仁王經疏 1

English (machine translation) 1

Language: English

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Composed by Dharma Master Yuance of Ximing Temple

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Sūtra of the Benevolent Kings Who Protect Their States, Spoken by the Buddha: Introductory Chapter, Number One

Intending to explain the sūtra, there are four gates of distinction: first, the intention in speaking the sūtra and an explanation of its title; second, discerning the signified central theme and the signifier teaching-essence; third, revealing that upon which the teaching relies and the sentient beings for whose sake it is given; fourth, the period of translation and the direct explanation according to the text.

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As for stating the intention in speaking the sūtra and its title: on careful examination, the true mark is profound and wondrous, and without the four wisdoms there is no means to realize its source; its contemplation is deep and subtle, and only by relying on the tripiṭaka can its path be opened. Therefore the Dharma King, the Great Sage, marked the central theme with the three prajñās, and […] the great beings expounded the depths through the four siddhāntas; the import of signlessness is truly found herein! However, […] many methods, and entry into the principle is not singular; for the sake of accomplishing the two protections, this sūtra was spoken. The three divisions of preface and so forth briefly state the protocol of various sūtras or the meaning of the eight chapters, extensively revealing the central theme of this sūtra. As for the title stating 'Sūtra of the Benevolent Kings Who Protect Their States, Spoken by the Buddha', this is the general name of the entire work. 'Introductory Chapter, Number One' is the specific designation within the chapters. Although the overall title is one, its meanings are four: its principle must revert to the real, and its intention lies in protecting the state. First, 'Spoken by the Buddha': the requested Dharma King, having perfected enlightenment for himself and others, discloses the wondrous Dharma; hence it is called 'Spoken by the Buddha'. Second, 'Benevolent Kings': the kings of states who are capable of requesting. 'Benevolent' means enduring, tolerantly enduring good and evil. 'King' means going toward, that to which the multitude goes; hence they are named 'benevolent kings'. Third, 'Who Protect Their States': that for the sake of which the discourse is requested. Fourth, 'Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra': discerning the Dharma that is capable of protecting. Prajñā is named wisdom, and pāramitā means reaching the other shore; that is, by the power of wisdom reaching the shore of nirvāṇa. Sūtra is sūtra; here it is translated as 'matching thread' (qijing). 'Matching' means fitting together: it tallies with the principle and matches the capacities of sentient beings. 'Sūtra' also has two meanings: first, stringing together; second, holding together. It strings together dharmalakṣaṇas and holds together sentient beings; hence it is called 'sūtra'. In terms of those who request and that which is requested, and that which protects and that which is protected, it designates the causes of the sūtra. 'Introduction' means the preface, the occasion that gives rise to the principal exposition. 'Chapter' means a class or category, or a category of meaning. Such meanings as 'Thus have I heard' follow one another in category, each subsuming distinct meanings; hence it is called a chapter. Among the eight chapters, this chapter is the very first and is called number one; therefore it is said:

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"Sūtra of the Benevolent Kings Who Protect Their States, Spoken by the Buddha: Introductory Chapter, Number One."

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Second, concerning discerning the signified central theme and the signifier teaching-essence, there are naturally two sections: first, discerning the teaching-essence; later, clarifying the central theme. Now, regarding the presentation of the teaching-essence, the various schools differ. The Sarvāstivāda school, the Abhidharma Kośa, and the Old Vibhāṣā all have two explanations: one explains it as voice, and the other as nāma, pada, and vyañjana; although there are two explanations, there is no distinct judgment between them. The newly translated Kośa, fascicle one, fully presents both explanations and likewise makes no distinct judgment. Fascicle three of the Nyāyānusāra recounts the explanations of the two masters, also matching the Kośa, accompanied by questions and answers. Therefore, the verse in fascicle three of the Nyāyānusāra states: 'The Muni expounded the aggregates of Dharma, / In number there are eighty thousand; / Their essence is speech or names, / Subsumed under these rūpa- and saṃskāra-skandhas.' The treatise says: 'Some say: The Buddha's teaching has speech as its intrinsic nature; they say that the aggregates of Dharma are all subsumed under the rūpa-skandha, because speech takes voice as its intrinsic nature. Some say: The Buddha's teaching has name as its intrinsic nature; they say that the aggregates of Dharma are all subsumed under the saṃskāra-skandha, because name has non-concomitant formations as its nature. Question: Speech and teaching are different names; a teaching may well be speech, while name and teaching have distinct essences. How can teaching be name? They make this explanation: It is precisely because there are names that it is spoken of as teaching. Therefore, the essence of the Buddha's teaching is simply name. Why is this? Because it signifies the meaning as it truly is, it is called the Buddha's teaching. Name is capable of signifying meaning; therefore the teaching is name. For this reason, the Buddha's teaching definitively takes name as its essence; citing name as the foremost, it subsumes pada and vyañjana.' The Samayapradīpikā, fascicle three, also agrees with the Nyāyānusāra. As an explanation: Western masters have transmitted this interpretation, each finding their support in the Kośa and the Nyāyānusāra. Why is this? If it is to cause living beings to produce joy, voice is superior; if relying on the signification of dharmas, name and so forth are stronger. Thus we know that each side relied on has a valid basis, and therefore both explanations are correct meanings. According to the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle one hundred twenty-six, which fully presents both explanations, the correct doctrine of the evaluators takes voice as the essence. Thus that treatise says: 'Question: What is the essence of such a teaching of the Buddha? Is it vākkarman? Or is it name and so forth? Answer: It should be said that vākkarman is the essence. Question: If so, how is what is stated immediately after to be reconciled? As it says: What dharma is called the Buddha's teaching? Answer: It means nāmakāya, padakāya, and vyañjanakāya arranged in sequential ranks, disposed in sequence, established in sequence. Answer: The later passage is meant to reveal the function of the Buddha's teaching, not to disclose the Buddha's teaching's intrinsic essence. Arranging, disposing, and establishing the nāma-, pada-, and vyañjana-kāya in sequence is the function of the Buddha's teaching. Some say: The Buddha's teaching takes name and so forth as its essence. Question: If so, how is what this passage says to be reconciled? As it says: What is the Buddha's teaching? Answer: It means the Buddha's spoken words, chanting, expressions, discussions, vocal tones, vocal pathways, vākkarman, and vocal intimation—this is called the Buddha's teaching? Answer: It is spoken on the basis of a mediate cause. Just as in the world children and grandchildren successively generate lineages, speech gives rise to names, and names are capable of revealing meaning. The evaluators explain: The statement that vākkarman is the essence is because it is what is spoken from the Buddha's intention and heard by others.' It is fully stated as in that text. Question: If it definitively is not the Nyāyānusāra's [view], it relies on the evaluator's position. Answer: The intention of the master of the Nyāyānusāra is that what is superior in reasoning is correct. Therefore, generating an independent reasoning, name and so forth are taken as correct. Another explanation: Saṃghabhadra fully presented the questions and answers of both schools and did not personally decide, and therefore does not contradict the evaluators' correct doctrine. If relying on the Sautrāntika, they take voice as the essence; within that school there are three masters' explanations. One says: It has the sound-base among the twelve bases as its nature, because apart from sound there are no separate names, phrases, or syllables. One says: It takes the continuity designation of sound in the dharma-base as its intrinsic nature, because it is an object-domain solely of the mental consciousness. One says: It universally uses both designated and real sound as the essence, due to the previous two meanings. If relying on the Mahāyāna, the various teachings differ. In some places it is solely voice, as in the Vimalakīrti and so forth: 'The Buddha with one sound expounds the Dharma; sentient beings, according to their kind, each obtain understanding.' Also, the Mahādhātu-sūtra says: 'Within the Tathāgata's single word of preaching the Dharma, he expounds an ocean of immeasurable sūtras.' Such teachings as these provide sincere testimony more than once. In some places they take only name and so forth as the essence, as the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: 'If nāma, pada, and vyañjana were not different from sound, the object-domains of dharma-pratisaṃvid and nirukti-pratisaṃvid would not be distinct.' In some places sound and name and so forth are combined and spoken of as the intrinsic nature, as the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: 'Or by means of voice, spoken words, and written characters, doing the work of a buddha.' In some places the signifier and the signified are combined and spoken of as the essence, as the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle eighty-one, says: 'The essence of a sūtra is broadly of two kinds: first, text; second, meaning. Text is that upon which [meaning] relies, and meaning is that which relies upon it. These two kinds together are called the object-domain of all that is knowable.' The Prakaraṇāryavācā is also the same. As to why the various teachings differ like this, the Tripiṭaka Master explained: 'In reality, nāma-, pada-, and vyañjana-kāya, voice, and text and meaning together are spoken of as the essence. Yet the various sacred teachings each rely on one aspect, and therefore do not contradict one another. Why is this? Subordinating the designated to the real, voice is used as the essence, because apart from voice there are no separate names, phrases, and so forth. Subordinating the essence to the function, names and so forth are the essence, because they are the two supports for signifying the intrinsic nature and distinctions of all dharmas. Relying mutually on the designated and the real, they are combined and spoken of as the essence, because if either one is lacking, the teaching cannot be established. The ultimate arising of understanding necessarily depends on text and meaning; therefore, the various explanations do not contradict one another.' Relying on the text of this sūtra, there are only two gates: first, the gate of dharma categories, which takes the four dharmas of name, phrase, and so forth as the essence. Thus the text below says: 'The names, phonemes, and phrases of this sūtra, up to thousands and tens of thousands of buddhas, preach its names, phonemes, and phrases.' Also the sūtra below says: 'The fruits of voice, which are names, phonemes, and phrases, as well as written characters and demarcated phrases, are all suchness.' Second, the gate of returning to the real, which takes tathatā as the essence. Thus the sūtra below says: 'The root of dharmas is suchness, the verses of reiteration are suchness, up to the discussions being suchness.' If distinguishing this extensively, it is as in the commentary to the first fascicle of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra.

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Concerning the signified central theme, various explanations differ, but three interpretations are briefly presented. One says: This sūtra takes the three kinds of prajñā as its central theme: that is, the principle of emptiness contemplated is the true mark, the wisdom capable of realizing it is the contemplation, and the capable signifier sacred teaching is the written words. Therefore, in the 'Chapter on Contemplating Emptiness', the three prajñās are spoken. One says: The central theme of this sūtra clarifies the two truths. Why is this? In the 'Chapter on Contemplating Emptiness', practice for one's own benefit is clarified; in the 'Chapter on Teaching and Transforming', practice for the benefit of others is clarified. A bodhisattva's gates of contemplation do not go beyond these two practices; these two practices do not go beyond the two truths. By virtue of ultimate truth, there is neither that which protects nor that which is protected; by virtue of conventional truth, there are the two protections of that which protects and that which is protected, and the practices for oneself and others are accomplished. As for the two truths: first, ultimate truth, which is its principle of emptiness; second, conventional truth, which is the gate of existence. They will be extensively distinguished in the 'Chapter on the Two Truths'. One says: The World-Honoured One himself judged this sūtra as having signlessness as its central theme among the three wheels of Dharma; thus the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra speaks in this way: 'First, for those setting out on the śrāvaka vehicle, he turned the wheel of the four truths (such as the four Āgamas); next, for those setting out on the bodhisattva vehicle, he turned the wheel of signlessness (the various Prajñāpāramitās and so forth); finally, for those setting out on all vehicles, he turned the teaching of definitive meaning.' It is fully as stated therein.

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Question: In this wheel of signlessness, which among the three natures is negated, and which among the three lack of natures is it based upon? As an explanation: Western masters are divided into two interpretations. First, Bhāviveka: he negates the three natures to establish emptiness, directly stating that the principle of emptiness is signlessness, fully as in the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā / Tarkajvālā (Zhangzhen). Second, Dharmapāla: he negates only the imagined nature as signlessness, as in the Saṃdhinirmocana and so forth. Among the three lacks of nature, both Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla rely on the three kinds of lack of self-nature and also consider them to be signlessness. Because of this, Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha and Tripiṭaka Master Cien each relied on one school. Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha, according to their order, completely negates the three natures and establishes the three lacks of nature: first, negating the conceptualized nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), he establishes the signless nature of conceptualization; second, negating the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva), he establishes the unproduced nature of dependence; third, negating the consummate nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva), he establishes the natureless nature of the real. Negating the three natures in regard to the one tathatā, he establishes the three lacks of nature, fully as in the Sanwuxing lun. Therefore, Paramārtha is largely the same as Bhāviveka; however, the distinction is that Bodhisattva Bhāviveka establishes without positing, whereas Master Paramārtha's intention resides in the three lacks of nature as non-posited truth. Second, Tripiṭaka Master Cien negates only the imagined nature and does not negate the [other] two natures, because the two meanings—existing conceptually but non-existent in principle, and existing in principle but non-existent conceptually—are distinct. Furthermore, regarding the three lacks of nature, according to their order, the three natures are directly spoken of as the three lacks of nature; thus the Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā says: 'Relying directly on these three natures, those three lacks of nature are established.' It is fully as in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, and so forth. Therefore, the two bodhisattvas Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla each relied on their own school to explain this sūtra.

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Question: How do we know that this sūtra fully teaches the three kinds of lack of intrinsic nature? Answer: As the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra states: "Or as a sūtra says: 'All phenomena lack intrinsic nature, are unarisen and unceasing, fundamentally tranquil, and innately in nirvāṇa.' Relying on what implicit intent did the World-Honoured One himself say that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature? Fully relying on the implicit intent of the three kinds of lack of intrinsic nature, it is said that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature. As for 'unarisen and unceasing', and so forth, it is spoken solely relying on the lack of intrinsic nature of characteristics, or it may also be spoken relying on the lack of intrinsic nature of characteristics and of the ultimate."

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Question: If so, why is the second wheel of signlessness called implicit? Answer: In fact, it fully teaches the three kinds of lack of intrinsic nature, and in principle there is no shallowness or depth; yet through a concealed manner, it says that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature and so on, without distinguishing and matching them to the three lacks of intrinsic nature. The Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra and others extensively illuminate the three kinds of lack of intrinsic nature. Therefore, in the approach of the third Dharma-wheel, the four characters 'lack of intrinsic nature' (niḥsvabhāvatā) are added, the intention being to clarify that there is distinctly the principle of the three lacks of intrinsic nature. It is on this basis that they are called explicit or implicit in meaning; it is not on account of shallowness or depth in principle that they are called explicit or implicit. If we explain this in detail, as in the tenth fascicle of the Guang bai lun (Śataśāstra-vaipulya-ṭīkā), there are the explanations of three masters: First, the followers of the Yogācāra establish the existence of the other-dependent nature; second, the Bodhisattva Bhāviveka asserts the emptiness of the other-dependent nature; third, the Bodhisattva Dharmapāla refutes both attachments. Hence, that treatise states: "First, the followers of the Yogācāra established their tenet by means of reasoning, saying: 'The entity of the phenomena grasped by conceptual construction is non-existent, but the entity of the phenomena produced by causes and conditions is existent. Dependent on this, one experiences karmic fruition and transmigrates in the three realms of existence; or one cultivates preparatory application and realizes the three bodhis,' and so forth at length. To corroborate this meaning, they cited a sūtra verse: 'The imagined is non-existent, / the other-dependent nature exists; / false conceptualization is destroyed / in accordance with the two extremes of superimposition and deprecation.' Second, Bhāviveka interpreted this sūtra, saying: 'Names are the imagined nature, and meanings/objects are the other-dependent nature. Since names are not existent with respect to their meanings/objects, they are non-existent; since meanings/objects are not non-existent according to worldly convention, they exist. One cannot cite this to prove that the other-dependent exists.' Next, the followers of the Yogācāra refuted his interpretation of the sūtra. The text has three sections: first, a general statement that it is unreasoned; next, a specific display of four fallacies; and finally, a concluding refutation showing that it contradicts the sūtra. First, in the general refutation they say: 'This interpretation is not so, because its meaning is contradictory.' Next, as for the four fallacies: (1) If names are non-existent because they are not existent with respect to their meanings/objects, then since meanings/objects are also non-existent with respect to names, how could they exist? (2) Furthermore, the names established for those meanings/objects are already born of causes and conditions; thus, like the meanings/objects, they should exist. (3) If the nature of the signifier falsely grasped is non-existent, how could the nature of the signified falsely grasped be existent? (4) If names have the capacity to designate in accordance with convention, and yet you do not accept them to be of the other-dependent nature, then since meanings/objects are also only conventionally designated as having capacity, why do you not accept them to be of the imagined nature? Finally, concluding with conventional designation, they say: 'The conventional designation of signifier and signified must either both be non-existent together, or both be equally existent. Now, as the sūtra states that one is existent and one is non-existent, what you say does not accord with the meaning of the sūtra.' Next, Bhāviveka, to prove his own meaning, further cited a sūtra, saying: 'By establishing these various names, / they express those various phenomena. / None of them exist in their own nature, / because the true nature of phenomena is entirely like this.' Next, the followers of the Yogācāra refuted this sūtra [citation], saying: 'The intention of the sūtra is not to say that names are non-existent with respect to meanings/objects; it only says that the true nature of the signified phenomena is non-existent, demonstrating that the true nature of all phenomena cannot be expressed. What is expressed by nominal designations is in all cases a universal characteristic; the specific characteristics of all phenomena completely transcend nominal designation. Specific characteristics are not non-existent, whereas universal characteristics are not existent. Here, it briefly states that the nature of the signified is non-existent, but it does not mean that the nature of the signifier is genuinely existent. Therefore, the verse only utters the words "those do not exist"; otherwise, it should have said "these do not exist in their nature".' Next, Bhāviveka, to prove that the other-dependent nature is non-existent, further cited a brief verse spoken in a sūtra: 'Not the least phenomenon is produced, / nor is the least phenomenon destroyed. / Pure vision contemplates all phenomena / as neither existent nor non-existent.' Next, the followers of the Yogācāra again refuted this statement: 'The intention of this verse is to clarify that the intrinsic nature and differences of the imagined nature—both signifier and signified—are fundamentally empty in their entity. Pure vision, which is free of grasping and without production or destruction, contemplates all worldly phenomena produced by causes and conditions as neither non-existent nor existent. Therefore, this does not prove that the other-dependent is non-existent.' Next, the Bodhisattva Bhāviveka cited a sūtra to substantiate that the other-dependent nature is empty, where a sūtra states: 'Phenomena arise from conditions; / conditions and phenomena are both non-existent. / One who is able to know correctly in this way / is said to comprehend conditioned arising. / If a phenomenon is produced from conditions, / this phenomenon has no intrinsic nature at all; / if a phenomenon has no intrinsic nature at all, / this phenomenon is not produced from conditions.' Next, the followers of the Yogācāra reconciled those sūtras, saying: 'Although these two sūtras say that phenomena produced from conditions lack intrinsic nature, they are not contradictory. For phenomena produced from conditions are of two kinds: first, the imagined nature; second, the other-dependent nature. Here, the intention is to clarify that the intrinsic nature of the imagined nature does not exist; it does not speak of the other-dependent. If one were to say that the other-dependent completely lacks intrinsic nature, one would then repudiate both defiled and pure phenomena as non-existent, which is called the wrongly grasped emptiness, harming both oneself and others.' Next, Bhāviveka said: 'Who could ever put a stop to this false conceptualization? When one attains right view, it will naturally be eliminated.' Third, the Bodhisattva Dharmapāla refuted both attachments to emptiness and existence, establishing the Middle Way wherein the other-dependent nature is neither empty nor existent. Thus he further states: 'Classes such as these, following their different views, divide the sacred words and form many factions, mutually raising disputes and each clinging to one extreme. Since they cannot eliminate the dust and defilement of evil views, how could they ever accord with the pure, sublime purport of the Mahāyāna spoken by the Buddhas, the World-Honoured Ones? Failing to comprehend the true principle and following their own clinging sentiments, approving of themselves and deprecating others, they are truly to be feared! One should abandon attachment to the two extremes of emptiness and existence, and awaken to the non-dual Middle Way of the Mahāyāna.'" It is extensively explained like that.

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Question: In Dharmapāla's system, as in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, the other-dependent is not eliminated; why is it said here that the other-dependent is neither empty nor existent? Answer: Dharmapāla's authentic view, as in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, does not eliminate the other-dependent; but now, wishing to bring to completion the intention of Āryadeva's treatise, he establishes the Middle Way, and so there is no contradiction. Another says: Dharmapāla's fundamental tenet establishes the meaning of the Middle Way, whereas the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi recounts the Yogācāra tenet; therefore, there is also no contradiction.

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Third, the clarification of the basis of the teaching and the sentient beings for whose sake [it was spoken]. This also has two sections: first, clarifying the basis of the teaching; second, the sentient beings for whose sake [it was spoken]. As for the basis: although the sacred teachings are numerous, essentially they consist only of the three piṭakas, the two piṭakas, and the twelve divisions of scriptures. As for the three piṭakas: first, sūtra, here called qijing (harmonizing scriptures), the meaning of which is as explained above; second, vinaya, here called tiaofu (discipline/subduing), because it disciplines the seven kinds of wrongdoing of body and speech, or because disciplining the three karmic activities so that they do not commit evil is also called discipline; third, abhidharma, here called duifa (facing phenomena), because the undefiled noble path faces its objects and fruits, it is called duifa; or it is called mātṛkā, here called benmu (matrix/mother), because it discriminates the characteristics of phenomena and can give birth to wisdom, it is called matrix. As for the two piṭakas: as stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, "Because these three piṭakas differ between the lesser vehicle and the greater vehicle, they form two piṭakas: first, the śrāvaka-piṭaka; second, the bodhisattva-piṭaka." As for the twelve divisions: as stated in the Saṃdhinirmocana, "namely sūtra, geya, vyākaraṇa, gāthā, udāna, nidāna, avadāna, jātaka, itivṛttaka, vaipulya, adbhutadharma, and upadeśa." These will be extensively analyzed when we reach the "Chapter on the Two Truths". As for this single scripture: within the three piṭakas, it is subsumed under the sūtra-piṭaka; within the two piṭakas, it is included in the bodhisattva-piṭaka; among the twelve divisions, it is provisionally subsumed under the first division. A detailed explanation is fully set forth in a separate treatise.

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As for those for whose sake [it was spoken], there are two meanings: First, in terms of the three vehicles: as in the three Dharma-wheels of the Saṃdhinirmocana, the first wheel of the four truths was spoken for those setting out in the śrāvaka vehicle; the second teaching of signlessness was spoken for those wishing to set out in the bodhisattva vehicle; and the third wheel was spoken for those setting out in all vehicles. Thus we know that this sūtra was spoken for bodhisattvas. If relying on the five spiritual lineages, this sūtra was spoken for those of the bodhisattva lineage and those of indeterminate lineage. The meaning of the five lineages is fully set forth in a separate treatise.

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Fourth, the translation period and the correct explanation according to the text. There are two sections: first, the translation period; second, the correct explanation according to the text. Regarding the translation period: for this single scripture, in accordance with the text below, there were originally two recensions. The first is the extensive recension; hence the subsequent "Chapter on Scattering Flowers" states: "At that time, the sixteen kings of great states, having heard the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra of a billion verses throughout the ten directions spoken by the Buddha, scattered flowers in offering." Thus we know that this sūtra also had an extensive recension. The second is the abridged recension. Although the Sanskrit text was one, following differences among translators, it became three versions. First, in the first year of the Taishi era of the Jin dynasty, the Tripiṭaka Master Dharmarakṣa of the Yuezhi kingdom—in Jin called Fahu—translated one fascicle, entitled Renwang bore (Benevolent Kings Prajñā). Second, in the third year of the Hongshi era of the Qin dynasty, the Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva—in Qin called Tongshou—translated one recension in the detached lodge of the Xiaoyao Garden at the Ximing Pavilion in Chang'an, entitled Renwang huguo bore boluomi (Benevolent Kings Prajñāpāramitā for the Protection of the State). Third, in the third year of the Chengsheng era of the Liang dynasty, the Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha of the kingdom of Ujjayinī in West India—in Liang called Zhendi—translated one fascicle at Baotian Temple in Yuzhang, entitled Renwang bore jing, with a commentary in six fascicles. Although there are three versions, the Jin version was the earliest and was feared not to be comprehensive, and Paramārtha's single version became obscure and did not circulate; therefore, we now rely provisionally on the version from the Qin period (according to Fei Zhangfang's Sanbao lu, all three translations are said to be in one fascicle; however, Fei Xueqi's Ruzang mulu states that it is in two fascicles).

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Sūtra: Thus have I heard.

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Commentary: From here below is the second [part], the division of the text and correct explanation. Within the one scripture, namely its eight chapters, there are two distinct divisions. First, relying on the original record, it is broadly divided into four: (1) the division on initiating, namely the opening "Introductory Chapter"; (2) the division on the main teaching, namely the following five chapters; (3) the division on the kings attaining state protection, namely the "Chapter on Receiving and Upholding"; (4) the division on dissemination, namely the "Chapter on Entrustment". Now, dividing this sūtra according to the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra, it is broadly divided into three: the first chapter is called the division on the causes and conditions for the arising of the teaching; the following five chapters are called the division on what is taught by the sacred teaching; the final two chapters are called the division on practicing in accordance with the teaching. Clarifying what has been heard and so forth is the cause and condition for the arising of the teaching, and is therefore called the division on the causes and conditions for the arising of the teaching; directly clarifying the Dharma-gates and various classifications taught by the sacred teaching is called the division on what is taught by the sacred teaching; clarifying that the assembly at that time, having heard the Buddha's sacred teaching, rejoiced and practiced it is called the division on practicing in accordance with the teaching. These correspond to the traditional explanation of preface, main discourse, and dissemination. "Preface" refers to the background and prelude, giving rise to the reasons for the main teaching. "Main" is the main doctrine, discerning the fundamental meaning of what is signified. "Dissemination" is propagation, gathering the supreme benefits for later generations.

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Regarding the introductory division, the text has two distinct parts: first, clarifying the preface certifying faith; later, from "At that time the Ten Epithets" onward, discerning the initiating preface. However, these two prefaces have three distinctions: First, distinction in name: one is named certifying faith, also called the general preface; the second is named initiating, also called the specific preface. Stating "I heard" and so forth causes beings to generate faith, hence it is called certifying faith; since all sūtras share this, it is called the general preface. Initiating the main doctrine through emitting light and so forth is called initiating; since it is distinct according to each scripture, it is called the specific preface. Second, distinction in time: one is called the preface before the scripture, because it is initiated prior to the preaching of the scripture; the second is called the preface after the scripture, because it was only composed after the preaching of the scripture. Third, distinction in person: one is called the Tathāgata's preface, because in all sūtras it is initiated by the Buddha; the second is called Ānanda's preface, because it was only spoken following Ānanda's request.

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Regarding the section certifying trust, there are briefly four topics: first, the causal origins of stating the matter; second, the intention in stating the matter; third, discerning the number of matters; and fourth, interpreting each matter individually.

1.19

Regarding the causal origins: as the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, fascicle two, states: "When the Buddha was about to enter nirvāṇa, between the sāla trees in the country of Kuśinagara, he lay with his head to the north, about to enter nirvāṇa. At that time, Ānanda had not yet eradicated his personal affection because he had not yet become free from desire. His mind was submerged in an ocean of grief, and he could not extricate himself. At that time, the Venerable Aniruddha said to Ānanda: 'You are the guardian of the storehouse of the Buddha's Dharma; you should not submerge yourself in an ocean of grief like an ordinary worldling. All conditioned phenomena are impermanent—why do you grieve? Moreover, the Buddha, the World-Honoured One, personally entrusted the Dharma to your hands, yet now you are troubled by sorrow and will lose what you have heard. You ought to ask the Buddha: After the Buddha's nirvāṇa, how should we practice? Who should be our teacher? How should we dwell together with the foul-mouthed Channa (in fascicle four of the *Dīrghāgama*, it asks how to dwell together with the bhikṣu Channa)? What words should be placed at the head of all the Buddha's sūtras?' Ānanda then questioned the Buddha about these matters. The Buddha told Ānanda: 'Practice the four bases of mindfulness. Take the prātimokṣa as your teacher. Deal with the bhikṣu Channa by the Brahmadaṇḍa method (fascicle four of the *Dīrghāgama* and fascicle thirty-six of the *Ekottarikāgama* both state: the Brahmadaṇḍa method means not speaking with him. It is explained in detail there). At the head of all the Buddha's sūtras, speak the words "Thus have I heard", and so on.'" According to the *Faji jing* and the latter part of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, the account is largely the same as the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*; fearing prolixity, I will not detail it. The *Mahākāruṇika-sūtra* states that it was Upāli who instructed Ānanda to ask. The reason the sūtras and treatises differ is that both men instructed him together; each account relies on one aspect, and they do not conflict.

1.20

Regarding the intention in stating the matter, there are briefly two kinds: first, to sever doubts; second, to generate faith. Regarding severing doubts: Paramārtha's notes state: "The *Sūkṣma-vinaya* states: 'When the monk Ānanda ascended the high seat to expound the Dharma storehouse, his body immediately resembled the Buddha, complete with all marks and signs. When he descended from the high seat, he returned to his original form. Seeing this auspicious sign, the assembly consequently had three doubts: first, they doubted that the Great Master Śākyamuni Tathāgata, out of compassion, had risen from nirvāṇa to proclaim the profound Dharma once again; second, they doubted that buddhas from other directions had arrived; third, they doubted that Ānanda had transformed his body and become a buddha. Now, in order to dispel these three kinds of doubts, he also uttered the words "Thus have I heard" and so forth, clarifying that Ānanda personally heard it from the Buddha, and that it was neither a matter of [the Buddha] rising from nirvāṇa out of compassion, nor other buddhas coming from other directions, nor Ānanda transforming his body into a buddha and preaching the sūtra himself.'" Regarding generating faith: the wondrous *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* states: "The time, the place, and the persons are stated because he wished to cause sentient beings to generate faith in their minds."

1.21

Regarding the number of matters, there are three explanations. First, in Paramārtha's *Record of the Seven Matters*, they are divided into seven matters: 1. 'Thus' indicates the Dharma heard: the text and principle of the entire work are definitely worthy of trust; 2. 'I' indicates the person capable of hearing, namely Ānanda; 3. 'heard' means personally receiving the spoken intent; 4. 'at one time' shows that the Dharma heard suitably coincided with the capacity of the time; 5. 'Buddha, World-Honoured One' indicates the master capable of preaching; 6. the dwelling place shows that the preaching had a location; 7. 'great bhikṣus' shows that it was not heard alone. Yet these seven matters collectively have only four purposes: the first, 'thus', clarifies the Dharma heard; next, 'I heard', distinguishes the person capable of hearing; the next two verify the Dharma heard; and the last two verify the person capable of hearing, as explained in detail there. Second, according to Nāgārjuna's *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, they are divided into six matters: 1. faith, 2. hearing, 3. time, 4. host, 5. place, and 6. assembly. Vasubandhu's *Pradīpa-śāstra* likewise speaks of six matters, as its verse says: 'The first three clarify the disciple, / The latter three verify the master's preaching; / For all sūtras, / The Dharma gate is like this.' Third, according to Bandhuprabha's *Buddhabhūmi-vyākhyāna*, they are subsumed under five matters: 1. comprehensively indicating what was already heard, 2. the time when the teaching arose, 3. specifically indicating the lord of the teaching, 4. indicating the place where the teaching arose, and 5. the recipients addressed by the teaching.

1.22

Regarding interpreting each matter individually: although there are differences among the seven, six, and five matters, for now we follow the five matters to interpret this sūtra. The similarities and differences among them will be examined in comparison when we come to the text.

1.23

Regarding 'Thus have I heard': this is the first, comprehensively indicating what was already heard. There are three senses in interpreting it: first, comprehensively interpreting 'Thus have I heard'; second, specifically interpreting 'Thus have I heard'; third, setting forth the purpose of stating them together. Regarding the comprehensive interpretation: it means that those who transmitted the Buddha's teaching, such as Mañjuśrī and Ānanda, all made this statement: 'The profound phrases and meanings thus spoken, I formerly heard.'

1.24

Regarding the specific interpretation: first we interpret 'thus', and afterward explain 'I heard'. Regarding 'thus': although the masters of this land have many interpretations, we shall for now state the accounts of the Western tripiṭaka masters and treatises. The Western tripiṭaka masters briefly offer three explanations. First, Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha says: 'Thus' has the meaning of certitude. There are two kinds: first, the text; second, the principle. The text is the signifier, and the principle is the signified. What Ānanda transmitted is certain in both text and principle, exactly as the Buddha spoke; therefore it is called 'thus'. Second, the Long-Eared Tripiṭaka Master interprets it with three meanings: first, explained in terms of the Buddha, the preaching of the buddhas of the three periods of time is without difference, hence it is called 'like' (*ru*); because their preaching is identical, it is called 'right' (*shi*). Second, understood in terms of phenomena, the true mark of all phenomena is called 'like'; preaching in accordance with suchness is called 'right'. Third, distinguished in terms of the Saṃgha, what Ānanda transmitted does not differ from the Buddha's words, hence it is called 'like'; being forever free from error is called 'right'. Third, Bodhiruci briefly provides four meanings: 1. 'thus' in resolving the mind, meaning one thinks to oneself: 'I shall thus resolve my mind upon bodhi and cultivate all good practices'; 2. 'thus' in teaching others, telling the person before one: 'You should thus resolve your mind upon bodhi and cultivate all good practices'; 3. 'thus' as an analogy: this person's awe-inspiring virtue blazes like the light of the sun, his wisdom is deep and vast like the great ocean, his countenance is upright and handsome like the full moon; 4. 'thus' as certitude: 'I have thus seen and heard', etc. Now in saying 'thus', we only take the fourth, 'thus as certitude'. The transmitter of the Dharma says: 'The principle and teaching spoken that I heard from the Buddha—what I speak is neither too much nor too little, neither wrong nor mistaken, definitely thus.' To be free from the fault of mistaken transmission, it is therefore said to be 'thus'. According to various treatises, there are also three interpretations: First, according to Guṇaprabha's *Prajñā-śāstra*: '"Thus have I heard" shows that this sūtra was preached by the World-Honoured One upon his present awakening, not composed by oneself.' Second, according to Nāgārjuna's *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*: '"Thus" means faith. In the great ocean of the Buddha's Dharma, faith is that which can enter, and wisdom is that which can cross over. One who has faith and complies says: "This matter is thus." One who does not have faith says: "This matter is not thus."' It is explained in detail there. Third, according to Bandhuprabha's *Buddhabhūmi-vyākhyāna*, the word 'thus' is stated first for the sake of four meanings; in general, it functions based on four meanings: 1. based on analogy, meaning the phrases and sentences to be spoken are just as I formerly heard (this uses the present as an analogy for the past); 2. based on instruction, meaning telling the assembly at that time: 'Listen thus to what I formerly heard'; 3. based on question and answer, meaning someone asks: 'Did you definitely hear formerly what you are about to speak?' Hence he replies: 'Thus have I heard'; 4. based on assent, meaning that at the time of the compilation, the assembly of bodhisattvas all requested together: 'Just as you heard, you should speak thus.' The bodhisattva transmitting the Dharma then assented to them, saying: 'Thus shall I speak: thus have I heard.' Furthermore, the word 'thus' means faithful endorsement and certitude, meaning: 'The Dharma thus I formerly heard; this matter is thus, up to this point I shall speak, and it is definitely without difference.' (This interprets based on faithful endorsement: the word 'thus' spoken in the sūtra is the word of faithful endorsement and certitude by Mañjuśrī and Ānanda. It means: 'The sūtra-dharma thus, I formerly heard this matter; thus the meaning clarified in this sūtra, I shall now speak, and it is definitely without difference.') Furthermore, the *Buddhabhūmi-vyākhyāna* presents three masters' interpretations: one says only the fourth; one says it relies only on the latter two of the four; one says it is spoken based on all four meanings collectively. It is detailed as in that treatise.

1.25

Regarding specifically interpreting 'I heard': first we interpret the characteristics of the self, and afterward explain its hearing. As for what is called 'the self': the transmitters of the Dharma, Mañjuśrī, Ānanda, and others, conventionally designate a self upon the basis of the body of the five aggregates; the ear faculty produces consciousness that can hear what is spoken, hence it is called 'hearing'. Therefore the *Buddhabhūmi-vyākhyāna* says: '"I" refers to the worldly conventional designation among the aggregates; "heard" refers to the ear faculty producing consciousness that listens and receives. Setting aside the specific to adopt the general, it is therefore said, "I heard."'

1.26

Question: In the Buddha's Dharma there is no person and no self; why do all sūtras say 'I heard'? Explanation: Various explanations on this point differ. According to Nāgārjuna's school, as stated in fascicle one of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, among the four siddhāntas, based on the worldly siddhānta it is said that there is a self, whereas based on the paramārtha siddhānta it is said that there is no self.

1.27

Question: Does not the *Madhyamaka-śāstra* state that within the approach of the true mark, it is neither self nor non-self? Why does the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* say it is non-self? Answer: They do not conflict. In the worldly siddhānta it is spoken of as self, while in the ultimate truth it is spoken of as non-self, each for individual persons. Alternatively, both attachments to self and non-self are dispelled, so one may also say neither self nor non-self. Hence the *Madhyamaka-śāstra* says: 'The buddhas have spoken of a self, / And have also spoken of non-self; / In the true mark of all phenomena, / There is neither self nor non-self.' If one specifically counters [the view of] self, then non-self is spoken of as the true mark. If one dispels both attachments, then neither self nor non-self is the true mark. Each is based on one aspect, so they do not conflict. According to Maitreya's school, in the sixth fascicle of the *Yogācārabhūmi*: 'Due to four causes, a self is conventionally designated based on the aggregates: 1. for ease of worldly speech; 2. wishing to conform to worldly conventions; 3. to sever the fears of definitive non-self; 4. to proclaim the gains and losses of oneself and others so as to cause them to have a mind of definitive faith and understanding.' The four causes are extensively explained as stated in fascicle thirteen of the *Samuccaya* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya*).

1.28

Regarding the word “heard,” it has in itself two meanings: first, according to the characteristics of phenomena (dharmalakṣaṇa); second, with respect to consciousness-only (vijñaptimātra). Regarding the characteristics of phenomena, the various explanations differ. According to the Sarvāstivāda school, the ear hears, not consciousness. According to the master of the Dharmatrāta treatise, consciousness hears, not the ear; the *Satyasiddhi* is also the same. According to the Dārṣṭāntikas, it is a harmonious combination that can hear, as explained in the thirteenth fascicle of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. Now, according to Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna of the Mahāyāna, there are in themselves two explanations: first, the ear hears, not consciousness; second, a harmonious combination can hear. Although there are two explanations in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, the harmonious combination is correct, because when directly explaining “heard,” it speaks of harmonious combination. According to the school of Maitreya, there are in themselves three explanations: The first says that the ear hears, not consciousness. The *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* says: “What is the characteristic of the ear element? It refers to being able to hear sound.” Furthermore, the *Yogācārabhūmi* says: “Because it constantly reaches this sound, it is able to hear.” The second says that consciousness hears, not the ear. The *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa* says: “Hearing means that the ear faculty activates consciousness to listen and receive.” Furthermore, the *Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā* says: “Hearing means listening and hearing; that is, the ear faculty activates ear consciousness to hear spoken teachings.” Another interpretation: In these two treatises, the ear hears while consciousness does not activate; the ear faculty is the substance of hearing. The third says: In these two treatises, a harmonious combination can hear, because the harmonious combination of faculty and consciousness is the substance of hearing. Therefore, the *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* says: “Question: Does the eye see form? Or does consciousness and so forth? Answer: The eye does not see form, nor does consciousness and so forth, because all dharmas lack an agent of action. Due to the presence of a harmonious combination, it is nominally designated as seeing. The ear and so forth are also like this.” It is extensively explained as in that text. The reason why these treatises differ in this way is to reveal the most supreme basis for hearing sounds. The *Yogācārabhūmi* and others state that the ear is hearing based on the meaning of differentiation. The *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa* and others say that consciousness is hearing to reveal that all dharmas lack an agent of action. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, the *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*, and others state that the harmonious combination is hearing. Each is based on one perspective, so they do not contradict one another. Explaining “hearing” according to the principle of consciousness-only has in itself two explanations. Therefore, the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa* says: “There is an opinion: By the empowering condition of the Tathāgata’s compassion and fundamental vows, images of the phrasing and meaning arise within the consciousness of the hearer. Although these images of phrasing and meaning directly arise based on the power of one’s own wholesome roots, yet in reference to the powerful condition, they are called the Buddha’s preaching. Through the power of the ear faculty, one’s own mind transforms and manifests them, and therefore it is called ‘I have heard.’” “There is an opinion: By the empowering condition of the hearer’s wholesome roots and fundamental vows, images of the phrasing and meaning arise upon the Tathāgata’s consciousness. These images of phrasing and meaning arise from the Buddha’s wholesome roots that benefit others, and are called the Buddha’s preaching. Although the consciousness and mind of the hearer does not grasp them, yet images resembling them clearly manifest, and therefore it is called ‘I have heard.’” Explanation: Regarding what the two masters in the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa* said, the first is Nāgasena—nāga here means “dragon” and sena means “army,” which is the treatise master Longjun (Nāgasena)—who did not accept that the fruit of buddhahood possesses form, sound, and so forth. The position of the second master accepts that within the fruit of buddhahood form, sound, and so forth are fully present; the tradition of Dharmapāla and others all rely on the latter explanation.

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