法華文句記 5.83

5.83

次「大經」下釋出緣因所以。三十二文具列四句，舊云：闡提無者定無善性，唯有惡境界性惡五陰耳；善根人有了因性，俱有正因，俱無果性。河西云：闡提有惡陰性，善人有善陰性，俱有無記，俱無同前。興皇三解，一約理解，理非善惡，有彼二用，即指二人各有善惡一種用故。俱有俱無者，互得有無一邊故也。餘二解不要。章安云：此釋涅槃河中七種眾生，應云闡提常沒，善人常出，俱有者俱在河中，俱無者俱不至岸，亦以果性為俱無也。又約三諦釋，闡提唯有世諦因惡，善人唯有真諦因善，俱有世諦果身，俱無中道因果。於諸釋中雖復少別，善人一句其旨大同，其不同者今不暇釋，具如《止觀》第五記，故今引同者證緣因善。

Next, below "the Great Sūtra," it explains the reason for its being the conditional cause. The thirty-two texts completely list the four propositions. The old [commentators] said: that an icchantika has neither means that they definitively lack the nature of goodness, having only the nature of evil realms and evil five aggregates; a person with roots of goodness possesses the nature of the revealing cause; both possess the direct cause; and both lack the nature of the fruit. Héxī said: an icchantika possesses the nature of evil aggregates; a good person possesses the nature of good aggregates; both possess the indeterminate; and both lacking is the same as above. Xīnghuáng gave three interpretations. First, explaining in terms of principle: the principle is neither good nor evil, yet it has those two functions; this refers to the two persons each having one kind of function, either good or evil. "Both possessing and both lacking" means that each mutually obtains one side of having or lacking. The remaining two interpretations are not necessary. Zhāng’ān said: this explains the seven kinds of sentient beings in the river of Nirvāṇa; it should be said that the icchantika constantly sinks, the good person constantly emerges, "both possessing" means both are in the river, and "both lacking" means neither reaches the shore; he also took the nature of the fruit to be what both lack. Furthermore, explaining in terms of the three truths: an icchantika only has the evil of the cause of the conventional truth; a good person only has the goodness of the cause of the ultimate truth; both possess the physical body of the fruit of the conventional truth; and both lack the cause and fruit of the Middle Way. Although there are slight differences among these various explanations, on the proposition regarding the good person their purport is largely the same. Those that differ there is no leisure to explain here, being fully as in the notes to the fifth fascicle of the *Zhǐguān*; hence, I now cite what agrees to verify goodness as the conditional cause.