仁王般若經疏 1.97

1.97

Question: Since Candraprabha explicitly asked about the causes and conditions for protecting the fruit of Buddhahood, the Buddha should have answered concerning the fruit of Buddhahood; why does he speak of transforming the four modes of birth? Answer: The various masters say this and that, which cannot be detailed fully. We now say: wishing to show that cause and fruit are not two, he clarifies that sentient beings being completely empty is not distinct from the Buddha. Thus the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: "The suchness of sentient beings and the suchness of Maitreya are one suchness without duality." For example, the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: "The Self is precisely the meaning of the tathāgatagarbha." All phenomena such as the four modes of birth distinguished in this sūtra are all suchness, no different from the Buddha. If one knows that the four modes of birth and the Buddha are one and not two, that is precisely protecting the fruit of Buddhahood. How could ordinary people understand a question and answer such as this? Unless one has long planted roots of goodness, encountered many Buddhas, and thoroughly awakened to the emptiness of all phenomena, how could one correspond with this text? As for the four modes of birth: being born from a mother's womb is called womb-born; the mother Viśākhā giving birth to thirty-two eggs is called egg-born; like the courtesan Āmrapālī, it is called moisture-born; and at the beginning of the kalpa, human beings were all apparitionally born. Second, from "does not contemplate rūpa as suchness" onward, he treats the various rubrics individually. To clarify the two emptinesses of persons and phenomena, there are two parts: first, extensively clarifying emptiness; second, from "Therefore, all..." onward, a general conclusion. In the first part clarifying emptiness, there are four clauses: first, clarifying the emptiness of phenomena; second, from "sentient beings" onward, clarifying the emptiness of persons; third, "six pāramitās" clarifies the emptiness of practice; fourth, from "the two truths" onward, clarifies that the object and teaching of the two truths are also quiescent. In the first text, regarding "does not contemplate rūpa as suchness," the various explanations are not one, and cannot be detailed fully. We now explain following the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa: phenomena born from conditions are devoid of intrinsic nature by themselves, and do not rely on intellect's deduction before becoming non-existent. This intends to clarify that conditions and contemplation are both quiescent. Therefore the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā says: "Rūpa is already unfindable, how much more so non-rūpa." If one embodies the meaning of the sūtra, it should fully explain the four clauses; here, for the sake of brevity, it only says "does not contemplate rūpa"; the same applies to vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, and vijñāna. Master Tripiṭaka says: If one were eliminating rūpa to return to suchness, it should say "contemplates rūpa as suchness." But the text says "does not contemplate rūpa as suchness" because if one eliminates rūpa yet preserves suchness, then the contemplating mind is not yet pure. Here, in the complete contemplation, one neither contemplates rūpa nor contemplates suchness, seeing neither emptiness nor existence, neither object nor wisdom. The following clauses are all similar to this. From "sentient beings" onward is the second part clarifying the emptiness of persons, in seven clauses: arising within the five skandhas is called the emptiness of sentient beings. "Self" means clinging to the five skandhas as a self. "Person" is the conventionally designated practitioner. "Permanence, bliss, self, and purity" clarifies that the substance of sentient beings is empty. Sentient beings are inverted; they arbitrarily reckon permanence, bliss, self, and purity within suffering, impermanence, non-self, and non-purity, hence he speaks of saṃsāra being empty. We now say: "sentient beings, self, and person" are named inverted phenomena; the four virtues of permanence, bliss, self, and purity are pure phenomena; if one can embody and know that these two are completely empty, they are therefore said to be suchness. Here he intends to clarify that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are not two. Suchness is another name for buddhadhātu, dharmatā, the correct path, and non-duality. Regarding "knower, seer, and soul": mental consciousness is named knower, eye-consciousness is named seer, and the uninterrupted continuity of rūpa and mind is named soul. Regarding "bodhisattva": the mind of the great Way is named bodhisattva. We now say: the former clarified sentient beings as the transformed; here he distinguishes the bodhisattva as the transformer; both the agent and the object of transformation are pure, hence he says "suchness." Third, clarifying the emptiness of practice, there are three clauses: first, the six pāramitās; second, the four means of embracing; third, generally, all phenomena of practices; clarifying that these various practices of the bodhisattva are all existing because of suchness. Fourth, clarifying that the two truths are suchness: taking emptiness and existence as saṃvṛti-satya, and the emptiness of existence as paramārtha-satya, therefore the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: "The suchness of paramārtha-satya is precisely the suchness of saṃvṛti-satya. The Buddha said: 'So it is, so it is.'" When we reach the later "Chapter on the Two Truths," this will be explained separately.