法華文句記 9.217

9.217

言六句者，初「如來」去，二「亦無在世」去，三「非實非虛」，四「非如非異」，五「不如三界」去，六「如斯」去。於中初明句意者，如來明見應云「法界」，何以但云「三界相等」？為令眾生知垂迹處無非法界，法身常住故云「如實」。「感法身」者，機擊法身令起二應，故名為「感」，不可單以法身為應。「如實」下正解。解中初第一句，「若準」下句中云「無二死」，應云無二種三界之因相也。直云「三界」者，能知見者名之為智，所知見如如即中境，中境不出三界故也。於所見中既通凡聖，今以如來知見皆實，餘所知見望佛皆虛而猶有因，佛如實見故云「無因」，離三界已無別理故。「無生死」去，即無二死果也。「起集」下結上無二死家之因果耳。故有五住集名「退」，有二死果名「出」，而云「無常果現」者，二死望中二俱無常，別指二土以為二死，通論金剛已前尚名無常故也。「亦無在世及滅度者」者，亦是雙非二邊因果。此之二句及兩雙非，故云「此四」。故前從如實知滅度者，約如理所離，次二句者，共顯中體，後之二句約能見說。「若雙非」等者，此之四句並成雙非，此雙非言若彼結之即成遍句，其言雖顯，恐與權教雙非相濫，是故重釋雙非結句，若屬一邊並在權教。「例如」下出結句相，以餘結句結今雙非令成偏句，則非圓實，故歷諸句次第結之。結初句云「非生非死」等者，以生為生死邊，以死為涅槃邊，是生是死乃是雙照。若結為生成生死邊，非生非死乃是雙非；若結為死但成涅槃，退出亦然。下二準此。若兩結已復更雙非方顯中道，故云「今皆非之」。今經中直爾雙非顯中，不偏結句故唯圓極。「如此之流」者，此例尚多，即「乃至」已下文是。如單複具足，處處雖有雙非之言，以句結之各有所屬，故一切見唯結成有，二乘諸句唯結成無，此有此無但成別俗，非此有無秖成別中，今明圓理故須細辯。《經》云「如來如實知見」，儻以二乘等釋則有毀佛之辜，然此結句唯在一家，判諸經論一切句法以辯文義宗趣不同。《淨名疏》中因釋〈迦旃延章〉，旃延但云「苦義空義無我等義」，義在三藏，《淨名》結成通義。呵云：空無所起是苦義等，當知空無所起是無苦無樂，但結歸於苦；既云無起，復云是苦，故但成通。若云空無所起雙非空有結成樂義，即成別意，別以出假為樂故也。若更雙非別教苦樂，方成實中，如是廣出，況復單複具足亦遍諸教，如四教四門，門門四門，門門四悉，一一悉中復有四悉，即成門悉各有具足，故別具足更須非之。圓門起見尚墮有句，安得更成複具等耶？故知若見非見若門若悉，皆須以法方能定句，終無以句能定法體。故釋義者，不觀句下法體所歸，如何能辯法句淺深？如何能消今經雙非？若以法定，隨舉一句即成實理。

Regarding the six phrases: the first begins with “the Tathāgata”; the second begins with “nor is there being in the world”; the third is “neither real nor unreal”; the fourth is “neither thus nor different”; the fifth begins with “not like the triple world”; and the sixth begins with “in this manner”. In explaining the meaning of the phrases, first: regarding the Tathāgata’s clear seeing, it should properly be said to be the “dharma-realm”; why does it merely say “the characteristics of the triple world”? It is to cause sentient beings to know that wherever traces are manifested, there is nothing that is not the dharma-realm, and because the dharmakāya is eternally abiding, it says “in accordance with reality”. Regarding “stimulating the dharmakāya”: the capacities [of beings] strike the dharmakāya, causing the two nirmāṇakāyas to arise, hence it is called “stimulation”; one cannot simply take the dharmakāya itself to be the response. Below “in accordance with reality” is the main explanation. Within the explanation, regarding the first phrase: below “if according to”, the text says “there are no two kinds of death”; this should mean that there are no causal characteristics of the two kinds of triple world. Merely saying “triple world” means that the one who knows and sees is called wisdom, and the thusness known and seen is the middle object, because the middle object does not lie outside the triple world. Because what is seen is common to both ordinary people and sages, here, because the Tathāgata’s knowing and seeing are entirely real, while the knowing and seeing of all others are unreal when viewed in relation to the Buddha and still possess causes, the Buddha’s seeing in accordance with reality is called “having no cause”, for once one has left the triple world there is no separate principle. From “there is no birth or death” onward refers to having no results of the two kinds of death. Below “arising and origination”, it concludes the causes and results belonging to the above lack of the two kinds of death. Thus having the origination of the five abodes is called “retrogression”, and having the results of the two kinds of death is called “emergence”; and regarding the statement “the results of impermanence appear”, when the two kinds of death are viewed in relation to the middle, both are impermanent, specifically designating the two lands as the two kinds of death, and generally speaking, everything prior to the adamantine [concentration] is still termed impermanent. Regarding “nor is there being in the world or passing into extinction”: this also doubly negates the causes and results of the two extremes. These two phrases and the two double negations are why it says “these four”. Therefore, from “in accordance with reality knowing those who pass into extinction” above, it is explained in terms of what is separated from in accordance with principle; the next two phrases together reveal the substance of the middle; the final two phrases are explained in terms of the ability to see. Regarding “if doubly negating” and so forth: these four phrases all constitute double negations; if these words of double negation are concluded according to those [other interpretations], they become one-sided phrases. Although the words are evident, fearing that they might be confused with the double negations of the provisional teachings, the concluding phrases of double negation are re-explained; if they belong to one extreme, they all belong to the provisional teachings. Below “for example”, the characteristics of concluding phrases are presented: using other concluding phrases to conclude the present double negations causes them to become one-sided phrases, which would not be the perfect and real, so he goes through the phrases and concludes them in sequence. In concluding the first phrase, saying “neither birth nor death” and so forth: taking birth as the extreme of samsāra and taking death as the extreme of nirvāṇa, “being birth and being death” is then double illumination. If concluded as birth, it becomes the extreme of samsāra, and “neither birth nor death” is then double negation; if concluded as death, it merely becomes nirvāṇa; the same applies to retrogressing and emerging. The two below are modeled on this. If, having concluded both, one further doubly negates them, only then is the middle way revealed; hence it says, “now all are negated”. In the present sūtra, it directly doubly negates in order to reveal the middle, without concluding one-sided phrases, and therefore it is exclusively the perfect and ultimate. Regarding “such types as these”: examples of this are still numerous, namely the text from “and so on” downward. As in simple, compound, and complete, although words of double negation exist everywhere, when concluded by phrases they each have their affiliation; thus all [wrong] views only conclude as existence, while the phrases of the two vehicles only conclude as non-existence; this existence and this non-existence merely constitute the conventional of the separate [teaching], and neither this existence nor non-existence merely constitutes the middle of the separate [teaching]; now, in revealing the perfect principle, a subtle differentiation is necessary. The sūtra says: “The Tathāgata knows and sees in accordance with reality”; if one were to explain it using the two vehicles, there would be the fault of slandering the Buddha. Yet these concluding phrases belong solely to our school, evaluating all phrasing methods in the sūtras and treatises in order to distinguish the differences in textual meaning, central theme, and orientation. In the commentary on the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra, in explaining the chapter on Kātyāyana, where Kātyāyana merely speaks of “the meaning of suffering, the meaning of emptiness, the meaning of non-self, and so forth”, the meaning resides in the Tripiṭaka [teaching], but Vimalakīrti concludes it into the meaning of the shared [teaching]. He rebukes him, saying: “Emptiness without anything arising is the meaning of suffering,” and so forth. One should know that “emptiness without anything arising” is neither suffering nor bliss, yet it is concluded by returning to suffering; having said “without arising” and further said “it is suffering”, it therefore merely constitutes the shared [teaching]. If one says that “emptiness without anything arising” doubly negates both emptiness and existence and is concluded as the meaning of bliss, it then becomes the intention of the separate [teaching], because the separate [teaching] takes emerging into provisionality as bliss. If one further doubly negates the suffering and bliss of the separate teaching, only then does it become the real middle. Expounding extensively like this, how much more so with the simple, compound, and complete that also pervade all teachings, such as the four gates of the four teachings, where each gate has four gates, each gate has four siddhāntas, and within each and every siddhānta there are again four siddhāntas, which then becomes gates and siddhāntas each having completeness; hence the completeness of the separate [teaching] must be further negated. When views arise in the perfect gate, one still falls into the phrase of existence; how could it further constitute compound completeness, and so forth? Therefore, we know that whether views or non-views, whether gates or siddhāntas, all must rely on the dharma to determine the phrase; never can a phrase determine the substance of the dharma. Therefore, an interpreter who does not observe where the substance of the dharma beneath the phrase ultimately returns—how could he distinguish the depth or shallowness of the dharma-phrases? How could he properly interpret the double negation of the present sūtra? If determined by the dharma, any single phrase that is raised immediately constitutes the real principle.