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妙法蓮華經玄義 10.24

妙法蓮華經玄義 10.24

Language
Classical Chinese

10.24

二、難十二年後名無相教,明空蕩相,未明佛性常住,猶是無常。八十年佛,亦不會三歸一,亦無彈訶褒貶者,此不可解。若言無相,何意不蕩無常?猶有無常,何謂無相?若言不明佛性法身常住者,共般若可非佛性法身常等;不共般若,云何非佛性耶?《大經》云:「佛性有五種名,亦名首楞嚴,亦名般若。」般若乃是佛性之異名,何得言非?彼即救言:經稱佛性,亦名般若者,是三德之般若,何關無相之般若。若爾者,《涅槃》第八何意云:「如我先於摩訶般若中說,我與無我,其性不二。」不二之性,即是實性,實性之性,即是佛性。如此遙指,明文灼然,何意言非?又《涅槃》佛性,秖是法性常住,不可變易。《般若》明實相實際,不來不去,即是佛無生法,無生法即是佛。二義何異?故知法性實相,即是正因佛性;般若觀照,即是了因佛性;五度功德資發般若,即是緣因佛性。此三般若,與涅槃三佛性,復何異耶?《金剛般若論》云:「福不趣菩提,二能趣菩提。」於餘名生因,於實名了因。實相了因能趣菩提,豈非佛性?但名異義同,如前分別,何得聞釋提婆那民,謂非帝釋?其謬類此。若言無常,八十年佛說,非佛性常住者,《涅槃》亦云:「八十年佛背痛有疾,於娑羅入滅。」那忽譚常辨性(云云)?《釋論》云:「佛有生身、法身」,生身同人法,有寒熱病患,馬麥乞乳;法性身佛,光明無邊,色像無邊。尊特之身,猶如虛空,為法性身菩薩說法,聽法之眾尚非生死身,何況佛耶。《釋論》云:「又生身佛壽則有量,法身佛壽則無量」,豈可以無常八十年加於法身耶?小乘中云:法身尚其不滅,如均提沙彌憂惱。佛問:汝和尚戒身滅不?答言:不。乃至解脫知見滅不?答言:不。何況般若法身而言無常!若言般若無會三者,何故〈問住品〉云:「諸天子今未發三菩提心者,應當發。若入聲聞正位,是人不能發三菩提心,何以故?與生死作障隔故。是人若發三菩提心者,我亦隨喜。所以者何?上人應求上法,我終不斷其功德。」若聲聞不求上法,何所隨喜?既隨喜上法,即是會三。若言般若無彈訶者,《大品》云:「二乘智慧猶如螢火,菩薩一日學智慧,如日照四天下。」又十三卷云:「譬如狗,不從大家求食,反從作務者索。當來世,善男女人棄深般若,而攀枝葉,取聲聞辟支佛所應行經。」又云:「見像觀跡,皆名不黠。」豈有彈訶更劇於此,謂無褒貶耶?若言般若是第二時教,引諸天子白佛云:「見第二法輪轉」者,何經不見第二,而獨言般若?《淨名》云:「始坐道樹力降魔,得甘露滅覺道成。乃至說法不有亦不無。」兩說相對,亦應是第二法輪轉。《法華》亦云:「昔於波羅柰轉四諦法輪,今復更轉最上之法輪。」《涅槃》又云:「昔於波羅柰初轉法輪,八萬天人得須陀洹果,今於此間拘尸那城轉法輪時,八十萬億人得不退轉。」經經皆有此旨,亦應併是第二,何獨《般若》耶?若言十二年後明無相者,何得二夜常說般若?故知無相之過亦甚眾多(云云)。

Second, refuting the markless teaching after the twelfth year: [They hold that] it clarifies emptiness and sweeps away characteristics, but does not yet clarify that the buddha-nature is permanently abiding, so it is still impermanent; the eighty-year-old Buddha neither unites the three into the one nor offers rebukes or praises—this is incomprehensible. If one calls it markless, why would it not sweep away impermanence? If there is still impermanence, how can it be called markless? If one says that it does not clarify the permanent abiding of the buddha-nature and the dharma-kāya: shared prajñā might not be the permanence of the buddha-nature and dharma-kāya, but how could unshared prajñā not be the buddha-nature? The *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* says: 'The buddha-nature has five kinds of names; it is also called Śūraṅgama, and it is also called prajñā.' Since prajñā is another name for the buddha-nature, how can one say it is not? They might then defend themselves by saying: 'The sūtra's stating that the buddha-nature is also called prajñā refers to the prajñā of the three virtues; what does it have to do with markless prajñā?' If that were so, why does the eighth fascicle of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* say: 'As I previously explained in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā*, self and non-self are non-dual in their nature'? The non-dual nature is precisely the real nature, and the nature of the real nature is precisely the buddha-nature. With such a reference made from afar, the clear text being brilliant, why say it is not? Furthermore, the buddha-nature in the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* is simply the permanently abiding dharma-nature, which cannot be altered. The *Prajñāpāramitā* clarifies the real mark and the limit of reality, neither coming nor going, which is precisely the Buddha's unproduced Dharma, and the unproduced Dharma is precisely the Buddha. How do the two meanings differ? Therefore we know that the real mark of the dharma-nature is precisely the buddha-nature as the direct cause; prajñā contemplation is precisely the buddha-nature as the disclosing cause; and the merits of the five perfections supporting and giving rise to prajñā are precisely the buddha-nature as the conditioning cause. How do these three prajñās differ from the three buddha-natures of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*? The *Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: 'Merit does not lead to bodhi; two [causes] can lead to bodhi.' With respect to the others, it is called the producing cause; with respect to the real, it is called the disclosing cause. If the real mark as disclosing cause can lead to bodhi, how is it not the buddha-nature? They are merely different names with identical meaning, as distinguished above. How could one, hearing Śakra Devānām [Indra], claim that he is not Lord Śakra? The error is of this kind. If one says that it is impermanent, spoken by the eighty-year-old Buddha, and is not the permanent abiding of the buddha-nature: the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* also says: 'The eighty-year-old Buddha had back pain and illness, and entered extinction at the śāla trees.' Why then would it discuss permanence and discern nature (and so forth)? The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: 'The Buddha has a physical body and a dharma-kāya.' The physical body conforms to human conditions, having cold, heat, illnesses, horse barley, and begging for milk; the dharma-nature body Buddha has boundless radiance and boundless physical forms. His exalted and distinctive body is like empty space, preaching the Dharma for bodhisattvas of the dharma-nature body; even the assembly listening to the Dharma does not have bodies of saṃsāra, how much less the Buddha! The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: 'Furthermore, the life span of the physical body Buddha is limited, whereas the life span of the dharma-kāya Buddha is immeasurable.' How could one impose the impermanent eighty years upon the dharma-kāya? In the Hīnayāna it is said that the dharma-kāya does not even perish, as when the novice Cunda was grieving, and the Buddha asked: 'Did your preceptor's body of precepts perish?' He replied: 'No.' Up to: 'Did his liberation and knowledge-and-vision perish?' He replied: 'No.' How much less could one say that the prajñā dharma-kāya is impermanent! If one says that prajñā lacks the uniting of the three, why does the chapter 'Inquiring into Abiding' state: 'Those sons of gods who have not yet generated the bodhicitta should generate it. If one has entered the fixed status of a śrāvaka, this person cannot generate the bodhicitta. Why? Because it serves as an obstruction to saṃsāra. If this person should generate the bodhicitta, I also rejoice in it. Why? A superior person should seek the superior Dharma; I never cut off their merit.' If the śrāvaka does not seek the superior Dharma, what is there to rejoice in? Since he rejoices in the superior Dharma, this is precisely uniting the three. If one says that prajñā lacks rebukes, the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* says: 'The wisdom of the two vehicles is like a firefly; the wisdom studied by a bodhisattva in a single day is like the sun illuminating the four continents.' Furthermore, the thirteenth fascicle says: 'For example, a dog does not seek food from the master of the house, but instead begs from the servants. In future ages, good sons and daughters will abandon the profound prajñā and cling to branches and leaves, adopting the scriptures that ought to be practiced by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.' It also says: 'Seeing images and observing traces are both called lack of wisdom.' Could there be any rebuke more severe than this, such that one claims there is no praise or disparagement? If one says that prajñā is the teaching of the second period, citing the sons of gods addressing the Buddha: 'We see the second turning of the wheel of the Dharma'—which sūtra does not see a second, that one speaks only of prajñā? The *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* says: 'First sitting beneath the tree of the Way, by power he subdued Māra; obtaining the nectar-extinction, the enlightenment of the Way was accomplished... Up to: preaching the Dharma as neither existent nor nonexistent.' Setting the two preachings against each other, this too should be a second turning of the wheel of the Dharma. The *Lotus Sūtra* also says: 'Formerly in Vārāṇasī you turned the wheel of the Dharma of the four noble truths, and now you turn once more the unsurpassed wheel of the Dharma.' The *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* also says: 'Formerly in Vārāṇasī when the wheel of the Dharma was first turned, eighty thousand devas and humans attained the fruit of srotāpanna; now when the wheel of the Dharma is turned here in Kuśinagara, eighty trillion people attain non-retrogression.' Every sūtra has this purport; all of them should likewise be the second—why only *Prajñāpāramitā*? If one says that after the twelfth year marklessness was clarified, how could prajñā have been constantly preached during the two nights? Therefore we know that the faults concerning marklessness are also extremely numerous (and so forth).

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