法華文句記 6.34

6.34

「安隱對不安隱法」者，如來已住安隱涅槃，對彼五濁不安之法，機感相遇故名為對，不安隱處亦復如是。「牆壁譬四大」者，應通三界無非減損，無色雖無四大造色，定果所為皆是牆壁，三界皆以意識維持；若約諸宗，無色非全無四大色，雅合其宜。「欲令」下觀解者，前則通於三界己他，故屬於事，此觀己身即觀心義。有人至此具以依正二報合喻，有何不可？且如成壞各二十中，已無有情如何釋濁？燒義稍隔故不用之。故今文但約三界正報因果，以正攝依其義自足。「歘然」等者，若唯約小乘無始相續，乃成本有，念念生滅乃是今無。今附大乘性理本無，無明故有，故云本無今有。故無明之言含於麁細。今指麁是細豈可餘途？然本無之言人之常說，斯為至難，故《大經》云：「本無今有本有今無，三世有法無有是處」，今雖引一句，與三句相關，故須略辯識其大旨。然此一偈四處出之，古人名為涅槃四柱，亦云四出偈，故知釋不當理涅槃室傾。言四出者，謂第九、十五、二十五、二十六，大理雖同對文小別。第九釋〈菩薩品〉，明差別無差別義；第十五釋〈梵行品〉，明得即無得無得即得；二十五〈師子吼品〉，釋有不定有無不定無；二十六破定性明無性。古來解釋隨情不同，成論師云：「金剛心前無常，常則本有今無，無常則本無今有。」又云：「本有煩惱今無般若，如此有無並在於昔，故在金剛前後三世有法無有是處。」地論師云：「常法體用本有今無。」章安難云：「本隱今顯亦應顯已復沒。」三藏云：「眾生無始而有終、涅槃無終而有始。」今難之：「無始之法方乃無終，無終之法必須無始，若煩惱有終是可壞法，可壞之法義必有始，有始有終皆從緣生，何得涅槃而言有始？有始必終全同煩惱，應言煩惱無始體即菩提是故無終。菩提無始即煩惱是，涅槃生死亦可準知。」今即約大，是故且云本無今有，其實本有即生死之涅槃，以從迷故而今無也；理淨本無從迷今有，故云本無今有。小宗若云：「本無今有從緣生故，故云無明。」觀諸師意與涅槃理都不相當。

"Secure facing insecure dharmas": the Tathāgata has already abided in secure nirvāṇa; facing those insecure dharmas of the five defilements, when capacity and stimulus encounter each other, it is called "facing"; the insecure places are also like this. "The walls symbolize the four great elements": this should apply across the three realms, where none is not diminished. Although the formless realm lacks the form derived from the four great elements, what is created by the fruits of concentration are all walls; the three realms are all maintained by mental consciousness. If based on the various treatises, the formless realm is not completely without the form of the four great elements, which fits the meaning gracefully. Below "Desiring to cause," as for the contemplative interpretation: the previous referred generally to oneself and others across the three realms, hence it belongs to external phenomena; this contemplation of one's own body is precisely the meaning of contemplating the mind. Up to this point, someone took both environmental and primary rewards to match the analogy; what objection could there be? Yet as within the twenty [kalpas] each of formation and destruction there are not yet sentient beings, how could defilements be explained? The sense of burning is somewhat removed, hence it is not adopted. Thus the present text only relies on the cause and effect of the primary reward of the three realms, which by subsuming the environmental under the primary makes the meaning complete in itself. "Suddenly" and so forth: if relying solely on the Hīnayāna, beginningless continuity establishes original existence, while moment-to-moment arising and ceasing is present nonexistence. Now, according with the Mahāyāna, the principle of nature is originally nonexistent, but exists due to fundamental ignorance; hence it is called "originally nonexistent and presently existent." Thus the phrase "fundamental ignorance" contains both coarse and subtle. Now, pointing out that the coarse is the subtle, how could there be any other approach? However, the words "originally nonexistent" are commonly spoken by people, yet this is extremely difficult; hence the Great Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "Originally nonexistent, presently existent; originally existent, presently nonexistent; that phenomena exist across the three times has no such place." Although a single phrase is cited now, it is related to the three phrases; therefore one must briefly analyze it to recognize its general drift. Now, this single verse appears in four places, which the ancients called the Four Pillars of Nirvāṇa or the Four-Appearance Verse; thus we know that if the interpretation does not accord with principle, the chamber of Nirvāṇa collapses. The four appearances refer to chapters nine, fifteen, twenty-five, and twenty-six: though their general principle is the same, facing the text there are slight differences. Chapter nine explains the "Bodhisattva Chapter," clarifying the meaning of distinction and non-distinction; chapter fifteen explains the "Pure Conduct Chapter," clarifying that attainment is non-attainment and non-attainment is attainment; chapter twenty-five, the "Lion's Roar Chapter," explains that existence is not determinately existent and nonexistence is not determinately nonexistent; chapter twenty-six refutes determinate nature, clarifying naturelessness. Ancient interpretations varied according to individual views: the Tattvasiddhi masters said: "Before the diamond-like mind there is impermanence; constancy is originally existent and presently nonexistent, while impermanence is originally nonexistent and presently existent." They also said: "Originally possessing afflictions and presently lacking prajñā, such existence and nonexistence both belong to the past; therefore, before and after the diamond-like mind, that phenomena exist across the three times has no such place." The Daśabhūmika masters said: "The substance and function of constant dharmas are originally existent and presently nonexistent." Master Zhang'an refuted this: "If what was originally hidden is now revealed, then having been revealed it should also submerge again." The Tripiṭaka master said: "Sentient beings have no beginning but have an end; nirvāṇa has no end but has a beginning." Now we challenge this: "Only a dharma without beginning can be without end; a dharma without end must be without beginning. If afflictions have an end, they are perishable dharmas; perishable dharmas in principle must have a beginning. Having a beginning and having an end both arise from conditions; how can nirvāṇa be said to have a beginning? Having a beginning it must have an end, being entirely identical to afflictions. One should say that afflictions are without beginning, their substance is identical to bodhi, and therefore they are without end. Bodhi being without beginning is precisely afflictions; nirvāṇa and saṃsāra can be known by analogy." Now we rely on the Mahāyāna, and therefore for the time being say "originally nonexistent and presently existent"; in reality, the originally existent is precisely the nirvāṇa of saṃsāra, which due to delusion is presently nonexistent; the purity of principle is originally nonexistent, yet through delusion is presently existent, hence it is said "originally nonexistent and presently existent." If the lesser school says: "It is originally nonexistent and presently existent because it arises from conditions, hence it is called fundamental ignorance," when observing the views of the various masters, none corresponds to the principle of nirvāṇa.