仁王經疏 1.6

1.6

Second, concerning discerning the signified central theme and the signifier teaching-essence, there are naturally two sections: first, discerning the teaching-essence; later, clarifying the central theme. Now, regarding the presentation of the teaching-essence, the various schools differ. The Sarvāstivāda school, the Abhidharma Kośa, and the Old Vibhāṣā all have two explanations: one explains it as voice, and the other as nāma, pada, and vyañjana; although there are two explanations, there is no distinct judgment between them. The newly translated Kośa, fascicle one, fully presents both explanations and likewise makes no distinct judgment. Fascicle three of the Nyāyānusāra recounts the explanations of the two masters, also matching the Kośa, accompanied by questions and answers. Therefore, the verse in fascicle three of the Nyāyānusāra states: 'The Muni expounded the aggregates of Dharma, / In number there are eighty thousand; / Their essence is speech or names, / Subsumed under these rūpa- and saṃskāra-skandhas.' The treatise says: 'Some say: The Buddha's teaching has speech as its intrinsic nature; they say that the aggregates of Dharma are all subsumed under the rūpa-skandha, because speech takes voice as its intrinsic nature. Some say: The Buddha's teaching has name as its intrinsic nature; they say that the aggregates of Dharma are all subsumed under the saṃskāra-skandha, because name has non-concomitant formations as its nature. Question: Speech and teaching are different names; a teaching may well be speech, while name and teaching have distinct essences. How can teaching be name? They make this explanation: It is precisely because there are names that it is spoken of as teaching. Therefore, the essence of the Buddha's teaching is simply name. Why is this? Because it signifies the meaning as it truly is, it is called the Buddha's teaching. Name is capable of signifying meaning; therefore the teaching is name. For this reason, the Buddha's teaching definitively takes name as its essence; citing name as the foremost, it subsumes pada and vyañjana.' The Samayapradīpikā, fascicle three, also agrees with the Nyāyānusāra. As an explanation: Western masters have transmitted this interpretation, each finding their support in the Kośa and the Nyāyānusāra. Why is this? If it is to cause living beings to produce joy, voice is superior; if relying on the signification of dharmas, name and so forth are stronger. Thus we know that each side relied on has a valid basis, and therefore both explanations are correct meanings. According to the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle one hundred twenty-six, which fully presents both explanations, the correct doctrine of the evaluators takes voice as the essence. Thus that treatise says: 'Question: What is the essence of such a teaching of the Buddha? Is it vākkarman? Or is it name and so forth? Answer: It should be said that vākkarman is the essence. Question: If so, how is what is stated immediately after to be reconciled? As it says: What dharma is called the Buddha's teaching? Answer: It means nāmakāya, padakāya, and vyañjanakāya arranged in sequential ranks, disposed in sequence, established in sequence. Answer: The later passage is meant to reveal the function of the Buddha's teaching, not to disclose the Buddha's teaching's intrinsic essence. Arranging, disposing, and establishing the nāma-, pada-, and vyañjana-kāya in sequence is the function of the Buddha's teaching. Some say: The Buddha's teaching takes name and so forth as its essence. Question: If so, how is what this passage says to be reconciled? As it says: What is the Buddha's teaching? Answer: It means the Buddha's spoken words, chanting, expressions, discussions, vocal tones, vocal pathways, vākkarman, and vocal intimation—this is called the Buddha's teaching? Answer: It is spoken on the basis of a mediate cause. Just as in the world children and grandchildren successively generate lineages, speech gives rise to names, and names are capable of revealing meaning. The evaluators explain: The statement that vākkarman is the essence is because it is what is spoken from the Buddha's intention and heard by others.' It is fully stated as in that text. Question: If it definitively is not the Nyāyānusāra's [view], it relies on the evaluator's position. Answer: The intention of the master of the Nyāyānusāra is that what is superior in reasoning is correct. Therefore, generating an independent reasoning, name and so forth are taken as correct. Another explanation: Saṃghabhadra fully presented the questions and answers of both schools and did not personally decide, and therefore does not contradict the evaluators' correct doctrine. If relying on the Sautrāntika, they take voice as the essence; within that school there are three masters' explanations. One says: It has the sound-base among the twelve bases as its nature, because apart from sound there are no separate names, phrases, or syllables. One says: It takes the continuity designation of sound in the dharma-base as its intrinsic nature, because it is an object-domain solely of the mental consciousness. One says: It universally uses both designated and real sound as the essence, due to the previous two meanings. If relying on the Mahāyāna, the various teachings differ. In some places it is solely voice, as in the Vimalakīrti and so forth: 'The Buddha with one sound expounds the Dharma; sentient beings, according to their kind, each obtain understanding.' Also, the Mahādhātu-sūtra says: 'Within the Tathāgata's single word of preaching the Dharma, he expounds an ocean of immeasurable sūtras.' Such teachings as these provide sincere testimony more than once. In some places they take only name and so forth as the essence, as the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: 'If nāma, pada, and vyañjana were not different from sound, the object-domains of dharma-pratisaṃvid and nirukti-pratisaṃvid would not be distinct.' In some places sound and name and so forth are combined and spoken of as the intrinsic nature, as the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: 'Or by means of voice, spoken words, and written characters, doing the work of a buddha.' In some places the signifier and the signified are combined and spoken of as the essence, as the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle eighty-one, says: 'The essence of a sūtra is broadly of two kinds: first, text; second, meaning. Text is that upon which [meaning] relies, and meaning is that which relies upon it. These two kinds together are called the object-domain of all that is knowable.' The Prakaraṇāryavācā is also the same. As to why the various teachings differ like this, the Tripiṭaka Master explained: 'In reality, nāma-, pada-, and vyañjana-kāya, voice, and text and meaning together are spoken of as the essence. Yet the various sacred teachings each rely on one aspect, and therefore do not contradict one another. Why is this? Subordinating the designated to the real, voice is used as the essence, because apart from voice there are no separate names, phrases, and so forth. Subordinating the essence to the function, names and so forth are the essence, because they are the two supports for signifying the intrinsic nature and distinctions of all dharmas. Relying mutually on the designated and the real, they are combined and spoken of as the essence, because if either one is lacking, the teaching cannot be established. The ultimate arising of understanding necessarily depends on text and meaning; therefore, the various explanations do not contradict one another.' Relying on the text of this sūtra, there are only two gates: first, the gate of dharma categories, which takes the four dharmas of name, phrase, and so forth as the essence. Thus the text below says: 'The names, phonemes, and phrases of this sūtra, up to thousands and tens of thousands of buddhas, preach its names, phonemes, and phrases.' Also the sūtra below says: 'The fruits of voice, which are names, phonemes, and phrases, as well as written characters and demarcated phrases, are all suchness.' Second, the gate of returning to the real, which takes tathatā as the essence. Thus the sūtra below says: 'The root of dharmas is suchness, the verses of reiteration are suchness, up to the discussions being suchness.' If distinguishing this extensively, it is as in the commentary to the first fascicle of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra.