法華文句記 9.180

9.180

「復次」下約四句，中二：初正釋四句，次「四句」下四句料簡。初正釋中先正釋，次總破古。初正釋者，依身次第不依句次第，故初法身為第四句，報身即第二句，以金剛前未名報故，即第一句是有量也。而未名佛，且云無常，其實更須分別同異，金剛至凡節節異故，應身即第三句。言「通途」者，欲以四句收一切故，故以第一句自金剛來，通及凡夫，故非佛之言所攝該廣，況復凡夫亦得以為三身之本，故入初句。次破舊中云「兩謗」者，品中明常不以常解，名為減謗。品無無常用無常釋，名為增謗。次四句料簡中又二：先結前生後，次正解。於中文自分二：初言「別者」，三身別釋，分句屬人，所屬楷定故也。釋報身中先定句，次釋疑。於中先明法報義等同第四句，次「但取」下明對句意。「凡夫共」者，今文釋佛，但三身之外皆屬凡收，故文尚以金剛之前不屬三身並入凡例。言「別教」者，三身別別各對句故，故是別教分別之相。次「通途」下通釋也。各具四句，三身互冥故云「圓釋」，三身各四故云「通途」。於中初通標，次一一通釋。初法身四句中，云「雙破凡聖八倒」者，凡四聖四中理任運常雙破故；然亦須簡八倒體狀，如前十八空中說也。第三句言「無常」者，無彼常故。第四句者指寂為法身，兩亦而照。次報身四句中，皆須約智。初「雙非」者，境既雙非，智必稱境。第二句中云「出過二乘故」者，小智但有，計無常故。

From "Furthermore" below, concerning the four propositions, there are two parts: first, directly explaining the four propositions; second, from "four propositions" below, investigating the four propositions. First, within directly explaining: first, directly explaining; next, generally refuting the ancients. First, as for directly explaining: relying on the order of the bodies, not on the order of the propositions, the initial dharmakāya is the fourth proposition; the saṃbhogakāya is the second proposition; because prior to the adamantine [stage] it is not yet named saṃbhoga, the first proposition is "measurable." Yet it is not yet named buddha, and is provisionally called impermanent; in truth one must further distinguish similarities and differences, because from the adamantine stage down to ordinary beings it differs stage by stage; the nirmāṇakāya is the third proposition. As for "general way": wishing to gather all within the four propositions, it uses the first proposition from the adamantine stage on down, extending generally to ordinary beings; thus the statement "not buddha" encompasses broadly, and all the more so since ordinary beings can also be taken as the basis of the three bodies, hence they enter the first proposition. Next, in refuting the old, saying "two slanders": the chapter clarifies permanence, yet not explaining it as permanent is named the slander of decrease; the chapter lacks impermanence, yet explaining it with impermanence is named the slander of increase. Next, within investigating the four propositions, there are also two parts: first, concluding the previous and introducing the subsequent; second, directly explaining. Herein it is naturally divided into two: first, saying "as for the distinct": explaining the three bodies separately, dividing the propositions to assign them to persons, because their assignments are definitively established. Within explaining the saṃbhogakāya: first, determining the proposition; next, resolving doubts. Herein, it first clarifies that the meanings of dharma and saṃbhoga are equally identical to the fourth proposition; next, from "merely taking" below, clarifies the intent of pairing the proposition. As for "shared with ordinary beings": the present text explains the buddha, but all outside the three bodies belong to ordinary beings; thus the text even groups those prior to the adamantine stage that do not belong to the three bodies under the category of ordinary beings. As for the "separate teaching": because each of the three bodies is separately paired with a proposition, this is the characteristic of distinction in the separate teaching. Next, from "general way" below, it explains generally. Each possesses four propositions; because the three bodies mutually merge, it says "perfect explanation"; because each of the three bodies has four, it says "general way." Herein, first generally indicating; next, generally explaining one by one. First, within the four propositions of the dharmakāya, saying "doubly refutes the eight inversions of ordinary beings and sages": because the principle of the middle spontaneously and constantly doubly refutes the four of ordinary beings and the four of sages; however, one must also distinguish the forms of the eight inversions, as explained previously under the eighteen kinds of emptiness. The third proposition says "impermanent": because it lacks that permanence. The fourth proposition points to quiescence as the dharmakāya, which doubly affirms and illuminates. Next, within the four propositions of the saṃbhogakāya, all must be understood in terms of wisdom. First, "doubly negates": since the object doubly negates, wisdom must match the object. In the second proposition, saying "because it transcends the two vehicles": because the inferior wisdom only clings to existence, reckoning it to be impermanent.