法華文句記 6.33

6.33

「今明」去，破二家也。於中為五：先破二師，「若單理」下先難道場，理是所通，若以所為能，則能通是所，更何所通？門義不成，故云「何門之謂」？「單教」下次破光宅，若不為所立能得能者，眾終不至所，然理不容多，門豈唯一？今言一者，具如後釋，宅既所棲唯應立一，尚云多有，況能通門？即《淨名》中不二之門有八千也。今理教相望不可單論。次「今取」下定其門相，即取理家之教為門。理既是一教不容二，且總為一，秖此一句雙破二家，則取所家之能，故從能有至，雖不正破道場用智，智望於教同是能取，教能既廢、智能亦然。但智必依教而觀於境，義已兼於能所，又不可云得智者也。雖然，現違經文，經云「教門」，而觀師云「理智」，故亦與光宅同壞。三「文云」下引證。教是能詮、涅槃是所，並異二師。四「門又二」下分別解釋。釋中二，先簡大小雖同有能所大小天隔，是故須辯權實二能，若識二能則二所有在，若識實所權之，能所俱成實能，善分判已後方論會。五「若宅」下設難，且以今昔相待為難，宅是所出、車是所入，宅門是所出之路，車門是所入之路，既二路不同出入各異，是故宅門非車門也。故今難云：若車宅門一，何故出宅仍未得車？若絕待者，今應徵云：若大車門非宅門者，索時亦應別有出路，何故還從所出索大，長者亦秖於此與大？又問：得宅門已、未得車門，住在何處？答：大小異途，是故云別。開小即大，同異如何？故今申之，斥則車宅永殊，開則二門不異，宅與車一，二門何殊？是故三乘具有二義，承教出宅不見小車，中間已經二味調熟，乃從父索先所許車，既索須與，開彼小門無非大教，門下小理終無別途，絕理無二麁妙體一，法住法位世間相常，三界尚如何別之有？若不先異，何所論同？沒苦之人於今咸會。

From "Now clarifying" onward refutes the two masters. Within this there are five parts: first, refuting the two masters. Under "If solely principle," it first challenges the master of Daocheng: principle is that which is penetrated; if one takes that which is penetrated as that which can penetrate, then that which can penetrate is that which is penetrated—what else would there be to penetrate? The meaning of "gate" would not be established, hence it says: "what could be called a gate?" Under "Solely teaching," it next refutes Guangzhai: if one does not establish that which can attain for the sake of that which is attained, sentient beings will never reach that which is attained; however, while principle admits no multiplicity, how could gates be merely one? Now in saying "one," it is fully as explained later: the house being that which is inhabited, only one should be established, yet it is still said to have many, how much more so for the gates that can provide access? That is, in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa there are eight thousand gates of non-duality. Now, looking at principle and teaching together, they cannot be discussed singly. Next, under "Now taking," it determines the character of the gate: that is, taking the teaching of the master of principle as the gate. Since principle is one, the teaching does not admit of two; for now they are united into one. This single sentence refutes both masters at once, thereby taking that which can for that which is. Therefore from that which can there is arrival; although it does not directly refute Daocheng's use of wisdom, wisdom viewed in relation to teaching is identically that which can take. Once the teaching as that which can is discarded, wisdom as that which can is discarded as well. Yet wisdom must rely on the teaching to contemplate the object, and its meaning already combines that which can and that which is; moreover, one cannot say "those who attain wisdom." Even so, it explicitly contradicts the sūtra text: the sūtra says "the gate of teaching," whereas Master Guan says "principle and wisdom," and thus it is ruined along with Guangzhai. Third, under "The text says," it adduces proof: teaching is that which can express, and nirvāṇa is that which is expressed; both differ from the two masters. Fourth, under "The gate is also twofold," it provides an analytical explanation. In this explanation there are two parts: first, distinguishing the great and small. Although both have that which can and that which is, the great and small are worlds apart; therefore one must distinguish the provisional and real forms of that which can. If one recognizes the two forms of that which can, then the two forms of that which is will have their places; if one recognizes the real that which is, then the provisional that which can and that which is both become the real that which can. Only after distinguishing them properly may one discuss their unification. Fifth, under "If the house," it sets up a challenge, using for now the mutual dependence of present and past as a challenge: the house is that which is departed from; the carriage is that which is entered. The gate of the house is the road of departure; the gate of the carriage is the road of entry. Since the two roads are not the same and departure and entry are distinct, the gate of the house is not the gate of the carriage. Therefore the challenge now asks: if the carriage and house gates are one, why is it that upon leaving the house one has still not obtained the carriage? If it is absolute, one should now demand: if the gate of the great carriage is not the gate of the house, when asking for it there should also have been a separate road of departure; why then do they still ask for the great from the place of departure, and why does the elder also bestow the great right there? Again it is asked: having obtained the gate of the house but not yet the gate of the carriage, where do they abide? Answer: the great and the small follow different paths, hence they are said to be distinct. When opening the small into the great, how could they be identical or different? Therefore it is now stated: to reject them means the carriage and house are eternally distinct; to open them means the two gates are not different. The house and the carriage being one, how could the two gates be distinct? Therefore the three vehicles possess both meanings: following the teaching to leave the house, they do not see the small carriage; having passed through the two flavors in between to mature, they then ask the father for the carriage previously promised. Once asked, it must be given; opening that small gate, it is nothing other than the great teaching. The small principle under the gate ultimately has no separate path; the absolute principle has no duality, the crude and the wondrous are of one substance, the phenomena abide in the dharma-position, and the mundane characteristics are eternal. How could the three realms still have any distinction? If one does not first treat them as distinct, on what basis could unity be discussed? Those who were submerged in suffering are all united now.