妙法蓮華經玄義 10

English (machine translation) 10

Language: English

Major Section 5: Explaining the characteristics of the teachings. If one propagates other sūtras without clarifying the characteristics of the teachings, it does not harm the meaning; if one propagates the Lotus Sūtra without clarifying the teachings, the text and meaning are deficient. However, the sage's intention is profound and hidden, and the method of the teaching is exceedingly difficult. Former masters either inherited [teachings] from famous craftsmen or conceived them from divine inspiration; though their crisscrossing paths ran in all directions, none knew which was correct. Yet contrary meanings cannot stand together, and conflicting principles cannot both be preserved. If a view has a profound basis and accords with the sūtras, it should be recorded and employed; if it lacks textual basis and principle, it cannot be trusted and accepted. The Great Master of Nanyue had personal realization in his mind, verified it against sūtras and treatises, and faithfully complied with the Buddha's words. The Tiantai master expounded and followed them, briefly clarifying the teachings in five parts: 1. The general intention; 2. Stating differences; 3. Clarifying difficulties; 4. Rejection and adoption; 5. Classifying the teachings.

10.3

Regarding the general meaning: within what is devoid of names and characteristics, the Buddha spoke by adopting provisional names and characteristics, delivering other sūtras that each accommodated particular conditions to confer benefit. Thus, with the Avataṃsaka-sūtra, at the outset he addressed capacities for the perfect and distinctive [teachings], the high mountains being illuminated first; he directly clarified sequential and non-sequential practice, and the merits of the [ten] abodes and [ten] grounds, but did not explain the Tathāgata's intention in preaching the sudden [teaching]. When he preached the four Āgamas—the Ekottarika-āgama clarifies the causes and effects of human and divine realms, the Madhyama-āgama clarifies the profound meaning of true quiescence, the Saṃyukta-āgama clarifies the dhyāna concentrations, and the Dīrgha-āgama refutes non-Buddhists, while all generally teach impermanence, knowing suffering, abandoning its origination, realizing its cessation, and practicing the path—he did not clarify the Tathāgata's intention in adroitly bestowing the small. When various vaipulya [sūtras] reprimand the small and censure the biased, praise the great and extol the perfect, and show compassionate practices and vows where facts and principles are extraordinarily distinctive, they do not clarify the intention behind juxtaposing rebuke and praise. When the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras discuss the shared [aspect], the three types of persons enter together; when they discuss the distinctive [aspect], bodhisattvas advance alone, extensively traversing the aggregates and sense bases to render them utterly pure, empty, and harmoniously interfused, yet they also do not clarify the intention behind the shared and the distinctive. When the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra comes at the end, briefly rebuking the three trainings and roughly indicating the five flavors, it also does not fully explain the finale wherein the Tathāgata established his teachings, tracing them from their beginning to their conclusive summation. All these sūtras accommodate the intentions of others to bring them benefit, without discussing the Buddha's own intention. Where does his intended purport tend?

10.4

The present sūtra is not like that. Anything that pertains to the detailed framework of dharma-gates, the great and small methods of contemplation, the ten powers, the fearlessnesses, and various rules is not discussed here, because these were already explained in previous sūtras. It discusses only the initial origin of the Tathāgata's dispensation of teachings, his giving and withholding in the middle period, his adjusting sudden and gradual to the proper time, the cause and condition of the one great matter, and the final culmination—the overarching framework of the spoken teachings, the fish trap and snare of the great conversion. To those whose past cultivation was pure and substantial, he immediately gave the sudden at the outset, directly explaining the stages, practices, and merits of bodhisattvas without mentioning the small. The text says: 'From the very first they saw my body and heard what I taught; they all immediately had faith in it, accepted it, and entered the Tathāgata's wisdom.' For those who could not bear this, he concealed his immeasurable divine virtues and, with the method of that which the impoverished delight in, expediently approached them, telling them to work diligently. The text says: 'If I were to praise the buddha-yāna, sentient beings would sink in suffering.' For such persons, he had to use this method to lead them gradually into the Buddha's wisdom. Once they had attained the path, they had to be reprimanded; this is just like the vaipulya [sūtras], using the great to shatter the small. The text says: 'Having sternly rebuked them, he showed them the jewel tied to their clothes.' If it was suitable to combine with the shared and wash away [attachments] with the half and full, then like the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, he swept away attachment to characteristics and brought them to the essential path. The text says: 'He led the multitude, wishing to cross the perilous road.' Having crossed this difficulty, he established them as son and father, entrusted them with the family estate, swept away provisional traces, and revealed the real original source.

10.5

One should know that this sūtra discusses only the great outline of the Tathāgata's establishment of the teachings and does not dwell on subtle and minute details. It is like an accountant who first sets down and later removes [counting rods] to determine the grand sum, without preserving measures of bushels and pecks. Therefore the Amitārtha-sūtra says: 'Immeasurable meanings are born from the one dharma.' Thus, based on the one buddha-yāna, he discriminatively preached the three. This is compared to setting down the counting rods. Gathering the immeasurable to enter the one, harmonizing the three to return to the great—this is compared to removing the counting rods, recording only the grand sum. Such intentions all belong to the ground of the dharma-kāya, which is quiescent yet ever illuminating; they did not merely begin at the tree of awakening to adapt to the great and small. The Buddha's wisdom has long illuminated spiritual capacities! The text says: 'It is solely for the cause and condition of the one great matter that they appear in the world'—this shows that his illumination of the great has been long indeed. The text says: 'Assiduously praising expedients'—this shows that his illumination of the small has been long indeed. The text says: 'The dharmas of all buddhas, after a long time, must surely speak the real'—this shows that his illumination of harmonizing the small to return to the great has been long indeed! The 'Chapter on Faith and Understanding' says: 'Sitting on the lion throne, seeing his son, he immediately recognized him'—these words show that his initial observation of the great capacity has been long indeed! 'Seeing his son from afar through the window'—this shows that his observation of the small capacity has been long indeed! 'Secretly sending two men to expediently approach him and tell him to work diligently'—this shows that his observation of the necessity to open the three has been long indeed! 'Their minds came to trust each other, and going in and out was without difficulty'—this shows that his observation of disciplining and rebuking has been long indeed! 'Taking charge of the various goods'—this shows that his observation of washing away [attachments] has been long indeed! 'Afterward entrusting him with the family estate'—this shows that his observation of the equality of teaching and practice has been long indeed!

10.6

One should know that the Buddha's intention is profound and far-reaching; Maitreya did not know its cause and condition, so how much less could those of lower stages, the two vehicles, and ordinary beings know it! The text says: 'Only I know these characteristics, and so do the buddhas of the ten directions.' Furthermore, among what has been spoken, is now being spoken, and will be spoken, this is the most difficult to believe and difficult to understand. The previous sūtras were 'already spoken' and conformed to the minds of others; because they did not clarify this intention, they were easy to believe and easy to understand. The Amitārtha-sūtra is 'now being spoken' and also conforms to the minds of others, so it too is easy to believe and easy to understand. The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra is 'to be spoken'; because people had already heard this beforehand, it is also easy to believe and easy to understand. When this teaching was about to be spoken, doubts and requests arose repeatedly, as detailed in the two texts on traces and the original source. When he accepted the request and preached, he merely preached the intention of the teaching. The intention of the teaching is the Buddha's intention; the Buddha's intention is the Buddha's wisdom; the Buddha's wisdom is exceedingly profound, and therefore there were three refusals and four requests. Being so arduous, when compared to other sūtras, the other sūtras are easy.

10.7

When he first sat at the place of awakening, Brahmā made the initial request, straightforwardly requesting the Dharma without a net of doubts. The earnest exchanges in preaching the various vaipulya [sūtras] can be known by observing their texts. When the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra was spoken, it was still in response to Brahmā's request. Only in the Avataṃsaka-sūtra, where Vajragarbha was petitioned, can it be compared. Yet masters have biasedly clung to it, saying that it surpasses the Lotus Sūtra, claiming that because a request was made by the small vehicle here, it is inferior to bodhisattvas; this is seeing only one side. Śāriputra, conveying the minds of the assembly, said: 'Sons born of the Buddha's mouth, with palms joined, gaze up in expectation; the bodhisattvas seeking buddhahood, eighty thousand in grand number, wish to hear the complete path.' How could it be merely the small vehicle alone? Moreover, when Maitreya, representing the whole assembly, sought resolution from Mañjuśrī, how does that differ from Mukticandra and Vajragarbha?

10.8

Furthermore, in the section on the original source, bodhisattvas requested the Buddha to speak the Buddha's dharma; how can this be compared to bodhisattvas requesting a bodhisattva to speak a bodhisattva's dharma? In this respect, it surpasses the other. In the other assembly, those gathered from the ten directions like clouds were all good friends of Vairocana Buddha from past lifetimes. In the assembly gathered like clouds in this sūtra, the bodhisattvas welling up from the earth all aroused their aspiration through Śākyamuni and are those whom I have converted; while generally these are equal, there is nonetheless a difference in closeness and distance. Furthermore, the other sūtra explains that when the buddhas of the ten directions preached the Avataṃsaka-sūtra and imparted empowerments, all were identically named Dharmamati, Vajragarbha, and so forth, without saying that those buddhas were divided bodies of Vairocana. Here, it explains the threefold transformation of the lands, where in each direction there are four hundred myriads of koṭis of nayutas of lands filled with buddhas, all of whom are divided bodies of Śākyamuni; this meaning is distinct from the other.

10.9

Those [masters] regarded the Avataṃsaka-sūtra as superior, so I have brought forward one or two lines, not intending to disparage it; if one were to compare their superiority and inferiority, one might lose the essential purport. It is simply that this Lotus Sūtra opens the provisional and reveals the original source; in both its earlier and later texts, doubts were numerous and requests doubled, unlike other sūtras. It was precisely because it profoundly discusses the Buddha's teaching, marvelously speaks the sage's mind, proximately unites with the perfect cause, and distantly unfolds the original fruit, that doubts and requests did not cease. If one can accurately know the characteristics of the teaching, one will recognize the Tathāgata's two wisdoms of the provisional and the real. The intention of the teaching is exceedingly profound; such is its outline.

10.10

Second, explaining divergent interpretations, which comprises ten views, namely the three of the south and seven of the north.

10.11

The southern and northern regions generally share three kinds of teaching characteristics: first, sudden; second, gradual; third, indeterminate. The Avataṃsaka-sūtra, for converting bodhisattvas, is like the sun illuminating the high mountains, and is called the sudden teaching. The Tripiṭaka, for converting the small vehicle, first teaches the half-letters, and is therefore called the teaching with characteristics. After twelve years, for people of the Mahāyāna, he taught the Prajñā of the five periods up to the eternal abiding, which is called the teaching without characteristics. All these are gradual teachings. There are other sūtras, not subsumed under the sudden or gradual, that clarify the eternal abiding of buddha-nature, such as the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra and Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra; these are called particular indeterminate teachings. These three concepts are generally used by all.

10.12

First, Master Ji of Mount Huqiu explained the sudden and the indeterminate without differing from the previous old [views]. He further divided the gradual into three: before twelve years, clarifying the Tripiṭaka where seeing existence leads to attaining the path, called the teaching with characteristics; after twelve years up through the Lotus Sūtra, clarifying that seeing emptiness leads to attaining the path, called the teaching without characteristics; and finally at the Twin Trees, clarifying the buddha-nature of all sentient beings and that icchantikas become buddhas, clarifying the teaching of eternal abiding.

10.13

Second, Dharma Master Zong'ai: the sudden and the indeterminate are the same as before; regarding the gradual, he further distinguished teachings of four periods, which is what was used by Master Min of Zhuangyan. The three periods do not differ from before, but after [the teaching] without characteristics and before [the teaching of] eternal abiding, he pointed to the Lotus Sūtra as harmonizing the three to return to the one, with all myriad virtues directed toward bodhi, calling it the teaching of identical return.

10.14

Third, the two masters Rou and Ci of Dinglin and Dharma Master Guan of Daochang clarified that the sudden and the indeterminate are the same as before, and further distinguished the gradual into teachings of five periods, which is what was used by Kaishan and Guangzhai. The four periods do not differ from before, but after [the teaching] without characteristics and before [the teaching of] identical return, they pointed to the various vaipulya sūtras such as the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra and Viśeṣacintibrahmaparipṛcchā-sūtra as the teaching of praising and blaming, suppressing and exalting.

10.15

Fourth, masters of the northern region also formulated teachings of five periods, taking [the teaching given to] Trapuṣa and Bhallika as the teaching for humans and gods, combining the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra and Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras into the teaching without characteristics, with the other three not differing from the south.

10.16

Fifth, Bodhiruci clarified the teachings of the half and the full: before twelve years were all the teaching of half-letters, and after twelve years were all the teaching of full letters.

10.17

Sixth, Tripiṭaka Master Buddha[bhadra] and the scholar Guangtong distinguished a classification of teachings into four traditions: first, the tradition of causes and conditions, pointing to the Abhidharma's six causes and four conditions; second, the tradition of provisional designations, pointing to the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra's three provisional designations; third, the tradition of deceptive characteristics, pointing to the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra and the Three Treatises; fourth, the tradition of the permanent, pointing to the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, Avataṃsaka-sūtra, and so on, with the eternally abiding buddha-nature, fundamentally existent and serene.

10.18

Seventh, there was a master who established teachings of five traditions, where the four meanings did not differ from before, and he additionally pointed to the Avataṃsaka-sūtra as the tradition of the dharma realm; this was used by [masters of] Hushen and Zigui Mahāyāna.

10.19

Eighth, someone cited Guangtong as stating: 'Because the four traditions do not cover everything, six traditions are further established.' Pointing to the Lotus Sūtra's myriad virtues identically returning, where the dharmas of all buddhas after a long time must surely speak the real, this was called the true tradition. Pointing to the Mahāsaṃnipāta-sūtra, where defilement and purity are mutually harmonized and the dharma realm is perfect and pervasive, this was called the perfect tradition. The other four traditions are as before; this was used by Master Lin of Qishe.

10.20

Ninth, dhyāna masters of the northern region clarified two kinds of Mahāyāna teachings: first, the Mahāyāna with characteristics; second, the Mahāyāna without characteristics. The one with characteristics refers to sūtras such as the Avataṃsaka-sūtra, Ratnakāraṇḍa-sūtra, and Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, which explain the stages and characteristics of practices and merits of the ten grounds. The one without characteristics refers to sūtras such as the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra and Viśeṣacintibrahmaparipṛcchā-sūtra, where the true dharma is devoid of sequential explanation, and all sentient beings are identical to the characteristic of nirvāṇa.

10.21

Tenth, dhyāna masters of the northern region rejected the four traditions, five traditions, six traditions, two characteristics, and half and full teachings, maintaining that there is only the one buddha-yāna, with neither two nor three; the Buddha preaches the Dharma with a single voice, and according to their kinds, they understand differently. The buddhas constantly practice the one vehicle, yet sentient beings see three; this is simply the teaching of the single voice. The presentation of divergent interpretations is concluded.

10.22

Part three, clarifying the refutations: first, to refute the five periods of the southern region—its doctrine is untenable, and by the same token the remaining systems of four periods and three periods are also undermined. If one asserts that what was before the twelfth year is called the 'teaching of characteristics', the master of the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra* would be contradicting his own treatise. The treatise says: 'I now intend precisely to clarify the real meaning in the Tripiṭaka.' As for the 'real meaning', this refers to emptiness; is this emptiness not marklessness? And is the Tripiṭaka not before the twelfth year? Furthermore, the *Āgama*s state: '"This is old age and death" and "Whose old age and death is it?"—both are wrong views. That there is no "this old age and death" is dharma-emptiness; that there is no "whose old age and death" is sentient-being-emptiness.' The Tripiṭaka scriptures themselves speak of the two emptinesses; how could the two emptinesses not be markless? Moreover, the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* states: 'In the Tripiṭaka, dharma-emptiness is explained as great emptiness.' In the Mahāyāna, the emptiness of the ten directions is explained as great emptiness. Since dharma-emptiness is taken as great emptiness, this is great marklessness. Furthermore, six years after attaining the Way, the *Aṅgulimālīya-sūtra* was preached, which clarifies emptiness most incisively; if this is not markless, what is markless (and so forth)? Moreover, the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: 'From the night of attaining the Way to the night of nirvāṇa, [the Buddha] constantly preached prajñā.' Prajñā is precisely the wisdom of emptiness.

10.23

Furthermore, regarding the teaching of characteristics before the twelfth year: did one attain the Way through it, or did one not attain the Way? If one attained the Way, this contradicts the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra*. The treatise master says: 'The four noble truths with characteristics are an expedient means to tame the mind; in truth one does not attain the Way thereby; one must see the equality of emptiness before one can attain the Way.' If it is already called 'with characteristics', how could one suddenly attain the Way? If one does not attain the Way, what is the use of this teaching? Furthermore, the five men including Kauṇḍinya initially, in the Buddha's Dharma, were silent without sounds or written words, yet obtained true knowledge and vision. As for this word 'initially', was it not attaining the Way before the twelfth year? Moreover, if they attained the Way, the teaching is identical to the markless; if they did not attain the Way, the teaching is identical to heterodox doctrines. Furthermore, if they attained the Way, what kind of Way did they attain? If they attained the Way by seeing emptiness, this returns to being identical to the markless; if they attained the Way without seeing emptiness, it is also identical to the ninety-five kinds [of heterodox paths] and is not attaining the Buddha's Way. The teaching of characteristics possesses both faults (and so forth).

10.24

Second, refuting the markless teaching after the twelfth year: [They hold that] it clarifies emptiness and sweeps away characteristics, but does not yet clarify that the buddha-nature is permanently abiding, so it is still impermanent; the eighty-year-old Buddha neither unites the three into the one nor offers rebukes or praises—this is incomprehensible. If one calls it markless, why would it not sweep away impermanence? If there is still impermanence, how can it be called markless? If one says that it does not clarify the permanent abiding of the buddha-nature and the dharma-kāya: shared prajñā might not be the permanence of the buddha-nature and dharma-kāya, but how could unshared prajñā not be the buddha-nature? The *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* says: 'The buddha-nature has five kinds of names; it is also called Śūraṅgama, and it is also called prajñā.' Since prajñā is another name for the buddha-nature, how can one say it is not? They might then defend themselves by saying: 'The sūtra's stating that the buddha-nature is also called prajñā refers to the prajñā of the three virtues; what does it have to do with markless prajñā?' If that were so, why does the eighth fascicle of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* say: 'As I previously explained in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā*, self and non-self are non-dual in their nature'? The non-dual nature is precisely the real nature, and the nature of the real nature is precisely the buddha-nature. With such a reference made from afar, the clear text being brilliant, why say it is not? Furthermore, the buddha-nature in the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* is simply the permanently abiding dharma-nature, which cannot be altered. The *Prajñāpāramitā* clarifies the real mark and the limit of reality, neither coming nor going, which is precisely the Buddha's unproduced Dharma, and the unproduced Dharma is precisely the Buddha. How do the two meanings differ? Therefore we know that the real mark of the dharma-nature is precisely the buddha-nature as the direct cause; prajñā contemplation is precisely the buddha-nature as the disclosing cause; and the merits of the five perfections supporting and giving rise to prajñā are precisely the buddha-nature as the conditioning cause. How do these three prajñās differ from the three buddha-natures of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*? The *Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: 'Merit does not lead to bodhi; two [causes] can lead to bodhi.' With respect to the others, it is called the producing cause; with respect to the real, it is called the disclosing cause. If the real mark as disclosing cause can lead to bodhi, how is it not the buddha-nature? They are merely different names with identical meaning, as distinguished above. How could one, hearing Śakra Devānām [Indra], claim that he is not Lord Śakra? The error is of this kind. If one says that it is impermanent, spoken by the eighty-year-old Buddha, and is not the permanent abiding of the buddha-nature: the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* also says: 'The eighty-year-old Buddha had back pain and illness, and entered extinction at the śāla trees.' Why then would it discuss permanence and discern nature (and so forth)? The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: 'The Buddha has a physical body and a dharma-kāya.' The physical body conforms to human conditions, having cold, heat, illnesses, horse barley, and begging for milk; the dharma-nature body Buddha has boundless radiance and boundless physical forms. His exalted and distinctive body is like empty space, preaching the Dharma for bodhisattvas of the dharma-nature body; even the assembly listening to the Dharma does not have bodies of saṃsāra, how much less the Buddha! The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: 'Furthermore, the life span of the physical body Buddha is limited, whereas the life span of the dharma-kāya Buddha is immeasurable.' How could one impose the impermanent eighty years upon the dharma-kāya? In the Hīnayāna it is said that the dharma-kāya does not even perish, as when the novice Cunda was grieving, and the Buddha asked: 'Did your preceptor's body of precepts perish?' He replied: 'No.' Up to: 'Did his liberation and knowledge-and-vision perish?' He replied: 'No.' How much less could one say that the prajñā dharma-kāya is impermanent! If one says that prajñā lacks the uniting of the three, why does the chapter 'Inquiring into Abiding' state: 'Those sons of gods who have not yet generated the bodhicitta should generate it. If one has entered the fixed status of a śrāvaka, this person cannot generate the bodhicitta. Why? Because it serves as an obstruction to saṃsāra. If this person should generate the bodhicitta, I also rejoice in it. Why? A superior person should seek the superior Dharma; I never cut off their merit.' If the śrāvaka does not seek the superior Dharma, what is there to rejoice in? Since he rejoices in the superior Dharma, this is precisely uniting the three. If one says that prajñā lacks rebukes, the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* says: 'The wisdom of the two vehicles is like a firefly; the wisdom studied by a bodhisattva in a single day is like the sun illuminating the four continents.' Furthermore, the thirteenth fascicle says: 'For example, a dog does not seek food from the master of the house, but instead begs from the servants. In future ages, good sons and daughters will abandon the profound prajñā and cling to branches and leaves, adopting the scriptures that ought to be practiced by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.' It also says: 'Seeing images and observing traces are both called lack of wisdom.' Could there be any rebuke more severe than this, such that one claims there is no praise or disparagement? If one says that prajñā is the teaching of the second period, citing the sons of gods addressing the Buddha: 'We see the second turning of the wheel of the Dharma'—which sūtra does not see a second, that one speaks only of prajñā? The *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* says: 'First sitting beneath the tree of the Way, by power he subdued Māra; obtaining the nectar-extinction, the enlightenment of the Way was accomplished... Up to: preaching the Dharma as neither existent nor nonexistent.' Setting the two preachings against each other, this too should be a second turning of the wheel of the Dharma. The *Lotus Sūtra* also says: 'Formerly in Vārāṇasī you turned the wheel of the Dharma of the four noble truths, and now you turn once more the unsurpassed wheel of the Dharma.' The *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* also says: 'Formerly in Vārāṇasī when the wheel of the Dharma was first turned, eighty thousand devas and humans attained the fruit of srotāpanna; now when the wheel of the Dharma is turned here in Kuśinagara, eighty trillion people attain non-retrogression.' Every sūtra has this purport; all of them should likewise be the second—why only *Prajñāpāramitā*? If one says that after the twelfth year marklessness was clarified, how could prajñā have been constantly preached during the two nights? Therefore we know that the faults concerning marklessness are also extremely numerous (and so forth).

10.25

Next, refuting the teaching of praise and disparagement as the third period: [They hold that] though it spans seven hundred asaṃkhyeyas, it is still impermanent and does not clarify permanent abiding, but is merely rebuking and praising. Now I ask: when prajñā was preached, the great disciples all transmitted the teaching and preached the Dharma; although they did not aspire to take hold of it, they all fully knew the bodhisattva's dharma-gates—how could they be rebuked? Being utterly bewildered as to what words these were, and not knowing how to reply—therefore we know that praising and disparaging should not come after prajñā, and is not the third period. Furthermore, Maitreya and others were also humbled; why only the śrāvakas? Moreover, if one asserts 'seven hundred asaṃkhyeyas', this too is incorrect. Its text itself says that the Buddha's body is unconditioned and does not fall into numbers; with an adamantine essence, what illness or distress could there be? It is solely to save sentient beings that he manifests these things! The text discerns the adamantine, yet people designate seven hundred; the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* also discerns the adamantine, so how could [only the latter] be permanently abiding? Furthermore, it says: 'Contemplating the real mark of the body, one contemplates the Buddha likewise.' Moreover, inconceivable liberation has three kinds: true nature, real wisdom, and expedient means; these are precisely the meanings of the three buddha-natures. Furthermore, the company of defilements is the lineage of the Tathāgata—is this not the direct cause buddha-nature? Without severing ignorance and craving, giving rise to all forms of clarity and liberation: clarity is the disclosing cause nature, and liberation is the conditioning cause nature. The three meanings are fully present, yet they judge it to be impermanent; how then could the three kinds of buddha-nature in the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* be permanent?

10.26

Next, I challenge the fourth-period teaching of 'common convergence' [i.e., the Lotus Sūtra], [which they claim] merely gathers together the myriad goods into the eka-yāna without clarifying the buddha-nature, and that [its mention of] extending life through supernatural powers—surpassing the sands of the Ganges before and doubling that number after—likewise does not clarify permanence. This cannot be so. The Lotus Sūtra clarifies a single nature and characteristic, born of a single ground, and that the teachings it expounds all reach the ground of omniscient knowledge (sarvajñatā-bhūmi). In opening its discourse, it immediately states, 'to open, show, awaken, and enter the vision and knowledge of the Buddha.' The Avataṃsaka clarifies the Buddha's wisdom, yet it still entails the wisdom of bodhisattvas, where the bodhisattvas' wisdom is like the earth on a fingernail and the Tathāgata's wisdom is like the earth of the ten directions. The Lotus Sūtra purely expounds the Buddha's wisdom like the earth of the ten directions; if it were not permanent, then how could the 'earth on a fingernail' of the Avataṃsaka clarify eternal permanence? Furthermore, the Avataṃsaka has him newly sitting at the bodhimaṇḍa and newly attaining true awakening, which places his attainment of buddhahood too close [in time]. The Lotus Sūtra clarifies that his attainment of buddhahood was long ago, and that the intervening events as well as today are merely traces. If what was expounded in the traces is said to be permanent, how could the teaching of the original source not clarify permanence? Moreover, the Anantanirdeśa-sūtra says: 'Though I expounded the ocean-like emptiness of the Avataṃsaka and practice through kalpas, I had not yet proclaimed such a profound Anantanirdeśa-sūtra.' The profound Anantanirdeśa-sūtra is already exceedingly profound, and this profound sūtra serves as a prelude to the Lotus Sūtra; how could it not clarify permanence? If they say that words about eternal permanence are sparse, is a single word of the emperor not an edict? The text says, 'The characteristics of the world are eternally abiding'; and further says, 'For immeasurable asaṃkhyeya kalpas, life is immeasurable, eternally abiding and unperishing.' The lifespan at Gayā city and the frequent appearances are the lifespan of the response buddha (nirmāṇa-kāya); the immeasurable lifespan of asaṃkhyeyas is the lifespan of the reward buddha (saṃbhoga-kāya); and 'eternally abiding and unperishing' is the lifespan of the dharma buddha (dharma-kāya). The three buddhas are fully present; the meaning of eternal permanence is complete. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa says: It manifests three kinds of bodhi: First, the bodhi of the response-transformation buddha: manifested in accordance with what ought to be seen, referring to leaving the palace of the Śākyas, going not far from Gayā city, sitting at the bodhimaṇḍa, and attaining sambodhi. Second, the bodhi of the reward buddha: referring to fulfilling the ten grounds and attaining eternal nirvāṇa; the text says, 'Since I actually achieved buddhahood, it has been immeasurable, boundless hundreds of thousands of myriads of koṭis of nayutas of kalpas.' Third, the bodhi of the dharma buddha: referring to the inherently pure nirvāṇa of the tathāgatagarbha, which is eternally pure and unchanging; the text says, 'The Tathāgata truly sees and knows the characteristics of the triple world... not as the triple world sees the triple world.' This means that the realm of sentient beings is identical to the realm of nirvāṇa; not separated from the realm of sentient beings, it is the tathāgatagarbha. It also says, 'I dare not disrespect you, for you will all become buddhas'—this is the direct-cause buddha-nature. It also says, 'In order to cause sentient beings to open the vision and knowledge of the Buddha'—this is the revealing-cause buddha-nature. It also says, 'The seeds of buddhahood arise from conditions'—this is the conditioning-cause buddha-nature. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa also clarifies three kinds of buddha-nature. The treatise says: Only the Buddha, the Tathāgata, realizes great bodhi, completely fulfilling all wisdom, and therefore it is called great. The statement 'I dare not disrespect you, for you will all become buddhas' reveals that all sentient beings possess the buddha-nature. With such clear evidence in sūtra and treatise, how can they say it is absent? Moreover, the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: 'The appearance of this sūtra in the world is like that fruit, bringing great benefit and peace to all, able to make sentient beings see the nature of the Tathāgata, just as in the Lotus Sūtra the eight thousand śrāvakas received vyākaraṇa, bringing forth the great fruit, like harvest in autumn and storage in winter, with nothing further to be done.' If the eight thousand śrāvakas did not see the buddha-nature in the Lotus Sūtra, the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra would not have referred back to it. The explicit text is reliable evidence; why labor to cling stubbornly? Furthermore, fascicle twenty-five of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: 'That which is ultimate and definitive is the eka-yāna attained by all sentient beings; the eka-yāna is called the buddha-nature. For this reason, I say that all sentient beings fully possess the buddha-nature, and all sentient beings fully possess the eka-yāna.' Thus, the present sūtra is the teaching of the eka-yāna, which profoundly accords with the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra. Furthermore, the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra still entails the three vehicles attaining the Way, whereas this sūtra is pure and unmixed; the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra does not further disclose the traces, whereas this sūtra reveals the original source and its meaning is manifest. Proclaiming birth everywhere, manifesting extinction everywhere, eternally abiding in the future, benefiting beings throughout the three periods of time; when the multitude sees it burned, my land is not destroyed—how could this be an extension of life through supernatural powers that has an exhaustion? This refutes the idea of extending life through supernatural powers (and so forth).

10.27

Challenging the teaching of the fifth period—the eternal permanence in the Twin Groves, the buddha-nature of sentient beings, and icchantikas becoming buddhas: I ask the Satyasiddhi masters: according to your interpretation of the meaning based on the two truths, is the teaching of the fifth period subsumed under the two truths or not? If it is subsumed under the two truths, it is identical with the other teachings; if the two truths of the prior teachings are still impermanent, how could the two truths of the Twin Groves be permanent? If the Twin Groves do not go beyond the two truths, yet are able to illuminate a distinct principle and destroy distinct delusions so as to be permanent, then the two truths clarified in the prior teachings also illuminate a distinct principle and destroy distinct delusions—why then would they be impermanent? The buddha-nature of sentient beings and icchantikas becoming buddhas are challenged similarly to this. Therefore we know that the principle it clarifies is no different from the previous period; on what basis then is it considered eternally abiding?

10.28

Challenging the sudden teaching can be understood by this analogy. Since the real is identical, on what basis is it called sudden? Although the provisional differs, one must not classify the great and small based on phenomenal events; that would be a great inversion (and so forth).

10.29

Next, I challenge the 'partial and indeterminate teaching', said to not belong to the sequence but to be an independent occasion, such as the Suvarṇaprabhāsa, Śrīmālādevī, Laṅkāvatāra, and Aṅgulimāla. I ask: The Aṅgulimāla-sūtra was expounded during the six years [of the early period], yet it lists the assembled congregation in sequential order, details other sūtras, scolds and clarifies permanence, distinguishing other teachings clearly; Indra, Brahmā, the Four Heavenly Kings, the ten disciples, and even Mañjuśrī are all scolded and reproved. Those who heard it together are clearly present, so it ought to enter the sequence; yet now it is judged as 'partial'. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa is also a text of scolding; how could it be cited as belonging to the sequence? Furthermore, what Vimalakīrti scolded occurred in the past, recounting prior words to decline being up to the task. One should know that already before the twelve years they ought to have been scolded, identical to the Aṅgulimāla. If the Aṅgulimāla is partial, then the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa is not sequential. If you say the Aṅgulimāla clarifies permanence and is an independent occasion, the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: 'The company of afflictions is the seed of the Tathāgata'—how could that be a sequential teaching? (and so forth).

10.30

Next, I challenge their classification of the five periods of teachings based on the five flavors of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra. They use milk coming from a cow to illustrate the teaching of marks before the twelve years of the Tripiṭaka; curds coming from milk to illustrate the signless prajñā teaching after the twelve years; raw butter coming from curds to illustrate the vaipulya teaching of scolding and praising; clarified butter coming from raw butter to illustrate the Lotus teaching of myriad goods converging into one; and ghee coming from clarified butter to illustrate the Nirvāṇa teaching of eternal permanence. This visibly contradicts the text and the meaning, engenders an inversion, and is not sequential at all. Why is that? The sūtra says: 'Milk coming from a cow' illustrates the twelvefold canon first coming forth from the Buddha; how can the twelvefold canon be correlated with the ninefold teaching of marks? First, the teaching of marks does not possess the twelvefold canon. Second, the teaching of marks was not what the Buddha expounded first; therefore, it should not be taken as its correlate (and so forth). They then rescue their view by saying: the Hīnayāna also possesses the twelvefold canon. They cite the text as proof: if cows eat the enduring grass of the Snow Mountains, they produce ghee; if cows eat other grasses, they do not produce ghee; thus we know that both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna universally possess the twelvefold canon, differing only in possessing or lacking the buddha-nature. Now I ask: even granting that they universally possess the twelvefold canon, why not take the twelvefold canon that clarifies the buddha-nature as the milk teaching? Fascicle seven of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: 'If [one says that] the nine divisions do not clarify the buddha-nature, this person commits no fault. Just as when saying the great ocean only has seven treasures and lacks the eighth treasure, this person commits no fault.' By this analogy, if the twelve divisions lacked the buddha-nature, this person would incur a fault. Since you say it is fully equipped with the twelve divisions, why would its failure to clarify the buddha-nature fall into the phrase of incurring a fault? How could it accord with the faultless twelve divisions?

10.31

If you say that from the twelvefold canon come the sūtras, and correlate 'sūtras' with the signless prajñā teaching, then 'sūtras' universally applies to all with marks and without marks, and all five periods are called sūtras; why correlate it solely with signless prajñā? They explain: Prajñā contains direct exposition, and is also the second period, so it is correlated with it. If you say that direct exposition must be sūtras, prajñā contains exposition by parables, nidānas, vyākaraṇa, and upadeśa; how could it solely be direct exposition? If prajñā combines all expositions and takes sūtra as its name, other sūtras are also direct expositions; why are they not correlated with sūtra? If you say it is the second period, which sūtra is not the second period, as already refuted earlier? As for deriving the vaipulya sūtras from sūtras, using them to correlate with teachings of scolding and praising such as the Vimalakīrti, the Vimalakīrti should not come after the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā, as already broken down earlier (and so forth). As for deriving prajñā from vaipulya and using it to correlate with the Lotus, the sūtra text itself says 'prajñā', yet they tortuously explain it as the Lotus, bending the sūtra's words to fit their interpretation, which is utterly senseless. The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says, 'The eight thousand śrāvakas received vyākaraṇa in the Lotus'; it does not say they received vyākaraṇa in the Prajñā; how can one call the Lotus 'prajñā'? Contradicting the text and losing the purport, it fails to form a proper sequence. As for deriving the Mahāparinirvāṇa from prajñā, they then explain: deriving the Mahāparinirvāṇa from the Lotus. This likewise does not accord with the sūtra text, like an intractable child or a stubborn sheep (and so forth).

10.32

Such are the faults of the five periods; as for the four periods and three periods, there is no need to refute them further—the doctrinal classifications of the South can no longer be relied upon. Now I further challenge the proponents of the three periods, who say: from after the twelve years up to the Lotus, all are identically called the signless teaching; [if so,] then since the Lotus unifies the three, the Prajñā should also converge into the one. If it does not, how could they both identically be signless? The four periods are also analogous to this.

10.33

Next, I critique the Northern theory of five periods. If it is said that the Trapuṣa-sūtra expounds the five precepts and ten virtues, that sūtra only clarifies the five precepts and does not clarify the ten virtues; being purely a teaching for humans, it is not a teaching for devas. Even if one takes this to be a teaching for humans and devas, all sūtras clarify precepts and virtues—should they also be teachings for humans and devas? Furthermore, that sūtra says: 'The five precepts are the mother of all buddhas; one who wishes to seek the buddha-way should read this sūtra, and one who wishes to seek arhatship should read this sūtra.' It also says: 'One who wishes to attain the deathless realm should wear the talisman of long life, ingest the medicine of deathlessness, and maintain the seal of perpetual bliss.' The talisman of long life is the teaching of the three vehicles; the seal of perpetual bliss is the way of nirvāṇa. Why say exclusively that it is a teaching for humans and devas? It also says: 'The five precepts are the root of heaven and earth, the source of all spirits; heaven preserves them to harmonize yin and yang, and earth preserves them so that the myriad things are born; they are the mother of the myriad things, the father of the myriad spirits, the origin of the Great Way, and the source of nirvāṇa.' Furthermore, they are the root of the four elements, the root of the five skandhas and six declines. The four elements are the four great elements; the four elements are fundamentally pure, the five skandhas are fundamentally pure, and the six declines are fundamentally pure. With meanings such as these, expounding that which exhausts the origin and reaches the utmost profundity, why would it be merely a teaching for humans and devas? Moreover, the elder Trapuṣa attained the acquiescence in the non-arising of dharmas, three hundred people attained the acquiescence of faith, two hundred people attained the stage of srotāpanna, the Four Heavenly Kings attained the gentle and compliant acquiescence in dharmas, the dragon kings attained the faculties of faith, and the host of asuras all aroused the aspiration for unsurpassable, true, and correct enlightenment. Observing this attainment of the way, how could it be merely a teaching for humans and devas? Furthermore, when the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa discusses the compilation of the Dharma collections, from the initial deer park up to the night of nirvāṇa, all the Hīnayāna teachings expounded were compiled into three Dharma piṭakas; from the initial birth up to the twin trees, all Mahāyāna expounded was compiled into the Mahāyāna-piṭaka. What preceded the deer park was not included within the Hīnayāna. Why? At that time the Saṅgha jewel did not yet exist. Therefore, one should not use the Trapuṣa-sūtra as the initial teaching. If it is said that the Trapuṣa-sūtra is an esoteric teaching where a single voice was differently understood, it should not stand at the head of the manifest teachings. The remaining four periods are identical to those of the Southern masters, which have already been refuted above (and so forth).

10.34

Next, I critique Bodhiruci's theory of the half and the full. If from the initial deer park the tripiṭaka exclusively clarifies the half meaning, and from the Prajñā onward up to nirvāṇa they exclusively clarify the full meaning, this cannot be so. From the night of attaining the way, the Buddha constantly expounded Prajñā; since the deer park, when was it ever not full? As in the time of Trapuṣa, immeasurable devas and humans attained the acquiescence in the non-arising [of dharmas]. Six years after attaining the way, he expounded the Aṅgulimālīya-sūtra. The Nirvāṇa-sūtra says: 'When I first attained the way, bodhisattvas numerous as the sands of the Ganges came to ask about this meaning, no differently from you.' One should know that the deer park should not be purely half. If it is claimed that the various sūtras from the Prajñā onward are all full, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'The Prajñā is not an esoteric teaching and was entrusted to Ānanda; the Lotus Sūtra is an esoteric teaching and was entrusted to the bodhisattvas.' If both are equally the full teaching, why would one be esoteric and one not esoteric? Furthermore, if both are equally full, both should equally converge the three. Furthermore, if both are equally full, the two kinds of curd, fresh and clarified, should equally be ghee, and ghee should equally be fresh and clarified curd. Since the tastes that serve as similes differ, how could the dharmas being illustrated all alike be full (and so forth)?

10.35

Next, I critique the four tenets: the causal condition tenet refers to the six causes and four conditions of the Abhidharma. If so, the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra also clarifies three causes and four conditions, and all dharmas are formed by causes and conditions; the term 'causes and conditions' is general, so why restrict it exclusively to the Abhidharma? Furthermore, the causal condition tenet differs from the nominal designation tenet, and therefore the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra says: 'Perceiving existence through the four truths is a method for taming the mind; it cannot attain the way.' Having established the causal condition tenet, what sort of way is attained? If it attains the Hīnayāna way, it is identical to the nominal designation tenet, so why establish it separately? If it attains the Mahāyāna way, it is identical to the perfect and eternal [tenets], so why establish it separately? Now that it is taken separately as a tenet, a distinct way ought to be assigned to it (and so forth).

10.36

Next, I critique the nominal designation tenet: this refers to the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra's contemplation of the three nominal designations as insubstantial and empty, yet these are phenomenal dharmas of worldly truth, not the tenet of that treatise. That treatise attains the way by perceiving emptiness, so it ought to take emptiness as its tenet. Furthermore, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa clarifies an emptiness-gate among the three piṭakas, but no nominal designation gate; if one refers to that meaning, one ought to employ that tenet. Since a distinct name is established, it is not the attainment of the way through perceiving emptiness (and so forth).

First 36 of 199 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

妙法蓮華經玄義 — Classical Chinese