仁王護國般若波羅蜜多經疏 1.15

1.15

第二明經宗體。曲作兩門：一明經宗、二明經體。初明經宗，復分為二：先明諸教、後明此經。明諸教者，凡諸經宗，隨經以立，所聞既異非唯一轍。如《維摩經》不思議為宗、《法華經》一乘為宗、《楞伽經》如來藏為宗、《涅槃經》佛性為宗，此諸經宗約對待立。若論至理，清淨法界言語道斷，宗何所宗？《楞伽經》中對治心量立宗之失，故經偈云「隨其所立宗，即有眾雜義，等觀自心量，言說不可得。」故知立宗皆是心量，若宗不生，宗還生矣。故淨法界無宗不宗，准此而言更何所道？今依言教無倒希求，為欲了知諸宗旨趣故揚摧矣。外道雖多宗唯我法，非此所要，廣如餘文。今依文判，教有三種。然佛出世初轉法輪說《阿含》等，多明有宗；次說大乘《般若經》等無相之教，多明空宗；後說大乘《解深密》等不空不有非空有宗。由佛世尊於法自在，當根為說有斯異矣。自雙林掩耀，部執競興，初小乘宗鷄薗起諍，四百年內分二十部，本末前後如常分別，於彼時中傳法聖者多知有教。次馬鳴、龍猛諸菩薩等造《智論》等，多知大乘無相空教。後慈氏、無著諸菩薩等造《瑜伽》等，多知大乘不空不有教。以佛滅後同佛在時，先有、次空、後非空有，雖明空有，聖不相違，故大乘法千年間付法相承曾無異說。洎千年後，空有兩宗清辯、護法二大菩薩，各依大乘了義之教，明空明有見解不同。依《西域記》，此二菩薩亦不對敵議其優劣。言空有者，所謂遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性，於三性中遍計體空兩宗共許，圓成實性體離名言，次二諦中下具明也。唯就依他論其空有，具陳此義。文分為二：初依聖教、後依古德。依聖教中，先明空有、後明二諦。明空有者，《瑜伽》、《唯識》皆有誠文，如當寺東院《金剛疏》中以為刊定。今依《廣百論》第十卷中略申梗槩。於中分三：初明師宗、次明立難、後申正義。初師宗者，此復有三：第一瑜伽學徒立依他有、第二清辯菩薩立依他空、第三護法菩薩雙破二執建立中道。為廣《百論》，聖天造本、護法造釋，故為第三評家正義。第二立難，文復分二：一明立宗、二明徵難。明立宗者，初瑜伽師申有宗云：分別所執法體是無，因緣所生法體是有，由斯發起煩惱隨眠，繫縛世間輪迴三有，或修加行證無我空，得三菩提脫生死苦。為證此義，引經頌難云「遍計所執無，依他起性有。妄分別失壞，墮增減二邊。」清辯釋云：名是計執、義是依他，名於其義非有故無、義隨世間非無故有，不可引此證有依他。第二徵難，略引四文。第一瑜伽者難清辯釋，文中有三。初總非云：此釋不然，義相違故。次興四難：一義例名無難。若名於義非有故無，義亦於名是無何有？二名例義有難。又於其義所立名言既因緣生，如義應有。三名義計執難。若妄所執能詮性無，妄執所詮其性豈有？四名義依他難。名隨世俗有詮表能，汝不許為依他起性；義亦隨俗假說有能，何不許為遍計所執？後總結云：世俗假立能詮所詮，無應並無、有應齊有，如何經說一有一無？故汝所言不符經義。應信遍計所執性無，是諸世間妄情立故；依他起性從因緣生、非妄情為，應信是有。第二立難。清辯菩薩為證己義，引經偈云「由立此此名，詮於彼彼法。彼皆性非有，由法性皆然。」瑜伽者難云：經意不說名於義無，但說所詮法性非有，辯諸法性皆不可詮。名言所詮皆是共相，諸法自相皆絕名言，自相非無、共相非有。此中略說所詮性無，非謂能詮其性實有，故頌但說彼非有言，不爾應言此性非有。第三立難。清辯菩薩證依他無，復引經中所說略頌「無有少法生，亦無少法滅，淨見觀諸法，非有亦非無。」瑜伽者難云：此亦不能證依他起其性非有。所以者何？此頌意明遍計所執自性差別，能詮所詮其體皆空無生無滅，離執淨見觀諸世間，因緣所生非無非有，故此非證依他起無。第四立難。清辯菩薩引經證成依他性空。契經偈曰「諸法從緣起，緣法兩皆無，能如是正知，名通達緣起。若法從緣生，此法都無性，此法非緣生。」瑜伽學徒會此經云：如是二經說緣生法雖無自性而不相違，以從緣生。緣生法有二種：一者遍計、二者依他。此中意明遍計所執自性非有，不說依他。若說依他都無自性，便撥染淨二法皆無，名惡取空，自他俱損。清辯菩薩見瑜伽師種種徵難，遂乃責曰：此妄分別誰復能遮，得正見時自當除遣。論文第三申正義者，護法評云：如是等類隨見不同，分隔聖言令成多分，互興諍論各執一邊，既不能除惡見塵垢，詎能契當諸佛世尊所說大乘清淨妙旨？未會真理、隨己執情，自是非他深可怖畏，應捨執著空有兩邊，領悟大乘不二中道。明二諦者，論云「然佛所說無相甚深二諦法門最為難測，今日自勵依了義經略辨指歸息諸諍論。世俗諦者，謂從緣生世出世間色心等法，親證離說展轉可言，親證為先、後方起說。此世俗諦亦有亦空假合所成猶諸幻事，從分別起如夢所為，有相可言名世俗諦。勝義諦者，謂聖所知，分別名言皆所不及，自內所證不由他緣，無相絕言名勝義諦。如是略說二諦法門，正法學從同無所諍。諸有大心發弘誓者，欲窮來際利樂有情，應正斷除妄見塵垢，應妙悟入善逝真空，為滿所求當勤修學。」

Second, clarifying the central doctrine and substance of the sūtra. This is subdivided into two sections: first, clarifying the central doctrine of the sūtra; second, clarifying the substance of the sūtra. Under the first, clarifying the central doctrine of the sūtra, there are again two parts: first, clarifying the various teachings; second, clarifying this sūtra. As for clarifying the various teachings: generally, the central doctrine of each sūtra is established in accordance with that sūtra; since what is heard differs, it is not of a single rut. For instance, the Vimalakīrti Sūtra takes the inconceivable as its doctrine; the Lotus Sūtra takes the One Vehicle as its doctrine; the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra takes the tathāgatagarbha as its doctrine; the Nirvāṇa Sūtra takes the Buddha-nature as its doctrine. These doctrines of the various sūtras are established in terms of relative contrast. If one speaks of the ultimate principle, the pure dharmadhātu cuts off the path of language; so what doctrine could be taken as doctrine? In the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, remedying the fault of mental estimation that establishes doctrines, the sūtra verse therefore says: "According to whatever doctrine one establishes, / there are immediately many conflated meanings. / Viewing equally the estimations of one's own mind, / spoken explanations cannot be grasped." Hence we know that establishing doctrines is entirely mental estimation; if no doctrine arises, then doctrine still arises. Therefore, in the pure dharmadhātu there is neither doctrine nor non-doctrine; in accord with this, what more is there to say? Now, relying on the verbal teachings with unerring aspiration, in order to make known the purport of the various doctrines, they are raised up and assessed. Although non-Buddhist paths are many, their doctrines are only the self and dharmas, which are not needed here, as detailed in other texts. Now, judging by the texts, the teaching is of three kinds: When the Buddha appeared in the world, he first turned the wheel of the Dharma and spoke the Āgamas and so forth, largely clarifying the doctrine of existence; next, he spoke the signless teaching of the Mahāyāna Prajñā Sūtras and so forth, largely clarifying the doctrine of emptiness; later, he spoke the Mahāyāna Sandhinirmocana and so forth, the doctrine of neither empty nor existent, which is not empty and not existent. Because the Buddha, the World-Honoured One, has mastery over the Dharma, he taught according to beings' capacities, and so these differences exist. Since the Twin Trees obscured their radiance, sectarian attachments have vigorously arisen. At first, the Hīnayāna sects initiated disputes at the Kukkuṭārāma, and within four hundred years divided into twenty sects; the root and branches, earlier and later, are distinguished as usual. In that period, the sages who transmitted the Dharma mostly understood the teaching of existence. Next, the bodhisattvas Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, and others composed the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa and so forth, mostly understanding the Mahāyāna signless teaching of emptiness. Later, the bodhisattvas Maitreya, Asaṅga, and others composed the Yogācārabhūmi and so forth, mostly understanding the Mahāyāna teaching of neither empty nor existent. Thus, after the Buddha's passing away, just as when the Buddha was present, first came existence, next emptiness, and later neither-empty-nor-existent; although they clarified emptiness and existence, the sages did not contradict one another. Therefore, in the transmission of the Mahāyāna Dharma over a thousand years, there was never any divergent interpretation. But after a thousand years, the two masters of the schools of emptiness and existence, the two great bodhisattvas Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla, each relying on the Mahāyāna definitive teachings, clarified emptiness and existence with differing views. According to the Record of the Western Regions, these two bodhisattvas did not directly confront one another to debate their merits. When speaking of emptiness and existence, this refers to parikalpita-svabhāva, paratantra-svabhāva, and pariniṣpanna-svabhāva. Among the three natures, that the parikalpita nature is empty in substance is accepted by both schools; the substance of pariniṣpanna-svabhāva transcends designation, as will be fully explained below under the two truths. It is solely with regard to paratantra that emptiness and existence are debated, and this meaning is set forth in full. The text is divided into two: first, relying on the sacred teachings; second, relying on ancient masters. Under relying on the sacred teachings, first emptiness and existence are clarified, and then the two truths are clarified. As for clarifying emptiness and existence, the Yogācārabhūmi and Vijñaptimātratā texts both have explicit passages, as established and settled in the Vajra Commentary of our temple's Eastern Cloister. Now, relying on the tenth fascicle of the Broad Śataka Śāstra, an outline is briefly presented. Within it are three parts: first, clarifying the masters' doctrines; next, raising objections; and finally, stating the correct doctrine. First, regarding the masters' doctrines, these again are three: first, the Yogācāra followers establish that paratantra is existent; second, Bodhisattva Bhāviveka establishes that paratantra is empty; third, Bodhisattva Dharmapāla refutes both attachments and establishes the Middle Way. For the Broad Śataka Śāstra, Āryadeva composed the root text and Dharmapāla composed the commentary; therefore, the third is the correct doctrine of the arbiter. Second, raising objections: the text is again divided into two: 1. clarifying the establishment of doctrines; 2. clarifying the cross-examinations. Clarifying the establishment of doctrines: First, the Yogācāra master presents the doctrine of existence, saying: "The substance of dharmas grasped by conceptual discrimination is non-existent, while the substance of dharmas arisen from causes and conditions is existent. Dependent on this, defilements and latent propensities are activated, binding the world to transmigrate through the three realms of existence; or by cultivating preparatory practice, one realizes the emptiness of selflessness, attains the three bodhis, and is liberated from the suffering of saṃsāra." To substantiate this meaning, he cites a sūtra verse as an argument, which says: "The parikalpita nature is non-existent; / the paratantra nature is existent. / Through false discrimination, things are destroyed, / falling into the two extremes of increase and decrease." Bhāviveka explains: "Names are parikalpita, while meanings are paratantra. Names are non-existent because they do not exist in the meaning; meanings are existent because they are not non-existent according to worldly conventions. One cannot cite this to prove that paratantra exists." Second, the cross-examinations briefly cite four passages. First, the Yogācāra master challenges Bhāviveka's explanation; within this text there are three points: First, a general rejection: "This explanation is not correct, because the meaning is contradictory." Next, he raises four objections: 1. The objection that meaning corresponds to name in being non-existent: If a name is non-existent because it does not exist in the meaning, then the meaning is also non-existent in the name—how could it be existent? 2. The objection that name corresponds to meaning in being existent: Furthermore, since the verbal designation established for that meaning arises from causes and conditions, it ought to be existent like the meaning. 3. The objection regarding the conceptual grasping of name and meaning: If the nature of the signifier falsely grasped is non-existent, how could the nature of the signified falsely grasped be existent? 4. The objection regarding paratantra of name and meaning: A name has the capacity to signify in accord with worldly convention, yet you do not accept it as paratantra-svabhāva; meaning is also conventionally said to have a capacity in accord with worldly convention, so why do you not accept it as parikalpita-svabhāva? Finally, the general conclusion: "The signifier and the signified conventionally established according to worldly truth ought both to be non-existent or both to be existent; how could the sūtra state that one is existent and one is non-existent? Therefore, what you say does not accord with the meaning of the sūtra. One should believe that parikalpita-svabhāva is non-existent, because it is established by worldly false sentiment; paratantra-svabhāva arises from causes and conditions and is not made by false sentiment, so one should believe it is existent." Second objection: Bodhisattva Bhāviveka, to prove his own position, cites a sūtra verse: "Through the establishment of these various names, / those various dharmas are signified. / They are all non-existent in their own nature, / because the dharmatā is entirely thus." The Yogācāra master objects: "The intention of the sūtra is not to say that the name is non-existent in the meaning; it only says that the dharmatā of the signified is non-existent, explaining that all dharmatā cannot be signified. What is signified by words and speech is always the common characteristic, whereas the specific characteristics of all dharmas entirely cut off words and speech; specific characteristics are not non-existent, and common characteristics are not existent. Here it is briefly stated that the nature of the signified is non-existent, but this does not mean that the nature of the signifier is truly existent. Therefore, the verse only says 'they are non-existent'; otherwise, it should have said 'this nature is non-existent.'" Third objection: Bodhisattva Bhāviveka, to prove that paratantra is non-existent, further cites a summary verse spoken in a sūtra: "There is no dharma whatsoever that arises, / nor is there any dharma that ceases. / Viewing all dharmas with pure vision, / they are neither existent nor non-existent." The Yogācāra master objects: "This also cannot prove that paratantra-svabhāva is non-existent in its nature. Why is that? The intention of this verse is to clarify that the intrinsic nature and particularities of the parikalpita nature, both signifier and signified, are in their substance empty, without arising and without ceasing. When, through pure vision free from attachment, one views the various worldly things, that which arises from causes and conditions is neither non-existent nor existent. Therefore, this does not prove that paratantra is non-existent." Fourth objection: Bodhisattva Bhāviveka cites a sūtra to substantiate that paratantra is empty in nature. The sūtra verse says: "All dharmas arise from conditions; / conditions and dharmas are both non-existent. / One who is able to know this correctly / is said to comprehend dependent origination. / If a dharma arises from conditions, / this dharma has no nature whatsoever; / this dharma does not arise from conditions." The Yogācāra followers harmonize this sūtra, saying: "These two sūtras say that dharmas arisen from conditions are without intrinsic nature, yet they do not contradict each other, because they arise from conditions. There are two kinds of dharmas arisen from conditions: first, parikalpita; second, paratantra. The intention here is to clarify that the intrinsic nature of parikalpita is non-existent; it does not speak of paratantra. If one were to say that paratantra is entirely devoid of intrinsic nature, one would then repudiate both defiled and pure dharmas as non-existent; this is called the ruinous grasping of emptiness, which harms both oneself and others." Bodhisattva Bhāviveka, seeing the various cross-examinations by the Yogācāra master, then censured him, saying: "Who can ward off such false discriminations? When one attains right view, they will naturally be eliminated." Third, regarding the statement of the correct doctrine in the treatise, Dharmapāla evaluates: "Such positions, varying according to differing views, divide the sacred words into multiple factions, mutually raising disputes and each clinging to one extreme. Since they cannot eliminate the defilement of bad views, how could they tally with the pure, sublime purport of the Mahāyāna spoken by the buddhas, the World-Honoured Ones? Not yet having converged with the true principle and following their own attached sentiments, affirming themselves and repudiating others, they are deeply to be dreaded. One should abandon attachment to the two extremes of emptiness and existence, and awaken to the non-dual Middle Way of the Mahāyāna." Clarifying the two truths: The treatise says: "However, the signless, profound Dharma gate of the two truths spoken by the Buddha is most difficult to fathom. Today, encouraging myself, I shall briefly distinguish the main direction based on the definitive sūtras to put an end to all disputes. Saṃvṛti-satya refers to the worldly and transmundane dharmas such as form and mind that arise from conditions; directly realized apart from explanation, they can be indirectly expressed; direct realization comes first, and only afterward does explanation arise. This saṃvṛti-satya is both existent and empty, formed through provisional aggregation like various illusory events, arising from discrimination like the creations of a dream; having signs that can be spoken of, it is called saṃvṛti-satya. Paramārtha-satya refers to that which is known by the noble ones, beyond the reach of both conceptual discrimination and verbal designations; directly realized within oneself without depending on other conditions, signless and cutting off words, it is called paramārtha-satya. When the Dharma gate of the two truths is briefly explained in this way, those who follow the right Dharma are in accord without dispute. All those with great aspiration who generate broad vows, wishing to benefit and bring joy to sentient beings to the end of future time, should correctly cut off the defilements of false views, and should marvelously awaken and enter into the true emptiness of the Sugata. In order to fulfill their quests, they should diligently practice and learn."