法華玄論 2.39

2.39

Next, the wonderful meaning of the cause is explained separately. The old [interpreters] said: “This sūtra explains only achieving Buddhahood through conditioning causes, and has not yet explained the primary cause, which is Buddha-nature; therefore, the cause is also not yet wonderful.” Critique: This was briefly stated earlier. This matter is not insignificant, so I shall now explain it extensively. This sūtra speaks of the wonderful in contrast to the coarse, and distinguishes the one by comparison with the three. Formerly, there being three vehicles, there were three natures; now, there being only one vehicle, there is only one nature—this is simply the logical consequence of the numbers. If the vehicle were one while the natures were three, that would be a failure of the logical consequence of the numbers. Now let us challenge this: If the vehicle is one while the natures are three, then since the natures are three, sentient beings would either achieve Buddhahood or not achieve it. Why is this? Because there are three natures and there is not one nature; therefore, some would achieve it and some would not. If that were so, how could the sūtra say, “Even a fine hair of good [action] leads all to achieve Buddhahood”? Furthermore, if one achieves Buddhahood now without having a one-vehicle nature, then in the past one should have achieved the three vehicles without having a three-vehicle nature. Furthermore, in the past there were three natures, so there was the principle of achieving three; now there is no one nature, so there would be no principle of achieving one. Moreover, if one achieves the one without a one-vehicle nature, then since both equally lack three natures, why not achieve three? Furthermore, if upon reaching the Lotus Sūtra, although it explains the one vehicle, there are still three natures, then the vehicle would be one while the natures are three. If the vehicle were one while the natures were three, then formerly the vehicles would have been three while the nature was one. But one cannot have three vehicles and one nature; how then could one have one vehicle and three natures? Moreover, having one vehicle and three natures is a contradiction in fact, which wise persons do not believe. For example, it would be like producing only one flavor and yet saying that milk has five natures. If milk has five natures, how could it produce only one flavor? If it produces only one flavor, how could one still say its natures are five? Anyone who slightly knows salt and plum, or is slightly different from wood and stone, would not make such a statement. If the statement is not even tenable, how could the doctrine still stand? If one says that the present teaching has no three-vehicle natures—differing from the past when there were three natures—then the present teaching should also have one nature, differing from the past when there was no one nature; this too is simply the logical consequence of the numbers. If one says that the present [teaching] explains that there are no three natures, and also explains that there is no one nature: since without three natures one does not achieve the three vehicles, if there is no one nature, how could one still achieve the one? If one says that the Buddha did not teach that there is a one-vehicle nature, nor did he explain that there is no nature, but merely spoke under a hidden aspect that the one vehicle achieves Buddhahood: having no causes and conditions for achieving Buddhahood, how could one ever achieve Buddhahood? In discussing the achievement of Buddhahood, there must be its rationale; only because sentient beings possess the principle of becoming Buddhas can they achieve Buddhahood. If it is not explained whether there is such a principle or not, by what means could it be achieved? For instance, without discussing whether a yellow stone contains gold or not, suddenly ordering someone to smelt it in a furnace is something unheard of.