觀音玄義 1.59

1.59

理外為四：一天然境智，只問此境為當，由境故境、由智故境；此智為當，由智故智、由境故智。若由境故境，此境是境，境即自生境；若智由智故智，亦是自生智，自生名性自爾，非佛、天、人所作，照與不照恒是境智，故名天然境智。二明相待者，若境不自境，因智故境；智不自智，因境故智，此即他生義。何故爾？境自生境，既稱為自，以境望智，智即是他。今境從智生，豈非他境？智亦如是，故名相待。次明因緣境智者，若境不由智故境，亦不由境故境，智境因緣故境；智亦如是，此即境智因緣共生義。共生有二過，墮自他性中。次絕待明境智者，非境非智而說境智，此即離境離智，無因緣而辯境智者，此是無因緣絕待，從因緣尚不可得，何況無因緣？一往謂絕理而窮之，不成絕待，並是理外行心妄想推計，故《中論》云「諸法不自生，亦不從他生，不共不無因，是故說無生。」那得如前四種計執是實，餘妄語。性實之執，見愛生著，九十八使，苦集浩然，流轉不息，云何執此而生苦集？隨執一種境智謂以為是，隨順讚歎，心則愛著而生歡喜，即是貪使；若人違逆責毀，心則忿怒而生瞋恚，即是瞋使。貪、恚既起，豈非癡使？我解此境智，他所不解，以其所執矜傲於人，豈非慢使？既執此為是，今雖無疑，後當大疑，豈非疑使？我知解此法，法中計我，豈非身見？六十二見隨墮一邊，豈非邊見？如此妄執不當道理，豈非邪見？執此是實，計為涅槃，豈非見取果盜？謂此為道，依之進行，豈非戒取因盜？十使宛然，皆從所執境智上起，將此歷三界四諦則有八十八使，就思惟歷三界則有九十八使，此則集諦結業，顛倒浩然，方招苦果，生死不絕。於其境智不識苦集，何處有道滅？既不識四諦，則破世間、出世間因果，無世、出世法，故無法寶；不識出世果，無佛寶；不識出世因，無僧寶，賢聖之義，一切俱失。若作如此執自生境智者，只是結構生死，增長結業，過患甚多。若非理外境智，更將何等為理外耶？故《大論》云「凡夫三種語，見、慢、名字；聖人，但一種語，名字。」今凡夫見慢取著，謬用佛語，介爾取著，乖理成諍。雖傍經論，引證文字，如蟲蝕木，偶得成字；尋其內心，實不能解是字非字，口言境智，不解境智，以不解故，如服甘露，則以境智起見，傷命早夭，故為龍樹所破，今不取此為境智以釋觀世音。自生境智既爾，餘三句亦然。

External to the principle has four [positions]: first, naturally existent object and wisdom. One simply asks whether this object is an object by virtue of the object, or an object by virtue of wisdom; and whether this wisdom is wisdom by virtue of wisdom, or wisdom by virtue of the object. If it is an object by virtue of the object, this object is an object [in itself], and the object is an object born of itself. If wisdom is wisdom by virtue of wisdom, it is also wisdom born of itself. Self-born means that its nature is intrinsically so—not made by Buddhas, gods, or humans—and whether illuminating or not illuminating, they are constantly object and wisdom; hence it is called naturally existent object and wisdom. Second, explaining relative dependence: if an object is not an object of itself, but is an object because of wisdom, and wisdom is not wisdom of itself, but is wisdom because of the object, this is the meaning of being born from another. Why is this so? When an object gives birth to itself as an object, since that is called 'self', looking from object to wisdom, wisdom is 'other'. Now if the object is born from wisdom, how could it not be an 'other' object? Wisdom is also like this; hence it is called relative dependence. Next, explaining object and wisdom through causes and conditions: if the object is not an object by virtue of wisdom, nor is it an object by virtue of the object, but is an object due to the causes and conditions of wisdom and object; wisdom is also like this. This is the meaning of co-arising from the causes and conditions of object and wisdom. Co-arising has two faults, falling into the natures of both self and other. Next, explaining object and wisdom in an absolute sense: speaking of object and wisdom while being neither object nor wisdom; this is being free from object and free from wisdom, and explicating object and wisdom without causes and conditions. This is an unconditioned absolute. If it cannot even be obtained through causes and conditions, how much less without causes and conditions? Although provisionally one might deem it an absolute principle, on exhaustive analysis it does not form an absolute; all these are mental fabrications and speculative projections external to the principle. Therefore the *Madhyamakaśāstra* says: 'All dharmas are not self-born, nor are they born from another, nor both, nor without a cause; therefore they are declared to be unarisen.' How could it be that, as in the four previous attachments, one is real and the others are false speech? From attachments to a real self-nature, views and craving give rise to clinging, the ninety-eight proclivities, and the mass of suffering and its origin swell vastly, cycling endlessly. How does clinging to this give rise to suffering and its origin? Whichever kind of object and wisdom one clings to, considering it to be right, following and praising it, the mind then becomes greedily attached and gives rise to delight, which is the proclivity of greed. If someone opposes and denounces it, the mind becomes furious and gives rise to resentment, which is the proclivity of anger. Once greed and anger arise, how could it not be the proclivity of ignorance? Thinking 'I understand this object and wisdom, which others do not understand,' and being haughty toward others because of what one grasps, how could it not be the proclivity of conceit? Having grasped this as right, though presently free of doubt, one will later have great doubt; how could it not be the proclivity of doubt? Thinking 'I know and understand this dharma,' positing a self within phenomena, how could it not be the view of selfhood? Falling to one side or the other among the sixty-two views, how could it not be an extreme view? Such false clinging that does not accord with truth, how could it not be a perverse view? Grasping this as real and taking it to be nirvāṇa, how could it not be the theft of the fruit that is the view of clinging to views? Calling this the path and proceeding according to it, how could it not be the theft of the cause that is the view of clinging to precepts? The ten proclivities are distinctly present, all arising from the grasped object and wisdom. Applying these across the three realms and four truths yields eighty-eight proclivities; regarding discursive thought across the three realms, there are ninety-eight proclivities. These are the knots and karmas of the truth of origin; perversion is vast and overflowing, thereby inviting the fruit of suffering, with birth and death never ceasing. In one's object and wisdom, not recognising suffering and origin, where could there be the path and cessation? Since one does not recognise the four truths, one destroys the causes and fruits of the worldly and supramundane; there are no worldly or supramundane dharmas, hence no Jewel of the Dharma. Not recognising the supramundane fruit, there is no Jewel of the Buddha. Not recognising the supramundane cause, there is no Jewel of the Saṅgha. The meaning of the worthy and the noble is entirely lost. If one thus clings to self-born object and wisdom, one merely weaves samsāra and increases knots and karmas, incurring very many faults and harms. If this is not object and wisdom external to the principle, what else could be taken as external to the principle? Therefore the *Dàzhìdù lùn* says: 'Ordinary beings have three kinds of speech: views, conceit, and names; the noble have only one kind of speech: names.' Now ordinary beings cling through views and conceit, mistakenly employing the Buddha's words; grasping slightly, they run contrary to principle and cause dispute. Although relying on sūtras and treatises and citing texts as evidence, it is like an insect boring into wood that accidentally forms characters: if one searches their inner minds, they truly cannot understand whether it is a character or not a character; their mouths speak of object and wisdom, yet they do not understand object and wisdom. Because they do not understand, it is like consuming amṛta [improperly]: they give rise to views based on object and wisdom, harming life and suffering an early death. Therefore it was refuted by Nāgārjuna. Now we do not adopt this as the object and wisdom to explain Avalokiteśvara. Since this is so for self-born object and wisdom, the other three propositions are likewise.