觀音玄義記 2.34

2.34

第二、別釋，二：初、標列。謂分文人法，各自解釋也。二、「以何」下，解釋，二：初、釋觀世音，二：初、結前生後二段。二、「云何」下，依別委釋，二：初、簡示境智，二：初、標科。思議中，「理外理內」者，此與餘文所說有異。若四教義，以藏通二諦為理外，別圓二諦為理內。蓋約真諦非是佛性，故云理外。若《淨名玄義》以衍門三教皆為理內二諦，蓋由通教真諦含中故也。今文通以外道及四教起見之徒，皆名思議理外境智。故引《中論》以為能破。若思議理內境智者，既破四性，觀理證真，正在通教，義兼三藏。若不思議境智者，正唯圓教，亦兼別教。圓該六即，別在後心。二、「一天」下，釋相，二：初、明思議，二：初、約理外，二：初、立四。謂天然、相待、因緣、絕待，此四即是四性異名。用此名者，略有二意：一、示名。言通於邪正，須以理惑定其是非。且如天然及以絕待，本圓極名，今在理外，故知不可以名定理。二、明理。外不全外，外意令內人勿於正法生於性計，故立此名定其見過。又四句中皆雙檢者，蓋以境智俱有自生等過故也。初天然中，言「由智故境由境故智」者，借彼相待顯此天然。二相待者，境待智成、智待境立也。三因緣者、非是單自單他而成於境，乃自他和合方成於境。因緣即是自他故也。智亦如是。此即共性。四絕待者，單自單他及自他共，此待皆絕。約無三句情謂，一往立絕待名，全非絕理。二、「並是」下，破，二：初、總約性執斥，三：初：約理外斥。上之境智既屬四性，不入三諦，故云理外。二、「故中」下，引《中論》斥。法離四性，那計四邪？三、「計執」下，約起過斥。理外妄想於四計中，自執者是實、他語者皆妄，見惑既盛，愛使亦增。見愛相添，即九十八，因茲造業受苦無窮。二、「云何」下，別示四性過，二：初、自生，二：初、舉過，二：初、約能迷所迷，二：初、能迷諸惑。隨執一種即生十使，利中有鈍，即背上使。歷三界四諦，成八十八。雖遍三界及以四諦，隨生一見即能具起一處，理顯頓能除滅，是名通名利使煩惱。若思惟惑界繫不同，既非迷理不對四諦，但歷三界而成十使，足前乃成九十八使。二、「此則」下，所迷諸法。即四四諦、四三寶也。二、「若作」下，約能執所執，二：初、能執性計，二：初、正判屬計。縱學佛法，若執境智自天而然，若照不照常是境智。我見不忘者，唯增生死。惑業既盛，與彼外外輪迴一等也。二、「故大」下，引《大論》證。彼論明三種我義云：凡夫三種我，謂見、慢、名字。學人二種，無學一種。見即利使，初果頓斷，故云學人二種。慢即頓使，四果方盡，故云無學一種。但隨世俗分別彼此，有名字我。言三種語者，即三種語我不同也。二、「今凡」下，所執正教。以見慢心用經論語，如蟲蝕字不知是非，唯增見慢即不知非，以此障理名不知是。昧是非故，服不死藥而致早夭。二、「今不」下，結非。二、「自生」下，例三。若增見慢，於百千句起過皆然。

Second, the specific explanation, which has two parts: first, setting forth the outline. This means dividing the text into person and Dharma, and explaining each separately. Second, from "By what..." downward, the explanation, which has two parts: first, explaining Avalokiteśvara, which has two parts: first, two sections that conclude what came before and introduce what follows. Second, from "How..." downward, the detailed explanation according to the specific, which has two parts: first, distinguishing and indicating object and wisdom, which has two parts: first, stating the outline. In [the section on] the conceivable, regarding "external to the principle and internal to the principle," this differs from what is stated in other texts. In the sense of the Four Teachings, the two truths of the Tripitaka and Shared Teachings are external to the principle, while the two truths of the Distinct and Perfect Teachings are internal to the principle. This is because the true truth is considered not to be the Buddha-nature, and hence is called "external to the principle." In the Jingming xuanyi, the three teachings of the Mahāyāna are all taken as the two truths internal to the principle, because the true truth of the Shared Teaching contains the Middle. The present text broadly refers to outsiders as well as those among the Four Teachings who give rise to views as conceivable object and wisdom external to the principle. Therefore, it cites the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā as that which can refute them. As for conceivable object and wisdom internal to the principle, having refuted the four natures, contemplating the principle and realizing the true belongs properly to the Shared Teaching, with its meaning also extending to the Tripitaka [Teaching]. As for inconceivable object and wisdom, it belongs properly and solely to the Perfect Teaching, and also extends to the Distinct Teaching. The Perfect covers the six stages of identity, while the Distinct is in the final mind. Second, from "One, natural..." downward, explaining their characteristics, which has two parts: first, explaining the conceivable, which has two parts: first, regarding that which is external to the principle, which has two parts: first, establishing the four. That is, natural, relative, conditioned, and absolute—these four are different names for the four natures. Using these names has broadly two meanings: First, showing the names. Words extend to both the heterodox and the orthodox, and one must determine what is right and wrong based on principle and delusion. For example, "natural" and "absolute" were originally terms for the Perfect and ultimate; here they are external to the principle. Thus we know that one cannot determine principle by names. Second, clarifying the principle. "External" is not entirely external; the intent of "external" is to keep those internal from producing an attachment to a nature with respect to the correct Dharma. Hence these names are established to determine their errors of view. Moreover, examining both sides in all four phrases is because both object and wisdom have the error of self-origination and so forth. In the first, "natural," the statement "because of wisdom there is the object, because of the object there is wisdom" borrows that relativity to reveal this naturalness. Second, "relative": the object depends on wisdom to be formed, and wisdom depends on the object to be established. Third, "conditioned": it is not that a single self or a single other forms the object; rather, the conjunction of self and other only then forms the object. "Conditioned" means self and other. Wisdom is also like this. This is the nature of common origination. Fourth, "absolute": single self, single other, and the combination of self and other—all these dependencies are cut off. In terms of the absence of emotional clinging to the three phrases, the name "absolute" is provisionally established, but it is entirely not the principle of the absolute. Second, from "All are..." downward, refuting, which has two parts: first, a general censure in terms of grasping at a nature, having three parts: first, censuring in terms of being external to the principle. Since the above object and wisdom belong to the four natures and do not enter the three truths, they are called external to the principle. Second, from "Therefore the Madhyamaka..." downward, citing the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā to censure. Since dharmas are free from the four natures, how could one cling to the four heterodoxies? Third, from "Calculating and grasping..." downward, censuring in terms of giving rise to faults. Through deluded conceptualizations external to the principle, among the four reckonings, what one clings to oneself is taken as real, and the speech of others is all taken as false. With the afflictions of view flourishing, the afflictions of craving also increase. Views and cravings adding together make ninety-eight [afflictions], and due to this, one creates karma and endures endless suffering. Second, from "How..." downward, specifically showing the faults of the four natures, which has two parts: first, self-origination, which has two parts: first, presenting the faults, which has two parts: first, in terms of that which deludes and that which is deluded, which has two parts: first, the afflictions that delude. Following grasping at any single one, the ten messengers arise; among the sharp there are the dull, which turn against the higher messengers. Passing through the three realms and the four truths, they become eighty-eight. Although pervasive across the three realms and the four truths, whenever a single view arises, it can fully arise in one place; when the principle is revealed, they can be suddenly eliminated. These are called the afflictions of sharp messengers, a general name. As for the afflictions of thought, their bindings to the realms differ: since they are not delusions regarding principle and do not correspond to the four truths, they merely pass through the three realms to become ten messengers; adding them to the preceding completes the ninety-eight messengers. Second, from "This then..." downward, the dharmas that are deluded. These are the four kinds of four truths and four kinds of three jewels. Second, from "If one makes..." downward, in terms of the grasping and the grasped, which has two parts: first, grasping at a nature, which has two parts: first, directly judging it as belonging to calculation. Even if one studies the Buddha-Dharma, if one grasps that object and wisdom are naturally so, and that whether illuminating or not, they are always object and wisdom, then for one who does not forget the view of self, this merely increases birth and death. When affliction and karma flourish, it is completely equivalent to the transmigration of those outsiders to outsiders. Second, from "Therefore the Great Treatise..." downward, citing the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa as proof. That treatise explains the meaning of the three kinds of self, stating: ordinary beings have three kinds of self, namely, view, arrogance, and name. Learners have two kinds; those beyond learning have one kind. View is the sharp messenger, suddenly severed at the first fruit; hence it is said that learners have two kinds. Arrogance is the dull messenger, exhausted only at the fourth fruit; hence it is said that those beyond learning have one kind. Merely following the worldly convention to distinguish self and other is the nominal self. The statement "three kinds of speech" refers to the different selves of the three kinds of speech. Second, from "Now ordinary beings..." downward, the correct teachings that are grasped. Using the words of sūtras and treatises with a mind of view and arrogance is like a worm eating characters, knowing neither right nor wrong. Merely increasing view and arrogance means not knowing the wrong; using this to obstruct the principle is called not knowing the right. Because of being blind to right and wrong, one drinks the elixir of immortality and yet incurs an early death. Second, from "Now not..." downward, concluding the error. Second, from "Self-origination..." downward, applying the same to the other three. If view and arrogance increase, giving rise to faults across hundreds of thousands of phrases is entirely the same.