法華文句記 6.90

6.90

「世人」下明大車體者，應如《玄》文顯體中辯，此為破古略辯異同。上雖明數及索不索，若不辯體，將何以明解行之本？已下諸師章安所引，故出今釋云天台師。初光宅、莊嚴雖並云高廣，而據果計因對昔未絕，故光宅指果此有五失：一者因乘無體乘何而出，二者名濫小乘果尚須索，三者以用為體能所不分，四者待昔無絕開權不成，五者攝法不遍以隔凡下。別無盡智之語，況復圓耶？別圓雖有無生之名，語同意別，斷證永乖是故不用。況以今待昔方為高廣，當知當體無高廣也。莊嚴在因，果必無體，況行是具度亦非所嚴，上求下化四教皆然，況唯知語其高廣、不解始終不二。舊師不取功德意斥莊嚴，欲同光宅又不云果，智屬白牛體亦不成，過準前說。又一師取福慧者，總破前三引無漏根力等屬慧，禪定解脫等屬福，豈但慧耶者？正斥第三，福慧已非車體。復謬引昔文證今，深不可也。過失云云，又取有解者，似符光宅。「空解無動故不取」者，意謂運義不成，不意運都無體。「盡無生智即有解」者，從所盡所無立名故也。又一師分對小乘，大乘但取實慧方便，運動如前。

Below 'Worldly people', on clarifying the substance of the great carriage: it should be distinguished as in the section on revealing the substance in the Profound Meaning; here, to refute the ancients, the similarities and differences are briefly distinguished. Although the number and whether they demand or not were clarified above, if the substance is not distinguished, how can the basis of understanding and practice be clarified? The masters cited below were cited by Zhāng’ān; hence, setting forth the present explanation, he refers to Master Tiāntái. First, although both Guāngzhái and Zhuāngyán say 'lofty and broad', they infer the cause based on the fruit and have not yet severed the relation to the past. Thus Guāngzhái points to the fruit, which has five faults: first, the causal vehicle has no substance, so what does one ride upon to emerge? Second, its name is confused with the Hinayana, where the fruit would still need to be demanded. Third, taking function as substance, subject and object are not distinguished. Fourth, waiting upon the past without severing it, opening the provisional does not succeed. Fifth, it does not subsume dharmas universally, as it separates ordinary and inferior beings. In the distinct [teaching], there is no talk of the knowledge of exhaustion; how much less in the perfect? Although the distinct and perfect have the term 'unborn', the words are the same but the meanings differ, and their severing and realization are completely contrary, so it is not used. Furthermore, taking the present as waiting upon the past to become lofty and broad, one should know that its own substance is not lofty and broad. Zhuāngyán rests in the cause, so the fruit definitely has no substance; moreover, the practices being the perfection of tools are also not what is adorned; seeking above and transforming below are true of all four teachings; how much more so that they only know how to speak of its loftiness and broadness, without understanding that beginning and end are non-dual. The old master does not accept merit, intending to reproach Zhuāngyán; wishing to agree with Guāngzhái, he again does not speak of the fruit; wisdom belonging to the white ox also fails to constitute the substance; the errors correspond to the previous explanation. Another master takes blessing and wisdom: generally refuting the preceding three, he cites the untainted faculties, powers, and so forth as belonging to wisdom, and dhyāna, vimokṣa, and so forth as belonging to blessing—how could it be only wisdom? This directly reproaches the third; blessing and wisdom are already not the substance of the carriage. Furthermore, falsely citing past texts to prove the present is deeply inadmissible. The faults are as discussed. Also, taking the understanding of existence seems to match Guāngzhái. 'The understanding of emptiness has no motion, so it is not accepted': this means the sense of conveying is not established, not realizing that conveying entirely lacks substance. 'The knowledge of exhaustion and non-arising is the understanding of existence': this is because the name is established from what is exhausted and what is non-existent. Another master divides them to match the Hinayana, while the Mahayana only takes real wisdom and skillful means, conveying as before.