法華玄義釋籤 16.45

16.45

次約外簡為二：初通敘不實，次「若此」下別出相狀。初如文。次為二：初此方，次西方。初又二，先明見相，次「直是」下結斥。斥中言「不出單四句」者，計天真者仍屬有句，計自然者仍屬無句。所言「縱」者，與而言之，實不可出。次西方中亦二：先明見相，次斥。初文言「外道論力受梨昌募」者，《大論》十八云：「毘耶離梵志等大顧其寶，令與佛論。取其雇已，即以其夜撰《五百明難》，與離昌來至佛所，問佛言：為一究竟道，為眾多究竟道？佛言：唯一究竟道，無眾多也。梵志言：我法各說有究竟道。佛言：雖有眾多，皆非究竟。何者？一切皆以邪著，故非究竟。佛言：鹿頭梵志得道不？答言：一切道中其為第一。時鹿頭比丘在佛後扇佛，佛問諸梵志：汝識其不？梵志云：識。慚愧低頭。佛說偈云：各各謂究竟，而若自愛著，各自是非彼，是皆非究竟。是人入論中，明辨義理時，各各相是非，勝負懷憂喜。勝者墮憍坑，負者墜憂獄，是故有智者，不墮此二法。論力汝當知，我諸弟子法，無虛亦無實，汝欲何法求？汝欲壞我論，終無有是處，一切智難勝，適足自毀壞。」長爪緣，如《止觀》第五記，具在無見、亦有亦無見、非有非無見及絕言見中所攝，以彼外道所見巧故所攝處多。次斥中三：先總斥，次「或時」下歷諸句斥，三引證。如是襵牒但是複四句耳。言「或時襵牒有無為有等」者，如《止觀》中直列名而已，此中略解麁寄複句以示其相。初句語略，應云有有有無為有，此是有家之有無也。雖有有無之別，同屬於有，故襵著有中。無等三句，例此可解。若約具足四句，則有中具四皆屬於有，襵著有中。無等三句，準此可見。「百千番牒」者，假使一句復生無量，隨其所生攝屬能生，此之能所不出於見，故非真實。

Next, distinguishing in terms of non-Buddhists has two parts: first, a general account of their unreality; next, from "if this" down, specifically presenting their characteristics. The first is as in the text. The second has two parts: first, this land [China]; second, the Western land [India]. The first again has two parts: first, clarifying the characteristics of views; next, from "merely" down, concluding with a critique. In the critique, when it says "do not go beyond the simple tetralemma": positing natural spontaneity (tianzhen) still falls under the lemma of existence; positing naturalness (ziran) still falls under the lemma of non-existence. When it says "even if granted," it is speaking concessionally; in reality, they cannot step outside it. Next, within [the section on] the Western land, there are also two parts: first, clarifying the characteristics of views; next, the critique. In the first part, when it says "the non-Buddhist Lunli accepted the reward offered by the Licchavis": the Da zhidu lun says in fascicle eighteen: "The Brahmins and others in Vaiśālī hired him with great wealth to debate with the Buddha. Having received their hiring fee, that very night he composed the Five Hundred Difficult Questions, and together with the Licchavis came to the place of the Buddha, asking the Buddha: 'Is there one ultimate path, or are there many ultimate paths?' The Buddha said: 'There is only one ultimate path; there are not many.' The Brahmin said: 'Our traditions each say there is an ultimate path.' The Buddha said: 'Although there are many, none is ultimate. Why? Because all are corrupted by heterodox attachments, therefore they are not ultimate.' The Buddha asked: 'Did the deer-headed Brahmin attain the path or not?' He answered: 'Among all paths, he is foremost.' At that time, the deer-headed bhikṣu was fanning the Buddha behind him. The Buddha asked the Brahmins: 'Do you recognize him?' The Brahmin said: 'I recognize him,' and bowed his head in shame. The Buddha spoke a verse: 'Each claims [his path] is ultimate, / yet clings to it with self-cherishing love; / each affirms his own and negates others', / and thus none is ultimate. / When these men enter into debate / and sharply analyze doctrines and principles, / they mutually affirm and negate one another, / harboring sorrow and joy over victory and defeat. / The victor falls into the pit of pride; / the defeated plunges into the prison of sorrow. / Therefore, those who possess wisdom / do not fall into these two dharmas. / Lunli, you should know: / the Dharma of my disciples / is neither void nor real; / through what Dharma do you seek [to debate]? / If you wish to destroy my discourse, / there is never any possibility; / the Omniscient One is hard to vanquish; / you will only bring ruin upon yourself.'" The circumstances of Dīrghanakha are as recorded in the fifth fascicle of the Zhiguan; he is fully subsumed under the view of non-existence, the view of both existence and non-existence, the view of neither existence nor non-existence, and the view that transcends speech; because that non-Buddhist's views were subtle and ingenious, the categories under which he is subsumed are numerous. Next, within the critique, there are three parts: first, a general critique; next, from "sometimes" down, critiquing through the various lemmata; third, citing proof. Layering and folding in this way is merely the compound tetralemma. When it says "sometimes layering and folding existence and non-existence into existence, etc.": as in the Zhiguan, it merely listed the names directly; here, it briefly explains and roughly employs the compound tetralemma to illustrate its characteristics. The first lemma is abbreviated; it should say: "existence-existence and existence-non-existence constitute existence"; this is the existence and non-existence of the category of existence. Although there is the distinction of existence and non-existence, they together belong to existence, and are therefore folded into existence. The three lemmata of non-existence and so forth can be understood by analogy to this. If one treats it in terms of the fully equipped tetralemma, then within existence the four are complete and all belong to existence, folded into existence. The three lemmata of non-existence and so forth can be seen on this basis. As for "hundreds of thousands of layers": even if one lemma generates an infinite number further, whichever are generated are subsumed under that which generates them; this relation of generating and generated does not go beyond views, and is therefore not real.