法華玄論 2.39

2.39

次別明因妙義。舊云：此經但明緣因成佛，未明佛性正因，故因亦未妙。評曰：前已略說。此事不輕，今當廣說。此經對麁言妙、形三辨一。昔有三乘則有三性，今唯一乘則唯一性，蓋是數之然也。若乘一而性三，蓋是數不然也。今請難之：若乘一而性三者，性既有三，則眾生或有成佛、或有不成。所以然者，有於三性、無有一性，是故或成或不成。若爾者，何得經云「一豪之善皆成佛」耶？又若今無一乘性而成佛者，昔應無三乘性而成三乘也。又昔有三性，有成三之理；今無一性，無成一理。又無一乘性而成一者，等無三性，何不成三？又至《法華》雖明一乘猶有三性者，則乘一而性三。若乘一而性三，則昔乘三而性一。不可乘三性一，豈得乘一性三？又乘一性三，即事相違，智人不信。譬如唯成一味，復云乳有五性。乳有五性者，豈唯成一味？若成一味，云何復說性五？微識鹽梅、少異木石，不說此言。言尚不成，義何猶立？若言今教無有三乘性，異昔有三性者，亦應今教有一性，異昔無一性，蓋亦是數然也。若言今明無三性，復明無一性者，既無三性不成三乘，若無一性何猶成一？若言佛不說有一乘性，復不明無性，但覆相說一乘成佛者，此無成佛因緣，何由得成佛？夫論成佛者必有其義，眾生有作佛理，可成佛耳。不明有理無理，何由成耶？譬如不論黃石有金無金，而忽令人爐冶，事所未聞。

Next, the wonderful meaning of the cause is explained separately. The old [interpreters] said: “This sūtra explains only achieving Buddhahood through conditioning causes, and has not yet explained the primary cause, which is Buddha-nature; therefore, the cause is also not yet wonderful.” Critique: This was briefly stated earlier. This matter is not insignificant, so I shall now explain it extensively. This sūtra speaks of the wonderful in contrast to the coarse, and distinguishes the one by comparison with the three. Formerly, there being three vehicles, there were three natures; now, there being only one vehicle, there is only one nature—this is simply the logical consequence of the numbers. If the vehicle were one while the natures were three, that would be a failure of the logical consequence of the numbers. Now let us challenge this: If the vehicle is one while the natures are three, then since the natures are three, sentient beings would either achieve Buddhahood or not achieve it. Why is this? Because there are three natures and there is not one nature; therefore, some would achieve it and some would not. If that were so, how could the sūtra say, “Even a fine hair of good [action] leads all to achieve Buddhahood”? Furthermore, if one achieves Buddhahood now without having a one-vehicle nature, then in the past one should have achieved the three vehicles without having a three-vehicle nature. Furthermore, in the past there were three natures, so there was the principle of achieving three; now there is no one nature, so there would be no principle of achieving one. Moreover, if one achieves the one without a one-vehicle nature, then since both equally lack three natures, why not achieve three? Furthermore, if upon reaching the Lotus Sūtra, although it explains the one vehicle, there are still three natures, then the vehicle would be one while the natures are three. If the vehicle were one while the natures were three, then formerly the vehicles would have been three while the nature was one. But one cannot have three vehicles and one nature; how then could one have one vehicle and three natures? Moreover, having one vehicle and three natures is a contradiction in fact, which wise persons do not believe. For example, it would be like producing only one flavor and yet saying that milk has five natures. If milk has five natures, how could it produce only one flavor? If it produces only one flavor, how could one still say its natures are five? Anyone who slightly knows salt and plum, or is slightly different from wood and stone, would not make such a statement. If the statement is not even tenable, how could the doctrine still stand? If one says that the present teaching has no three-vehicle natures—differing from the past when there were three natures—then the present teaching should also have one nature, differing from the past when there was no one nature; this too is simply the logical consequence of the numbers. If one says that the present [teaching] explains that there are no three natures, and also explains that there is no one nature: since without three natures one does not achieve the three vehicles, if there is no one nature, how could one still achieve the one? If one says that the Buddha did not teach that there is a one-vehicle nature, nor did he explain that there is no nature, but merely spoke under a hidden aspect that the one vehicle achieves Buddhahood: having no causes and conditions for achieving Buddhahood, how could one ever achieve Buddhahood? In discussing the achievement of Buddhahood, there must be its rationale; only because sentient beings possess the principle of becoming Buddhas can they achieve Buddhahood. If it is not explained whether there is such a principle or not, by what means could it be achieved? For instance, without discussing whether a yellow stone contains gold or not, suddenly ordering someone to smelt it in a furnace is something unheard of.