation and eternity, which is not called generating the mind of the correct path. Now, wishing to lead all bodhisattvas to generate the mind of the correct path and bring an end to the contemplation of annihilation and eternity, he therefore spoke this sūtra. Furthermore, wishing to explain different Dharma approaches and different applications of mindfulness, he therefore spoke this sūtra. In the past, he taught wholesome and unwholesome approaches, determined and indeterminate approaches, and applications of mindfulness such as permanent and impermanent, suffering and bliss; now, he wishes to speak of the non-wholesome and non-unwholesome approach, the non-determined and non-indeterminate approach, and the application of mindfulness that is neither permanent nor impermanent. As the sūtra says: "Even dharmas should be abandoned, how much more so non-dharmas." Furthermore, wishing to transform sentient beings' deep and heavy hindrances, he therefore spoke this sūtra. Below it states: one who should fall into the evil destinies, by upholding this sūtra, has the three evil destinies extinguished, and shall attain sambodhi. Such various causes and conditions are all stated based on the text of the sūtra and following Nāgārjuna's Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa regarding the causes and conditions of prajñā. Question: For people of what stages was this sūtra spoken? Answer: Some say: "Prajñā is practiced by those of high stages; how could ordinary persons like us participate in such matters?" Thus they look at the shore and cut themselves off. Now I say this is not so: this person creates obstacles for themselves within the unhindered Dharma; is this not lamentable? If one says that prajñā must belong to the high stages, those of high stages inherently do not fall into the evil destinies—why would they await practice before being able to escape them? Now the sūtra says: if one wishes not to fall into evil destinies, not to be born into lowly families, and wishes to experience bliss life after life among humans, gods, and pure lands, up to the ultimate Mahāparinirvāṇa, one must study prajñā. This intention clearly shows that those who should fall into evil destinies do not fall because they practice prajñā. Therefore, from ordinary persons on the ground of thin [defilements] on up, to the ten bhūmis and below, all must study prajñā. Furthermore, there is the account transmitted by Bodhiruci from the treatise-master Vajrarsi, a disciple of Vasubandhu, which also explains the origin of prajñā. The reason prajñā was spoken is to cut off the ten kinds of hindrances of sentient beings. The ten kinds of hindrances are: first, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of non-existence of things; second, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of existence of things; third, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of being seemingly existent while non-existent; fourth, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of disparagement; fifth, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of unitary existence; sixth, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of different existence; seventh, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of real existence; eighth, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of distinct differences; ninth, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of conforming to names as referents; tenth, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of conforming to referents as names. These ten hindrances hinder prajñā. In each of the eight divisions of Prajñā, every single division addresses these ten hindrances. What is called the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of non-existence of things: sentient beings, for long kalpas, have clung to self and what belongs to self, mostly stagnating in the illness of existence; therefore, the Tathāgata explained that all dharmas are ultimately empty. But when disciples who receive the teaching hear of ultimate emptiness, they immediately give rise to erroneous views, claiming there is no cause and effect, and thus lose the two truths. This annihilationism hinders prajñā. For the sake of this hindrance, the Buddha spoke this sūtra. As the sūtra says, "The bodhisattva does not abide in all dharmas while practicing dāna and all other practices"; therefore, using the myriad practices as the cause and the dharmakāya as the effect, even though it is ultimately empty, cause and effect are not lost. What is called the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of existence of things: the former was annihilationism; this is eternalism. Disciples who receive the teaching, having heard that the bodhisattva practices the cause and attains the effect, then claim that the cause is capable of evoking, the effect is capable of responding with existence, and that there is a person capable of practicing and practices that are practiced. Thus, although the view of non-existence is eliminated, the thought of existence arises again; hence it is called a hindrance. For the sake of this hindrance, prajñā is spoken to cure it. As the sūtra says: if a bodhisattva has the lakṣaṇa of a self or the lakṣaṇa of a person, they are not a bodhisattva; if they see the lakṣaṇa of dharmas or the lakṣaṇa of non-dharmas, they are also not a bodhisattva. Even while practicing dāna, the three elements are constantly empty; cause and effect are distinct, yet there has never been evocation and response. It is comparable to planting a tree in empty space, or weaving silk in empty space; how could one, upon hearing of existence, immediately give rise to eternalism? What is called the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of being seemingly existent while non-existent: disciples who receive the teaching, hearing that the bodhisattva above does not cling to existence or non-existence, then give rise to divergent views: "If both existence and non-existence are unobtainable, how could there be the myriad diverse functions? Thus, as the six sense objects correspond differently and the four great elements are mutually contrary, because there are myriad functions, we know it is not non-existent." Question: What is meant by "seemingly existent while non-existent"? Answer: For example, a mirage is seemingly existent while non-existent. The existence of myriad functions seen by sentient beings—this perceived existence is seemingly existent while non-existent; therefore, it is termed a hindrance. How is it cured? It is again refuted through metaphor. In metaphor, it is like a mirage: although it seems existent, in reality it is non-existent; the perceived existence is also fundamentally non-existent. As the sūtra says: "A composite entity cannot be spoken of, yet ordinary people greedily grasp its affairs"; below, dreams, phantoms, bubbles, and shadows also refute this. Regarding the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of disparagement: some people, hearing the second hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of existence of things above that the essence of dharmas is empty, and then hearing the third that the functions of the myriad dharmas are empty, claim that saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, sentient beings, and Buddha-nature are all empty; adopting this view of emptiness, they then disparage the Buddha-nature. Why is that? What we now distinguish as empty: saṃsāra is false and unreal, so it can be empty; Buddha-nature is not unreal, therefore it is not empty. Thus the sūtra states: what is empty is the twenty-five realms of existence; what is not empty is the Mahāparinirvāṇa. Below, this sūtra states: "nor is it without lakṣaṇas." "Nor without lakṣaṇas" precisely clarifies that the Buddha-nature does not lack the lakṣaṇa of nature. Question: The Nirvāṇa Sūtra may clarify Buddha-nature, but how does the Prajñā have this statement? Answer: "The Nirvāṇa Sūtra clarifies Buddha-nature, whereas the Prajñā Sūtra does not yet clarify Buddha-nature"—this is what the disciples of Harivarman say. Now, the disciples of Vasubandhu clarify that prajñā and Buddha-nature are just different names for the same thing; therefore, prajñā also clarifies Buddha-nature. Next, the fifth and sixth: the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of unitary existence and the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of different existence; these form the pair of unity and difference. This unity and difference encompass both Buddhist and non-Buddhist assertions, covering all dharmas. For example, the Sāṃkhya asserts unity, the Vaiśeṣika asserts difference, the Nirgrantha asserts both unity and difference, and the Jñātīputra asserts neither unity nor difference; these four attachments all hinder prajñā. Furthermore, among disciples who study the Buddhist teachings, some say the two truths are of one essence or of different essences, or they say there is unity because of conventional continuity, and difference because real dharmas perish. Such rigid attachments also hinder prajñā. How are they cured? As stated below: the Tathāgata speaks of a composite entity as not a composite entity. It should also be said that the Tathāgata speaks of the mark of distinct dispersion as not the mark of distinct dispersion. It is only that ordinary people greedily cling to seeing a composite entity, and ordinary people also greedily cling to seeing the mark of distinct dispersion; therefore, the buddhas and bodhisattvas examine this unity and difference as ultimately without foundation, which is called refuting unity and difference. The seventh and eighth: the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of real existence and the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of distinct differences; these two hindrances take attachment to teachings and attachment to marks as a pair. Regarding attachment to teachings: as the six topics above were all refuted and cleared away as empty, the confused person then says: "If they do not exist, why did the Buddha speak of them? Because the Buddha spoke of them, we know they are not non-existent. Just as with form: if it were non-existent, he should not speak of form; because he spoke of form, we know it is not non-existent." Because of clinging to the Buddha's speech and claiming dharmas really exist, it is called a hindrance. How is it cured? As stated below: a bodhisattva should not give rise to a mind abiding in form, nor give rise to a mind abiding in sound, smell, taste, touch, or dharmas. If the six sense objects existed, how could one not abide? Because one does not abide, we know the six do not exist. Although the Tathāgata spoke of the six, they are merely conventional designations; how could one cling to conventional designations and then say they really exist? Regarding the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of distinct differences: the confused person says: "If all dharmas only have conventional designations and no real substance, why does each dharma have its own mark? Just as seeing a crane lets one know there is a pond, and seeing smoke lets one know there is fire, these are called indicative marks. A narrow neck, thick lip, flat bottom, and large belly are the substantial marks of a jar; horns, a dewlap, and a hanging tail are the substantial marks of an ox. Since these marks exist, they should not merely be conventional designations." Making this attachment is called a hindrance. How is it cured? As the sūtra states: "Being free from all lakṣaṇas is called the buddhas." If marks really existed, how could they be freed from? Because they are freed from, we know there are no lakṣaṇas. The ninth is the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of conforming to names as referents, and the tenth is the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of conforming to referents as names. Regarding the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of conforming to names as referents: the confused person says: "If all dharmas have no marks, why are there names? Because there are names, we know there are marks. Just as using the name 'fire' to summon fire results in fire coming, not water arriving; using the name 'water' to summon water results in water coming, not fire arriving. Therefore we know names express dharmas, so the substance of dharmas is not non-existent." Making this assertion is termed a hindrance. However, this ninth hindrance differs from the seventh: the seventh clings to the Buddha's teachings to give rise to delusion and attachment, whereas this one directly traces marks and names to claim there is a substance of things; this is why they differ. How is it cured? As the sūtra below says: "Speaking of minute dust particles, they are not minute dust particles." For example, accumulating minute dust particles forms fine form; accumulating fine form up to forming a world system. Although there is the name "world system", in reality it has no substance, up to: although there is the name "minute dust particle", in reality it has no substance. Since there is no substance, how could there be a name? As Master Sengzhao said: "A name does not have the power to grasp a thing, and a thing does not have the reality to correspond to a name." If a name lacks the power to grasp a thing, it is not a name; if a thing lacks the reality to correspond to a name, it is not a thing. Being neither name nor thing, where do name and thing reside? The tenth, the hindrance of the lakṣaṇa of conforming to referents as names: the confused person says: "If all dharmas have no substance, how do sentient beings make use of the myriad dharmas? Since they make use of them, there is the substance of the myriad dharmas; because there is the substance of the myriad dharmas, there are the names of the myriad dharmas." Using the substance to substantiate the name is termed a hindrance. How is it cured? As the sūtra below says: "All conditioned dharmas are like dreams, phantoms, bubbles, shadows." The internal mind and external objects are entirely non-existent; how could one say there is a substance of dharmas and use substance to substantiate names? Question: These ten hindrances are cured by prajñā; should we now use this explanation, or should we not use it? Answer: If one insists that there is delusion as the hindrance and understanding as that which can extinguish it, this is still the perspective of arising and perishing, which is itself a hindrance and must be refuted. If one says prajñā is the refuter and the hindrance is the refuted, is it refuted because of seeing it? Refuted because of not seeing it? Refuted because it is alone? Refuted because it has a companion? When examined in this way, one does not see delusion as something that can be extinguished, nor understanding as something that can arise; this is neither understanding nor delusion, without arising and without perishing. Only when one awakens to such an affair is it first called prajñā.